SPEECH AND REALITY

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INTRODUCTION BY

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CHAPTER 1

IN DEFENSE OF
THE GRAMMATICAL METHOD

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1. *The Unity of Social Research*

IN DEFENSE OF GRAMMAR, this essay is written. Grammar, we pretend, is the future organon of social research. In this way, following the astounding developments of dialectics and mathematics, from ancient analytics and arithmetics, to their modern standards, grammar, too, will ascend beyond the grammar school, and become from a dry-as-dust textbook-obsession, the open sesame to the hidden treasures of society. This our belief is more than a belief. Ludwig Feuerbach, one hundred years ago, was the first to start a grammatical philosophy of man. He was misunderstood by his contemporaries, especially by Karl Marx.

During the last three decades, three quite separate developments have brought Feuerbach's ideas to the fore again. First, in the many social departments, history, ethnology, sociology, the problem of a plurality of aspects, a multiformity of patterns, became so pressing that thinkers more or less instinctively turned towards a method that would guarantee this plurality as the basic phenomenon. This already means a groping in the direction of the grammatical method. For in grammar only is there performed such a multiformity within unity. Second, in the central field of general philosophy, a group of "language-thinkers" emerged, especially in Germany; now, however, among Anglo-Saxons, too, in the persons of A. A. Bowman and N. R. A. Wilson. Third, the linguists themselves began to look in the direction of society.

Up to 1900, linguistics more or less constituted a parallel to the economics of the Adam Smith style. Reasoning about the origin of language was fatally handicapped by Robinson Crusoe ideas of a first individual corresponding to the homo oeconomicus. A man like Rudyard Kipling could address the students of St. Andrews with his startling speech on: the liar as the first person to speak really. Besides, the abstractions of the eighteenth century enlightenment still lingered on sufficiently to veil the struggle for existence that is implied by every word we speak. The body was delegated to the struggle for food and shelter; the "mind," however, with the optimism of the age of reason, was contemplating the truth of the matter.

Neither did the romantic school of the Grimms conceive of the perils and diseases of our mental life. They liked folklore and oral traditions. They did not bother with the insanity, the follies, the downfalls, of the mental life of mankind. We are warned today, by psychoanalysis, by Nietzsche, by the revolt of the masses, that the struggle for existence is a struggle within the social body of language and fails as often as it succeeds. The destruction of the German language between 1933 and 1939, is, I believe, one of the speediest and most radical events of all times in the field of mind and speech. And witnessing it with our own eyes and ears, we cannot separate the linguistic or the spiritual collapse from the social. Language, logic, and literature, as I have shown in other essays,[1] define the fate of a society, and they express every political change; in fact, they embody and change. Language is a process that can be weighed and measured and listened to and can be physically experienced. It goes on before our eyes and ears. Is it not strange that the science of this lifeblood of society, should not be exalted to the rank of social research?

Our defense of grammar is provoked by the obvious fact that this organon, this matrix form of thinking, is not used as a universal method, hitherto. We propose to explain why the two accepted methods of science do not work in the social field. We propose to explain to the social research worker that he has ad-

[1] See p. 67.

hered to the appropriate method, however reluctantly or unknowingly, for a long time. We hope to have found an objective terminology for the grammatical phenomenon which is free from mere verbalisms. And although the positive handling of the new method will be presented in later chapters, we hope to follow a procedure, in this chapter, through which the old are confronted with the new in a definite and in an irrefutable manner. The different methods will be compared in the peculiar form in which they have been stated by the older scholars themselves. We shall show that, by taking them literally and as they were meant by the founders of the methods now in use, they exclude application to society, by establishment.

Medieval and modern thinkers never have laid claim to a method by which they could explain the changes of society. Hence, their present day disciples in the fields of history, ethics, psychology, sociology, economics, philology, who insist that our social knowledge must either be "scientific" (the usual attitude) or cannot help being theologically informed, *all do wrong to their own authorities*. The originality of social research hinges on the existence of a method that is neither stolen from theology nor from natural science. We intend to prove, in the terms of grammar, of theology, and of natural philosophy, that such a particular method exists, and that by using it Roman Catholics and Protestants and Free Thinkers are united in a common enterprise. Without such a unity, among all parties involved in social research, the revolt of the masses must find the various intellectual groups in a helpless division, as helpless as in the new war, the single neutral country in Europe is found. We hang together, or we shall hang together, is the future of the intellectuals. We must discover a common basis for social thinking. Or the masses will do without us, in our ununderstandable division.

2. *Social Dangers Compel Us To Speak Our Mind*

What is wrong with society? That there is war, revolution, crisis, and decadence in it. Without these evils, we should live in the Garden of Eden, and that means, without self-conscious re-

flection on our social situation. Social disintegration is a blessing
in disguise since it compels us to wake up. The grammatical
method insists that the negative aspects of society compel us to
think, to speak, to write, to study, and nothing else makes us
think really. Our analysis of the dangers and evils of society will
omit all the individual evils of the single and lonely human being.
We do not inquire into the problems of disease and death,
suicide and lunacy here although they reflect social ills or cor-
respond to social ills. We shall speak of social ills only in the
sense that they comprehend more than one generation or more
than one locality. At this magnitude of two generations or two
local groups, the social problem is perceived most distinctly.

The evils, then, prove to be of not a very great variety. The
evil of *anarchy* prevents translocal units from cooperating. Its
members or classes do not care to come to an agreement. They
are not inspired by unanimity, and they fail to meet each other
regularly for a sincere restoration of unanimity. They break up
the unit into sections. Everybody is making his pile, grabbing
more than his share, and exploiting his membership in ways un-
foreseen. Anarchy, or, in economics, the crisis, the depression, is
caused by a lack of cooperation and of common inspiration. The
good that would cure the ill, is unanimity. For, then, the different
agents in space would function as one body politic whereas now
each agent is pursuing his own interest only.

Decadence not only means that people do not have children, it
also means that they do not prove to have the stamina of con-
verting the next generation to their own aims and ends. Deca-
dence is the disease of liberalism today. We must not think of it
as a biological failure, merely; it is a weakness of the whole man.
It is the disease of the "Last Man" of Nietzsche who twinkles:
"What is love? What is a star? What is happiness?" and blasts
the future because he only could enter the future by inspiring
the next generation, and this precisely he declines to do. "Deca-
dence" means to be unable to reach the future, in body or mind
or soul. The decadence of an older generation condemns the
younger generation to barbarism. Decadence of parents leaves
children without heritage. The only energy that can fight this
evil is faith. Faith, properly speaking, never is a belief in things

of the past, but in the future. Lack of faith is a synonym for decadence.

In *revolutions*, the new men, the future generation does violence to the existing order and to the people formed in and by the past. The old are "liquidated," "eliminated," because they are considered "past men."

War introduces power and government into regions hitherto not organized by the warring government. And the high strung army organization of a country at *war*, by its own machine efficiency, is a symptom for the special effort that is made to make the government more efficient, more powerful so that the territory that hitherto was *outside*, now may become incorporated. Wars try to incorporate external territory. Anarchy tries to disestablish unity within one body politic, it destroys its *inner* unity. Wars disregard *exterritoriality*. We are compelled, by the two facts of anarchy and war, to distinguish between an inner and an outer space in society. The twofold character of space is that, in any society, a border-line, like the skin of an individual animal, cuts the world of space into two parts, one inner, one outer. And no society exists which must not make the distinction between the front that faces inward, towards unanimity or anarchy, and the front that is confronted by the problem of war, of efficiency against resistance, by the problem of power in external space.

