

An Introduction Rosenstock-Huessy's *Sociology*

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At a Sociology conference in Trento some years back I gave a paper on Rosenstock-Huessy's *Sociology*.¹ After my talk a German Professor of Sociology thanked me for helping explain what Rosenstock-Huessy was doing in that work, adding that the magazine *Merkur - Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken* had sent him a review copy of the 2008/9 edition published by Thalheimer and edited by Michael Gormann-Thelen, Ruth Mautner, and Lise van der Molen. But, he confessed, he could not do the review as he could not get very far with the book, and he was clueless as to its sociological purpose and contribution. As someone who has been reading Rosenstock-Huessy for almost twenty five years, and who, in spite of my best efforts, has never managed to escape his shadow, I was not surprised by this comment.

According to Rosenstock-Huessy the first seeds of the system had germinated as early as 1906,² and he was over seventy when he announced, with the appearance of the second (and third) volume(s) of the *Sociology* 1958, (the literally translation of which is) *The Full Count of the Times*, that he had finally managed to present it. The first volume, which we have translated as *The Hegemony (Übermacht) of Spaces*³ had appeared in 1956 volume. It was a heavily revised version of (what can be translated as) *The Forces of Community* of 1925 – what is most notably different is that the distinction between ‘play spaces’ and ‘life spaces’ has been introduced as a key organizing principle of the work.

The *Sociology* is a vast and digressive work, and like that other work of a life-time, Goethe's *Faust*, the *Sociology* suffers stylistically from the numerous overwrites and

1 The most recent edition is *Im Kreuz der Wirklichkeit: Eine nach-goethische Soziologie*, 3 vols., Mit einem Vorwort von Irene Scherer und einem Nachwort von Michael Gormann-Thelen, new edition of *Die Soziologie* by Michael Gormann-Thelen, Ruth Mautner, and Lise van der Molen, Mössingen-Talheim: Talheimer, 2008/9, An English translation of the revised version of the slightly amended second printing of 1956/58 *Sociology*, which appeared in 1968 and which contained a number of changes authorized by Rosenstock-Huessy has been done by Jurgen Lawrenz, with Frances Huessy and myself and Gottfried Paasch presently editing it. Page numbers will be to *Im Kreuz der Wirklichkeit*.

2 See of footnote 2, *Im Kreuz* Volume 1, p. 433.

3 My thanks to Ray Huessy who ‘nailed’ the best translation for *Übermacht*, after none of the translation team could quite agree whether Dominance was sufficient, or whether Tyranny went too far.

interruptions that are part of its history. But there are a number of other reasons why the response of the aforementioned Professor to the *Sociology* is not untypical, and why reviews of it were generally less than enthusiastic.⁴ One reason has to do with the particularity and peculiarity of Rosenstock-Huessy's mind. I am tempted to say that it is akin to someone with Asperger's Syndrome who sees meaningful patterns where others just see diverse phenomena, except Rosenstock-Huessy has the knowledge and intelligence to make the case for the existence and importance of the patterns he sees. He had a photographic memory, and his range and depth of reading was vast. And as he himself emphasized on numerous occasions, it was invariably derived from original source material⁵; his references to secondary material are thus rare; even rarer is his praise of the 'research' of other scholars. The material he collects might be as diverse as a Medieval coin or medallion, a line of hieroglyphics from the wall of an Egyptian temple that he had visited (he taught himself hieroglyphics as a teenager), or a totem as much as a constitutional document or holiday - those who know his work know that he employed what he called the 'calendar method', and he treats holidays and celebrations as serious signifiers of cultural memory. (Cultural Memory is now a discipline in itself, though Rosenstock-Huessy's anticipation of the field remains largely unknown). Moreover the connections which to him seem obvious are ones that few, if any others have seen - there are countless examples, but I just mention two. One, touched on in the *Sociology* and developed in *The Fruit of Lips*, is the extraordinarily interesting and provocative, at least to more traditional biblical scholars, reading of the gospels as forming a cycle in which each gospel having its own grammatical accentuation, and each written to a specific constituency and solving a specific 'disease' of antiquity. Thus the Gospels are what they are because they are not expressing one, but four orientations.⁶ Rosenstock-Huessy finds suggestions of this reading by Hilarius Isaac at the end of the fourth

4 Cf. Michael Gormann-Thelen, Nachwort, 'Leben jenseits der vier Burchstaben: Ein Hinweis auf Eugen Rosenstock-Huessys Über-Lebenslehre,' *Im Herz*, 3, 813.

