

SPEECH AND REALITY

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INTRODUCTION BY
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CHAPTER 4

GRAMMAR AS SOCIAL SCIENCE



OF ALL THE DOGMAS of antiquity, the grammatical dogma is the last to persist. The schools have shelved Euclidean geometry, Ptolemaic astronomy, Galenian medicine, Roman law and Christian dogma most radically. Ancient grammatical dogma still dominates.

This essay tries to show that grammar need not be dry as dust but the fruit of our actual experiences of reason, creativity, authority and communion. It tries to deliver our educational system from a basis that has become obsolete. It is felt generally that this basis is bad. Hence people found it necessary to reinforce this weak basis by a number of social sciences, like "human relations," "psychology," "sociology" etc. It will be simpler and more effective to change the basis.

If the social value of grammar could be tapped in the beginning, it would be superfluous to bring in all kinds of remedies against the ravages wrought in human hearts and brains by the grammatical dogma.

As these grammatical prejudices are polluting the mental stream at a very early age, the harm in most cases is never repaired. Later epochs will look with amazement at the grammatical rack on which we torture ourselves and our little ones.

The worst sinner always must be made the first convert before a specific sin can be healed. Grammar being the most obsolete and poisonous element in our social instruction, society cannot expect much health unless this element is converted into a positive asset. I propose to show that the low grade grammar of

our primary schools can be graded up. Higher grammar, as well as higher mathematics, are available. When witches were burned, higher mathematics came to our rescue.

Higher mathematics by including infinity, enabled us to decipher the secrets of mass and energy, time and space of nature. The world ceased to be magic and bewitched. Its electronic order stands revealed, with the help of higher mathematics.

Higher grammar, by including emphasis and drama will enable us to decipher the secrets of social movement, masses and persons, diseases and cures of the body politic. Higher grammar will develop the same respect for the dignity of the social processes of speech which higher mathematics have bestowed on nature's laws. Low grade grammar has degraded speech into a wilful tool of a man's mind. Higher grammar will reverse this. Speech will stand out as the field of energy within which man receives or loses his mind, changes or opens it. The dogmatic grammar belittles speech as a tool of the mind of our school children. Higher grammar will make it look great and lawful. It will prevent many cases of schizophrenia which stem from the terrors of the grammatical dogma.

The worst sin is, of course, its Greek origin, our grammar school's tradition from Latin and Greek sources. The Greek and Latin names and tables of grammar have been handed to us even when we had to learn French, German, Spanish or Russian, or English itself. The wrong Alexandrian table of grammatical values is with us everywhere.

This table looks quite innocent. It usually runs:

<i>amo</i>	I love
<i>amas</i>	thou loveth
<i>amat</i>	he loves
<i>amamus</i>	we love
<i>amatis</i>	you love
<i>amant</i>	they love

or: I kill, you kill, he kills, we kill, you kill, they kill. And we all learn these lists to gain access to a language. What can be important about such a list?

Permit me to contrast this list by another immediately. Our "crucial" list would place:

<i>ama</i> (amate)	love!
<i>ame</i> (amēus)	that I may love! (that we may love)
<i>amatus</i> (amant)	loved (they love)
<i>amavimus</i>	we have loved

as equivalents in emphasis. In this list, each personal state, thou, I, it, they, we is identified with a special fundamental social reaction. In the Alexandrian list, all persons are put through the same drill. They all seem to speak in the same manner. It is here that the fatal error has crept in. Much of our confusion about social relations and much of our ignorance about speech can be directly traced to this error.

In listing *amo*
amas
amat
amamus etc.

the impression is conveyed that all these sentences can and should be treated as of the same social character. The effect on any reader of such a list will be that any indicative is spoken with the same degree of emphasis. We contradict. We say that *amat* and *amo* and *amas* are worlds apart in social emphasis and therefore cannot be taught as homogeneous. The Alexandrian list is insincere. It is a very late compromise in which superficially all persons seemed to have access to one and the same mode, the indicative; in our lives, to this day, the indicative forms no continuum of *amo amas amat*. Nor must it ever form it. To the contrary, we must get rid of this list because it induces people to think and act wrongly in society and to overlook the difference in emphasis between *amas, amo, amat*.

I am confident that I can prove these points in the following pages.

