

SPEECH AND REALITY

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy



INTRODUCTION BY
CLINTON C. GARDNER



ARGO BOOKS, INC.
NORWICH, VERMONT

CHAPTER 7

THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO SPEAK



1. *Everybody Speaking*

IN ALL THE FOREGOING chapters, speech connected people in responsory and correspondence. It was *interlocution* between beings who by such conversations became what they were called to be. This attitude is in contradiction with the usual attitude of the modern mind who wants to master language, who learns to make speeches. Our own times treat basic English or Spanish correspondence, or scientific German as purely "useful" studies. We think of speech in the first place as the question: do I speak? and as the fact that I, I with a capital letter, speak. Generally speaking, we may express this fact by saying: the individual, every individual is interested in his power and his right to speak. Language, in other words, has its definitely individualistic aspect.

From the individual's point of view language serves me and my purposes. In speaking without accent, a foreigner may gain access to a new community. "I speak," and "let me speak lest I choke," is everybody's experience at times. *What, then, does speech add to the individual?* What happens to me when I speak? This is the question of this chapter.

Our individualistic era may have to make its peace with the fact that all speech is One from Adam to the End of the World, that the spirit is One or not at all. But the world will never concede this point unless first every individual can feel sure of his own free speech within such terrifying unity. Hence

in this chapter we shall look at speech as man's *personal right*. And we shall worm our way into the heart of speech from a purely individualistic angle. By doing so, we may hope to discover some final terms for grammar because that which applies to every human being, would have the claim to be called valid.

In linguistics, it is not enough to have a theory about language. Since I at this moment am talking of talk and speaking of speech and writing of writing, my situation is much more desperate than when a zoologist thinks of toads. The toad does not listen in to the zoologist's lecture on the toad. But I myself as a speaking individual do indeed listen in to my own remarks on speech. The man who wants to speak and to be free to speak, within myself, listens in to my tirades on the meaning of speech. If the scientific Ego proposes any learned terms, my low brow "Me," must be able to feel secure, under such terms. The final terms for grammar can only be found if every human being under the sun can be made to realize that he himself is protected by these terms in his own birthright to speak freely.

But is man not real enough without speech? Does speech add to him anything except power? Is speech more than a tool? Man eats, sleeps, digests, mates, works, is young and gets old biologically. Is this not real enough? Why is it not real enough? Everybody knows that it is not enough. But when he is asked why, he often falters and doubts.

There is one simple reason for the answer: No. Biology is not enough because we crave for self-realization. And we do not call the larva of an insect the real animal. Neither do we give this name to the butterfly. Real is the insect in all its phases of life *together*. The *togetherness* of all the moments of life is the only real reality. Hence, the male in us is not the real man, neither is the female. The hoary head is not the whole human being; neither is the baby. "Real" always is more comprehensive than any biological segment. But "real" we crave to become. Everybody is called forth to realize himself and everybody lays claim to this. This fact that there is a contradiction between our physical equipment as merely male or female—male and female he made them—and our ambition to be human, rarely is exploited in any philosophy of language. And yet, this contradiction is at the bottom of politics and religion.

Of this, we have a great example in the last century. Karl Marx insisted that an iron law held labor down. Their wages could never go beyond bare sustenance of their own body plus "propagation of their kind." This formula conveyed something utterly insulting. To speak of human beings as nothing but "body plus propagation," denies them something though at first sight it may not be too clear what this something is. Quite logically, religion which so far had taken care of male and female for transforming them into humans, was declared, by the heralds of the iron law, opium for the people. By this declaration, the worker was degraded, in this existing world, to a member of the physical species.

The physical species does not know of any common denominator between male and female except by mating. Male and female need each other. *But in which sense are they the same?* Male and male, female and female do not need each other physically. But we can identify them. This is not at all clear of the two sexes, from a biological point of view.

The equality of men and women can never be demonstrated on the level of biology. It is a political, a religious, a literary, a language question. It is a demand which cannot depend on the external fate of being born with one or the other sex organs.

Neither worker nor woman can be satisfied with their dependence on the world of external circumstances, on material power as in the case of labor, on physical organicity as in the case of women. Innumerable people would be or are in danger of remaining incomplete and unreal if they should depend on marriage, conception, motherhood, on the one hand, or on material wealth, on the other. Physiology and material goods are important. But they cannot determine our fate ultimately and completely.

As this is our danger, the individual tries to belong to reality not by sex and labor alone. Greater vigor, greater intimacy, are needed for his integration. When a group of educators got together, they tried to define citizenship. One man said under general approval: a citizen is a man who is profitably employed. This was before our citizen-soldiers were drafted. The definition showed that even our educators were pure-blooded Marxians who saw nothing but labor in the average man. A citizen, of course, is not a man who is profitably employed, but *he is a citizen who*

potentially could found a city himself. And exactly this power comes to man by speech.

To a "city," we must belong, in order to be human. Daily and hourly we want to be sure of this belonging; and truly, it will have to be the plenitude of reality, the inner world of the human mind, and the external of the cosmos. Man demands freedom in all directions of self-realization. The ancient origin of all men and the newest politics of his own days, to participate in all these treasures of reality is felt by anybody to be a part of his bill of rights. And there comes the equality of all men in speech, an equality which is bestowed by any community on every one of its members.

In speaking, each member appropriates everything which has ever been uttered within the orbit of this group, and he learns it in play-like fashion. He is reminded of all the memories ever precipitated or crystallized, and thus becomes the carrier of the memories of his nation or tribe. As such a membrane, the blind singer is enabled to articulate centuries of Greek life, or an invalid who long ago was compelled to stop working, even today with his trembling voice can narrate to us the tales of this mansion or that village, and make this tale grow so that it finally has become a tremendous story. Or a young student in his songs builds up courage for the great future tasks of his community. The words of his songs, as well as their rhythms, predicate and in a way predict his life, by which they shall be verified one day.

Consider the structure of any language; is it not its greatest miracle that it permits a woman to quote the words of men, or that it presents a child with the thoughts of a hoary head? The greatness of epics or fairy-tales, of folk-songs or legend, consists in the fact that anybody can appropriate them. As far as one's mother-tongue has spread out, so far anybody becomes capable, is made an expert, and acquires power from anything which anybody else sang or thought in this same tongue. One's tongue is called, not the mother's tongue, but the mother-tongue, and there is a poignant difference. Physically, we are the children of our mother. Mentally, however, our national language is our mother-tongue. It is the matrix, it is—as we may well say instead of

mother-tongue—the mother-mind, of which we are the re-minders. We recall anything that has ever been called into existence by this matrix mind. Of course, we may recall it in a silly manner; we may learn to speak or to recall by rote, but our language offers a second description of the process by which we become the heirs at law of the matrix mind. We can learn things “by heart.” When we have learned to speak by heart, the property of this language has ceased to be an external fact. Within any language, millions of acts proceed perpetually for the metabolism or the re-translation of all the words ever spoken, because it is any man’s birthright to participate by heart in this great fortune of common speech.