This discussion has given us an undebatable basis for the social system. For the two axes of time and space, with their fronts backward, forward, inward, outward, are not merely verbal definitions of the social order; they are open to a unanimous experience and an identical consciousness of all human beings. They are universally valid as much as any mathematical and logical truth. That society is imperilled by four diseases threatening one of its time or space fronts, compels man to become conscious of the social process at all. And the first statement that he, then, is compelled to make is that society cannot survive indefinitely any one of these four ills. The four fronts of life perpetually must be balanced. The complete victory of any one of them: total war, total decadence, total anarchy, total revolution, is the end of society. And it would make all thinking about society utterly superfluous. With these evils rampant and unchecked, no social

research is meaningful or possible. Social research is imprisoned in a reality, in a cross of reality between the four simultaneous tasks to cultivate faith, power, unanimity, respect, all four. Social research is the search for the restoration of the perpetual balance.

The four dangers of the social order shake us up out of our illusions and dreams. But what means are at the disposal of society to fight these dangers? The means are perhaps most easily envisioned by starting with war. War between two territories ends with peace. What does this mean? People who have not been on speaking terms, begin to speak again.

Peace, after a war, has to be concluded; peace has to be explicit. It took ten years after World War II before the victor tried to speak. There was then no peace from 1945 to 1955.

When decay ravages a civilization, the old no longer have the enthusiasm for teaching the young their own faith. Again, a lack of speech. It is not exactly that the young are not on speaking terms with the old. However, the words that go back and forth, between parents and children in a decadent age, do not reach the ears of the young with the power that carries conviction. Something is wrong with the content of language. It seems mere verbiage, dead formula, a petrified ritual.

That "anarchy" means a lack of unanimity, of common inspiration, is a tautology. Words are used as though it were all one society. But the words (like justice, welfare, commonwealth) do not have an identical meaning among men. Though being one crew on one boat, they yet do not speak one language. The words do not fly like the winged words of common song; the words are murdered by mutual diffidence, or at least, mutual-indifference. Two languages are spoken under the hypocritical veneer of one. Tower of Babel.

In revolutions, all the language and traditions of the past are devaluated like an obsolete currency. The sterling value of old terms and of classical values is ridiculed. A new language is created.

This short list may suffice, for our momentary purpose, to suggest that the four evils of society which compel us to think, do something to language. They all hurt language. Why must they do so? For the simple reason that language is the weapon of

society against those four ills. The four diseases dismantle society, by breaking down one of its fronts in time or space. All speech defends these four fronts.

The evil of decadence is the lack of faith in the future. The evil of revolution is the lack of respect for the past. The energy opposing revolution normally is loyalty. Royce's attempt to extol loyalty above all other forces in society, is a truly conservative philosophy. We are not loyal to the future; we are, however, loyal to the past.

And now the fourth evil of society, war. War rages when anarchy between two groups is replaced by the violent effort of establishing unity. War rages between one group that is unanimous inside—and any army is a model of unanimity, or it would not be an army—but is so far powerless to impose its will peacefully on another group. It is stopped by some not integrated part of the world outside of it. Wars prove the weakness of the peacetime system. It lacks power, by its organization in space. Wars make up for the lack of power in peace. The evil of war is a rift in space between two parts of the earth. The good that overcomes war, is efficient government. And government is efficient organization of space, of territory.

evil: anarchy (=crisis),   decadence,   revolution,   war,
     no unanimity   no faith   no respect no power
good: unanimity   faith   respect   power

Is it possible to classify the evils and goods of social life in a manner that is concrete and complete? I think we can.

Between two generations, either the old or the young may be at fault. Decadence condemns the old order of things, revolution brands the new. Or, more clearly still, in a decadent society, the past is out of order, in a revolution, the future is brought in by violence. Decadence and revolution are evils of social time, of social evolution through time.

As to anarchy and war, they are symptomatic of the evils of the order of society in space. A more careful analysis of these two diseases in space is fruitful. The division of the time axis into past and future, is obvious. Taking our stand in any given present of society, we shall credit the past generation with decadence,

the future classes with revolution, or the past with sufficient faith. The fact is that time is twofold, expanding in two opposite directions, into the past and into the future. This, although in direct opposition to the physicist's erroneous view of time, is obvious to anybody who speaks within society. The past and the future do not exist outside a present of which they are the future and the past, and, to it, appear as either good or evil.

It is more obscure that space, too, is of a twofold nature. Anarchy, however, and war, are of a strictly opposite nature. We only speak of anarchy where we expect unanimity. When a war rages between two far distant countries, as between Canada and Germany, this is not anarchy. Nobody had a right to expect unanimity between them. War breaks out because one of the two had no power to organize or to govern the other. States are outsiders to each other. Anarchy exposes the internal disruption of an inside unity.

3. *Society Lives By Speech, Dies Without Speech*

Vital speech has as its raison d'etre the conquest, the perpetual conquest, of these four trends.

To the four diseases, four different styles of speech bring relief. Men reason, men pass laws, men tell stories, men sing. The external world is reasoned out, the future is ruled, the past is told, the unanimity of the inner circle is expressed in song. People speak together in articulated language because they fear decay, anarchy, war, and revolution. The energies of social life are compressed into words. The circulation of articulated speech is the lifeblood of society. *Through speech, society sustains its time and space axes.* These time and space axes give direction and orientation to all members of society. Without articulated speech, man has neither direction nor orientation in time or space. Without the signposts of speech, the social beehive would disintegrate immediately.

When speech is recognized as curing society from the ills of disharmony and discontinuity in time and space, grammar is the most obvious organon for the teachings on society. If the name

"grammar" may seem equivocal, in face of the shortcomings of the grammar school, it suffices to say: a science is sought by which we may diagnose the power, vitality, unanimity and propriety of the lifeblood of society, of speech, language, literature. Instead of descriptive linguistics and remedial sociology, our method represents remedial linguistics, testing the powers of peace and war.

We have two recognized methods in organized science, logic and mathematics. Logic celebrated its triumphs in scholasticism. A new logic arose in wrestling with Aristotle and Augustine, when dialecticians were forced to admit the paradox alongside the rule of contradiction. *Jesus est homo; Jesus est deus;*[2] is the fundamental paradox. *Nihil fit ex nihilo; Mundus creatus ex nihilo,*[3] is another. A logic that keeps the paradox, is placed on a more realistic, more comprehensive, and more understanding plane than the logic of antiquity. Hence, scholasticism is unsurpassed in its logical subtleties.

Mathematics is the organon of the new sciences. In wrestling with Euclid and the discovery of the rotation of the earth around the sun, appearance was stripped of its authority as much as, in scholasticism, flat and plain logic. Mathematics is purification of experience, keeping the data of experience but stripping them of mere semblances. The world of space, of expansion, opened up under this new organon, as much as the realm of values had been represented successfully by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura.

It may be asked what we could wish more. Is there a need for a new "instauration" and a new method? We have claimed that a new or, at least, an unexploited method exists, the grammatical. For the time and space of society, language is the lifeblood.

Now and here, we are living in a twofold time and a twofold space. As living beings, we are responsible for the conservation of the accomplishments of the past, the fulfilment of the future, the unanimity of the inner, the efficiency of the external front of life. In order to live, any organism must face backward, forward, inward and outward. It was the mistake of former biologists, refuted by the Uexkuell school, that organisms could exist without the

[2] Jesus is man; Jesus is God.
[3] Nothing comes out of nothing; the world is created out of nothing.

distinction of an inner and an outer space, a distinction unknown
to dead matters. And it was the error of former sociologists to
treat social time as being a straight line pointing from the past
through the present into the future. Instead, any living being, and
the social group as well, has to defend a present under the simul-
taneous stress from past and future. To live means to look back-
ward as well as forward, and to decide, in every moment, between
continuity and change.

