

SPEECH AND REALITY

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INTRODUCTION BY
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CHAPTER 3

THE UNI-VERSITY OF LOGIC, LANGUAGE, LITERATURE¹



A Program for Collaboration

EUROPE CELEBRATED THIS YEAR the centenary of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). And an attempt like the present to unify the cosmos of thought, literature, speech, can find no better patronage than the name of Wilhelm von Humboldt. For his ambition had been the *human* cosmos. His brother Alexander, after his travels through America, wrote the famous pages on the cosmos. Wilhelm rivalled with him and set off against the natural "cosmos" a second world no less complex or startling. He studied all the languages in his reach, not only the Semitic or Indoeuropean but the Chinese, Basque, Amerindian, and South Sea tongues as well, because he believed that the structure of language contained the secrets of national individuality, of history, of man's creative destiny. He treated languages as a historian of philosophy might study the many schools of Greek thought, not for their own sake but for a complete picture of the possibilities of the human mind.

Humboldt's legacy was left unused. It is only in the last years that scholars have begun to take stock of the 250 or 300 languages of mankind as one great and marvellous disclosure of the

¹ Address first given to the Philosophy Club at Dartmouth College in 1935.

human mind. To Humboldt, language was a finished product rather than a process of production. Therefore, the way a child learns to speak could not furnish the clue to the creative process handed down to us in language. On the contrary, any comparison drawn from the children's nursery must be misleading. It is in the highest zones of our own intellectual life that we must look for analogies when we try to discover the energies which created speech and are regenerating it today.

Under Humboldt's auspices, then, I am waging war against the venerable superstition that philosophy can be successful without philology, or vice versa. To me, language, logic, literature are various forms of crystallization in one process. With this hypothesis I seem to violate the central dogma of philosophy. But *amicus* Plato, *magis amica veritas*. And I am afraid the solution will not satisfy at all the behaviourist or even the pragmatist or any partisan of a more or less monistic school. We are neither idealists nor materialists. There are many predecessors in the field, Thomas Carlyle, John the Disciple, in his character as the author of the Gospel of St. John, Friedrich Schlegel, Hamann. Especially in the last twenty years, men like Majewski, Ebner, Buber, Cuny, Royen began to develop forms of thinking which may enable us to describe the unity of thought, speech, and literature.

This new trend is by no means an accident. Without such an effort, the confusion in the social sciences and in the humanities would increase. The deplorable lack of method in the social sciences springs from the sterilizing attitude of the philosophers. Pride always acts as a sterilizer. And it was certainly the pride of philosophy that it was beyond speech and not at all at the same level. Language was material, thought was idealistic. Thought was in process, language in being. What if Humboldt is right and language is in process?

What if Carlyle were right, and thinking is precisely as much of myth-weaving and dancing the dance of the seven veils as any sartor resartus can produce? Before going on, I had better admit that the correct title of this paper would be "Thought, Language, Literature," or, on the other hand, one could have coordinated the three sciences involved: Logic, Linguistics, Lit-

erary criticism. In one case, the enumeration would have embraced three activities represented in the division of humanities; in the other, their three subject matters. However, the alliteration of the three "I's" proved too strong an enticement. Thus my mind fell into the trap of language at the very beginning, and I am giving myself away as a pointed example of language's power over a man's logic.

Logic, Philosophy, wishes to be a science, the science which can tell us when something is true. Being a "Science" of truth, philosophy scoffs at the suggestion that language has to be interpreted and bookwriting as well when thought is examined. Whenever a critic called the thinker a mere myth-weaver or a sartor resartus like any poet or maker of books, philosophy paid no attention. The logician, proud of his scientific character, prefers symbolical logic to the modest confession that he is a writer of books and a speaker of words. It is strange that departmental wrath should be roused by a statement which allows the philosopher to bridge the gulf between the scientists and everybody else. Should he not be proud to be the model man who is allowed to represent the genuine liberty of man to speak his mind? But to come home from the Odysseys of the special sciences, to the common truth for all, seems less satisfactory than to be an expert in a special science of truth.

In stating now the case of the philologist, we cannot quote individual opinions so much as the departmental situation. This situation does not suggest that languages are in need of any philosophy. I studied Greek, Latin, Arabic, Gothic, without ever hearing of any linguistic principle. The departments are simply divided according to languages. When Rudyard Kipling produced his notorious speech as Rector of St. Andrews, in which he asserted before the student body that the first man who invented speech must have been a liar, a man who wanted to cheat his fellow men, there was no roar of protest from the philologists to call him to order. Modern linguists do not think that the power of language is intimately connected with the power of truth. They do not assume that, as Aristotle said, truth is the obvious aim in speech, and lying only secondary. The whole idea of levels in speech depending on its nearness to truth is

unheard of. The science of truth and the sciences of languages are separated. Language is thought of as being a tool, a gadget at man's ready disposal to serve him whenever he wishes to put up this or that air. Looking down upon the age of revelation, we are safely embarked on an age of vilation, words being degraded to the level of brass tacks.

Turning to the third group of activities, literary criticism and comparative literature, things are somewhat different. Not that the philosopher learns from the critic, but the literary critic sometimes makes the deepest remarks on logic and language which fatally remain unheeded by logicians and linguists. I remember, for example, certain lines in Mr. Thibaudet's book on "Trente Ans de Vie Francaise" which may serve as an illustration how even laws can be discovered which completely escaped the logician or the linguist. Thibaudet focuses on the fact that Bergson's famous use of the word "Durée," duration, is a deviation from common usage:

Une chose qui dure signifie d'ordinaire une chose qui ne change pas. Au sens bergsonien, durer c'est changer, changer comme on change en vivant. Dès lors dans "je suis une chose qui dure" le verbe être n'est pas à sa place. Le mot "je suis" empêche la durée de couler. C'est que la langue est l'oeuvre d'une métaphysique substantialiste inconsciente et que la philosophie devrait, si en elle était capable, se créer un autre langage, quelque: je deviens un avenir qui dure. Mais il est conforme à une loi plus profonde encore que la philosophie, s'insérant dans un langage qui est fait contre elle en épouse la direction pour la dépasser.²

So here the critic drops the utopian suggestion that the thinker should invent a language of his own, and assures us

² A thing that lasts signifies commonly a thing that does not change. In the Bergsonian sense to last means to change, change the way one changes while living. Hence in "I am the thing that 'lasts'" the verb to be is not in place. The word "I am" hinders the flow of duration. Speech is the work of substantialist, unconscious metaphysics and philosophy would have to create for itself, if it was capable of doing so, another language like: I became a future that lasts. But language conforms to a law still more profound than philosophy, and philosophy has to fit into a language made against it, and must go in language's own direction in order to become capable of surpassing it.

that according to an even more profound law, philosophy must be interpolated into language like an insertion, must go with the language in language's own direction in order to become capable of surpassing it. What a depth! What tremendous consequence for the history of language! What a teaching to the philosophers who always try to extrapolate language and to become fishes on land. We learn here that the philosopher speaks. Still he uses the word in an extreme sense and thereby surpasses the limits of the word's meaning. Words return into language changed and transformed, sometimes petrified and paralyzed after having passed through the thinker's mill.