We call this a fortune and not a treasure. The term treasure insinuates too much the dead goods in a warehouse. Too often, education or civilization are interpreted as treasures which are stowed away somewhere in a library or a museum. However, it is our fortune, good fortune as well as misfortune, that we wind our way through the language by letting it pass into us, and then by letting it go out from us, too. Language is a means of communication; that is one of the more platitudinous definitions of speech, but it expresses a very mysterious feature of language which is mostly overlooked by those who use this definition. For it is not said that one *understands the other fellow* when he speaks; the only thing we may assert is that one man *understands that which the other man says*.

Since I may not be able to say that by which I would make myself understood—who can?—the first thing that we know of any sentence is that the language can be understood by A as well as by B, the two interlocutors. When I see two people speak together on the street, I may very well doubt if they really intend to understand each other. It would be superficial to impose on them an intention which they didn’t have at all. They wish to talk *to* each other, neither more nor less. Only in rare moments do we use language for the purpose of recognizing each other in the spirit and in truth, and in unconditional surrender.

Any reasonable person knows that we do not recognize each other in the spirit unless love or hatred, solidarity or enmity,

open our eyes to our vis-à-vis. When we would thus penetrate into each other, we always would experience a sublime moment in which new language was born, and new human words formed. However, when those real powers of love or hostility are not entering my heart, I may instead exploit the matrix tongue as far as it goes, and it is in those very periods when my heart is relaxing or vacant that language and speech are of infinite value to me. It is true, they do not now reveal me, because I am lying fallow, but they do reveal to my interlocutor our common background of assonances and associations.

Conversation produces agreement, and this in itself is agreeable and important, and does not connect me with the other fellow at the core, but, so to speak, at our common roots. For this reason it is no small thing to be able to speak to each other, although it may be for both partners nothing but the indifferent talk about the weather. We cannot be personal all the time, because we cannot love or hate all the time. What, then, is keeping us alive in these long intermediary periods? It is the common will which we recall as our prepersonal and common heritage whenever we converse in the ready phrases of our mother-tongue. Certainly the mouth shall say that of which the heart is full. This however does not mean that our heart can be full all the time. Then we say to each other: "Isn't that marvelous!"—"How wonderful!"—"Ripping!" or some other slang expression, and we still shall be mouthpieces of truth because we let the old mother-tongue speak through us. Instead of our own heart, *hearts that have spoken before us are allowed to speak through us.*

When we do not sing a new song, we do quote an old song. To speak means either to create or to quote, and in as far as we conserve the existing language we are respected as an immense network through which all utterances of the common will flow. Like the leaves of an elm-tree, the assonances of a language whisper and hum. All these voices and sounds together articulate the implicit will of the community. Why are all thinkers in search of a system? If a man could voice the whole of language that would be the most faithful system, since, on the one hand, it would contain the greatest variety, and on the other, it would show the greatest unanimity. To speak means to be-

lieve in unanimity. This can be demonstrated by the strange fact that any language pretends to be complete. Whether the language has eight hundred words or eighty thousand, its speakers always naively assume that they can express themselves in this language on anything they want.

2. *English Spoken*

There is, nevertheless, a "but" to all this. We have many different languages. Languages conflict with great violence. If sex produces a fission in our species, the fission which rends man into linguistic groups would seem to outdo the cleavage of sex by far. Are there not hundreds of languages? Granted that any man is fortunate enough to appropriate the treasures of his one mother-tongue, it remains true that this is one language only; so, is he not shorn of his real inheritance?

It would be poor comfort to say that the individual never comes to the end of his own language, after all, for if we might admit this for the individual the people as a whole still would be deprived and robbed; and in fact, the peoples of this earth have rebelled against this isolation.

Two thousand years ago, an utterly new phase of speech was entered upon. Never since has any speaking group of the human race based its existence on the fact of one individual language. A new principle was proclaimed: all languages may be translated into each other. Practically speaking, all languages rest today on the common basis of translations of the Bible. The Bible has furnished the core of the linguistic treasures and concepts of any nation, and around this core, any number of new international languages cluster. They are the professional languages of all the arts and sciences. Today, the fermentation of all native languages through this central leaven of the universal Bible and the universal science has transformed the languages. They no longer can be considered as separate individualities. They are becoming varieties and idioms and seceders.

Just the same, seceders may build hard and fast walls between each other, and these prison walls of language occur time and again whether between nations or between professions. Hence it

is an important problem how to diagnose this fact. We shall not understand the life of language unless we know that it may die and does die, and kills the spirit of its speakers eventually. Let us try, then, to diagnose the conditions under which speech is alive.

It is the essence of language to be momentary, fluid, fleeting. Hence a word has its full truth only among the people between whom it spouts, and at the moment at which this happens. This explains the authority of the words of Jesus which today are quoted in baptism, at confirmation, at communion supper, etc. He did not intend to say anything beyond the complete truth of the moment in which they become articulate. They were words *rising to the occasion*, and for this reason, they were sincere and fluid. This fluidity, however, should not be mistaken for making these words purely accidental. The contrary is true: *a word which fully rises to a specific occasion* transforms the situation from an accident into a meaningful historical event. Jesus made no "occasional" remarks, but he spoke those words by which the event came to life fully, and it is in this life-giving capacity that we still remember them. That is to say, the more innocently an utterance is fully dedicated to this occasion and no other, the more original and eternal it may turn out to have been. Compared with the deep truth which is possible at one moment between two people, all other truth is more remote and less genuine, albeit a mathematical proposition, a law, or a book.

Truth cannot be tin-canned and sent around in boxes. Schools cannot teach the very best, because they usually are so far away from the best moment for saying the best. *The person for whom the word spoken is expected to have validity must participate heart and soul* in the event of which the word speaks. It is true that later on the important word may be communicated to those who were not present; I may call somebody in and say, "Now listen, although you really are too late." This newcomer or last-comer to the queue can hardly see what is happening or has happened at the head of the queue. For this reason the words in proceeding through the queue to him lose their meaning, which in the beginning had been obvious.

It is at this point that language becomes rigid, classic, formal, abstract, hieratic. It remains open word, yet it freezes down to

phrase. But the members of the individual group will not admit this, and because they don't admit it, the *division of speech* becomes inevitable. Because the words of these people are now spoken not because they are sincere, but because they are the proper words, the outsiders lose interest in joining this speaking unit. Who would stay away from a group which would always speak the truth in its present and fluid state? But when part of the time people stick to their words only because they are their words, and for no other reason, the foreigner is left out in the cold.