The now and here of all of us, means that we are living in a
twofold space and a twofold time. And the term twofold is
literally true, because time unfolds itself in two directions, past
and future, the deeper, the more vitally we do live. The extension
of the past, the prospect for a future, increase, when we look back-
ward and forward with intensity and courage. And in the same
manner, space unfolds itself more and more, the more we throw
ourselves into the process of facing the outside world and the
inner process of agreement and harmony within the respective
unit. Forward, backward, inward, outward lie the dynamic fron-
tiers of life, capable of intensification, enlargement, expansion,
and exposed to shrinking and decay as well.

And we speak lest we break down under the strain of this
quadrilateral. We speak in an attempt to ease this strain. To
speak, means to unify, to simplify, to integrate life. Without this
effort, we would go to pieces by either too much inner, unuttered
desire, or too many impressions made upon us by our environ-
ment, too many petrified formulas fettering us from the past, or
too much restless curiosity for the future.

The grammatical method is the way in which man becomes
conscious of his place in history (backward), world (outward),
society (inward), and destiny (forward). The grammatical
method is, then, an additional development of speech itself; for,
speech having given man this direction and orientation about his
place in the universe through the ages, what is needed today is
an additional consciousness of this power of direction and orienta-
tion. Grammar is the self-consciousness of language, just as logic
is the self-consciousness of thinking. As an adept of grammar,
man acquires the capacity of resisting the temptations of a
primitive logic and its unwarranted application to man's place in

the universe. This primitive logic is especially characterized by the assumption that time is built up out of "past," "present," "future," in this order, so that the present simply results from the past, and the future is caused by past plus present.

Equally thoughtless is the assumption of this same logic when it operated with a space of three dimensions, width, length, and height. The modern fashion of a four dimensional universe is not better; for it, too, leaves space undivided in an outer and an inner circle, in contradiction to every experience and observation of living beings. However, we sustain the time and space axes of our civilization by speaking, because we take our place in the center of this civilization, confronted as we are with its four aspects: its future, its past, its inner solidarity, its external struggle. And in this delicate and dangerous exposure to the four fronts of life, to the inner, the outer, the backward, and the forward front, our words must strike a balance; language distributes and organizes the universe, in every moment, anew. It is we who decide what belongs to the past and what shall be part of the future. Our grammatical forms betray our deepest biographical decisions.

When I say that the table is round, the word "is" may seem (wrongly)[4] to be a "copula" because it is applied to a thing. But when a member of society says: "I am happy," the small and inconspicuous verb "to be," assumes its full place in time. "I am happy," means that I say this now because only at this moment is my happiness so complete that I must speak of it. I may have been happy before, I may be happy later on. Nevertheless, it remains true, and this qualifies the "I am," that I say it now. So an "I was" preceded the "I am," and "I shall be," will follow; both are times when I said or shall say other things because other things will fill my consciousness. The "I am (happy)," then, implies that it stands between "was" and "shall be." Any assertion in the present is biographical in that it presupposes past and future, for the speaker or the group for which

[4] The great and highly significant blunder of the past grammarians to discriminate against the "is" of the copula as lacking in verbal quality, is abandoned by all linguists today, although our school children, probably, and our students of logic, will go on learning it for quite a time.

he speaks. "We are" and "I am" (much more clearly than the shadow of the "it is," as it is used for things in space), always decide, "cut off," and single out and judge.

Whether I say, in our days "Europe was a great civilization," or "Europe is a great civilization," passes judgment on the life and death of Europe. I either relegate it to the past or I credit it with a future. And whether I say: we all should have peace on earth, or: these dictators should keep quiet, proves where I draw the line of inclusiveness or exclusivity, respectively, between myself and the people whom I consider "we," on one side and some unspeakable people, somewhere in the outside world. And this last judgment on social matters is passed daily all over the globe, by our speaking social universe.

The author has developed the grammatical method at great length in other books.[5] The present book does not intend to repeat all of the arguments and examples used in these writings, but to advance the discussion by challenging the scientists and theologians (among these especially the Roman Catholics), so that they might give room for the new thought, on the basis of their own admissions, about their own first principles. By inviting them to welcome a method left open by them, according to their own definitions, we may hope to contribute to the pressing process of securing the independence of the teachings on society from theology and natural science. We must see both: our own independent task and the last achievement of the two other branches of knowledge, the latter by restoring theology to the rank of a science, and by reducing the natural sciences to the sciences of space only.

Grammar grants or expresses or is liberty, peace, contemporaneity. Without common speech, men neither have one time nor mutual respect nor security among themselves. To speak has to do with time and space. Without speech, the phenomena of

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[5] Especially in *Soziologie* and *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts* (See Bibliography). In the English tongue, the only other contribution, apparently forgotten today, is Magnusson's brilliant Ph.D. thesis (University of Minnesota) of 1893, on the grammatical tenses; today, see the posthumous book by Archibald Allan Bowman (Princeton and Glasgow), *A Sacramental Universe, Being a Study in the Metaphysics of Experience* (Princeton University Press, 1939). In German, the writings by Ferdinand Ebner, Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber point in this direction.

time and space cannot be interpreted. Only when we speak to others (or, for that matter, to ourselves), do we delineate an inner space or circle in which we speak, from the outer world about which we speak. It is by articulated speech that the true concept of space, and that is its being divided in an outer and an inner sphere, comes into being. The space of science is a posteriori, and just one half of the complete phenomenon of space. But the truly human phenomenon of space is found in the astounding fact that grammar unites people within one common inner space. Wherever people articulate and vary one theme, they move in an inner room or community as against the world outside.

And the same is true about the phenomenon of time. Only because we speak, are we able to establish a present moment between past and future. Because I am telling you all this here and am waiting for your answer, is it possible for you and me to forget past and future, and to call this hour an hour, this paper a unity, this time one moment, one time span. By human speech, space and time are created. The scientific notions of time and space are secondary abstractions of the reality of grammatical time and space. Grammatical time and space precede the scientific notions of an outer space or of a directed time. For they presuppose an inner space between the scientists and some contemporaneity between them, too. Without the preestablishment of one inner space of "science," no scientific analysis of time and space holds water, or even can take place at all.

Through the dangers that threaten society, man is compelled to pass judgment on the trend of affairs in society. Is it decaying? Is it disintegrating? Is it going to last? Is it going to live? Behind every one thinkable problem of our social sciences we can trace this major preoccupation of distinguishing between the living and the dead elements of the social pattern. The danger of death is the first cause of any knowledge about society. The opposition between history and nomothetical (legislating) knowledge is overrated as a distinction between knowledge about the past and knowledge about the future. However, in history, as well as in ethics or legislation, the knowledge, the expert understanding, is

proven by nothing else but by this sense and tact for the survival
value of the various facts mentioned in the tale.

"*Vom Tode und nur vom Tode fängt alles Erkennen an.*"[6]
This is true of all knowledge. In the case of social knowledge, it
is the fate of the group whether this group is doomed or going
to survive, that builds up the grammar of society. "Ascent" and
"decline" are the somewhat mechanical terms for this ambiguity
in every social phenomenon. Without the distinction of the plain-
spoken: "it will live," "it lives," "it has lived," man would not
know anything. Anarchy, decay, war, revolution, are four forms of
social death. Because they are death in its social disguise, and
because man is in constant search of life, these social perils, in
their variety, compel us to speak our minds.