5 In 'Introduction to all three volumes' of *Im Kreuz* he says that the universal history he developed has been 'worked out from the original sources,' vol. 1, 17.

6 *The Fruit of Lips: Or Why Four Gospels* (Pennsylvania: Pickwick, 1978) Rosenstock-Huessy writes: John was called into the Greek and Luke into the Jewish world of mind; Peter was called into the Roman sky-world, Mark, even went to the cradle of all sky worlds, to Egypt. Matthew the ill-mannered, discovered the price to be paid for ritual.' p. 53. Also see *Soziologie* - see *Im Herz*, 2, 299-300. Also *Die Frucht der Lippen* in vol. 2 of *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1964), 796-903. Ray Huessy is presently doing a new translation and edited version as *The Fruit of Our Lips*, for Wipf and Stock.

century, but I think it fair to say that his thesis is not something taken seriously by contemporary biblical scholars, many of whom, as Rosenstock-Huessy fulminates against throughout, are more sympathetic to there being a common source (the Q document) of the synoptic gospels. The second, is Rosenstock-Huessy's claim that the term world has changed so that now it simply refers to universe expanded in space, so that the phrase from King James 'world without end' eliminates the Greek meaning of 'the eons of eons', which stresses what Rosenstock-Huessy sees as a central Christian truth, that 'that the world comes to an end one eon after another.'⁷

There is probably no area of investigation which Rosenstock-Huessy treats where his own take on the material fits comfortable with a scholarly consensus. Anyone familiar, though, with the paradigmatic shifts that are typical of disciplines in the Humanities and 'social sciences' might be more sympathetic to Rosenstock-Huessy if they get the bigger picture of what he is doing – which is not so easy. For to 'see' the bigger picture the reader must be willing to be swept along by the plethora of materials, digressions, anecdotes, anachronistic examples, and astounding claims about the importance of historical facts rarely considered that important. For example, Rosenstock-Huessy's argues that All Soul's Day is of primary importance for the subsequent revolutionary fate of Europe.⁸ Or consider the historically fatal link between statistics and 'worldliness' that occurs in the following:

The first statistic of our millennium was made by the Chamberlain of the Roman church, Cencius, when he counted the bishoprics of Christendom.

Here the place of the stories of every saint's legend was taken by the numbering of vestment monies to be paid by the churches. Cencius, the Roman finance minister, counted up the taxable capacity of all churches under Rome. Therefore his task was the handling of a matter, not love. "World" is that form of handling by which we do justice to reality, without necessarily loving it. And we do not love, if we can bring ourselves to think of our existence without this thing. When we handle things, the spirit comes into servitude of the hands; but hands are not made for creating life, like our procreative members. Hands fabricate, manipulate, count and grasp. The concept is the language of these worldly things, for we do not speak to them, but of them.

7 *Im Herz*, Vol. 2, 156-157. Also *Fruit of Lips*, XVIII-XIX.

8 *Im Herz*, 2, 48-54. Also *Out of Revolution*, (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 506 ff.

From concept to number: This is the way from 1050 to 1950.

In this whole millennium, reality is changed to concept and number, to facilitate our mastery over it.⁹

The conjecture is brilliant – but in a book that bristles with brilliant conjectures, it is the kind of conjecture that is unlikely to be taken up within any disciplinary consensus. Rosenstock-Huessy was always the enemy of academic specialization, and academic specialization had little time for him precisely because the kind of insights he had require the mastery of an enormous amount of materials from different disciplines - which is to say his ‘view of reality’ synthesises philosophical, sociological, historical, religious, anthropological, and institutional materials, most of which he reads in a manner alien to any of the specialists in the disciplines because while the material might seem to fit neatly into one discipline he has it inflected through multiple disciplines. But that inflection is not arbitrary, at least not in his eyes: for he does have a method in what the disciplines might see as madness. That method is, of course, ‘the cross of reality.’ It emphasizes our place within the different spatial (inner and outer) and temporal (trajective, projective) axes. Throughout the *Sociology* he provides an elaborate account of what it involves, and, not surprisingly, in spite of the overtly schematic and simplified rendition I have just provided, it is not a simple schema or geometrical template that one can simply lay-over the world. Moreover, in so far as we are all caught up in our own worlds the cross of reality will always be an open method. If one compares this method with Marxism, or Freudian or Lacanian Psychoanalysis, the Anglo-Analytic philosophical orientation, the phenomenological, or various post-structuralist ‘strategies, or feminist or queer theory, I think the most significant difference is just the sheer volume of what one has to know to get anywhere at all with it. This helps clarify why the *Sociology* is an extremely demanding work, even if its demanding nature does not lie in any turgid, or to put it more charitably, highly nuanced philosophical vocabulary, but rather in the enormous facts about tribes, empires, the Greeks, the Jews, the Church, European revolutions with which he builds a social philosophy.