In a petrified language, in the respect before the formula which claims authority although it doesn't gush forth as in the author, we taste the decay and impotency of the reality which they tried to express. Of course, a child is willing to learn the language of the adults. In learning a language, we all give time to mere preparation. Nurseries and schools are precincts in which language is spoken in a preparatory mood. There is nothing wrong with this in itself, as long as the adults overcome the unreality of the classroom and nursery, and use language instead of formulae. However, schools, at times, seem to get the upper hand, to such an extent as we see it today. Modern doctrine has it that the children's language reveals to us the secrets of language, and that creative writing can be taught in classrooms. Once this is believed by a society, speech is definitely degraded into something second-rate, something childish and something unreal.

If speech were fully accessible to mere students, the reality of the adults would have to consist of a speechless universe. A speechless universe means madness for the individual, chaos for the things of the world, and *mere violence to keep order between man*;¹ for man will obey only those words which were not spoken in the French recitation-class or in a commercialized short story. Having lost faith in speech, he no longer may obey the order of the day which is authorized by its creative power,

¹ This indeed was the first fascist's, Sorel's, conclusion. On his death bed, in 1923, he cried: "We have destroyed the validity of all words. Nothing remains but violence"; and we took with us from Germany a last copy of a Free Youth Journal. In 1933, the headline read: "Words have lost their meaning."

in the necessity of the moment. This was meant, by the way, in the book of Exodus when God said to Moses: "There is no sky-world of astrology; you cannot hear what you have to do from the fourteen hundred and sixty-one year cycle of Egypt. My name is, I am here and now." This meant two things in one: first, it meant that man must rise to the occasion, now. Second, it meant that to rise does not imply a blind reaction, a hit-or-miss move. To rise to the occasion means to listen to the suffering of which speech is the healing. Reality which remains speechless must drive man crazy.

But the common will of any group tries to survive too long quite often. The language becomes ceremonious, and nothing new can really be said in such a group. We all know of official occasions where the truth can no longer be said. In our department meetings, in our churches, in our parliamentary procedures, we always seem to lag far behind reality. When a group is definitely unable to come to grips with reality in its speech, it is dead.

Even then, many groups preserve their vanity and go on in their terminology, only it is no longer a community of living speech. In Sparta, the famous city of Greece, we have a warning. It was in the time of the Christian martyrs and bishops, of Origen, the great thinker of Alexandria, of Tertullian, with his ferocious eloquence, and of the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius; but in provincial Sparta coins were minted with archaic Dorian inscriptions, and people were compelled to use a language of eight hundred years past in this little district of the Roman empire. This restoration of language no longer reflected the common will. It now was an external ceremony of aristocratic pretense. This language no longer had anything to say. The life of the times was not in it, but in the much-mixed and quite impure communal Greek, called "Koine," which was not beautiful, but powerful, not archaic, but up to the occasion.

3. *The Mental World*

Let us return now to the inner structure of language as it is placed before us in any simple sentence. At the start, we should

repeat that language is the common will which has become vocal. Hence its speaker never may be considered as a groupless individual, but as a voice of the group itself. Even the obstructionist, the rebel, who contradicts, speaks the language of his community just the same. If common will is basic to the process of speech, then the command—"Go!"—"Speak!"—"Come!"—"March!"—"Turn about!" is the root of the verb. A command presupposes a voluntary correspondence between mouth and ear. Mouth and ear—order and obedience, are like poles which form themselves inside of a group and befall its organs and members.

To command and to obey are two polarizations inside of one field of force of free will, or, as we should say, of voluntariness or spontaneity. To obey a person makes manifest the true character of human will, for an order is necessitated by some external problem. He who gives a command acts under pressure of a common want, or common duty, or common compulsion, or fear. But he who obeys simply wills, and is indifferent to the content. Hence, he who serves represents more honestly the pure attitude of the volunteer, *id est* the "willer." He is relaxed, harmonious, not tense. Any serving person, a page at court, a daughter in the house, remains more delicate. They do not need to be tough. They appear to be the embodiment of voluntariness.

A general has greater difficulty in keeping his freedom and equilibrium than his subordinates. The subordinates must allow the general to participate in their inner freedom and harmony which those who are at peace in his service may so easily preserve. They should then impart this mood to the superior. Then his order will burst forth in the most successful manner. That there should be some correspondence between order and obedience before the order is given may be tested by the intensity or loudness which distinguish an effective or an ineffective command. There are three degrees of voicing an imperative: if we just deliver it in the ordinary manner of speech, the order doesn't stand out sufficiently from the rest of the conversation. Such an order will not be taken seriously. A very loud and urgent order cannot be mistaken, but it roils the listener; although taken seriously, it makes for obstinacy.

The good imperative is voiced in a voice half-way between

these two. It is understood as an order because the ground-swell makes itself felt, and it is also carried out because it does not stir up resistance. The good officer in the army will neither chat nor shout. Because mouth and ear must exist in harmony before the order is given, it is correct to say that the whole speaks to its members. The imperative does not cleave the group since the man who gives the order does not step forward with any will of his own; he voices the common will, and he who obeys also is not isolated from the rest of the group; he does the same thing which is voiced by the other. The poor man who must say "go" relies on my going because he cannot go himself. If he could go himself, he might change the world. When he says, "Go," and I do go, we together change the world. Orders transform the world. Hence, the future is reached by imperatives, and only to the imperative shall the world ever surrender.

There is a different burden on a sentence when an inner process and an external situation are distinguished. When I say to somebody, "lift the stone," your will and mine constitute one common will, which is polarized into my mouth and your ear. To this community, an object is added which the common will does not encompass since it lies outside the unanimity of the group. That which is not contained by the communion of which we are the voices we call an object. All objects rate as an external world of resistance. *The object resists*. Resistance of objects, and the insistence of subjects who unite in a common will constitute two different worlds. When we speak with objectivity, we know that we are not among ourselves; it means that we are in the world, and have to expect resistance and difficulties.

Because modern man is so terribly world-conscious he has reduced his language to the style of objectivity. When a mother speaks to her child, or an officer to his men, they forget the whole danger of resistance by an external world. They rely on spiritual unity; the only merit of the commanding officer is that he knows the secrets of insistence. If the soldier is made to feel that this time his officer means business, victory is certain. Inside of the group, then, insistence is a speaker's achievement. But the opposite is true of the man in the world. When we consider our vis-a-vis as not related to us in fellowship but as having

other interests, then he becomes a thing of nature, and things of nature are tough nuts; they are hard and impenetrable. Towards an object, only one style of speech is open to us. We may take its measure, its statistics, its I.Q., its weight; we may take "into account," as we say so significantly, its tendencies and prejudices; and after we have accounted for all its objective qualities, and observed the trends, we may interpret, and estimate, and influence it, or we may buy it, or order it to be produced by scientific methods. For the objective world, measure and figure, calculating and accounting, ratio and mathematics are the right terms in which I speak of the objects of our actions so that we might break their resistance.