Now if words cannot leave the realm of thought unchanged, any philosopher's mind is the seedbed of language. Words die in our brains and are resurrected. To think means to translate from one language into another better language. At this moment we are not so much interested in the final truth of Mr. Thibaudet's discovery as in the fact illustrated by our quotation that thought does something to language. It kills words, for example. If this is true, philology must inquire what logic does to language. And logic can no longer remain indifferent to the fact that it has duties towards language. That is why we wish to speak here of thought, speech, and literature as one united effort of mankind to disclose or to conceal the truth.

Our hypothesis is that they are rays of one fire burning in man to communicate to or to hide from his fellow man his share of truth. And we throw out the hypothesis that thought, language, and literature, in so far as they are means of concealing or revealing truth to ourselves, to a partner, or to all men, are ruled by the same laws. Without such an hypothesis, our intention might be misinterpreted as analogous to the many warnings of wise men to give heed to language. These warnings are, of course, of great usefulness. Perhaps I may quote from Whitehead some lines on language: "Language delivers its evidence respecting the width of human experience in three chapters; one on the meaning of words, another on the meanings enshrined in grammatical forms, and third, on meanings beyond grammatical forms and beyond individual words, meanings miraculously revealed in great literature." It is one of the great

joys to find restated, in an age of prose, the contributions to truth made by poetry. But though grateful for Whitehead's restoration, we shall go a step further, for which we are not at all sure of his approval but which opens the possibilities of a wide realm of new information and research.

In some of Thomas de Quincey's Essays he gets near to our viewpoint. When he discovered that the Greek idea of an enthymeme³ was not limited to the formal omission of one link in a syllogism, but that the field of the enthymeme was the whole realm of life in which a man tries to give an account of life and reality without the help of expert knowledge, he faced the central situation in which thought, speech, and literature are all present in one creative effort. The utter contempt of philosophers for oratory must not blind us to the fact that any speaker on the platform tries to speak his mind in a lasting way, and that therewith, he is struggling with the living word in a unified effort. He has to think in the monologue we call thought, he has to speak to an audience by which he gets involved into a dialogue, and he is hoping for a lasting effect by which his words shall become detached from the moment and take on the power of outlasting more than one occasion. In this sense, one might say, a speech from the hustings of Athens, looked at not with the impatience of the Platonist but with the devotion of an ethnologist, discloses the threefold character of words: in the monologue the man is thinking aloud; in the dialogue, he is speaking to his hearers, and in the pleologue of "a 'possession forever," he speaks for future recollection. By "*pleologue*" I mean a kind of speech which can be presented to more than one audience, *pleo*, *pleion* being already used in this sense in natural science. From the monologue, thinking branched off as a special realm, and from pleology was developed literature.

Today, with two thousand years of contempt for rhetorics behind us, we think of thought and literature as two activities which are practically separated from linguistic problems. We exercise our reason today by reading or writing articles and books. The intermedium stage of speaking our mind is rarely inserted.

³ Enthymeme—leaving out a link in the deduction when coming to a conclusion.

This creates the illusion that we can think outside the realm of speech. This belief is at the bottom of modern epistemology. And it seems to me this fallacy is also betrayed in Kipling's witty remark on the first speaker as being a liar. Kipling thought of his hero as a man who could tell lies because he knew the truth *outside* of his speech. The modern thinker conceals from himself the fact that no thought can come in the ken of the majority of man except in listening. Most people partake in the reasoning process by listening and answering. The electric induction of the dialogue makes us partners in truth. Once the social situation is over, we are empty again.

The idea that man is thinking all the time extends the special attributes of a thinker's situation to the man on a football team or the people in the kindergarten or a typist's office. In reality, we discover as many new things about ourselves or about the world or about our beliefs through speaking out and writing down as by thinking inwardly. The revealing and concealing process is equally at work in all three aggregate states. This could be overlooked by optimists to whom thought within a mind seemed to be always aiming at the truth. But man is as eager to betray himself as others, and uses as many tricks to cheat his own conscience as that of others. Thought is, in itself, no more proof against the fallacies of passion, prejudice, and interest than speech or writing. Thinking can be myth-weaving exactly as fiction is. And literature struggles for truth just as desperately as thought. We have no reason either for a special optimism in regard to thought's sincerity or for a particular pessimism with regard to the book writer's mendacity.

When we ask ourselves what can help us to reduce the forms of thought, the forms of language, and the forms of literature to one source-alphabet of forms by which man veils and discloses himself to society and by which society itself is disclosed or veiled, we can point to Goethe's remark on a "Source-Alphabet," *Uralphabet*, existing in mankind. This primeval statement was, after all, made by a master of the word, perhaps its greatest and most comprehensive embodiment for centuries. For Goethe was a singer and narrator of his folklore and mother-tongue, the most reflective philosopher of nature, and the cre-

ator and champion of the idea of a *Weltliteratur*. He had been told by a physiognomist that, judging from his skull, he was the born popular speaker. Not only were thinking, speaking, writing all equally powerful in Goethe, but he never doubted that they were at bottom one and the same process. That conviction makes his aphorism on a human *Uralphabet* important.

So let us again risk the assumption that man is essentially concerned with disclosure and velation. That man is divided from animal nature by the one fact that any group, nation, tribe, member, human individual, wherever we find him is occupied in justifying himself to himself, to others and to the kind. This explains why he is wearing clothes, why he is making speeches, why he is reasoning and why he is writing books. It explains also why we are all listening to the scruples of ourselves, to the gossip of our neighbors and to the wisdom of the books. Man is in every moment bound up with his kind in a way no animal is. At every given moment man answers for his attitude by true or false statements. He is perpetually active in disclosure and velation, perpetually passive in enclosure and reception. Mankind is present where a man exists. The ambassadors of the kind to its members may be the man's mind itself, or the ears of a partner, or the eyes of a reader, or all three. But they all speak and ask for information on behalf of the kind. And man answers, by revealing or concealing, all the time his attitude.