We speak our mind. Any thought about the life and death
of our own group compels us to convey it to others. We cannot
keep the thought to ourselves forever, however slow we may be to
talk to our neighbors about it. We write books, let it slip into
our teachings, our last will and testament, our letters, our con-
versation, our vote. Why is speaking to others, why is com-
munication, the best verification for the fact that we are involved
in social research? The life of society survives the living genera-
tion, it is polychrone. The average scientist today thinks of think-
ing as going on between contemporaries. This is not true for our
field. Any reader, any listener, any student, is younger, less tor-
mented and less worn out by experiences than the writer or
speaker. This, at least, is the assumption under which the writing
of books, etc. (except for examination papers) is meaningful.
Death cannot be fought in society except through engaging
younger men to join the battle-front (younger perhaps not in
years, but certainly in this special experience by which I am
moved to speak). Social disintegration compels older men to
speak to younger men. Education is not a luxury for the sake
of the younger individual; is it not very often their ruin? How-
ever, society needs allies in its fight against decline. The true
form of social thought is teaching. Social wisdom and social re-
search never are communicated to contemporaries as are physics.

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[6] "From death, and from death alone, springs all knowledge."—Franz
Rosenzweig, *Der Stern der Erlösung* (Heidelberg, 1954), p. 1.

In physics, the lapse of time between old and young physicist is neglected as much as possible. In true social *"Erkennen"*[7] the lapse of time between the speaker and the listener is of primary and constitutional importance. Natural science is based on pure reason. Theology is based on the purity of the creed. The validity of social knowledge wholly depends on its being based on pure teaching. The great new discoveries are communicated *coute que coute*, and in the communication itself is to be found the key to their being verifiable knowledge, "science." The meaningful character of science about society depends on its being able and willing to fit into the polychrony of society, since society is a container for an infinite number of ages; "pure teaching," without any immediate utility either for teacher or student, is the central process by which true social knowledge may be tested against "mixed teaching" which would be the usual teaching with an eye on examinations, prestige, current events, etc. For "pure teaching" is the guarantee of the scientific level of this teaching, and it is perhaps the only guarantee for its scientific purity.

Our science is not based on a critique of pure reason, but on a theory of pure teaching. In harmony with our subject matter, society, we ourselves operate when we are subjects of social research, as organs of the social process of speaking, teaching, writing.

The grammatical method reconciles the process of the man in research with the processes he describes, by recognizing his place in the temporal process of speaking and listening, teaching and studying. We speak in our anguish or in our curiosity to minds whom we try to make into our listeners, readers, students. This is the intellectual responsibility shouldered by the most sceptical and most uncommunicative thinker. Even Sorel, who shouts for violence, in his doctrine, actually, and first of all, shouts for readers for his treatise. The first outcry of human self-consciousness about society is the word: Listen! And as long as this word is not recognized as the corner stone of our whole building of a social science, this science will never come of age. *"Audi, ut vivamus."* "Listen and we shall survive," everybody is saying who

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[7] The German word *"Erkennen"* suggests the process of getting an insight, or of acquiring a certain knowledge.

talks at all on social questions. "Listen and society will live," is the first statement and the perpetual promise of any social research.

The Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) proves its failure to explain the process. Our formula also is at odds with the medieval: *Credo ut intelligam* (I believe so that I may understand). In *Out of Revolution*,[8] I have discussed at great length a formula that, though parallel to these two, would give expression to the mental attitude that introduces into our science the fact of the second person who listens, as essential to any theory of social research. However, our formal "listen, and we shall live," does not preclude the useful character of the theological and the scientific formulas, *Credo ut intelligam* and *Cogito ergo sum*. Only it claims to contain them, and to be of equally a priori value as the two formulas that have commandeered the loyalty of centuries.

Audi, ne moriamur. Listen, lest we die; or: listen and we shall survive is an a priori that presupposes a power in man to establish relations with his neighbor that transcend their private interests. The formula, by its own supposition, denies the Marxian idea of thinking as pure self-interest; it also precludes the idealistic idea of thinking for the sake of thinking.

Beyond the natural life and death of two individuals in mute isolation, "survival" constitutes an enhanced explicit life thanks to listening. This, however, is not our concern at this moment. We wish to defend the introduction of the grammatical method here. By introducing the listener, the "you" that is expected to listen, something is achieved that science fails to do; the dualistic concept of a world of subjects and objects is abandoned. Grammar does not know of two but three persons, I, you, it. And so does social research know of the teacher, the student, and their subject matter. To prove the scientific equality of this method with the existing methods, we shall now trace these to their scientific foundations. In the march of science through the last millennium, some assumptions had to be made which we all share whenever we deal with non-social problems.

[8] See Bibliography.

4. *The A Prioris of Theology and Physics*

Human survival and revival depend on speech.

The delineation of the topics to be approached with the grammatical method will become clear when we ask the fundamental question what logic and mathematics or what theology and science promise to achieve. If they leave a whole realm of experiences untouched, it will not startle us to see that modern society is in need of a new method for our unsolved social problems. This defense of grammar is intended to give us the good conscience of not trespassing on ground that is the property of others.

In order to condense this undertaking, we will try to formulate the theological and the scientific intention in two Latin formulas. We use Latin not for any snobbistic reason. In Latin, we are allowed the careful study of every word of the formula in a more detached and carefully weighing manner than in our own tongues. A translation will be added.

Anselm of Canterbury has summed up his research in a phrase which is apt to serve as the pattern, with the respective changes, for science and for the social teaching, too. By taking Anselm's formula, we shall be sure to be in touch with the thought of the theologians and logicians themselves. As to science, we shall try to model the formula, as far as possible, according to Descartes. Anselm says, in *De incarnatione verbi*, c. 4, that he wrote his famous two booklets *"ut quod fide tenemus de divina natura et eius personis* praeter incarnationem, *necessariis rationibus sine scripturae auctoritate probari possit."*[9]

The subject matter of theology is divided into two parts: 1. divine nature and trinity; 2. incarnation. No. 1 is a matter of logical discussion and deduction, No. 2 of historical and personal experience. The science of theology, with its organon logic, is based on one irreducible datum in experience, the Crucifixion; all the rest is given to free research and disputation. Without the one irreducible experience of fact, this theology would not

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[9] "So that what we hold by faith about the divine nature and its persons, *except for the incarnation,* can be proven by necessary reason without the authority of the Scriptures."

have been Christian. Without the free discussion of everything else, however (and modern agnosticism overlooks this immense scholastic freedom often), there never could have been a theology.

The truth formula that medieval theology tried to prove by necessary reasoning about God, except for the incarnation, is absolutely comprehensive for the activities that are signified under the name "scholastic." In the formula, it need scarcely be said that the words "except for the incarnation" do not mean that the incarnation is without influence on the reasoning process. The term "except" is misleading if it is interpreted literally.

"Except" means that the necessary reasons cannot explain our traditions and memories of the historical life and death of the founder of the Church. Anselm says, at another place, that he can prove negatively that mankind could not have found peace without this historical experience. In other words, theology can go so far to prove the negative situation of a world and a humanity without the incarnation. From this assertion, it is clear that the fact that is excepted from reasoning, the incarnation, is not an annex. It is present all the time in the mind of those reasoning. The combination of speculation and tradition, then, is quite subtle: the historical experience forces the speculation on a level that it could not possibly attain otherwise. For instance, a world and a humanity without the incarnation can be proven to be incomplete, to be in the red, to give a sound basis for despair and pessimism and agnosticism. If this is so, the cohabitation of two sequences of facts really is the basis of theology, in all its mental activity. Christianity is not based on a myth or a legend. It is its honor to be an historical faith, based on events plus reason.