Another terminology comes to the fore when we tell a story. The story moves us out of the present into the by-gone past. In the inner world of insistence, and in the objective world of resistance the will to live is quite obvious. But our first assumption about the past is that it is dead; hence, when I enter the museum of the past with the lamp of historical enlightenment, and when I tell a story or write history I must bestow on the past the element of a living will. To speak of the past means to convince myself and my listeners that real life has gone on in the past; that it isn't all dead stuff of taxidermists. All histories speak first of all of great names. What's in a name? The history of the human race is in names. Our objective friends do not understand that, since they move in a world of objects which can be counted and numbered. They reduce the great names of the past to dust and ashes. This they call scientific history. But the whole meaning of history is in the proof that there have lived people before the present time whom it is important to meet.

History gives renown to the past. Any historical sentence in language has a nominative with it; a named carrier of the deed. Please compare these two sentences: "Lift the stone!" and "Caesar crossed the Rubicon." In "Lift the stone," the person to whom the sentence is addressed and the person who gives the order—both are in the dark. Out of the night of unconsciousness, two concepts emerge: the act of lifting, and the object, stone. This act of lifting obsesses the speaker, but since he

is incapable, for some reason or other, of lifting the stone himself, it is his obsession to transplant his own possessedness with the act and place it squarely upon the man to whom he gives this order. The imperative, "Lift the stone," is a success as soon as the stone is lifted.

And now turn to the sentence, "Caesar crossed the Rubicon." The whole action happened long ago. Neither the speaker nor the listener, therefore, can do anything about it. It's all over. Nothing about this act seems to matter; so the past would remain dead and uninteresting unless somebody crossed the Rubicon for whom we cannot help caring. If Smith had crossed the Rubicon, we wouldn't look up for a minute. Ever since there has been a Rubicon, millions of mosquitoes, mules, and men must have crossed it. Who cares? The scene changes as soon as we can say: "Caesar did it." The nominative of the man who did it transforms the past into a part of our own life. The very word Caesar still survives in "economic czars." Caesar is our own flesh and blood. Because we live with the spirit of Caesar, as Shakespeare knew, the past becomes inspired when we can name Caesar as the author of one of the facts of this past. Facts are objective and dead. Acts are historical, and thereby restored to life in the name of the author of every sentence we report. Acts differ from facts as actions of persons of renown, of tradition.

Without the persons of tradition, history would move in such sentences as: "The Rubicon was crossed," "Rome fell," "San Francisco was rebuilt after the fire." That would be history without a will. All history, then, moves between passive and nominative. When we try to collect mere data, we may concentrate on the passive: Constantinople was conquered in 1453; but then we add: by the Turks. In this sentence, "Constantinople was conquered by the Turks," the Turks are the real agent, the subject of the sentence. The old grammarians, therefore, called the expression "by the Turks" the ruling subject of meaning, despite the grammatical form of the sentence. The Turks are the regents of the action. In Greek the expression used is of some interest. They did not say that Constantinople was conquered by the Turks; they would say that it was conquered "under" the Turks. Thereby it becomes quite clear that the passive process

which passes over Constantinople comes under the heading of the Turks; under their name this conquest of Constantinople is effected.

Something happens in the past, then, as though it were floating down the river of time. This is our historical date, but the name which covers the date, and makes it into an event of human history, towers above the dark waters of time as a bridge of tradition. Caesar, or the Turks, or Christopher Columbus, attract all the light of the event upon themselves. America was discovered in 1492 by Christopher Columbus. That America was discovered is purely descriptive, but that Christopher Columbus discovered it makes it into an event that is still important for us. For this reason the discovery of America comes to life in the Knights of Columbus. There could hardly be Knights of the Discovery of America.

So we may repeat, What's in a name? And now we may answer once more, we appropriate the past by the names of its authors, and in this act the data of history—1066 and all that—become events which deserve to be told. The deaf and dumb past enters our own conversation in the form of a narrative whenever the purely *factual* sentence of the book-shelf: "America was discovered" can be restored to its actual human powers—"Christopher Columbus discovered America." In other words, a name has to be added to the purely descriptive material before prehistory becomes history. Innumerable stories wait to be told, because they wait for their author. There always is historical source material. We know that the wheel was invented, and fire was invented, and the harness of horses was invented; but all this is incomplete history. The finishing touch is added only when we can relive the story of Prometheus; that is, the story of the man who dared to do it, who risked his life, who made a reputation in the process. So we may say that the style of history always alternates between collecting new facts and narrating the deeds of great men. Adam, Noah, Abraham tell us something about history. Flints, beads, bones, tell us something about prehistory.

The passive and the nominative are the forms into which speech turns with regard to the past. You live the past by speaking of great names. We can hardly be surprised if we now turn

to the world of feeling inside us; and clearly, then, poetry, even lyrical poetry, lives by point and counterpoint, by theme and inversion of the theme, by two themes competing and fighting each other by contrast of two waves of sound expressing this suspense and the wavering of the soul. The soul experiences this torn-to-pieces-hood as divine but at the same time as hell. We are rich in this welter of feelings, and at the same time we are in anguish. Therefore, the subject of the musical experience of this inner man is nameless in the deepest sense of the word. He hasn't yet made a name for himself because of the overwhelming feeling. Being not too sure of himself, he doesn't know whether he will be called hero or coward in the end. He is in the state which quite literally could be called the pre-nominal state, the state in which we still wait for our real name in history and our objective place in the world of things.

This is very clear in the words used in lyrical poetry with the greatest effect. It is effective to use pronouns: you, I, mine, our, we, thou, are the true forms of the realm of emotions and mixed motives; and the grammatical forms attached to these pronouns are subjunctive and optative, which render the fact that these processes are mere assumptions of the inner experience; they have not yet materialized. In the sentence "Lest thou misunderstand me," the whole process remains within me; so much is it suspended that it is not allowed to come true. The same English language which has nearly discarded the optatives and subjunctives still clings to the sentences with "lest" which express negative desires. To admit negative desires in preference to positive desires is a typical Anglo-Saxon affectation.

In song, the power of language rests most within itself. While all language presupposes an inner room or space in which it can surge and connect the interlocutors, *id est* the group, singing penetrates, so to speak, to the very depth of this process. All speech hails from unity. Nobody could speak if he didn't believe in unity, and unity does not exist in the outer world. When we sing, we feel ourselves inside of a whole; we feel at home in the world. To sing, then, is to speak "in the second power." It is pure expression in the present, dropping the relation of speech to future or past or outer world. The singer is enchanted

by the chant, as our language with admirable precision reveals when it connects these two words. Incantation, for the singer as well as for the enchanted listener, and ultimately for the whole universe which is spellbound by these sounds, expresses the state of complete spontaneity. To sing means to volunteer, to exhibit one's free-will. One cannot sing well without eagerness.

Now, to be eager means to feel free. Eagerness is freedom experienced, or voluntariness. All the discussions of philosophers on free-will and liberty of choice investigate the question objectively on the outer front. But on the outer front, man's will is resisted by myriads of objective obstacles. Looked upon objectively, man's own self is the greatest enemy of man's free-will. How could it be otherwise? Once we put the glasses of outwardizing upon our nose, the universe only shows its objects and divisions. We "outwardize" anything at which we stare as we have to detach it *from* us.