1. *amat* is spoken without emphasis, as a fact. *Amo* and *amas* cannot be spoken without grave social consequences. Hence, they presuppose emphasis, whereas we must learn about emphasis as the social element in grammar.

2. The political qualities of our various crucial utterances can be evoked by an up-to-date grammar or they can be repressed and destroyed by the prevailing grammar. The crucial proof of 1 and 2 is furnished by the current confusion between history and science. History has an emphasis which science cannot have. History cannot be science because it requires emphasis.

1. *Amatur*

Amatur, he is loved, is an objective statement. Some fact is reported of somebody who is neither the speaker or writer nor the listener or reader. He usually does not know that people speak of him. On the other hand, it is equally noticeable that neither the speaker nor the listener has any stake in the sentence "*amatur*." In "*amatur*," the process of love has been made powerless. This is no small achievement. Of love we can only speak in fear and trembling if we speak of it in the first or second person. The third person neutralizes the power of love. The objects of science are made powerless. God in prayer, God in the ten commandments—is the living God. God as the object of theology is powerless, a mere third person.

If somebody third is said to be in love, the sentence ranks with "it rains" or "it shines." Usually, such a statement is called objective. This term is quite in order under one condition. The objective statement "it rains" or "he loves," not only abstracts from the speaker but *from the listener as well!* "Objective" then, is a two-fold negation of relationship. The objective is removed from the speaker as well as from the listener. Usually in modern thinking this twofold quality of "the objective" is neglected; "objective" seems to be anything to which the subject is indifferent or from which the subject has detached himself. This reduces the linguistic situation to a monologue of a thinking subject who thinks an object. We return to the plenitude of grammar by the important rule that "*amat*" abstracts from two people instead of from one. The "subject" to whom the sentence "He loves," is a detached statement of fact, must be dissolved into two people, a subject and a praject: the speaker

and the listener. Only then can we fathom the depth of the abyss between the objective third person in *amat* and the two conversing people who exchange their views about him as subject and preject. To come to real grips with any objective statement and to assign it its place in social life, it is useful to replenish the sentence *amat* into its full setting of a conversation:

John says *amatur*. Bill may reply "*amatur sed non amat.*"¹ In this dialogue, the reply may be affirmative or negative. In both manners, the addition of the reply makes it clear that A and B debate the *truth* about *tertius* (the third). A fact in the outer world is in a debate to which the two speakers do not contribute any personal attitude on their part.

2. *Amo*

If we now turn to *amo* or *amas*, these forms are not conveying objective facts primarily. They are, it is true, called indicatives, in Alexandrinian. But this omits one half of the sentence's significance: *amo* has a double emphasis compared to *amat*. A man who says *amo*, is doing two things at once: He is involved in an act and besides he confesses it. In such an entanglement, obviously his confession can only be undertaken if it does not cancel out the act. *Obviously certain acts may be cancelled out by being confessed!*

The first person who speaks of himself runs a risk which he does not run in speaking of somebody else! He runs the risk of destroying the act to which the sentence testifies. It is true that in many cases, I can admit that I am doing this or that without destroying the deed in the admission. Destroying in such cases seems an exaggeration. Why should I not say: I laugh, I scorn, I travel by train? Now it is true that these sentences usually do not brook destruction of the act they describe. But we have not claimed that they destroy. We have claimed that they involve a risk to the speaker. And of this, there can be no doubt: any act divulged while in process, can be interfered

¹ "he is loved but he does not love."

with. The first person (I) who says to anybody else what "I" am doing, makes his act vulnerable by intervention from the outside. Any act can be stopped. And the speaker who says what he is doing or going to do, invites disaster, or if he says what he has done, invites criticism!

A man in his five senses will not speak of his own deeds in the first person if he does not have to. The lid will be clamped down on his mouth by the pressure of risk and danger. And it is possible to determine the quantity of emphasis which is required to pry this lid open.