Now let us construe the scientific thesis of Cartesius and all his followers and fellows in modern philosophy and science of nature. Natural philosophy is Descartes's and is modern man's task. I propose the following formula for their basic concept of nature and science. *Philosophia naturalis et scientiae naturales operam dant, ut quod sensibus tenemus de physica natura et eius elementis*, praeter expansionem spatii et motum, *necessariis rationibus sine mundi speciosi auctoritate probari possit*. Natural phi-

losophy and natural science endeavor that the facts which we obtain through the senses about physical nature and its elements, may be proved, *with the exception of space and its expansion,* by necessary reasoning without the authority of our impression.

That natural science reduces nature to a system of rules about waves, movement, weight, etc., has often been discussed. The whole hierarchy of the sciences tries to reduce chemistry to physics, biology to chemistry, anthropology to biology, sociology to anthropology. At a meeting of the psychologists of this country at Dartmouth, the president read an address that gave a mathematical formula for all psychological research. A famous geometrician published a book, *Laws of Divine World Order,* in which everything was based on geometry. This was towards the end of the nineteenth century. Two hundred years before, Spinoza had written his "ethics *more geometrico.*" It is less often stated clearly what the *conditio sine qua non*[10] of all these calculations is, a condition that cannot be demonstrated but must be accepted by intuition. Yet, the fervent discussions about the dimensions point to the fact that the intuition of space and its expanded nature is at the bottom of all these discussions, as a premise from intuition or as an irreducible datum. The words "except for the intuition of space" seem therefore justified. This becomes more evident when we see that the term "dimension" is used whenever the word space is left out of the discussion. The word dimension is very often carried over to the concept of time. However, the very term or label dimension is primarily intended to label a quality of space, or of higher mathematics. All efforts to make it mean time, are metaphors. Time as a dimension of space, and the four-dimensional universe, are, it is true, terms that are widely used today. Yet, this does not make the original premise any less a concept of space. When we extend a fundamental category so far as to contain some other fundamental concepts, it may show that the other concept, here the concept of time, is giving us trouble. It does not alter the fact, however, that we cling to the space-category as having the right to leadership.

10 The condition not to be missed.

The fourth dimension for "time" is in itself a capitulation before the one category that can not be parted with: space and its so-called three dimensions. It is a poetical metaphor when used for time. And for instance, neither Descartes nor Spinoza have found it necessary to reason about time. Descartes declared time to be miraculous, a daily creation of God. Spinoza tried to treat it as a wrong impression which, in favour of space and timelessness, should be looked through as deceptive, just as in Hindu philosophy *time is not reasoned about but reasoned away*. In natural philosophy time is either a fourth dimension of space or a mere impression. It does not rank either with the one intuitional exception from pure reason which is space and space only,[11] or with those mathematical realities of necessary reasons. Time is neither a category nor a fact, in natural science.

So much as to time. On the other hand, God does not come in as a premise, either. To the strict scientist, God is a hypothesis for which he finds no need within his own system. We never get anything out of a system which we have not put into it first. And the very concept of nature, in the science of the last four hundred years, is reducible to space by establishment, and to space only, with the intentional omission of God or of time.

In our grammatical philosophy, or in our grammar as the organon of a new science of society, we concentrate on the phenomena of time. That man must make contemporaries by conversing, by speech, by teaching, that we read Homer and Shakespeare today, that we sing songs, in a chorus, and pass laws for the future, is the odd situation of society and man in society. Our new formula reads: social philosophy and the teachings of society are based on the assumption that the contents of our consciousness about the social changes can be proved, *except for the experience of peace*, by necessary reason without the authority of the empirical statute law. *Philosophia societatis et doctrinae sociales operam dant, ut quod conscientia tenemus de societate eiusque mutationibus temporalibus*, praeter pacem, *necessariis, rationibus sine staturorum auctoritate probari possit*. This state-

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[11] The book by A. A. Bowman, A *Sacramental Universe*, is especially rich in material to prove the space-obsession of science. I shall gladly accept the term "time-obsessed" for myself.

ment is built in strict correspondence to the two other methodical claims. Before going into detail, we may pause lest some points in the structure of the three formulas remain obscure.

1. *Theologia et logica scholarum operam dant, ut quod fide tenemus de divina natura et eius personis praeter incarnationem, necessariis rationibus sine scripturae auctoritate probari possit.*[12]

2. *Philosophia naturalis et scientia naturae operam dant, ut quod sensibus tenemus de natura et eius elementis,* praeter spatium et motibus in eo, *necessariis sine auctoritate mundi speciosi probari possit.*[13]

3. *Philosophia socialis et doctrinae sociales operam dant, ut quod conscientia tenemus de societate et eius mutationibus temporalibus,* praeter pacem, *necessariis rationibus sine statutorum auctoritate probari possit.*[14]

An analysis, by no means exhaustive, shows the following parallels:

1. All three formulas have as their subject two intellectual enterprises: one a general philosophy, the other a specific science, or a number of them. This double subject is descriptive of the fact that we have before us enterprises of a vast character; enterprises that were and are carried on by an army of thinkers who get the general question of their work tendered to them by a philosophy, and who set out to answer the innumerable specific questions in a specialized manner as scholars in many departments.

2. All three movements represent an attempt to replace one knowledge by a knowledge of scientific character. The first knowledge may be called, in a broad sense, empirical knowledge; the scientific task is to change this knowledge into knowledge of universal validity (*necessariis rationibus*). The three types of empirical knowledge are: a. The teachings of the Bible. b. Since nature has no Bible, its empirical authority is the world of our senses, the world of phenomena (like sunrise and sunset), which, in our phrasing we have given as "*mundus speciosus*," the specious world. c. The empirical authorities of the social order are

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[12] Theology and the logic of the schools endeavor. . . . see footnote p. 25.
[13] See translation pp. 26–7.
[14] Translated in preceding paragraph.

the statutes of all groups which, although they lack the quality
of scientific necessity, are nevertheless as binding on its mem-
bers as the Bible to the believer or the appearances of the
world to the layman.

3. All three sciences must keep one fact that cannot be dem-
onstrated but that must be accepted before any discussion can
start and before reasonable questions can be asked. This is meant
by the word *praeter.*

The incarnation, for the Christian thinker, the expanded
space and movement within it, for the scientist, and peace, for
the social teacher, are singled out as facts of this irreducible char-
acter. Why "peace" is such an a priori fact, we shall discuss at
greater length later on. Here, we only call attention to the cir-
cumstances under which the three parallel facts are realized.
Every one of them reaches the individual mind before he sets
out for his scientific task. They appeal to him not in his quality
as a scholar on research, but in his quality as human being
within society. The medium through which the three facts reach
the layman within the scholar so that, on their basis, he may
start work, differs in each of the three cases. Of space and move-
ment in space, the man knows by intuition, by his individual
sense apperception. Of the incarnation, he knows through the
living traditions of the church down through history. And of
peace, the individual is informed by social experience within his
group whatever this group is (tribe, family, community, school,
camp, etc.). The empirical data, in all three cases, reach him
through different channels. One is his sense equipment, the
second history, the third daily life in the group.

In addition to this analysis, it may be stated that the a priori
fact *"incarnatio," "spatium," "pax"* may have to be enlarged.
For instance, Thomas Aquinas taught that not only the incar-
nation but the Trinity also was inexplicable by mere reasoning.
Others may add some other element to *"pax"*; and I myself have
admitted movement, *motus,* as having equal status with space
as a primary datum. This vacillation, however, has no influence
on the main structure of the formula; the word *"praeter,"* except
for, may be followed by one or two data. We are concerned
only with the feature of the formula by which two different

groups of data are discriminated: those that must be given to the observer or thinker before he becomes a scientist, that must be given him as a human being, and another series of facts not communicated to him except when acting as a scholar in his field.