With this as a basis, it is not improbable that a uniform structure may permeate the mental, linguistic and literary processes by which man answers for his behaviour. Why should we in thinking with ourselves use a structure completely different from the structure of an account written for the public, or a response given to our parents in so many words? Differences like that between slang and Oxford English may exist between shorthand thinking and longhand writing, but there is, for example, not the slightest reason why in writing a book we should be expected to know the general subject first and the paragraphs and sentences much later, while in the reasoning process, we are presented as marching forward from one short syllogism to the next. It is more probable that a man's thought is one great

unity, precisely like a book. And the logical connections between the shortest particles of this great one book of thought within himself are of little importance either to God or himself. A logical error would then have the weight of a fly sitting on an elephant's back. The structure of the elephant thought is not altered by a break in the chain of syllogisms. The philosopher's notion that he has refuted his opponent when he has proved a logical slip is a poor idea. A man's real thought is not even touched by this kind of argument. A man's thought is as much of a piece as a nation's literature.

The great process in man which is expressed by the polarity of disclosure and dissemblance, we may perhaps call our answerableness. This perpetual stream of answers is given in the face of the man's world, under the eyes of man's God and to the ears of man's kind. Mankind, world, God, whoever is addressed, still one of the three is addressed and must be addressed either by thought, speech or book by every human being in every moment of his life. Often the group acts on behalf of its members, declaring to other groups what it stands for. But declarations of independence or declarations of interdependence are made incessantly by humanity.

The calls, expressed in these declarations, may reflect intentions, or memories, complaints or war-cries, doubts, or certainties, desires or fears. It is always an *apologia pro vita sua*, whether a nation, a great poet or a burdened conscience explain to Geneva or to posterity or to God what they are actually compelled to become. We say with purpose "compelled to become." Because the alleged activity of man is greatly exaggerated by all those thinkers who forget man's answerableness. Man's activity is pretty much limited to the choice to conceal or to disclose the truth of what is happening to him. To him who does not like to betray himself, the most he can say of himself is that he did not make himself or his so-called actions, whereas he was indeed able to decide about his amount of hypocrisy about his actions. Our contribution to our biography is essentially our decision how far we can go with the truth. We all cannot go very far. But the classification of a person's power is greatly derived from the differences in this respect.

In other words, man's real action is contained in the myth-weaving or truth-disclosing business. This is our action. For the rest we belong to nature. Now, a venerable tradition pretends that thought is theory and that hands are practical. From the point of view that man is an answerable creature, thought, speech, and literature are his greatest actions. Because society is constantly determined by a man's choice to obey his fear and to dissemble the truth, or by his courage to tell himself or others what is the matter. Society is constantly changed and transformed by these confessions or suppressions of what just happens in our minds, our groups, our destinies. And this is a material process also, as Erasme de Majewski pointed out. Anybody knows that words can be noisy, that our senses are strained by hearing and following an argument, that a long meeting can ruin our nerves.

Still we are constantly denying the obvious truth that it takes energy, physical energy to tell the truth. That most cases of lying are just so many cases of mere weakness, because we have not the nerve to tell the other man quite what we think of him or ourselves. Our statement that man is involved all the time in a process of reportage and self-justification can now be supplemented by the other that man is often not in a position to obey this challenge. The spark which he is expected to send into the network of electric current in the community does not come because he feels too weak and wishes to conceal his weariness. That makes him lie or reticent in times where he would speak, it makes him obdurate where he would listen if he just felt strong and healthy enough.

Concealment thereby is losing its equality with disclosure. Velation is shown to be the escape from disclosure. It is dependent on the fact that there is disclosure of truth all the time. Like cold as compared to warm, or ill as compared to healthy, lying is nothing in itself, but a possibility furnished by the existing precedents of truth. Society is based on truth, on the truth of its members' answers, because all efficiency of lying and hypocrisy is based on the successful usage of means sanctified by their connection with true statements made before. We can only play safe because others were foolish enough to speak their mind. Thus we can quote them.

Now we have enumerated already, in a casual way, some modes of behavior in the process of disclosure. A man can hear a command, he can intend to go somewhere, he can announce an emotion, remember a common experience, or he can try to describe simply what happens to him whenever he takes up the receiver and begins to trust the electric current of the living word. Perhaps we can find that language, literature and the sciences taken here as the realm of thought show traces of a certain equilibrium between these different forms or modes of expressing the truth. In case the different ways of informing the kind form a certain system, the original source alphabet of the human soul would become real.

Let me begin with a most simple statement. It is a trite truism that poetry may be divided into dramatic, lyric and epic forms. It is or seems a platitude that grammar knows of imperative, indicative, subjunctive or optative. It is not difficult to see that in an offhand way the comparison between lyrics and the optative is more striking than, let us say, the participle in grammar, that the march of dramatic action fits well into the scheme of a grammatical imperative, and that the epic style and the indicative of grammar reflect the same mood.

This offhand remark must of course be deepened and corrected. Now, the dramatic plot and any imperative have this in common, that both are pointing forward to an unsettled future. In primitive Greek drama the unsettled thing is often only the recognition of older facts, the *anagnorismos*; still, the "*Heimarmene*," fate, is felt on the stage even in such a case. How much more if—in modern tragedies—the end is left uncertain till the last minute. Likewise he who acts under the dramatic compulsion of an impetus which leads on into an unknown future is involved in a process in which he will be moulded. The uncertainty about the future combined with a disregard of the past, the paradoxical dependency on the future despite its risks is felt in the case of the imperative and of the drama.

Compared with drama, any epical description like the shield of Achilles in the *Iliad* or the lyrics of Anacreon are both relatively timeless. They are both much less interested in the time element of the experience they try to convey. An external fact is described, an inner movement is pictured. As to the memories, quotations,

formulas about the past, the unavoidable conventional elements in any poetry, they are turning the man and his audience to the past. Epic and formula in poetry are often taken to be one. But it is more fruitful to discriminate between the hieratic elements in poetry—like the Homeric *Ton d'apomeibomenos prosephe nephele gereta Zeus*,⁴ this collection of nouns and participles, and the descriptive elements which indicate, by their vigorous verbal indicatives, the active and present observation.

Indeed, the past found quite a different expression in grammar than the simple indicative. The perfect with its frequent reduplication as in the word memory itself, in *dedi, perdidi, pepuli*, etc., shows what sharp a tension exists between the short root of the imperative *dic, duc*, go, march, the indicatives "it rained," "it snowed," and the reduplicated or prolonged form by which man tried to characterize the miraculous standstill of the past: "*Ewig still steht die Vergangenheit*."⁵

Now on the level of complete literary works, there seems to be the same contrast between the dramatic and catastrophical suddenness of explosion in a tragedy and the wide-swung, well-balanced formula of the conventional language of the law for example with its breath-taking regarded, regarded furthermore, whereas . . . whereas . . . and so on for pages. Here, or in Homer's recurrent lines, a quieting influence is secured because the past is fully represented and resumed, the known precedes the unknown, and before our speech turns to the future, we dwell in the past.