It was of course as a ‘social philosopher’ that Rosenstock-Huessy held his Dartmouth appointment. And while he constantly and unequivocally criticises philosophy from

9 Im Herz 2, 327-328.

'Parmenides to Hegel' (the same arc had been critically attacked by his friend Franz Rosenzweig in *The Star of Redemption*) for reducing and neutralising truth,¹⁰ the *Sociology* is most definitely a contribution to social philosophy. If I call it a philosophy, I do so in the sense that philosophy is that matter of discourse that attempts to provide a coherent and truthful reflective orientation toward, or insight into the 'All',¹¹ - which also includes the sociality and historicity of our locations (temporal and spatial) within and with respect to the 'All' - thus it has to do with the legitimacy of how the material under consideration is put together and what meaning we may ascribe to it. For Rosenstock-Huessy, the 'All' figures in *The Full Count of the Times* as the fundamental locus of orientation for the most elemental social formation, the tribes, and it is within the context of the need to explore and roam within 'the All' that the human historical journey begins.

The 'definition' of social philosophy I am suggesting is something of a Hegelian formulation, but I do not think it wrong because of that; for whatever one thinks of some of Hegel's philosophical 'moves' and their 'logic-driven' genetic scaffold, he understood that the human sciences do not exist in isolation, and philosophy is what provides the means by which to bring them into conceptual coherence.¹² This does not mean that Rosenstock-Huessy's major influences are philosophical - they are not; his main influences are his faith and his loves and his study of language, and historical events (generally inflected through the World Wars) and powers, especially the power of founders, most notably the founder of Christianity, but also founders of social formations and institutions. While I have just spoken of Rosenstock-Huessy's philosophy, it would be perhaps more accurate to say his social philosophy is, after all, a sociology.

But any notion that it would make sense to ingratiate himself within the discipline of Sociology seems to have completely bypassed Rosenstock-Huessy, as he either ignores, or sleights most of the main 'players' in the field (Pareto is simply 'ghastly,' and Weber is

10 *Im Kreuz der Wirklichkeit*, 3, 220-221.

11 Rosenstock-Huessy was critical of philosophy's preoccupation with 'visibility', but I think once something is drawn into discussion then it is exposed to philosophy's way of doing business; however, after Kierkegaard, Feuerbach and Nietzsche philosophers have transformed philosophy by making it responsive to needs and hopes that smash any hope of reason remaining a totalising and expansionary orb-like process.

12 In the 1916 correspondence with Rosenzweig, Rosenstock-Huessy speaks of the table of contents of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* being 'a work of genius' that is destroyed by the 'fearful digestive process of the elaboration', p. 153 Eugen to Franz, November 26, 1916, *Judaism Despite Christianity*, edited by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Foreword Paul Mendes-Flohr, Preface Harold Stahmer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011) 153-154,

equated with ‘the death of the university’),¹³ or, most commonly, makes the most perfunctory acknowledgement of their existence (Weber again, Durkheim, Simmel, Tarde etc. appear but are never seriously engaged with.) And at a time when Sociology was beginning a ‘golden age’ of influence as a discipline in North America and Great Britain, he proceeds as if nothing of any importance was happening there at all. Thus in a work of well over a thousand pages, if all mention of other sociologists were omitted, and if we leave out Saint-Simon, whose importance as a sociological founder is discussed at some length as well as Rosenstock-Huessy’s debt to him,¹⁴ a few pages at most would be lost. Yet it is evident from the section entitled ‘Reflexivum: The Self-Consciousness of Sociologists’ Rosenstock-Huessy indicates that he hopes to reconcile the different sociological orientations by locating them within his own planes of analysis. The attempt is deeply reminiscent of Kant’s undertaking in the first *Critique* to critically reconcile all metaphysical positions by showing philosophers the moment in which their respective metaphysical moves have violated the transcendental logic he has laid down – in Rosenstock-Huessy’s case it is the violation of ‘the cross of reality.’