The emphasis with which a man is compelled to speak up, *amo*, must overcome the resistance of the social pressure which warns him not to invite interference! *Amat*, he loves, involves ordinarily no risk to the speaker. He may murmur detachedly and indifferently. But "*amo*" makes a difference. The speaker of a sentence in the first person cannot help changing his own social situation simply by divulging any act, thought, feeling, intention of himself. Therefore it takes an emphasis to say "*amo*" which is absent in "*amat*." This emphasis must be strong enough to break down the caution which advises us not to speak! For this reason, the most difficult sentence to pronounce of all human sentences is *amo*. For while the sentence: I eat, I sit down, concerns a moment of our lives, *amo* concerns the final direction, and its lasting destination. There is much more danger that people can interfere with my description of a lifetime act than with a ten minute luncheon. Hence, we do not say publicly *amo*. We say this perhaps to the person in question, but to nobody else. To our families we say: we are engaged to marry, which brooks little interference. And to the rest of the world we proclaim we are husband and wife which brooks no interference whatsoever.

amo

"*Promessi Sposi*" (Manzoni's
great novel) *sumus*

maritus et uxor

sumus

— I love

— We are engaged to
be married.

— We are husband
and wife.

could be enclosed in concentric circles.

Then it would be clear, that *amo* can never be as general or as public a sentence as *amat* because it invites the risk of rivalry, jealousy, wrath. To the world, if I am intelligent at all, I shall not say *amo* but *uxor mea est*. That is, I shall transform the first person sentence into a third person sentence. By saying *uxor mea est*, I have chosen the *objective term* which involves no risk of interference, which does not need any emphasis on my part and which does not have the character of a confession.

We conclude that *amo* is made of absolutely different stuff than *amat* and the history of language proves our point. *Amo* is an emphatic form, a subjective exclamation which is quite wantonly inserted into the Alexandrian table as an indicative. The first form singular did not originate with the indicative. The tables of the indicative borrow it. *Amo* is in a class of forms with *alas*, *behold*, *see*, *verily*, as an emotional form. *Amo* and *amat* belong to two different situations of expression.

3. *Amas*

The rift between *amo* and *amat*, however, is not wider than the rift between *amas* (you love) and *amat*.

For modern man, this second rift may even be more readily understood. For we have learned to be pretty objective and pretty indiscreet about ourselves. People keep diaries, are analyzed, confess, write letters and therefore say things in the first person, nobody dared to utter three hundred years ago except under an objective veil of sentences in the third person.

But as modern men we may take great liberties with ourselves, and divulge all our secrets. Hence the first person and the third no longer seem miles apart. But how is it with the second person? We not very often can take the same liberties with the person to whom we speak. I may well know that you are in love with so and so. But before you are engaged to marry, I have no right to tell you face to face you love him. It is you who first has to tell me! If you have condescended to make such a confession to me, I later may quote your own sentence in some ways like these: Since you love him, if you love him, before you fell in love with him!

Any speaker needs some permission on the part of his listener before he can "tell him off!" Take a child and his mother. The mother may say: you are pretty naughty today. But why? Because she is the child's mother! The mother is in authority. Also the doctor to whom a sick person comes for advice, is free to say: You have diabetes. This means that statements of fact in the second person ("*amas*") presuppose establishment of a specific social relation. The speaker's *right* to say "*amas*" is derived from a covenant under which a certain amount of authority to speak was granted him!

The mother is required to say: You are naughty, by her offices with the child. The friend is entitled to say: *si amas*, because he has been authorized to know this fact, by this conversant or in some other legitimate manner. In communicating to the person I speak to something of which this person is the agent, I base myself on a relation wholly absent of sentences in the objective third person.

And who is the foremost second person who must listen willy-nilly to my statements about himself or herself? It is the person to whom I have the right to address wishes, orders, complaints. The second person in *amas* is not somebody or anybody, but is you in particular for whom I have become in some degree responsible. You may have asked for help and advice, or you may be under my care by law or by army and navy rule. In any case, *amas* is not said without emphasis. However, the emphasis of *amas* is not of the same type as in *amo*. The break which it takes to say *amo*, is part of an impetuous victory over the inhibition of keeping any mouth shut. The emphasis which it takes to say: you are a thief, is that of an impetuous victory over the inhibition of the listener to open his ear! The mother's authority, the doctor's office are needed before the patient will be patient enough to listen!!

Most modern men belittle this secret of emphasis which is needed to make people listen! The editor of our student paper with 3,000 copies daily seemed to abuse his tribune. I said to him: "After all 3000 people read your stuff." He naively answered: "Oh, I am only one of 3000. Anybody can say or write what he likes." He had a printing press. He had a paper as

his mouthpiece. People were prepared to read this paper. They were not prepared to listen to Johnny or Jack. A more important case is the modern union. In a trade union, the ears of the members are usually closed to everybody, including the President of the United States, in labor matters. This is the real impact of a union, that its members cease to listen to words about work read outside their established journal.