To point forward and backward in time and to look inward and outward ourselves in space are four perpetual situations of man. In any given moment, a living being is exposed to the possibility of repeating the past or cutting him off from his past, and it is given the choice to withdraw into its inner self or to look and lose himself in his environment. In all these respects man is not distinguished from other life on earth. His distinction comes from the fact discussed before, that he must give an account of his choice as to past or future, inner being and outward action, to the world, to God, or his kind.

⁴ Answering him responded the cloud gatherer Zeus.

⁵ "Eternally still stands the past." (Friedrich von Schiller)

Now it is obvious that he can describe or disclose his choice as well by one word as by a whole book. As a matter of fact, one book is only one thought, or at least the good books are. All the wealth of ideas in a book must not conceal the fact that one book has its significance from its unity, not its variety. And as such a unity, it is only one thought, one word, one exclamation of man. The chapters, the paragraphs, the sentences and the words are mere particulars out of which *monumentum aere perennius*⁶ of the book was built. Therefore the attitude of a book being one thought and one word only, can well be defined by asking ourselves how far it is concerned with the description of an outward process, or wishes to reflect an inner movement or pushes forward to a solution in the future or is reproducing the past.

Naturally, any book can mix these four attitudes, but it must use these four cardinal attitudes precisely as a man who speaks can shift from perfect to imperative, from indicative to subjunctive (or optative) and still is bound to move within these forms of decision about our situation in time and space. As long as the biologists overlooked the polarity of inward and outward, and the philosophers that between the past and the future, the identity of the grammar of society with the grammar of language could be overlooked.

The identity is repeated, as I have shown in my sociology, on higher and higher levels of life. Here it may suffice to follow the division of inward lyric, outward epics, backward-looking formula and forward-pushing drama upon the next higher level of literature. Poetry is only one form of expression. And our suspicion must be raised by a division which seems to identify the classes of poetry with the forms of grammatical flexion. What about other forms of speech? Prose, legislation, prayer? one asks immediately. Indeed, poetry itself is only one type of expression, and we can say that prose is its natural peer. Even orthodox linguists are looking now into this direction. Meillet showed some years ago that the earliest Indoeuropean language had prosaic and poetic words for the same processes and forces, like heaven, earth, fire or water. And Royen drew the conclusion from similar

⁶ A monument longer lasting than ore (Horace on his verses).

discoveries that language could well be imagined as pluralistic, inasmuch as it would differentiate things and concepts simultaneously under different systematic principles. Indeed, nobody can speak one language only. Man's reality is at least fourfold.

The four forms of lying tell the same story. Fiction, lying, hypocrisy and cant are four styles of concealing our truth. The imperative is the form which abhors lying most. For to use "cant" means only to repeat participles and formulas, to lie means to conceal external facts, fiction is the arbitrary invention of inner sentiments, but a hypocrite dissembles the imperatives of his actions.

Scientific prose is, though not the only one, still a match for poetry. Prose leads to figures and equations, poetry to analogies and semblances. If this shall be true, prose must be at least as differentiated as poetry. The unity poetry we had found to be divided into the descriptive, the formula, the lyric and the dramatic element. Inside the realm of scientific prose we find as many completely different departments of language as in poetry. The grammatical forms of imperative, indicative, optative and participle are recomposed in prose by oratory, mathematics, philosophy, and history. Political speech is the articulation of an imperative; philosophy reflects on our inner thought. Mathematics analyze relations in space and accomplish the creation of a language perfectly objective. A mathematician is able to express himself in language valid for all. Any philosopher, by the very fact which we learned from Thibaudet that he corrects words, retreats into an inner world into which not everybody can follow him. And that among scientific prose, all pure narration looks backwards and tries to conjure up the past and to quote its speech and utterances as faithfully as possible needs hardly saying.

Balancing new prose and poetry as units—and by prose I am speaking of prose in the sense of science and rationalization—weighing them in their functions in society, we feel that prose is less an expression of our wishes and desires, of our inner emotions than of our external observations. Poetry is the guardian of the inner processes. But the fact remains that both prose and poetry, even taken together, are only in charge of two modes of our conscious life, of the elating optative of our inner self and the analytic indicative of the external world.

The two other wings of man's expansion into time, present and future, are occupied by two other types of speech, the past by ritual, the future by all the imperatives mastering our life, beginning at the bottom with "keep right," and ending at the peak with "do right." At first sight, we may seem to compare uncomparable weights. Is the imperative and the participle really of equal importance as the bulk of prose and poetry? Here, the bookish tradition of two thousand years is visited upon us. It is true, we do not meet the imperative and the ritual in the classroom, or the lecture hall or the laboratory or the library. For the imperative this fact was eloquently stated by Wilhelm Horn in his book on *Sprachleib und Sprachfunktion* (*The Body of Language and the Function of Language*).

He says: "The great influence of the imperative on all the other forms of the verb is not astounding when one observes our daily ways of speaking. It is possible to read many pages of a book, or to listen to long lectures, without coming across a single imperative. In the spoken language of everyday life, however, in the give and take of talking, the imperative occurs frequently." And we know today that in Greek and Latin the second person of the indicative was formed after the model of the imperative. "*Das*," (you give) for example, sprung from "*da*" (give) in Latin.

And it is equally easy to vindicate the ritual, this powerful realization of the past. It would be a superficial statement to think that ceremonies are simply in decay in the century of progress and that they are not fit to hold a candle to descriptive prose or elating poetry. The everlasting formula, the reduplication which guarantees us against the inroad of an uncertain future must not be of ecclesiastical shape. In these United States the lawyers are the priesthood of the formula. In fact, modern democracies find their most sacred ritual in parliamentary speech and procedure. At all occasions, whether suitable or not, the "anybody second?," "the motion is carried," and so on, show the tremendous power of the formula for binding society together.

It is this binding power which alone deserves to be termed religion. And perhaps this is the point where the change between the new realistic school of thinkers and the traditional can be seen most clearly. Meillet is perfectly willing to admit that religious ceremonies practically always use a language that differs

from that which a man uses in the ordinary course of life. "Whenever they perform rituals men return to manners of speech that are peculiar." This could be reversed with more propriety. For it is a logical mistake to seek the ritual outside the speech and to ascribe a special speech to the ritual. The special speech is the ritual. That's just it. Regardless of the contents of a man's speech, his degree of religious "boundedness" is marked clearly by all the occasions where he will use a conventional, a ritualistic, a solemn language. Established religion knows about this bondage, atheists try to forget it.