I think that the neglect of the completely disparate character of these two sets of data has done much harm. For it has separated the sciences from common sense, without further discussion of this all important question of what scientist and public keep as common intellectual possession. Before any scientists can do research, laymen and experts both are joined together as a people by these fundamental experiences of love for Christ, of motion through space, of peace within. This survey will suffice to show the similarity and yet, the important differences of the three methods. But it is time to turn to the analysis of the third formula.

5. The Metanomics of Society, or Teaching

The laws of a country tell us positively whom to obey, whom to exploit, whom to trust, whom to fight in war. This is no science, it is empirical knowledge, based on the allegiance to a particular country. The social philosophers try to prove by scientific reasoning that the different contents of the consciousness of all citizens of all different social groups have a proper place in time, that society is a meaningful phenomenon in time despite its changing contents and changing membership. But no social science can communicate any truth to a student or reader who has no experience of peace, and for that reason, of the evil conquered by peace. It is hopeless to teach social doctrines to boys and girls who had no experience of peace at home or in school, to unemployables or people who had to live like hunted animals.

Without the intuition and consciousness of the peace that precedes human understanding as a primary fact, all our teaching falls to pieces. With this in mind, the reader will easily understand why the young Germans who saw no peace between

1914 and 1923 were unable to be educated by the old German teachings. The premise was not there which, tacitly, had been at the bottom of every student's conscience and consciousness in former days. Anarchy, decay, war, revolution destroy social teaching as well as society, or more than society.

The reader will also understand why I myself, between 1919 and 1933, tried to put every young German in a situation in which peace and fellowship could be realized before words of interpretation were spoken. The experience of peace by students of society must be secured before the content of any teaching on society can bear fruit. And since in modern society, many conflicts, class wars, disintegration, anarchy, are experienced, the basis of the social sciences is reduced. Also, since the sociologists decline to admit this one undemonstrable premise, they often miss the point in their research to which their findings will have to converge.

Most social scientists abhor the idea that they are not scientists in the sense of natural science. I think that they are right in this sentiment in so far as they are afraid of having to bow, perhaps, to a religious authority. When the choice is between faith and science, it is a natural temptation for a social scientist to join the natural scientists.

However, the figure we cut in society, is a figure in time, not in space. The problems of tradition and progress, change and continuity, are before any social scientist whenever he opens his mouth or fountain pen. For, without a student who gives his time, without a reader who sacrifices the notorious "reading time of two minutes five seconds," there is no such thing as a social knowledge. I have not seen a sociologist who had not written or was not going to write a book or magazine article. Books, however, are temporal phenomena in a changing society, and books change their meaning with any change of society. Hence, the social philosopher, with every thought and every word, is doing something in time and with time himself. And whatever he describes, history, constitution, cases, habits, is a social phenomenon within time limits.

If we know when a phenomenon is in order and when it is out of order, when it is a part of social peace, and when it is

a part of social war, we know all we can know about it. When we know the books a college boy ought to read, we have selected his contemporaries, despite all the distances through time. We have looked forward to the goal we desire him to reach and we have looked backward so that he may take with him into the future the important luggage from other ages. We have stood by him, although older than he and waited for him so that he might catch up with us. And in waiting for him, we ourselves have moved out of our own individual time and built for him and us the college and the classroom as a place of communication and contemporaneity that overcomes the division between the generations, to a certain extent at least. In presenting him with representative thinking of other times, we have vaulted a present that stands out between the past that our teaching represents, and his future that his learning is anticipating.

The first embodiment of the new grammar of society, then, is education. For, in education, two "distemporaries" meet so that they may become contemporaries as the *De Magistro* of Augustinus taught us, in our interpretation of this dialgoue.[15] The teacher and the student are the two social agents in which the time element is outstanding. The teacher is more than an experienced man who tells stories from his life's personal experience. Any teacher represents more than his personal knowledge. He brings in mankind's traditions, and so he is the channel through which the quintessence of the past is passed on. Any student as a student is more than a young man. To get an education means to have more future, more direction, more responsibility than the uneducated hobo who tries to make a living from day to day. The fact of the student's studying divides his lifetime into a time of preparation for life and of a later life. And so, the student is emphasizing the time element of a future that is distinguishable from the present just as much as the teacher emphasizes the time element of the past by which he must bring to the present moment the valuable possessions from the past.

[15] Read before the Augustinian Society at Harvard, December 17, 1938. See also the chapter on the *De Magistro* in *The Breath of the Spirit* (see Bibliography).

That it is possible, in teaching and learning, to weave a pattern of contemporaneity around people of different classes, is the great example of pacification in society. Hence, the dialogue in the class room is not the logical phenomenon of which we think in the Platonic dialogues, nor the mathematical agreement of which we think in the physicist's laboratory. It is important to stress the third side of the dialogical situation: it is a victory over natural differences in the temporal order of men, and the fact that any conversation between distemporaries is a victory over nature, exalts the educational process to the one social process of primary significance. As there is pure reason, there is pure social process in education. Education is not a part of nature. In education, at least, we are not in the realm of nature. At this point, society is *sui generis*.

No reduction to phenomena of space is possible or even meaningful. The grammatical method, and the grammatical subject matter is completely distinct from natural phenomena. And the same is true, of course, of the fundamental distinction of education and theology. The situation is not evading the issue of temporal flux. The notorious expression of a "specious present," in some modern American philosophy, for the true achievement of contemporaneity between distemporaries, is, however, evidence of the need for a clarification of this independence of social time and social research. Education is, in its form and method, not dealing with eternity. Eternity may be made its content. But the educational process itself is secular, temporal, untheological, social. It aims at peace between classes, between groups of different times. And it presupposes the desirability of peace.

We have stressed, in Anselm's formula, the one thing that must be presupposed and assumed, the incarnation. We have stressed, in the scientific process, the presupposition of dimensional space and movement in it.

In stressing the minimum datum of the social sciences, peace, we may have a similar task of shifting the emphasis to something usually not mentioned and never analyzed, in its methodical importance, as a constitutive act for the process of social teaching itself. And yet, for our enterprise, it is worthwhile to consider what happens when these prerational assumptions cease to be the center or a priori. One has to concentrate on the fact

of space in order to see with scientific eyes. Nature vanishes without space and motion as first given. We get Christian Science, superstitions, Hindu mysticism without this basis. One has to concentrate on the incarnation in order to give all the logical investigations about human values in our era their proper place. Without the incarnation, the logic of values must lead to polytheism. And modern value philosophies nearly all are polytheistic. Their values are manifold. And a mere phenomenology of values without unity is the result of any philosophy of values without a universal standard for the perfect man.

Now, the same trouble has to be admitted for the assumption that peace is implied in all social research, as at bottom the central and intuitive social experience without which we cannot have social knowledge or direction. We have a lot of historians, sociologists, etc. who either are unaware or are openly hostile to this assumption. Also, we have not, perhaps, succeeded in clarifying our thesis that peace is the one experience of time that is essential for making our notion of time complete and real and irrefutable. So one more word about the relation of peace to time.

The full implications of this relation belong, of course, in the more lengthy chapters of my grammatical organon.[16] But the concept of time, in the sense of a fourth dimension of space, deprives time of its peculiar quality of change. Now, change is more than movement. All change is ambiguous. It can be just as well change for better as change for worse. It may lead to death or to new life. If time were to be studied just because everything in time will change like the New England weather, the temporal phenomena would have no criterion of order, among themselves, as to sequence, righteousness, justice, desirability, etc.