Hence, to investigate free-will objectively must always lead to a demonstration of the same will's dividedness. Objectively, we are all torn to pieces. Why should the five fingers of my hand be considered one? Looked upon objectively and anatomically, they are five. There is no end to divisions in the outer world. But speak or sing, and millions are embraced, as in the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven. When the outer world or the respectable world of history, or the martial world of mortal danger repress our language into our own inner self, when we have to sing inside ourselves, so to speak, because external barriers silence us, then speech will go underground. Speech might be prevented, obstructed, forbidden, but to think, to speak within ourselves is unconditional freedom. Thoughts pay no custom duties, and they pass all frontiers. At the speed of lightning does thought travel.

Song did stand for us as the extreme case of voluntariness within a harmonized world, and now we added that thought exhibited this same quality of unconditional freedom. At this point we meet the ivory tower of the thinker. Does he talk to himself? The thinkers of all times solemnly declared that the underground river of thought was of a different quality from the open word. They said that words obviously belong to the social

community, but to think was a man's property. It seemed to be the product of his mind. The reason for this declaration of independence of the thinker is found in his experience of freedom. Doesn't he think what he pleases? But this arch heresy of the last century which separates thought from speech ignores three facts:

First, a man who thinks without opening himself to the truth, dreams. In other words, truth goes beyond my mind or your mind. We remain subjected to truth when we think, and truth is that of our thought which is still valid when it is communicated to others. Our thought, then, is validated or invalidated by our community. Madmen think alone. Sanity depends on communion. We conclude, then, that truth cannot be owned by us, but that it is imparted to us. If this is so, it is quite misleading to say that we think. It would be correct to say that we open ourselves to the truth.

Second: All wisdom of the ages and all linguistics of rank insist that the languages are not means by which we represent the truth after it is perceived, but that languages are means to discover hitherto ignored truth. The relation between thought and speech, then, is inter-action. We converse with ourselves in thought. For this reason, something may seem to us deep wisdom in a dream but when we awake and reply to it, it will have to stand the test of a real conversation. We have an idea, and we meditate, or mull it over. In this process, the speaking and hearing of two people is lodged within one. Children express themselves naively because they live in unity with the universe. Adults think twice.

What does this mean? Before we say anything to anyone else, we try to listen to it ourselves first. We anticipate the critical role of the listener. The idea is the creative act, the cogitation is the pondering, doubting, conceding reflection. When a thinker is able to persuade himself of the truth of an idea, then he is his first vanquished. He celebrates the first victory of his persuasiveness inside himself. To think is to say "Thank you" to one's own idea which has overcome one's own resistance and criticism. Objectively, we all resist the truth as long as we can, because truth is perfectly ruthless against our own self-interest. Hence it is not true to assume that the thinker will be too readily intoxicated by his

own idea. Any thinker of quality is amazed by the poor level of the criticisms raised against his theses, for he knows many more dangerous objections to his own ideas: he had to answer all of them himself before he became convinced. The soliloquy of the thinker reflects the unceasing conversation which pulses through all the members of the linguistic unit. *The mental world, then, is the duplication of the speaking world by unifying the speaker and the listener within one mind.*

Third: These two facts we could discover by careful analysis of the processes of speech and thought. A third point, however, leads us further than the commonplace; it is something essentially new which now has to be stated about language. Most men think that a dictionary contains the words of a language, and that a system of philosophy contains the thoughts of a man. If this were all, words would constitute the world of speech and thoughts would constitute the mental world. The connection between the two worlds would remain a great mystery, or perhaps not even a mystery. Modern thinkers treat the two worlds simply as two. The latest books on the philosophy of language never mention the fact that the authors themselves speak to us in their books. They do not see any vicious circle in the fact that they think and erect into a system their thoughts about the words in which they tell us their system. If this is madness, there is method in it. By restricting the language to the dictionary of words, the reason why we think becomes indeed inexplicable. To think seems simply to be endowed with an insatiable curiosity. Why we should respect each other's curiosity I do not know. I usually kill flies when they become too curious.

4. *The Healthy Person*

Fortunately the relation between thought and speech can be clarified on a higher plane. We already know that to speak does not mean only to speak of something in so many words, but to speak to somebody in the most effective name. If I wish to reach a person I must address him and I must use the right name for him and for the authority which I claim when I give him orders.

In the name of the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the United States my sergeant can march me a hundred times around the barracks, even though he may disguise the president's authority by shouting: "In the devil's name!" Everybody falls under the spell of names while he learns to speak. The unbelievable omission of Victorian thinking was that they thought of men as individuals who "later" on formed a society. Such societies do not exist, because we first of all are named and spoken to in the name of great powers.

I grew up in a family, with a mother and a father. Both these people never appeared to me as individuals; they were pillars of a roof over my head. They were the two persons of the great power of parenthood. Obviously, the father was not the mother and the mother was not the father, but neither were they separate. Instead they were the two bridge-heads of that great bridge under which I stood and which prevented the sky of panic terror from falling on my head. It was a social building much more solid than the George Washington bridge, in whose name they claimed for some inexplicable reason obedience and respect. The woman that had the right to call me by my name never was anything but my mother, and I believed that I had the name under which she addressed me. A woman whom I meet by accident would never have the authority to call me for my breakfast. My mother had.

There is a point, of course, at which names cease to have power over me; I rebel against their tyranny. I do not allow my mother to choose my wife; and my father may not choose my profession. I may scorn my mother's order to marry the perfect girl; yet if I wish to acquire the power to make the choice in my own name, I cannot marry for mere spite. Marriages built on *dépit d'amour* strike me as horrid. The positive act of choosing appeals to a man's freedom, or love, or responsibility, or right, or destiny, and we need to be fortified by these positive names. In the long run, the tyranny of names is not evaded unless we introduce the right names and put them in their right place. The world must become convinced of our power over names by accepting our terms. This means that we think with a purpose, and the purpose is to introduce the right names into society. *To think means to introduce better names.*

We think because we ourselves wish to speak with authority, just as we were spoken to before. In the name of that power which we have come to know through names, we wish to tell our own tale. We wish to speak up and explain how we disestablished and had to disestablish certain names and put others in their places. To think, then, is the stage in which old names are transformed into new, and in which all words except one become mere words for the time being.

It is only in one single name that the thinker in us remains dependent on the community out of which he withdraws when he begins to talk to himself. And we shall have to say a word about this one cable by which his own power plant still shows its character as a subsidiary to the main power line of speech through the whole race.

But first let us survey the realm acquired by the individual who—in our days—is expected to think for himself. What a change from the days when a slave was not even expected to speak but remained mute, a mere receiver of orders given. Now, the individual depicts, in himself, the whole City of Men, in all its ranks and classes. In the liberty to speak to ourselves, we are the real kings of the world. Thinking compares to speaking as flying to walking. The pedestrian beats the hard earth with each step and the ground reacts to each step. In the air, this perpetual interaction is avoided. Similarly, the thinker does not have to wait for the answer, the approval, the patience, the good will, of anybody else. The earth which in conversation is represented by the interlocutor, the audience, recedes while we think. While we really speak to others, we also have to listen. But while we think, nobody but we ourselves can contradict us or order us around or curse us.