Man is answerable for reality and he fulfills this calling by preserving the full life of reality. All reality tends backward, forward, inward or outward. This means four original approaches to reality, and four different aggregate states for the speaker:

Man is beyond the It and I.
The "I" is boundless; "It" asks "why?"
By "you" I'm changed into your "thee,"
And all together sing their we.

And this is equally true of a nation which puts up legislation, sciences, arts and rituals, or when a writer shifts between novel, drama and lyric to express himself, or when the man in the street tours between his grammatical forms. To him who is interested in a more subtle terminology, let me say that I find myself in agreement with him that forward, backward, inward and outward, is perhaps too simple. Plasticity, conventionality, aggressiveness, and elation are more exact descriptions of the human attitudes. A man is plastic under the impact of an imperative, he is aggressive where he dissects the world by figures, forms, and the calculus, he is elated where he trusts his inner revelations, and he is conventional or repetitive where he reduplicates the past.

Reduplicating, plastic, elated and aggressive are, then, the potentialities of man as revealing or concealing truth. Thought, language, literature obey the same forming principles. The group, the high-strung artist, a nation like Italy today or Russia yesterday, an educated man or a savage—all are compelled to answer for one or more tendencies of self-realization whenever they think, write or speak. And realization is approached not in one way but by a

plurality of moods, the plastic, aggressive, elated and conventional. One cannot speak of man without listening to his own remarks about himself. He knows more than the indifferent scientist about the tragedy in and around him.

These discoveries imply far-reaching results for history, for psychology and sociology. I shall not try the patience of my readers by enumerating all the scientific problems which can now be tackled with a sure method. On the other side, I fear that without any practical application the new categories may appear too abstract. I think, therefore, one example might be taken from each of the three activities so that the results become tangible. These three activities of man being speech, thought, book-writing, we ask: what is the immediate contribution to our customary concept of grammatical processes? What is changed in our general outlook on literature? And third, what reaction can be expected from philosophy?

Ordinarily, our scheme for linguistic processes divides the tenses, the *modi*, the pronouns and the declension. We get a nice list: I love, thou loveth, he, she, it loves, we love, you love, they love. In learning a foreign language the "amo, amas, amat, amamus, amatis, amant" is a permissible scheme. But it betrays to me an unforgivable lack of imagination when a child is shown such a synopsis of his mother-tongue. In our mother-tongue we ought to know the deeper coordination of modes and tenses and pronouns.

Some pronouns belong to some forms immediately, and were imitated only superficially by derivative forms. "Think"—as an imperative—is an original, an eternal and perpetual form. "We shall think" is artificial, and "they shall think," also. Why is that so? The imperative is closer connected with you and thou than the indicative or the participle. One might even say: there would be no thou except for the imperative. The I, on the other hand, belongs especially to optative and subjunctive. And the it, not the he, is the original form of the indicative. In other words, a thoughtful grammar, a philosophical grammar, would stress the fact that three forms of the verb are related to three forms of personality. The synopsis should run: *ama, amem, amat*. Here

we have genuine and direct forms. The *we* belongs to the participle perfecti, perhaps.

In any case, the real creative effort and the later analogical extension are placed today in a misleading way before the child. As long as nobody had to learn his own language from the grammar book and dead and foreign languages were the only objects of philological treatment, the corpse could be treated as a corpse. Our own language should be disclosed to be our own living self, not a pedantic bed of Procrustes. Such a new synopsis would put an end to the easy objections to the "substantialism" or the "wrong metaphysics" of language about which we heard Mr. Thibaudet—and so many others—complain. The philosophers could no longer excuse themselves with the inadequacy of their "instrument" of expression. For it would become obvious that words and forms undergo a permanent circulation in any given period of time. Words which meant verbal action must be used as nouns the more often they are repeated, and thereby become incapable of expressing their original verbal meaning.

The transition from futuristic to finite significance, from motion to standstill, is the inevitable fate of living words. Tools, like an anvil or scissors, need not die. They are dead. And when it was thought that words were tools, one only thought of them as dead things. But life cannot be obtained without its price. And the price to be paid for life is death. That is why any generation, any speaker musters a churchyard of language and has, by his speech, to resuscitate the dead.

So much about the disguise of truth by our grammar books. In literature I wish to emphasize another side of truth. We can see now why a nation's health and hygiene in mental affairs depends on a sound equilibrium between the four tendencies of describing, and thereby dissecting, of singing and thereby elating, of listening to orders and thereby changing, and of thanksgiving and thereby perpetuating reality. Thus any special literature could be characterized by the proportions that are shown between its four central moods. Or take the literary aspect of the nineteenth century with its wealth of science, novels, and historical research. Liturgy, prayer, rituals practically dying out, the substitutes for a genuine occupation of the trend backward had to be invented.

Historicism replaced the ritual. It certainly is true that history looks backward. But it does this only as a subspecies in the sphere of prose. Prose is always analytic, dissecting, aggressive. So the part played by history writing during the last hundred years is explicable as an emergency-measure. But its failure is also explained because it was but a substitute. History-writing could accompany the triumphal march of the natural sciences, these clearest outposts of our outward tendency, but it could not hope to keep the full balance, because it remained enclosed in the general field of prose.

This fact explains the shift today to a decidedly unprosaic imperativic literature. It is no mere guess when we assume that the health of an individual and the wealth of nations may depend on a balance between prose, poetry, ritual, and imperative. This can be expressed grammatically by saying that any individual or group must remain capable of shifting freely and at the becks of fate from the subjective I to the objective it, and further to the listening thou and to the remembering we.

With this formula, we already encroached upon the proper field of philosophy, where I owe you my last example. There is nothing so well safeguarded by philosophers as the naive arrogance of the school that reality can and has to be divided into objects and subjects. This division is taken to be the division of the world. Alas, the world would not survive this division if it were to be taken seriously. It springs from a concealment and velation of the simple reality that the attitude in which we face the outward world as a subject is merely one perfunctory and transient function or mood among other functions and moods.

He who looks forward, for example, cannot know of any such division of the world. He acts, as we saw, under the compulsion of an imperative. He is initiated into the future because he is still plastic. He hears a command. The great fact of any ethical imperative, whether coming from above or below, from out or inside, is that I am not the subject of the imperative which I hear. Take the philosopher himself, setting out for thirty years of mere thinking. He called his basic axiom *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am). Thereby he gave it the innocent form of a scientific and prosaic statement. Dealing with science he

wished to express all the truth about himself in the style of indicative. But nobody can believe when a man at twenty-four resolves to devote his life to thinking that he is taking this step in a descriptive attitude of the *cogito ergo sum*.