The ambition of Rosenstock-Huessy’s critical attempt to provide definitive placement of the styles and types of sociology is too heavily taxed by the convoluted and undeveloped narrative to do it justice. Nevertheless, the position he advances is extremely interesting. Sociology he argues tends to gravitate around two predominant positions – which he ultimately designates as design sociologists (*Gestaltungs-Soziologen*) and power sociologists (or sociologists of forces – *Kräfte Soziologen*).¹⁵ The power sociologists, he states, look for the unifying forces dispersed through the various spheres of social life such as art, religion, the economy, law etc. – and by looking for this underlying they tend to be the more philosophical (though he also classifies some sociologists such as the now almost forgotten Karl Dunkmann, Leopold von Wiese and Alfred Vierkandt, who did a savage review of his 1925 *Forces of Community*, as straight out ‘philosophical sociologists.’)¹⁶ The design-sociologists, whose founder he finds in Comte, look at how these areas link up to a total formation or design – they are often socialists and concerned with the economy.¹⁷ Having

13 *Im Kreuz*, Vol. 1, 383, and 18.

14 *Im Kreuz*, Vol. 1, 43-51.

15 *Im Kreuz*, 33-37.

16 *Im Kreuz*, 33.

17 The convoluted nature of the presentation makes it hard to really be convinced by Rosenstock-Huessy’s classification as he leaves too many loose ends. Thus, for example, having united ‘special and universal or

made the contrast Rosenstock-Huessy then suggests that it is the underlying unity- 'the real problem of sociology' - between these positions that is all important, viz.

All reality comes with a price tag for the energies expended and the forces being marshalled; it is the common problem of all sociological directions. Whether their subject is law, art, sports, or politics, sociologists are obliged to inquire into the energies being consumed, because they must be provided for. Moreover, for every specific social domain, energies must be diverted from the whole system and put at the disposal of the social domain. Beyond these specific needs, a budget for all domains in toto must be guessed in outline, then estimated, and eventually provided.

The most important of these production costs, however—so to speak, the common wealth of all sociologists—comprise the lives of men. All areas from religion to economy are areas of concern precisely because they take over the lives of identifiable human beings and command them to do their bidding.

Sociology must therefore put to each of these areas the same question: Who makes a living here? Which men, what kind of men, comprise the body of this artefact? Who is embraced in it, who expelled? Human lives, parts of human lives that serve as building blocks for an institution, must be questioned if one wishes to contemplate an institution "sociologically." Sociology does put the question, for it needs to know the operational expenditures involved in the creation of social order.

But human lives are always on the run, perpetually in motion, growing, dying, etc.; and so the cost involves seconds of human lives, from the instantaneous moment via day and year to the partial and whole passage of life. The economy of the spirit, which rears its constructions from flesh and blood, is in the final analysis the problem of sociology.

general and above all formal and content Sociology', the later he sees as represented by Simmel, Durkheim and Tarde(33) against philosophical sociology, and then linking them up with design sociology, he then argues 'Formal sociologists tend, on the contrary, to reject socialism and to show annoyance at the universal and oh-so-unscientific reform fanaticism of the other side' 35.

The issue of costs is therefore common to the power-sociologist as well as to the design sociologist. The first analyzes the single entries in the ledger, the other puts forth the bill for the whole.¹⁸

Thus while Rosenstock-Huessy decisively does not identify with any classical sociologists apart from Saint-Simon (and the fact that he sees his sociology as post-Goethean only underscores how different is his thinking about who the important sociologists are), it is the above set of questions which makes him align himself with the sociologists and not with the historians which was the one group (at least in Germany) that had been most inclined (albeit in small numbers) to welcome him. Thus, as we shall explore in more detail below, while Rosenstock-Huessy's *Sociology* requires a Universal History, Rosenstock-Huessy is a sociologist rather than a historian because:

While history opens the gateway into our past, while natural science discovers the external world and politics paves a particular path for us, sociology reveals the number and kinds of all these and other pathways. It is only by being moved that a human being is real. Whether we run a war or prepare for marriage, we have to "make tracks," be on our way. Sociology follows us on our heels on all those pathways, because it is upon those pathways that human beings become actualized.¹⁹

The methodological distinction between history and sociology is also developed in the following passage:

Although I too went backward in time, my principal problem was almost the exact opposite of what an historian would seek. I asked myself: How could the Stone Age Indian remain so true to his ancestors, yet here I am, with my future, still his descendant. How can man proceed in a forward direction, who is also prone to turn inward, into himself; or against the external world, putting up a front to it—not to mention falling for superstition again? Sociology is charged with the task of securing that intersection against any infringement, where we might turn progress into regress, or flee from the warpath into retirement. For this reason sociology must also differentiate highways from byways. Any path that does not provide for a possible return is a byway. Sociology is responsible for the crossroads as well as the whole

18 Im Kreuz, 36-37.

19 Im Kreuz, 1, 17.

network of roads; and all roads must remain open at the crossroads to traffic in every direction, since otherwise they lose their reality. But we can lay our hands on an authentic human being only if we meet him on all the ways he frequents.