The man who says "you are a fool," needs no emphasis to say this. But he will fool himself if he says it to somebody who is not prepared to listen to him. And this *preparedness* comes from an emphatic and emphasized relation between listener and speaker! Sentences like *amas*, you sulk, you are naughty, would be powerless unless the listener has an intent to listen to the speaker. This intent must outweigh the natural unwillingness of any individual to hear other people interfere with our own affairs! Why is advice unasked for never given successfully? Because it has no power to unlock the recipient's ear. In "*amat*," no power is required to state the facts. Our indicatives require a knowledge of the facts; they do not presuppose any social power or authority over other people. But the quality of any sentence in the second person is graded by the degree of authority which the speaker wields over the listener. He must have converted the listener into just that—a listener. The action of saying "*amas*" is a forceful act because it has not only its content: you love, but besides must evoke an intent on the part of the listener which cannot be taken for granted.

4. Comparison

We now can compare the three persons in a sentence: the speaker of *amo* has made up his mind to break his silence about himself although this means running the risk of intervention. The listener of *amas* has made up his mind to invite interference. The speaker and listener of *amat* have nothing to readjust in their own political attitude before they listen to this fact. They are neither defying nor inviting interference in their own affairs.

Out of this comparison of *amo*
amas
amat,

a most important conclusion results: whereas *amat* is debatable as to truth, *amas* is debatable as to authority, *amo* is debatable as to wisdom.

Tertius amat, yes or no, is paralleled not by a You love, yes or no, but by a "you are in love," I beg leave to tell you. And the man who dares to say, I am in love, may do well to consider the wisdom of such a statement, neither the truth nor the right of this statement is dubious—for he should know whether this is true and he should have the authority to speak for himself. The decision to speak of my own actions is debatable as to its political propriety.

In grouping our three sentences as modes of behavior, *amat* stands disclosed as a dualism of our power to know, *amas* as the evaluation of a decision of our power of authority, *amo* as our power to reveal our secrets.

Hence, knowledge	third person
authority	second person
communion	first person

are faced with three different hurdles. Reason, knowledge faces problems of fact, of truth or falsity, of information or observation. Reason may be wrong or right about *tertius*.

But authority faces the dilemma between the listener's freedom and his necessity. "*Amas*," is a sentence which interferes with your freedom, if I find it necessary to tell you, it is because I assess our relation to be of such a nature that it is necessary to tell you.

And communion faces the decision between being silent and speaking out. The man who says in the presence of a lady, "I sweat," overcomes his shyness about his secret and not his doubt about this fact! And he probably would not think of telling her "you sweat" although it may be both true fact and be known to him. But he has no authority to either state the fact or reveal his perception of it to the lady. To do so would imply his social superiority.

The social discrepancy between *amat*, knowledge of facts,

amas, authority to tell, *amo*, revelation of secrets, is enormous. They represent three different social processes between man, fellow man and the outer world.

5. *The Teaching of Grammar*

Is it wise to teach generations of men in our mechanical columns of grammar, that *amo*, *amas*, *amat*, *amamus*, *amatis*, *amant* is a "natural" list?

It seems to me that we positively obstruct our own and our children's insight into the currents of speech by these unquestioned fictions of Alexandria (2200 years ago) which we faithfully repeat. The conflict between the real person and our educational system may largely be attributed to the educational blindspot about grammar, as a social science.

All the other social sciences are now-a-days desperately at work to remedy the false dogmas planted in the grammar school and high school. Whether our mother tongue or foreign languages are concerned, the social abstruseness of the doctrines in grammar is the same.

It would seem to me that it is simpler to tell the truth from the beginning, instead of first ruining a child by our wrong education and then overlaying our wrongs with psychological and sociological correlatives.

This could easily be achieved if the Alexandrian table of grammar were discarded. It has in its favor prescription, and prescription is a great deity. But it contradicts all the experiences of society and of us in society. While we all instinctively know that to speak of our visions is of very different emphasis, grammar fills us with the opposite consciousness.