Descartes listened to an *imperative*, the old imperative of the serpent: *Cogita et eritis*.⁷ And, it is true, by thinking he became what he was finally. But the *cogita* was not spoken by the same voice within Descartes which then set down for work. The *cogita* was spoken to him, not by him. And when he listened to his calling he was in that moment neither an I nor an it, neither a subject nor an object. "*Cogita*" cannot be said to be an object. And it cannot be said to be a subject either. Subjects and objects, both cannot obey to human speech. In any case, where we have an imperative, he who gives the command is an I, and that I will always be of superhuman size in the imagination of the person who receives it. The things which the philosopher is called forth to think about are his objects. He himself is something which is neither subject nor object.

The truth about man is that he can, luckily, never dream of becoming a pure subject or an object cog in the machine. It is always a degradation when a human person is treated as an object. And it is always an impermissible deification when he thinks of himself as a *prima causa*, as a real subject. Did he make himself? The exclusivity of the division into subject and object can no longer be defended on philosophical grounds since before man can make this division he must have obeyed the imperative "*cogita*," and this imperative is meaningless without an I that commands, and myself in the position of neither an "it" nor an "I," but a listening "thou," flying like a projectile from another, stronger arm's bow. Under the spell of being addressed I find myself in the plastic attitude which allows a man to be transformed into something different from what he was before. The thinker who divides the word into subjects and objects would not be able to do so had he not passed through a stage in which he was no analytic dissector. It is curious that reasonable persons believe in the universal validity of the division between objects and subjects.

⁷ Think and you will be.


For it is obvious that the lack of a third and a fourth noun is the real cause for this belief. People who have lived together, who have shared an experience, all those who can say "we" to each other and from each other are as little objects and subjects among themselves as the person named in the command. They, too, must be signalled out as a different kind of order. They are transformed by the common past. One could, therefore, offer a soothing drug to the pains of transcendental idealists who believe in objects and subjects only, by speaking of *prejects* for the "thou" or "you" under the imperative, and of *trajects* for the result of union in the we-participle. Once there is a word, everybody will begin to believe in the existence of the essence behind it. And let me say this: a name wrested from our lips in honest struggle for truth is in fact in most cases the standard bearer of a part of reality. By its name, a thing is called forth into life and put under the protectorate of the whole human society.

Man's projectiveness, his "*Geworfenheit*," is the problem of many modern thinkers, like Kierkegaard or Heidegger. Any child is "prejacent," i.e., nearer to the front of life, compared with its parents. On the other hand, we all crossed the stream of life several times before we came into our own; and each time it was a different crew that experienced despair and faith, success and failure in the same boat we were in. The term "we," i.e., those who were trajected in the same boat from one side of the river to the other, is a concept by which a common experience is stated. It is the reward of any life-history to make us members of a commonwealth or group which is willing to share our thanksgiving. Most of us are little exposed to the temptations of scientific aggressiveness or mystic subjectivism; we are satisfied with our trajective conservatism or blinded by our revolutionary projectivity.

It is, then, no arbitrary choice to pick the words projectivity and trajectivity so that they may rival henceforth with objectivity and subjectivity. As Mr. Thibaudet said, "*une loi profonde*," a profound law, governs the circulation of speech, thinking, and writing.

When I began thinking I was harassed by the allegedly scientific terminology of objects and subjects. I forgot all about this

division and began to determine my own system of coordinates by looking into life and society around me. Biology and sociology can agree on our cross of reality:



We then saw that man is not talking or thinking *about* these four potential situations in *one* language but that he is somebody different himself whenever he begins to listen or to think from one of these four angles of his real life. It is not given to man to cover his complex reality by one single style of his consciousness before our consciousness can claim to have recomposed our reality. If I understand Professor MacIver right he, too, wishes to vindicate a plurality of styles for "any science which makes the life of man its province."

No marriage would become the reality it usually is if there were not the four styles of (1) the divine command "love me"; (2) the elation of the honeymoon; (3) the hard reckoning of household economy; and (4) the security of the evening chatter and the common holidays. Any one phase of speech or style does not suffice to express our full experience of the life within and outside, before and behind us.

The mistake of all "isms," especially of rationalism,³ but of mysticism too, is that they pretend to reach by one single attack or emotion what is only given to those who are less short of breath. The process of perpetual re-inspiration differs widely from the tyrannic strokes of momentary inspiration. Thus, we had to look out for a vocabulary which would give a pointed description of the human styles rooted in those four different angles of our existence. When we called them Plasticity, Reduplication, Aggressiveness, and Elation, we certainly were naming them "a fortiori" which is a good rule in the process of giving names.

Nevertheless, these new names remained within the circle of our present article and discussion. They were perhaps striking, but they sacrificed to this quality their "pleological" value because

they were not reconnected with our traditions. Mere private words move in a vicious circle. Technical terms must become detached from our subjective theory; they have to enter the field of merciless competition and selection in the schools. They ought to be tested whether they are really indispensable or not. When a man knows two colors only, black and white, our problem is not to have him learn new terms for black and white but to make him see blue and green.

In a similar way we could not extrapolate the long academic history of objects and subjects. We had to respect the existing language. However, we could disclose the fictitious character of all claims for exclusivity raised by either subjectivists or objectivists. And so we reached a compromise. We kept the old terminology but limited it by two more technical terms. Thus we sacrificed beauty to continuity because we are writing scientific prose after having given vein to our poetical inspiration. To speak is itself a political action. And political action is always re-connecting new events to old forms of life. That is why true politicians always revel in compromise and why the poetic and creative inspiration of the first moment is always replaced by a prosaic technique. That is why both mere subjectivism or merciless objectivism are bad philosophy. And this is finally why our own program of the new method went itself through the different styles of self-expression till it could feel its way back into the great tradition.

This great tradition was a tradition within the schools of thinking. In these schools all possible ideas were taught and analyzed. But teaching and analysis are both rather late processes in the biography of words and forms. And for the very simple reason that the truth which a student is expected to grasp is supposed to be in existence when he enters the school, one fact was not mentioned in this academic tradition, nay it was shunned: that thinking takes time. The appropriation by the student—that took considerably much time. But this secondary process seemed unimportant to the pre-existence and everlasting of the truths themselves. The heroic fact that every moment truth comes to us like Pallas Athene from the head of Zeus was transmogrified into the hilarious experience of the academic vacations. When

the students left school for the long vacations that happy vacuum between two inspirations was produced which is one of the conditions for the perpetual process of re-inspiration or—and this is only another expression for re-inspiration—for the growth of truth. The emptiness and forgetfulness, these breathing spaces of a vacant mind, are no accidents in the process of thinking. Nobody can, shall or may think all the time! And we incorporate truth not without re-thinking the same problems. Thinking takes time.