The idea of peace, however, transcends a quality of change, and thereby of time-relations. Peace is the experience of change at the right time. The best change is a peaceful change. Peace is not a situation that obstructs change or history or reform. Peace is presupposing change and time processes. It is made through the birth, aging and death of the members of society. Man's mortality is the simplest guarantee for constant social

[16] *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg 1963/64.

change. But peace is that quality of change by which it is approved and supported by all people concerned. Peace, then, means that the change is accepted unanimously. Since peaceful changes are unanimous changes, peace adds to the external and natural element of time as treated in physics, the one, essential, quality of human participation in this time process by our own consciousness. Peaceful change is the more desirable change because it means that the greatest possible number of members of society are participating in the flux of time, consciously, and are approving of its due process.

The inner relation of time to consciousness is borne out by this qualification of the temporal order as an order that should go on, if possible, in peace, not in war. Because only in this way, is the consciousness that we have of society, and its lawful order, a consciousness that is scientifically and critically purified. How could the social scientist have real knowledge, knowledge that claims to be universally true, if his consciousness cannot be shared by all other men? Hence his inside in the lawful changes of society must be capable of being shared by all other members of society. It is then a *sine qua non* for the existence of a social philosophy that change can be made peacefully; for only then can he hope that his own philosophy of the social changes is universal and that means, is tenable because it is valid for all.

Peace, then, is used here in its dialectical sense of the event that after strife and struggle and war or anarchy, restores the time and space axes of society. We said that speech sustains the time and space axes of society. We also stated that anarchy, war, decadence, and revolution were the four major disturbances of these axes and the cross of reality formed by them. Then, we proceeded to state that any cure, any medicine for these disturbances consisted in somebody speaking his mind to his listener. Since any social evil was of a polychronical character, involving more than one generation, the first remedial way of coping with it was to invite somebody less informed, less hurt, less worn out, so that he might share our shock, our dismay, our insight, our solution, as our listener and student. We summed up this basic rule of social research in the phrase: listen so that we may survive.

Now, we can add to this one more statement: peace is the

experience of this survival after social catastrophes. Peace embodies the survival value of the previous catastrophes of humanity. It is not just the innocence of paradise, but historically acquired immunity from certain dangers and evils of society. Each peace is a concrete and specific victory over a specific disturbance of previous peaces. It is the synthesis to which all social knowledge, according to Ward's one word definition, aspires.

Intellectual synthesis is the peace of our mind, the reflective correspondent to peace in society. Peace and synthesis are twins, the Latin stem, *pax*, rightly dealing with the world in which Rome was dominant, and the Greek word synthesis, dealing with the parallel realm of thought.

When Ward saw Haeckel and Ostwald in Germany, they argued a one word definition of science. Haeckel gave: Genesis, Ostwald, the chemist, defined: Analysis. And Ward said: Synthesis. Here we have the three ways of thought pretty clear. Genesis, is theology, and Haeckel, the evolutionist, who forged a picture in favor of his faith in the solution of the *Welträtsel* (the puzzle presented by the world) is revealed as a theologian in disguise (and all German philosophers were theologians in disguise). Ostwald, in using the term analysis, is true to the Cartesian tradition: he is a true scientist, of modern times. Ward, however, saves the independence of social teaching. Dealing with the creative efforts of our social life, teaching must, in its own method, contain the same germ of responsible creativity. Synthesis is the widest application of the principle of speech as used by the teacher of peace. The creation of peace, then, is the problem of the subject matter and of the subjects dealing with social research as well. At least we must establish peace between ourselves, speaker and listener, before we can communicate truth.

6. *Meta-logic, Meta-esthetics, Meta-ethics,*
or the March of Science

The question of what to call the organon of social research, is by no means quibbling over words. The march of the sciences is well staked by the changing terminology for their underlying

method. This changing terminology, and this change in method, is, in itself, a great chapter in the education of mankind. And since we have seen that education is the primary experience of how mankind establishes peace between distemporaries, it is obvious that the change from method to method occupies the interest of all modern sociologists, beginning with Saint-Simon and Comte. Saint-Simon asked himself: why was scholasticism progressive, scientific, regenerating? Why is modern theology apologetic, timid, reactionary? Why is the same science vital at times, and second rate at others?

Comte also divided the evolution of the sciences into three chapters. And this historical scheme has a parallel in logical investigations about the necessary number of methods for covering the elementary fields of human inquiry. In the last generation of the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian schools, Lask, Hans Ehrenberg, Jaspers, and others advocated the coordination of three basic doctrines that should take the place of the all too simple metaphysics of the enlightenment and its present day adherents. Metaphysics, it was stated, should give way to three independent "meta" doctrines: meta-ethics, meta-logic, and meta-esthetics. These three doctrines should be the respective bases for our research in the social, the natural, and the value-universe. The significance of all our research and teaching, they claimed, depended on our willingness to base society, nature and values on three, not on one foundation. Neither Comte's scheme of history, nor the neo-Kantian logical discussion has convinced the social scientists themselves.

We here take up their task in combining them; and by comparing the real concrete march of the sciences through time with the ideal types of scientific method, we shall, perhaps, be able to state their quandary in a more practical manner. It will appear, from our comparison, that the two sciences advocated by philosophers, meta-logic and meta-esthetics, exist long since; the two have transgressed on the third field. And because they have transgressed, they wore labels under which the modern social scientists are accustomed to expect enemies instead of allies. Only when the social scientists can make peace with theologians and natural scientists, both, and yet preserve their independence, will

the teaching in society prove convincing. Teachers who cannot establish peace among their departments do not deserve the confidence of their students.

Meta-logic already exists. In the beginning of the twelfth century and not earlier than that the term theology came into use for the task of organizing "on the crypt of the Bible the eight stories of dialectical theology." It was a revolutionary term. Too many people today, even among educated and scientific groups, confuse Christianity with theology. But theology got its name as a science to solve problems that had arisen from an unsatisfactory functioning of the Church, after 1000 years of existence. In this sense, theology is absolutely a twin to our own enterprise of a social science for a society not functioning satisfactorily. The century that preceded the coining of the new phrase "theology," had discovered the paradox as the primary obstacle to a scientific treatment of the problems of the Church![17] Theology is meta-logic, forcing the logic of one-line reasoning to the altitude of the paradoxes with which vital thought deals. *Nihil ex nihilo; mundus creatus ex nihilo.*[18] *Paulus apostolus Romanus et non Romanus est.*[19] *Panis et vinum corpus Christi est et non est,*[20] etc.

For meta-logic, it was important to stress the fact of the relatively late creation of the term theology for it. As to meta-esthetics, the basic science that transcends the empirical knowledge of nature, we have an ancient term, but, with the Renaissance, a completely new meaning. Metaphysics, with Aristotle, is the term, familiar to all of us. And most people imply that modern metaphysicians have the same topic as Aristotle. This is not so. Nature, in modernity, is not the ancient cosmos with which Aristotle dealt. It is nature minus the values and secrets of the gods (or of God), in modern time.

The concept of nature to all modern metaphysicians, is puri-

[17] The Berengarian disputes, after 1050, were raging on behalf of the paradox that was to become the constant problem of scholasticism: *"est ipsum et non est ipsum."* This is well shown in the recent publication by Gerhart Ladner, *Theologie und Politik vor dem Investiturstreit* (Baden bei Wien, 1936).

[18] Nothing comes from nothing; the world is created from nothing.

[19] Paul is the Roman apostle and not Roman.