Sociology goes on to differentiate the real (authentic) from the unreal (inauthentic) human being. As soon as it applies this measure, it will discover that authentic man can never pursue just one path in a single direction. The first conquest of the Matterhorn ended in catastrophe; but this occurred on the downward climb. The way back belongs to the way forward, and vice versa. So any path traversed just once in one direction cannot be real or authentic for sociology. Sociology is concerned with well-worn paths; they are ways that have been trodden more than once.²⁰

I have quoted these passages at length because they are of central importance to the *Sociology* and they draw our attention to this very post-Goethean and post-Nietzschean sensibility underpinning the entire purpose of the work. Bluntly put the entire purpose of Rosenstock-Huessy's *Sociology* and the structure it takes is to enable humanity to draw upon the powers and capacities which enrich its spirit. The corollary is to alert humanity to the forces at work within modernity that deplete those powers. This stands in the closest relationship to the fact that Rosenstock-Huessy's *Sociology* is built around the following two philosophical claims: first that the modern soul is threatened by the philosophical and concomitant social decision to make our world on the basis of 'things' being dissolved into space. Our very selves are thus but things to be calculated and plotted and thus tyrannized as we are compartmentalized and fragmented due to the accelerating mechanization of modern life. This is the premise that underpins the first volume of *In the Cross of Reality* or *Sociology*, and the title *The Hegemony of Spaces* draws our attention to what Rosenstock-Huessy sees as the increasingly inhuman domination we experience in our spaces of play and serious life so that now we moderns find ourselves caught up in the 'tyranny of spaces.' (The Tyranny of Spaces and their Collapse' is the title of the Concluding Part of the work.) That tyranny, for Rosenstock-Huessy stands in the closest relation to the Cartesian move which dissolves all living forms into spatially measurable ones, and the Nietzschean response to the modern predicament which privileges art above truth. Although Rosenstock-Huessy finds much in Nietzsche that is admirable, he sees Nietzsche's response to modernity as equally one sided,

20 17-18.

in its escape plan, as Descartes' initial metaphysical dissolution of reality. Thus Descartes and Nietzsche are represented as a peg-legged pair, the motherless Descartes, and fatherless Descartes – each want to give birth to a world (*The World*, we might recall, is the title of Descartes' posthumously published most systematic work) but their fecundity, unlike that of the great social formations Rosenstock-Huessy discusses in *The Full Count of the Times*, is ultimately barren. For neither knows how to bear and nurture living creatures. In large part, for Rosenstock-Huessy, this is because they do not really grasp the nature of the events and institutions which have nurtured the greatest potencies through the ages.

The tyranny and collapse of spaces thus lead to *The Full Count of the Times*, the second (and third) volume(s) of the *Sociology*, where Rosenstock-Huessy picks up on what he sees as the real nature of our freedom: that we are not only speaking creatures but time-making and time-saving creatures. Closely related to this is that the kinds of thinking expressed by Descartes and Nietzsche fails to understand that the power of speech as a response to our suffering lies in its capacity to call upon others to found new times and new ways of life. This failure, for Rosenstock-Huessy, is also evident in the other three 'disangelists' of modernity – Freud, Darwin, Marx (Nietzsche is the other 'disangelist') who each attacks the roots of our sociality: the family (of the tribes), 'nature,' as the Greeks understood it, as a further expression of the living harmony actualized in the polyphonous ways of life made possible by the combination of freedom and division of labour in the Greek city states, the division of labour which was the creative fruit of empire, and the providential understanding of history of the Jews and Christians.²¹ He also opens *The Full Count of the Times* with a critique of Schelling's (mis)understanding of the dimensions of time.²² Given Rosenzweig's confirmation of Schelling's importance for the 'new thinking,'²³ Rosenstock-Huessy's critique of Schelling – that he does not grasp how future is not simply the not known, but that it is much rather the potential fulfilment of our decisions I think has special significance in that it clarifies why Rosenstock-Huessy's view of reality is cruciform, and thus the expression of away of thinking in which our fate is bound up with the mastery of the times, which is not the case with what Rosenstock-Huessy sees with Rosenzweig's pre-Christian view of time. As

21 *Im Kreuz*, 2, 13-22.