That does not mean that any quantitative amount of seconds, hours or days is needed—as modern barbarians try to figure out. In our assertion that thinking takes time, the term time is used in the sense of “all the possible qualities which color time” or of phases of time which by their lawful sequence from impression to obsession to expression to definition represent a process in reality. “Time” is not meant as a merely external flux of astro-nomic units. It is meant as the ever changing flux of experienced time. The formula: thinking takes time, then, contains two statements: (1) our thought is dated; it comes to us as a moral obligation to think now and here. We must be willing to devote ourselves to this duty now and here, the 10th of July, 1935; (2) a plurality of various stages of the mind must be passed before we can pretend to have done our duty. To conceive or to understand a definition cannot be called a complete mental process of reasoning. Various phases must be experienced before thought can claim to have covered reality. Thought is a sociological⁹ and biological process. As such a process it can only be realized by circulating through a number of phases or stations. Thought, speech, writing are creatures and behave like all other creatures.

If thought is the crowning process of vitality, it can be made clear to the dogmatists why in the social sciences, or in life or in any book except in mathematics, definitions cannot come at the beginning but have to form the end of the mental process of which the book or the speech or the meditation is the expression.

Definitions are results. Any man of fine understanding knows this instinctively. But it can now be proved why this must be so and why mathematicians, legislators—in their legal definitions—and similar types are in an exceptional position.

A definition is man's last word in a series of words on the matter. It is true that last words can be handed down in classrooms for some thousand years as long as the credulity of the students will repeat them. But this transmission of the products to the latest generations has little to do with the process of finding the truth in actual production. The process of thinking *leads up* to the definition precisely as a trial ends in the defining sentence of the court. All language in a court or in a parliament leads up to a decision. But the decision is meaningless without the proceeding debates of plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiff argues on the objective break of the law; the defendant urges his subjective right to act as he did; the precedents bring up the past in order to enable the present court to form an opinion how far the case is the reduplication of former events. Finally the decision comes down upon the unsettled new and shapeless pre-jacent case and presses it into a legal form.

The due process of law contains all the elements of the mental process which we discussed previously, but represents or invests the different phases of the process in different persons. The attorney, the defendant, the counsel for defendant and the judge are four people. It is a complete misinterpretation of the process to take these people as speaking the same language. They are expected to sing in a different tune. The complaint of the plaintiff was, in former days, the real dirge. The murdered man was carried by his friends into the court, and loud and passionate "*planctus*," uttering loud cries and putting ashes on their heads, the relatives of the dead man forced attention and hearing upon their bereavement. They asked whether this was right or not. The criminal or unlawful event was made present, was embodied in their yells and gestures. When the corpse could not be brought into the court, a part of the body at least had to be presented. So naively had to be introduced the break of the law—what we call evidence today. The event had to be made *visible*.

The defendant would not allow the plaintiff to surpass him in dramatic activity. He would begin to unfold before the community his inner self. (The court, in those day, was the community.) He, of course, had great difficulties to reveal his inner state of mind, as he has today. His most sacred feelings, his al-

legiances to God and men, his religion, had to be disclosed. At this point, the remark on speech as a disclosure of truth gains its full significance. The words of a defendant must reveal his inner state of mind, the purity of his conscience, the absence of burdening memories, the harmony and peace of his interior. The old law used two devices for so perplexing a purpose. The defendant would dig up the deepest roots of his consciousness, conjure up the most remote ramifications of his motives and he would ask his nearest friends, two at least, but very often seven or twelve or more, to accompany this process of solemn self-denudation with a plain-chant in which they would assert his good faith in this process of dismantling his inner self.

While the sufferings of the murdered man had to be voiced most emphatically by his friends in dramatic complaint, so had the defendant, in his dangerous process of self-revelation, to be protected by his friends. So tremendous seemed the task to make a man speak his inmost mind that the deeper he was asked to delve the more helpers would stand around him. It was as if they should outweigh, by their solemn assertion of his good faith, the scar which is conveyed to any member of the community by a too public confession of his inner soul. We cannot reveal without breaking through the veil of convention and of reverence.

Shame is a mental attitude, without which man would not be under the degree of pressure which is needed for the production of truth. An important element in the process of language, thought and writing is man's bashfulness. In the due process of law, parties overcome their natural shame by a ritual of emotional excitement. Of this whole creative effort of former times little is left over today. Few people think of an oath as of a process of tremendous profound psycho-analysis, intended to lay bare a man's relations to God. In taking an oath, a man committed his whole future to the vengeance of his gods. He bound his presence in court, this short moment of a day, to all the rest of his life. Whereas the complaint brought the crime into the court from outside, the oath revealed the entire inner life, the hopes and fears of the man under accusation, to his judges.

What is so difficult for us to grasp is the meaning of the solemnity of the oath. External evidence is stated by rational speech.

But inward evidence has a style of its own. The superficiality, the plainness of mere description, trustworthy as it is in dealing with material facts, is utterly out of place when a soul is challenged to overcome its reserve and to tell the truth about inner facts. Our age mixes the spheres. It has lost much of the old wisdom which knew that the inward secret could not be stated in the same language as outward reality. Outward reality is secured by as *many* dates as possible. Inward reality is procured by intensifying speech up to a climax of white heat passion! Quantity for external evidence, but quality for internal evidence is the rule in court—and in philosophy. The oath is an attempt of intensifying, of condensing the utterance. It may not be successful any longer, but it indicates the pluralism of styles in any due process of law.

An impatient reader may object, at this point, that though he was willing to admit the pluralistic character of speech in legal procedure, he did not see its relationship to the process of thought in a philosophic debate; furthermore, is not the decision outstripped of all the preceding arguments and speeches? Can it not rest upon himself? What is the use of going backwards to the arguments of passionate parties after the debate is closed?

This brings us back to the central stream of our argument. The due process of law includes the different styles of human disclosure of reality because it is one of the models of complete human speech. It condenses into the proceedings of one day facts and feelings, memories and plans which stretch out over indefinitely more time and space. The definition is the quintessence of this condensed process. Now, the juridical and legal process is the matrix of philosophical reasoning. The Greeks carried it over from the *Polis* into the Academy. Plato never begins with a definition. How could he in a dialogue? We cannot begin with the last phase if we are not the appointed *legislators* of society! In framing a law, the legislator has full power to rely on trajected experience, collected from passionate and rational evidence. He derives his credentials from a community, from a "we"; hence his words are not his private words but the language of his community. When he formulates the law his words have undergone the full development of normal speech. They have been used in all their connotations. His words must have migrated over

their whole "area of meaning"—as Gardiner calls it—before he can nail them down to that concept which he wishes to convey by his formula.