This freedom of thought is very wonderful. How many boring moments, embarrassing situations, impossible people, have we survived thanks to our power and right of having our own ideas on the subject and of keeping our mouth shut but our mind wide awake.

Speech puts man on a throne. For any man who has something to say, thereby acquires an office in society. And thrones are seats of office. Thought gives man a kingdom. Is this kingdom a consti-

tutional state? Is the freedom to think the anarchy of despotism, or the government of due process of law?

We now shall round out the freedom of the individual to master speech and thought, by considering the constitution, the law of freedom.

A friend of ours had a charwoman working for her and, since they lived in a lonely valley, she knew that she could not find another woman if this one left her. The charwoman was dishonest. She was arrogant. One valuable after another disappeared. One day, our friend coming home, found the charwoman in her own dress, giving a party to her friends. Nothing was said.

Obviously, our friend became an accomplice to the thefts committed. The laws do not exist unless they are understood as orders telling you and me what to do and what to say. A law does not only say: Do not kill. It also says that you and I are obliged to speak up when murder is committed. Either we have to denounce it to the police or we have to tell the criminal. *But speak we must.* The tragedy of modern political science is that this greatest implication of all laws is not stressed. The law not only makes us act and behave. The law is helpless if it does not make us *tell the truth*. Part of the truth, in this case, was that the charwoman was a thief.

It did not help our friend much that she decided to say nothing. Things got worse and worse. And finally, she could not dare to have guests because they would be robbed, too. After some such unpleasant reclamations, our weak friend moved to the city and lost her home. "How many a time," she told me, "have I cursed myself for my initial weakness. I should have spoken up at the very first occasion; and I am sure Alice expected just this and she despised me ever since for not having reprimanded her. And her later frauds were a kind of contempt of court provoked by my failing her by not resisting her."

He who may speak, at times must speak. He who sits on a throne, at times must make speeches from his throne. And he who owns a kingdom as a sovereign, must govern this kingdom. As we must speak up, when a law is broken, so we must keep order among our thoughts. We must say to some destructive thoughts: away with you to the abyss of forgetting. We must say

to ourselves: Shut up. Kings are not happy people as they cannot do as they please. They have to govern, and they come to see too many things which are not as they ought to be. We have victoriously conquered the whole realm of thought to ourselves. That which former generations did not dare to think, Is there justice? Is this law right? Is my country right? Is there a God? man, for the last two thousand years, has taken upon himself to ponder freely.

We now shall give an example of this complete freedom of thought. It is two thousand years old. It is a great instruction in the constitution of a thinker's kingdom. It shows his freedom at its climax. And it is quite widely acclaimed by the modern colleagues of this example.

The Magna Charta of free thought was written by an adherent of Parmenides, of the thinker who introduced the unfortunate idea of "Being" which ever since has tortured philosophers. What do we mean when we say: a thing *is*? What is it "to be" or not to be? Well, this disciple of Parmenides radically answered this false question with the final answer:

Nothing has being. Even if something had being it would be impossible for anybody to communicate it to anybody else. The reason is that 1. the real things do not correspond to our terms and 2. nobody thinks the same thoughts as somebody else.² Gorgias the Greek nihilist, was perhaps the first who said that nothing has being, that we cannot say anything which is true and that no two people can think the same thing. But we all have inherited this his nihilism. In 1905, William James wrote an essay "How is it possible that two people can think the same thing?," as a tribute to this eternal dilemma. Where there is freedom, there always is abuse. We cannot guarantee to all people the liberty to think without allowing for libertinism. As all men may think, so all men may deny the existence of everything.

But what is wrong with Gorgias? Why is his and James' question a silly question? Or why is it unanswerable?

Here, our preparation on the preceding pages stands us in good stead. We there have learned that to speak is to participate in

² Gorgias, On Not-Being. Compare Gigon in *Hermes* 1936, 212.

and to contribute to the movements of society. To speak means to order or to obey, to listen or to reply, to sing or to meditate, to narrate or to worship great names, to analyze and to judge objects. To think means the array of all these processes of a whole community within ourselves. The philosopher is an abridgment of a whole city as a theologian might be considered the whole church contracted into one individual who tries to rethink her in all her aspects. In other words, to think means to play all the roles of society in our own imagination. To speak means to enact the various roles in society itself.

By speech, then, we contribute actual power to the life of society. By this, one thing becomes clear. He does not speak who talks *about* everything under the sun. The chatterbox does not speak in the full sense of this term because he does not speak with power. The man who says: Do this. Or: I will do it. Or: This is gone for good, says these sentences only in as far as he is going to back them up by his own actions. I say something the more, the more committed I am to this statement. He who says something and does not mean it, is a liar. He who says something and makes it clear that he does not mean it, is a chatterbox. Both types of man may say something but they do not *speak*. Speech enters the scene only when we are back of our words with our reputation, life, honor. A witness in court speaks because if he does not speak, he will have perjured himself. *Anything below this degree of veracity simply is uninteresting.* A soldier who reports "fortress taken," when it is not taken, is a fake.

Below the danger point of truth and therefore perjury, speech is not speech but gossip, chatter, prattle. As long as a man or woman says what they have experienced, have seen, wish to see done, and what they are willing to back up, they speak. This we know, since we have found that speech is not the act of abstract judgments or generalizations but is a response, an order, a correspondence, an expression, an account of our own realizations.

We may have freedom of speech but how can we "speak" where we have nothing to say? Our neighbors, our government, our family, all may agree: Let him speak. However, full fledged speech is not the making of remarks on the weather or on God and the world. A man makes a speech when he can do something

about his word. When Webster made his great speech, he went on to vote. And his speech without his vote, and without other people voting, would be a sham and a fiction. The oratory does not make the speaker. One can be a speaker without any oratory. That which is needed is a platform on which it makes sense to speak. And where does it make sense to speak? In a place and at a time when that which I have to say will have some sort of consequence.

Speech must be consecutive. It must have a place in a process or it is not speech, but an aside. And on the stage, the asides are permissible because they have some consequences with the audience. Speech cannot be understood or cannot be said to exist outside such a consecutive process of law, of voting, of experimenting, of taking notes for the exams; the grapevine telegraph, the gossip in the women's club or in the men's club, they all have consequences. In fact, the consecutive actions of these seemingly purposeless remarks is terrifying. A family may be hunted out of town by some of these casual remarks said in the right place and at the right moment. To speak, then, is to enter into a definite process of life at a certain point with a certain sentence. The sentence in which somebody is accused of breaking the law, makes no full sense unless it is said in due process of law.