In our modern society, *amo* and *amas* are treated as though they too were mere statements of fact as *amat*. And psychological shamelessness, social name-calling, the tyranny of the physician and the analyst, are a few results of this lack of wisdom and authority from the grammatical table. Every man is told to think of himself or herself in a matter of fact way, as though he or she were a third person. This puts his or her human rela-

tions on a wrong, objective, basis which devaluates it. For objectively, we speak of those who are absent and who therefore need neither blush nor listen. Human relations thrive where we attribute secrets of communication and loyalties of listening. Human relations die where all our statements only contribute facts.

6. *History or Science*

This may be shown in our fourth form of grammatical statement which is much abused today and which its official custodians have surrendered to the form of indifference in "*amat.*" This is the form, *amavimus* (we have loved), *vicimus* (we have won), *fuimus* (we have been). In this form we have a plurality of subjects claiming to have done as one man one and the same act in the past. "We" in *amavimus* is a merger between speakers and listeners. One man's word and the other man's listening have led to action. This common action we now can give the tale. All history is the tale of acts in which some speaker and some listener have become one. "We" always has to come about by speech. As animals, we have no "we" status in us. When a man has asked a woman to love him and she has responded, there exists a "we" who can experience together. When soldiers have obeyed their officers, there exists now an army whose campaigns may unfold! But never is there any animal "we." All "We's" are historically created by a successful fusion of some speaker and some listeners.

History then is the inside story of a We group—if it is history! But our historians who are not historians, but scientists by intent, pretend that "we" and "they" are words of the same quality. That our history and the history are purely descriptive and therefore they write scientific histories. In these third person histories, the villain is not in us but in the outside world. We are made to believe that we, the historians and the readers, of the historical books, are seated in some grandstand of the opera as onlookers. Mr. Toynbee and Spengler have popularized this view.

If anyone asks how to discern the We of genuine history-writing from the "they" stories of the alleged science of history, it is very simple. All scientific history books must foster a plural of histories. Toynbee has 21 civilizations, Spengler has six. The average college teacher of history distinguishes Spanish, French, Croatian and Mexican histories and innumerable others; the more scientific history becomes, the more numerous do become the histories. "They" can be said of any group and nation, big or small. Harlem has a history, the Bronx has a history, Manhattan has a history, it would appear. The subdivisions of a third-person-history crave multiplication.

But our story would not be our story if it were many. Our history is the story of us who have spoken to each other. We who have our history to tell, first must have been on speaking terms with each other! To have spoken to each other is the indispensable base for our right or capacity of saying "We!"

All "we's" are historically produced by processes of speaking and listening to each other. And the very term "we" sponsors the successful fusion of speakers and listeners into a noticeable and more or less perpetual unity. Hence the normal sentence with we will be a story, and the verb of a story normally will be in the past. *Amamus* (we love), therefore, is not as original a form as *amavimus*.

The modern mind deliberately declines to distinguish between "We" and "they" statements. For the modern mind is based on a dogma. And this dogma runs: Natural man speaks. Speech is part of man's nature. All people can say "we" or "they" as they please. This academic lie makes of Thucydides and Tacitus and Macaulay and Gregory of Tours and Voltaire scientists of an objective world despite the fact that every one of them felt himself a faithful child of the history which he tried to rewrite as "our history."

Again the Alexandrian grammar is in favor of this lie as

amat
amamus
amatis
amant

follow *amo*, *amas*, without delay. How can adults rid themselves

from inveterate habits which have surrounded them since their seventh year?

It is only in grave catastrophes that we have to dig beneath such inveterate habits because they threaten our very existence. In today's crisis, the simplest reactions of a citified product of our educational system are uncertain. He is so objectified that he has lost his roots in his "We" history and his direction towards the people for whom he has to care. For twenty years a young lawyer or doctor or teacher or minister has been filled with a picture of his social relations which ultimately hails from Alexandria's decaying society.

The crisis of our human relations has awakened me to the necessity of elevating grammar to the rank of a social science. Higher grammar tells us of our innate faculties of reason, authority, wisdom, experience. A higher grammar must reinstate the reality of speaking and listening people in the place of the nightmare of a speechless thinker who computes a speechless universe. The Alexandrian table of forms, *amo, amas, amat, amamus, amatis, amant* then will be discarded. It is the end product of a secondary process which has tried to obliterate the foundations of speech. The primary of speech to this day allots different forms of statement to different states of man. As he, as I, as you, as we, Charles William Jones leads a different life.