[20] Bread and wine are the body of Christ and they are not.

fied, leaving aside the problems discussed by Christian theology and history. Metaphysics is ancient metaphysics minus the mysteries about God in history. It deals with nature and the god of nature only. In calling attention to the fact that modern metaphysics actually are the knowledge transcending man's science of the world of phenomena, we correct the too comprehensive conception of metaphysics. A term that, in Aristotle, was merely a literary accident: that the book was placed after his physics— became restricted in modern times to considerations of the meta-esthetical kind. That which must balance all physical observation of the natural world of appearances, is the subject matter of this Renaissance rival of theology, metaphysics.

Thus, the neo-Kantian demand for meta-esthetics has been satisfied by metaphysicians, beginning with Giordano Bruno and Descartes. This is a perfectly good word since the physical world is the world of sense apperception (=esthetics), of aisthesis. And the so-called "esthetics" in the sense of beauty, of the *universalia in re* are part of this quest in so far as the general conditions that bodies in the world of appearance must satisfy, certainly are qualified by the category of beauty, this being the unity of appreciation for our sensuous system.

I have justified in my book *Out of Revolution* my choice of the word "metanomics"[21] for the organon and epistemology that is needed for any plunge into the material questions of society. I do not think that my choice is arbitrary. The terms ethics and meta-ethics are impossible, as a pair because of the highly specialized use of ethics as moral discipline. It seems impossible to restore to ethics the character of an empirical science. The empirical sciences feel that ethicists are concerned with standards more than with facts. Economists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, lawyers are the standard-bearers of the empirical knowledge in the social field. In this case, the term meta-ethics is useless for it would not be in clear opposition to those descriptive activities but to the moralizing ethics only. Metanomics rises beyond any partial and particular field of legislation of lawful functioning in society. It deals with the law of legislation in society. And it

[21] "Metanomics" from the Greek *meta*, beyond, and *nomoi*, laws.

is in the enjoyable position, as a name, to be in clear polarity to the law as well as to economics.

The theology of Anselm and Thomas is meta-logic; metaphysics of the 18th century style on the God of nature is meta-esthetics. My task is the meta-ethical and that is pressing today because of the coexistence of antagonistic laws of society. Meta-logic was needed when a new paganism disrupted the Christian Church in feudal and local worship. Metaphysics was needed when coordination of physical facts, discovery of America, etc., a system of distant continents and countries and bodies became compelling. Metanomics, or meta-ethics are, in the time of radio, the result of the pandemonium of propaganda for different systems, different types of man, different social orders that compete in our ears incessantly. We must identify the historical names and the Kantian terms, and we shall find that humanity has followed a *remarkably* steady course in going from meta-logic to meta-esthetics to metanomics.

I have listed the endeavor of metalogic as the *concordia discordantium canonum* on the workings of divine truth: the concording of the paradoxical utterances of the spirit. Concording science is meta-logic. I might list the passion of the last centuries of natural philosophy as the passion for a system that coordinates far distant bodies and relates the hitherto unrelated facts of the world and also, as metaphysics, explains that very passion for a "system." A systematizing science is natural science, meta-esthetics.

And my own direction of thought, probably, will have to be listed as the meta-ethical search for a synchronization of mutually exclusive social patterns of behaviour, as "the metanomics of the great society" which must contain contradictory ways of life. My grammar of assent, my grammatical organon, is devoted to the task of supplementing the statute law of any given society with the metanomics that explain and satisfy our enthusiasm for the synchronization of the distemporary, of old and young, black, brown and white, government and anarchy, primitive and refined, highbrow and lowbrow, innocence and sophistication, all at peace, in one human society.

Perhaps, it is safe to say that meta-logic, meta-ethics, and metaphysics all concur in trying to prove one and the same thing for

the mind, for society, and for nature. After all, they are wrestling with the question of the omnipresence of God. Theologians wrestle with this omnipresence despite the confusing maze of rational statements and propositions. Metaphysicians try to interpret the phenomena of the world of our senses as being capable of cosmic harmony and beauty, as being natural, despite the confusion of the phenomenal world.

Metanomics, then, might be interpreted as the search for the omnipresence of God in the most contradictory patterns of human society. No wonder that though they all concur, they also must use different methods; the logical, or dialectical, is in use for explaining the contradictions of propositions (nothing comes from nothing; yet, God created the world out of nothing), the mathematical and physical: the smallest unit is the atom; no, the smallest unit is the wave. The grammatical or dialogical: all men are identifiable; no, all men are different. In this latter proposition, I feel that we are in the center of all social problems of the future. The paradox of the human being in society is just this: that man is a separate unit with separate interests, and that he is a fellow with identical interests as well.

The picture of man, under the hegemony of meta-logic, theology, was that man was an abject sinner, in his individuality. The picture of man, under natural philosophy, was that he was everybody else's equal. The vision of the social teacher is metanomical. He knows that the economics of society differentiate us incessantly; the variety of mankind is perplexing. By metanomics he reclaims man's power to identify himself with others despite these differences. The equilibrium between the special social sciences in which man appears to differ, and the social philosophy which make him appear eternally the same human being, is the secret of all research in the social field. We cannot give up one side of the social paradox, either by identifying all men as being the same, or by allowing them to become so different that they lose their power of identifying themselves with others. Peace is the term which expresses the existence of this paradox in society: that different people by having peace together, are identifiable.

With this paradox at bottom, social teachings are placed on the same basis as the medieval and the modern sciences. No research,

no intellectual enterprise on a large scale, can get going without the preservation of contradictions. Man is in a contradictory position because he is alive. God is contradictory because he is the living God. And nature is paradoxical because she is in movement. Empirical human thought is not vital enough to reflect the contradictions of its subject matters: society, values, nature. It is only when the scientific stage is reached, as in scholasticism, or science, or now in social research, that the empirical and mechanical workings of the individual mind are sublimated to a common enterprise of mankind. In it the thinking process is mirroring not one aspect of its object, but all its contradictory aspects.

Whenever a province of life is conquered by science, the mind rises beyond the first empirical assertion to the higher plane of the paradox, of contradictions. Many bodies, one space; many truths, one God; many times, one peace. And the teaching of social order and disorder must be built on the contradictory vision of man at war and at peace in order to become the preeminent intellectual enterprise of the future.

7. *Theses*

Speech sustains the time and space axes of society. Grammar is the method by which we become aware of this social process. Grammar, then, offers itself as the basis for the meta-ethics of society. We have called this new discipline not meta-ethics but metanomics of society, for the obvious reason that economics, bionomics, theonomy, deal with the laws (*nomoi*) of the different realms of science.

The aim of this new organon is synchronization of distemporaries. Any educational process does this very thing in empirical fashion. Peace is the datum that must be given in immediate personal experience to the student of social teachings. Peace cannot be deduced rationally.

The two previous scientific enterprises are the meta-logic of the middle ages, in the form of theology, and the meta-esthetics of modern times, in the form of metaphysics. Meta-logic (theology)

concorded discording truth, saved the paradox of living truth against the laws of contradiction and of the excluded middle. Meta-esthetics (metaphysics) saved the unity of matter and movement, the unity of space in a system of distant bodies.

8. *Schematic Survey*

	Meta-logic	Meta-esthetics	Meta-ethics
abstract term:	Meta-logic	Meta-esthetics	Meta-ethics
concrete field:	values (gods)	nature (space)	society (time)
intellectual tool:	dialectics	mathematics	grammar
historical name:	theology	natural science	"metanomics" proposed
task:	*concordia discordant- ium canonum* concording contra- dictory eternal truth	coordinating movement of *distant* bodies: system	synchronizing antagonistic "distempo- raries"
starting points:	1050, Lanfranc 1142, Crusades	1543, Coper- nicus 1620, Descartes Thirty Years' War	1808, Saint- Simon World War