Our degree of speaking power depends on our ability of making our words an actual contribution to the life of society. This does not depend on the speaker. Somebody must be willing to listen to him, too. Our friend with the dishonest charwoman did tell us. But we were the wrong address. The sentence: "She is a thief," cannot be spoken to a private person with full meaning. The sentence reaches its proper meaning only on the level of a formal accusation at police headquarters. Speech is incomplete when it is not addressed to the right address.

This is the reason why so many people cannot distinguish between real speech and pseudo speech. Pseudo speech is speech which externally says the same thing as the right speech. Only, it is not told the right person in the right place and the right time. Any truth has to be said specifically. If it is not said to this person at such and such a time, it usually does more harm than

good, or it does no good. The world is full of misplaced and mis-timed speeches. It lives by the few speeches made at the right time in the right place.

The indications for right and wrong, good and evil, with regard to a sentence, are not of a logical or scientific nature. They are a problem of timing. The same sentence is right and true and good at a certain unique moment. This is true of any important sentence. Two and two equals four, this is true always. But the reason is that it isn't important. It is not a vital truth. Anybody who has crowded his friends into a car, knows that at times, seven are four. And that is important.

This case of seven in a car are four is a good instance to study the difference between 2 and 2 equals four and a vital sentence. That seven people should go into your car, is your own statement made on the spur of the moment. Your word might run: Get in all seven (although the car was made for four people). What is the difference between 2 and 2 are four, and: get in all seven in this car for four? The difference is that one is a judgment and the other an order. Now, mind you, my request is not made without judgment. I have gone over the situation; after all, it is my car, and I cannot be expected to ruin it. But I shall take a risk. And after I have passed judgment, I do say, just the same: Get in all seven. Such a request or order given, uses judgment and then moves beyond it or even against it. Imperatives are not pre-judicial or made without judgment; but they put the judgment in its place.

Imperatives appeal from mere facts to the real question what importance we should attribute to these facts. In the case of 2 and 2 are four, we do not think too much of the fact and in fact, we abolish the rule daily.

2 and 2 is a preliminary, advisory sentence. When I was a boy, my father took me through a thoroughfare on which it was written: No thoroughfare. And he said: My son, if this was not a thoroughfare, the sign, No Thoroughfare, would not be here.

For every truth, there is but one right process of law by which it ultimately can be verified. The more serious the truth, the rarer the occasion. Whether a girl might have married you, you can find out only as long as your "constellation" with her lasts. Neither before nor after, shall she or you ever know. Whether

Germany went to war with us, was decided between December 7 and December 8th, 1941. Whether you like Yellowstone Park, you cannot say before you have been there. And ten years after you have been there your censure of its beauties would not carry much weight either.

When a professor in his class demonstrates that God is a black cat chased in a dark night, he is right. In a classroom, the truth about God cannot be found. He is not an object. So he cannot be produced. He is not in space, so he cannot be contained in a container. So, how could he turn up in a classroom? Classrooms are atheistic by establishment. They are God's concession to our curiosity. "Intellectual curiosity," of which they make so much on campus, denies God *per se*. The rules for free thought imply that we should stress the limitations of free thinking. But God is only met when it comes to the statute of limitations. I cannot answer the sophomore who asks me: Is there a God? I can, however, help a man who is humble enough to ask: Can a man ask such a question for curiosity's sake? This man is groping for the conditions of his health, for the limitations of his kingdom of free thought.

The atheism on the academic campus is of the essence because colleges are the places for intellectual curiosity. At best, Plato can "contemplate" the Divine and have a look at the eternal ideas. On campus, man speaks of everything. Hence, God keeps quiet.

In war, it is different. The simple fact that there is a war, is a judgment over man's misgovernment of his own affairs which is quite evident and eloquent. In war, nobody doubts that there is a God, because there is so very little we can say. In war, we all long for peace because in peace, we are free to say something. In other words, in war, we long for our share in the divine power of speech, for our share in God and his truth.

God simply is the power to speak the truth, with such consecutive results that that which is said also happens. Everybody who speaks believes in God because he speaks. No declaration of faith is necessary. No religion. Neither God nor man need the paraphernalia of some religion to know of each other. God knows who speaks in his name and who does not. And man knows very well when he speaks in God's name and when in the devil's.

Soeren Kierkegaard is thought of as a religious genius. If so,

there is reason to believe that he was created into one by one terrible impression in his youth. His father, in a storm on a lonely heath—he was a herdsman—and in the presence of Soeren, seems to have cursed God in desperation. This moment made epoch in the son's life. He realized then and there that the father was in deadly earnest to do as much as was in his power to deny God. Kierkegaard became one of the few people who knew when and where we really are in touch with God, when not. Kierkegaard became famous as the man who distinguished between professors of the crucifixion, that is academic people who talked about God, and people who suffered from God, one way or another, by either trying to slay God or to do his will. The curse of his father was spoken in a consecutive context. And so, it was actual speech. This, probably, the father did not know. But we must not think that this matters much. For, speech is a fact regardless of what the speaker knew of what he was doing.

Now, we may come to the point which we made before: The free thinker may dispose of every sacred name, and every loyalty, during his life. He may bury his dead values as the man who leaves his parents to cleave to the wife of his choosing. But choose he must. The thinker who disposes of old names as rotten must choose. To think is an act of suspense. We can say: the ideals of my childhood were childish. We can say: patriotism is not enough. We can say: we are betrayed. But when we say so, we still say that we ourselves do not wish to be childish, do want that which will suffice, and do not intend to cheat anybody.

The pompous Mr. Gorgias in all of us who sits back in his chair one day—and this hour comes to most people—and says that nothing is, nobody knows, and nobody can speak to anybody else, appears always long after the event of our having heard and understood something very well indeed. The gorgeous thing about Gorgias is that he himself has very well understood all the arguments of everybody else, knows very well that which is and that which is not, has gotten through the chicken pox and the measles, has been sent to school, has learned how to speak, how to write and read. So, the poor man has experienced all the very truths which he now refutes so splendidly.

Philosophy and thought are just as much experimental sciences as physics. And the crucial test is that the Gorgias even can make a name for themselves by the thesis that we cannot make ourselves understood. Every textbook on Greek philosophy gives his name and his doctrine to this day. Nihilism went under his name before Nietzsche and the Nazis carried Nihilism a considerable step further and so, there is little comfort for the Nihilist. We know him as a Nihilist. The world is so real, we are in being so much, that even the abyss opened by his negation finds a place in our positive creation. Gorgias' No reminds us of the typical bachelor who on the eve of his engagement forswears marriage forever. It is a *tonic*.

Our Yes is comprehensive, our No's are specific. Our Yes is One, our No's are many. The one Yes permeates everything, and even those things to which we affix a negation are still more supported by our yes, than destroyed by our No's. *Yes and No are not parallel or equals*, despite official logic.