Hence his sentences are spoken in a different vein. To teach

the Alexandrian list

I love
you love
he loves
we love
you love
they love

suppresses the difference in emphasis. The child is made to believe that I love and you love and we love may be said in a similarly flat voice as he loves or they love. And this, indeed has been the result: our educated classes have come to deny emphasis. But the volume of emphasis which goes into I love, or we love, or you love, is the specific value of these sentences. Their emphasis sets them apart from the sentence "he loves." The sentence "he loves," is justified if it is true and not false.

But the sentence "I love," is justified if it is an act of faith and not shameless. The sentence "you love" is justified if it has a healing and not an insulting quality. The phrase "we love" is justified if it is based on experience of a common life and not on an abstract dogma.

third person:	Truth	Falsehood
first person:	Faith	Shamelessness
second person:	Love	Hate
third person pl:	Life lived	dogmatic assertion

Emphasis is the strength of tone. And the strength of tone reflects the degree of our immersion into what is said.

In a different state of aggregate, we intone differently because the atmosphere in which we speak differs.

An illustration of this fact is offered by the Society of Friends. The Friends thee and thou, among themselves. And a modern storywriter tried to imitate their conversation by letting them speak in sentences like "thee go." He slipped. The Friends use thee as a third person. They use the emphatic thou as the vocative of God in prayer. But the accusative thee is treated as a third person. They therefore say: thee lives, thee goes, thee speaks. When we ourselves speak of "poor me," we also go on to phrase our say in the third person: poor me is sick. Old one is tired. Me, thee, he, are accusatives. They are not of the same volume as I, thou, Socrates. They are governed—as accusatives by the objective world outside the subject; hence, the speaker of the me-sentence does not feel its action to flow from his own center.

Me is sick, I say because I look at myself as an objective fact. I have painted this, I have spoken, puts the indelible stamp of personal decision under my word. The accusatives of the personal pronouns share the impersonal character of the third person and of the indicative. The case which we call accusative, neutralizes the "accused" so that his own subject as man or woman is renounced in favor of his now being an object of perception for everybody else.

The Quakers in saying: thee lives, the speaker by saying: Me does not know, disclaim any pretense to personal emphasis of either confession or imposition!

In these factual forms of, thee lives, me does not know, our own theses are confirmed by contrast. If the speaker and the listener wish to objectify their own existence, they place the unemphatic mask of being third persons upon themselves, and they conjugate the verbs accordingly as though thee and me were third persons. It follows, that I and thou have a different quality from me and thee and therefore I go, *amo*, is in fact linguistically an old optative or subjective! Originally, the indicative did not exist except for third persons. To this day, a vestige of this is preserved in the distinction we make between he is and I am. "Am" is taken from a very different source of inspiration compared with "is." The two words have nothing in common. The original list of the indicative was

me is
 thee is
 he is
 it is.

The original ego-centric ejaculation, I am, stood far away.

But that is as it should be with us, too. Children and adults should feel that whenever we say "I" we combat the pressure on the lid of our mouth, which advises us that we speak of the Ego. The Alexandrian pest has removed this feeling. But human nature has come back with a vengeance. Stammerers and stutterers, self-conscious and shy people testify to this. As the schools try to make I and thou as unimportant as the he or it, the shy person is apt to overemphasize the subjective character of any sentence, and he will not even utter the most harmless sentence in the third person. Once the fundamental distinction in emphasis is jettisoned, the school teacher and the timid soul both are right. The teacher by requiring that I and thou be pronounced as indifferently as he or it; the timid soul longing to say nothing at all, as to speak of him or it is misconstrued as being as shameless as to say I or thou! Once the ways of speech are confused, the brazen intellect will obliterate all distinctions by speaking of everything: the intellect neglecting the real social life between speakers and listeners. The timid soul will obliterate the distinctions by speaking of nobody: the soul

neglecting the neutral objects which do not involve the speaking or listening people.

Brazen objectivity and whispering shyness are social malaises which spring from an insecurity of grammatical distinctions. And they will abound, if grammatical distinctions have ceased to function as expressions of social realities and states of emphatic living.

This example may help to illustrate the purpose of this essay. The reclamation of grammar as the Baedeker of social relations is not a luxury. The Alexandrian lists of grammatical forms cauterize the social sensibilities of the objects of our educational system. The falsehood of our grammar is the reason why we should begin to build up higher grammar. For the wrong grammar is not ineffectual. It does positive harm.