The philosopher cannot begin as a legislator. He is without authority to speak the last word in the quarrel. As a school-master, he can dictate. But this kind of dictatorial teaching which fills bluebooks of students with definitions has nothing to do with philosophy. The philosopher is not sure of his community. Before he can decide anything, he must have waited for his community. He must have found his belongings, the group which is willing to share his problem, to hear his complaint, to act as his jury, to be moved by inner or outward evidence or by precedent.

There is no reason to complain that words have a wide area of meaning, are full of shades and are apt to lead to misunderstanding. The wideness of their area of meaning is their great quality. Without it, I would be unable to persuade the reader that some of the connotations of a word are less important for our common purpose than others. I could not carry the reader or listener to the point where he understands my intention to limit the word henceforth to a special task. I could not awake his interest in one special side of it.

Now this process of persuasion is the process of research in the social sciences. He who begins with the definition tries to escape from the rules of this process. He can be a mislocated legislator whose will for power seeks an outlet in writing and teaching. But he is no social scientist. For he declines to think loudly and to make thereby acceptable to his collaborators his process of reasoning. That is why I entertain some hope that the terms of preject and traject might prove useful. I did not choose them in the first phase of my own private reasoning. I did not use them when I pleaded my cause before the reader and recommended it passionately to his interest, as a fruitful discovery. They came to us as the finale. Any existing and tested thought is reduced into the directory like a telephone number under which we can call again. This is the value of a concept. We can call upon the reality condensed into it. A stranger coming to a place without any friends will find little comfort in the possession of the telephone directory of that place.

Concepts like preject or subject are on the border line of speech and dogmatism, life and petrification, research and library. Definitions are quite literally defining the frontier between studio and museum in man's art of thinking.

People who define on the first page analyze coagulated words. They start exactly at that point where the vital process ends. Coagulated speech, in its aggregate state of conceptual truth, is a corpse the anatomy of which can be highly useful. But anatomy of corpses knows nothing about life. Life includes precisely all the processes preceding death. That is why abstract reasoning is not the only reasoning process. It is not true that a man has reason, will and feeling as three departments of his vitality. Emotions, will, and memory are loaded with reasoning processes precisely as objective contemplation is. We are using our mental power equally in art and science, in education and in religion. The picture of a man shifting between will and contemplation (Schopenhauer), or between irrational mysticism and cold rationalism is a caricature of the nineteenth century.

The human cosmos is represented to completeness in every microcosmic act of inspiration. Man, like any living creature, is exposed to the four directions of time and space—forward, backward, inward and outward—in every actual process of thought or speech. The difference between his emotional, his imperatival and his rational state is one of arrangement, not of complete separatedness. Perhaps it may help to use numerals for the four elements, 1 for memory, 2 for imperative, 3 for rationality, and 4 for inner experience. Then, each process of thought will contain all the four elements; but the arrangement or sequence of the elements will vary in the different states of our mind.

- 1, 2, 3, 4 may describe ritualistic reasoning.
- 3, 1, 2, 4 can serve as formula for scientific prose.
- 2, 4, 1, 3 would do justice to the order of elements
when we are projected into obedience.

We can say that man is unable to think or to speak without using all four elements simultaneously. It is not the elements that differ in poetry, science, politics or religion. It is their arrangement. Man's mind is always complex, because it has to reflect the cross of our reality. Man's mind is rooted in a soul

which is able to take on the different forms of traject, object, subject and preject because it has to fight on all these four fronts of life in every given moment.

At this point, Mr. Karl Buehler's investigations fit into our own discoveries. However, it cannot be the purpose of this paper to deal with his studies in detail since he separates thought and language throughout. Our main purpose is the unity of the human cosmos, and the due process of life, death, resurrection, through which all mental energies flow.

Several applications have been given. In grammar, our mother-tongue should be presented to us as the introduction into the secrets of personality. In literature, books are all failures or gains for the sound equilibrium of national consciousness. Any one-sidedness of literature will be visited upon the nation by fatal suppressions of reality. And in philosophy the "cogita" obliges us to limit scientific thought to its proper field and time. Nobody "shall" think twenty-four hours a day, and nobody can use his mental powers in one "style" only. He is bound to alternate between them.

The "cogita," this charter of the scientist, is after all a sub-species of the general "Hark, Hear, Listen" which we extend to all man so naively whenever we lecture or teach or write books. And it is at this point, or better, this end of our rapid sketch, where we can reap the finest fruit of the new method. The only possible content of any human ethics which does not overlook man's most human capacity completely is revealed now. Any set of Pelagian rules for good behaviour will always end in utter failure when it pretends to go beyond pure conventions and utilitarianism, because it denies man's freedom and our life's incalculability.

Any substantial ethics aims at the non-human side of our experience, the zoological mechanics of outside happenings. But the quiver of true ethics holds no other arrows but the imperatives derived from man's talk with the universe. They run all like the first commandment: Hark, give ear! It is man's duty to hear and to listen to the voices of love and wisdom and the law. For the rest he is free. There is no such thing as an ethical material code. For might he not hear a voice louder and more

true than all these? The only ethical command which church and society can impose on man is: Give ear, think it over. The first thing society must guarantee to its members is time for recollection and reconsideration. It is the first need in our laws about marriage, for example.

Wherever a man thinks, he answers to objections made audible by his own conscience and memory; wherever he listens to his friend or foe he is a "*heteroakroates*," the hearer of somebody else; wherever he reads a book he takes part in the dialogue between absent or former partners. It will take a new and better collaboration among the disintegrated body of the sciences which are in research about man to describe completely the processes of language, literature and thought as aiming at the everlasting man who lives under the three commands *Audi! Lege! Medita!* (Listen! Read! Think!) These three commands are our human dowry. They are our only moral prescriptions of general character. They make human society the delicate, frail, loveable creature it is. And they are only three forms of one command. And is not all education based on this assumption? How could we dare teach students without believing in these three commandments? They are the only possible justification for the arrogance of man to write and speak and lecture.

It is the emergency in which we find youth, ourselves, society, which justifies our attempts to force their attention in the direction of our problems. It is because mankind is in need of new elements of reintegration that our new principles offer themselves as a method for the social sciences and the humanities. It is the pressure and seriousness of the imperative form on which depends the fruitfulness of all our indicatives.