22 *Im Kreuz*, 2, 19-22.

23 Schelling predicted narrative philosophy in the of his brilliant fragment "The Ages of the World". The second volume [of the Star] attempts to supply it.' Franz Rosenzweig, *The New Thinking*, edited and translated by Alan Udoff and Barbara Galli, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1999), ' 82.

much as Rosenstock-Huessy sees Rosenzweig as an ally – the cross while compatible with the star, indeed intrinsically collaborative with it, it is also another way of world-making.

In *The Full Count of the Times*, Rosenstock-Huessy identifies the main contributions of the different social-time bodies that humanity has created. While we modern have been confronted by great traumatic crises and horrors culminating in the World Wars, Rosenstock-Huessy is arguing that we are now in a position where, if we throw off our spatially fixated determinates and their modern sociological counterparts, we can be open to the great inflows of time that confront us in our relatively new planetary environment. Thus, unlike Rosenzweig, Rosenstock-Huessy is not so preoccupied with specifying what is unique about the revelatory traditions. And in keeping with his primary focus, Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption*, makes a powerful argument for why neither folk religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism or Islam are genuine revelatory religions. For his part, however, Rosenstock-Huessy argues that the Christian way ultimately requires us to take a providential view of human faiths and their world making in order to be recipients of what each mode of world making brings to the fulfilment of the times. But we can only really do this if we understand what is living and what dead in the criss-cross of traditions. And that also means being attuned to our own traditions. This also means counteracting the social amnesia which Rosenstock-Huessy sees as intrinsic to our modern condition,²⁴ as well as the tyrannical dangers of myth, metaphysics, utopianism and romanticism which he sees as modernity's powerful forms of social delusion.. Just as Rosenstock-Huessy claims that 'our freedom consists of being able to perpetually partition new times and new spaces,'²⁵ the *Sociology* intended to help us win freedom by gaining time and opening new life and play spaces that enable genuine social solidarity and conviviality. According to Rosenstock-Huessy by reading the *Sociology* :

The reader will encounter these mysterious acquaintances [Rosenstock-Huessy is referring to other human beings from other ages and locations] over the two parts of this book. The first volume makes the introductions, so that we meet them in the spaces of their world and their play spaces. The second [and third] volume puts forth the doctrine of their epochs and their calendars, and concludes with the fullness of the times. Taken in combination, a peril will be seen to emerge from these volumes, a

24 *Im Kreuz der Wirklichkeit*, Vol. 2, 54.

25 *Im Kreuz der Wirklichkeit*, Vol. 1, 22.

twin-peril. The first of these, every one of us shall have to live through in our respective habitats; the other relates to our specific era, forty years before the year 2000.²⁶

Thus our history of suffering will become more transparent; it will be simplified. At the end of the second volume, the author as well his patient reader will find themselves liberated from the prevailing detours of philosophy and not only directed to the new paths, but also to the resources needed for treading them.²⁷

Of course, it is precisely what Rosenstock-Huessy presents in the 'encounters' that gives the *Sociology* its depth and power, and, in spite of its dire need of a heavy edit, *The Count of the Times* is an extraordinary journey into the great creative and redemptive moments of humanity. It is a journey which is sensitive to the triumph of love over death and the creative response of humanity to its suffering. In conclusion I will quote from Rosenstock-Huessy chapter of the 'first sociologist', Saint-Simon. For it powerfully expresses precisely why he thought Sociology was such an important discipline, and why he was a Sociologist, and why he thought Sociology was the modern academic heir of the best of Christianity.

As a whole, sociology remains unfree, because it is bound in with and bound to mankind's condition of suffering. It is not a presupposition-free science. Everything known to sociology is known only because suffering is a fundamental fact. From the very first, her only knowledge is that human beings suffer, that accordingly something is not as it should be. Indeed she can scarcely know anything else. And so she breaks with the liberal wishes and the liberal man, whose spirit commences with the true, the good, and the beautiful. But sociology admits to having sprung from fear—fear of the void, of suffering, and of the injustices that fill the world and provide her with the only possible orientation.²⁸

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27 Im Kreuz der Wirklichkeit, Bd. 1, 22-23.

28 *Im Kreuz*, 1, 46-47.