The Yes is prevalent even in the mouth of the Nihilist with his innumerable No's. Poor No's, they have to be affixed to any one specific denial. It is like saying that this star is an illusion, and this, and this and so on to a million stars. The milky way has so many that he who denies the existence of a hundred million single and specific stars, still has not refuted the existence of the milky way itself.

Our No's start at the bottom, and at the atom. Our Yes starts with the whole.

Before Mr. Gorgias and Professor William James can write articles on how we can understand each other or that we do not understand each other, we all are agreed already that we can speak to each other and that we do understand each other. The Oneness of the spirit for all is the condition of all doubt, all curses, all negations and denials. The one name which thought or speech cannot abolish or deny because it proceeds itself in the power, in the light and in the name of this name, is the spirit. Everybody who has the freedom to speak and the freedom to think, enjoys these two freedoms in the name of One spirit for all mankind. Long before I can understand, myself, I know that people do understand. Before I know, I have admitted and am committed to the fact that man is allowed to know

better than I know now. I believe in the power, the truth, the light of speech and thought when I am quite hazy. Aye, the more I am in the dark, the more certain I am that I am in the dark, which is another way of saying: I know that there is light.

5. Yes

The one word which precedes all the pompous No's of my intelligence, is one emphatic Yes. This Yes no philosopher can abolish or cross out in his vocabulary. The whole bombastic article of Gorgias proves that he believed in this Yes of the Spirit. He was sure that they would understand and admire and approve of him, the people for whom he wrote his brilliant thesis.

Whoever speaks believes in the unity of mankind. And he believes that the unity of mankind is not produced by physical or political or economic or racial reasons but by our faith in speech.

He who says: No, by his very word No, affirms his Yes to the Oneness of the spirit. We all believe in the Holy Ghost and the stranger our own particular spirit of the moment, the more fervently do we believe in the Oneness above and around this our particular way of looking at the world. The individual's greatest freedom has as its corollary the spirit's greatest necessity. If all men are bound by one truth, then, my-truth makes sense. Otherwise it doesn't. If it does not, I go mad with my freedom.

It is quite unimportant whether a man knows that he believes in God or not. The power to speak is God because it unites me with all men and makes us the judges of the whole world. Back of any soldier, back of any rebel, back of any judge, back of any worker, God is the one and everlasting name who towers over the cemetery of mere words, the classrooms of our definitions, the brown studies of our reflections, as the power which urges us to speak, to be silent, to think. Unless we bow to this power, we must abuse our right to speak and to think. For either we try to use it right and to tell the truth, think the truth,

listen to the truth, or the tongue will dry up in our throat, and our ears shall hear nothing but cries of suspicion and hatred and despair. We will be cursed by posterity as the destroyer of peace, of power, of credit, of order, all things which Truth alone can establish.

The freedom of speech and the necessity of speech are one and the same thing. The belief in God and the right to speak are not two different affairs. God is not a religious proposition. Speech is not a political proposition. Thought is not a scientific proposition. Religion, politics, science, are all makeshifts, machinery, departments. Neither the real God nor the real man knows of them. The man who speaketh, speaketh only because God wants him to speak the truth. The man who listens, listens because he is eager to know the truth. And the truth gives me my place in time and space, between my sex, my background, my rank, my age, and the full powers of a human face.

All men form one Man who is conscious of himself. Gorgias, the denier, of course, is part of our consciousness. We all have him in us. All speech is conversation within mankind. All speech presumes that we all are one. The word "in-dividual" is a queer term. Literally, it means, that which cannot be divided any further, that which is indivisible. By the fact that the Word is given to us we all have become One Individual. We began by treating the individual's right to speak and to think. In the process, we discovered that there is only one in-divisible in-dividual, because we all are pledged to Oneness when we open our lips. By speaking, the individual makes himself a cell of one tremendous body politic of speech. Open your lips, and you have ceased to be yourself. You have become a member, and you occupy an office and you govern one kingdom of the whole world. And as little as Greece or Holland can be "sovereign" but is obliged to govern and to govern well, so you can keep your franchise of thought solely by governing your thoughts.

The name in which we have the right to speak to others, speak of others, and are spoken to by others, must be unshakable or we become devils. And he who thinks that he may destroy or abolish all names, even the name of truth in which he alone has his right to abolish some names, is a devil.

God cannot be proven and need not be proven. But the devil can be proven. I very well am able to see that the deniers of the one and only name eternal, make hell for all of us. The liar who reports a fact which he knows is not so, the hypocrite who pretends an emotion which he has not experienced, a commander who asks me to do what he is not willing to do himself, a scientist who plans us all except himself, they all abolish the commonwealth of speech in which I have my franchise of free speech and thought. They devalue my treasure. These devils, then, make my pursuit of happiness impossible. For my happiness depends on the existence of a universe of speech and thought to which I can contribute and in which I may share. What good does it do me that I am free to swim if all the waters in which I might swim, dry up? This is what the four types of liars do: dry up the ocean in which I feel free to swim.

In this ocean, in this One, One Individual of the Spirit, one man is as representative as another of the fullness or of the deficiency of any one cell. Everybody may say everything which can be said.

If we take this statement seriously, then it is possible to relate the individual's attitude to speech to the structure of the whole of speech and literature and science and art and poetry. For, then, in every one human being, the potential organ for law, for poetry, for literature, for science, must appear in some manner and degree.

We, therefore, now shall proceed to affix certain grammatical terms to these attitudes of all of us by which we "man" the various aspects of speech, the aspects by which we declare our relation to an event as before us or behind us, as outside of us or within us. Everybody may say: Europe will be a great civilization. Then he lets her rise from the dead. Everybody may say: The Americans are practical people. Then he looks at them from the outside. Everybody may say: I enlist. Then he becomes a part of the people.

Fantastic, that in one paragraph, we traced a man's power to put a whole continent to death or to life, his power to stare at this mighty republic from the outside, and to get inside of it, too. This witchcraft of speech and thought—where is it anchored in our organism?

6. Some Final Terms for Grammar

The individual, in his power to say

This has been

This shall be

I see this. This is.

I am of it. Let me be one of yours.

enters four orders of grammar. We shall call his powers to say: 'This is, his *objectivus*, and his right to claim membership of it, his *subjectivus*. These two terms are of old standing and everybody knows of object and subject though perhaps not always very clearly. But what of the judgment: Europe has been a great civilization and, we have gone through hell. This historical report we shall label the *trajectivus*, because we are ferried over a stream of time in these statements. Then it is not difficult to prescribe the proper term for the sentences of the character "Let there be light," "Come, love me." They are "*prejectivus*," the prejective throws us into a new, unprecedented situation.

The *prejectivus* corresponds to the dramatic

the *subjectivus* to the lyrical

the *trajectivus* to the epical

the *objectivus* to the "logical" manner of speaking.

So far, we built our nomenclature up from the real individual human speaker. Everybody finds these attitudes within himself. Now, we shall pass muster all linguistic phenomena in the light of this insight. The whole intellectual life of a nation must reflect this balance of power between

command

song

history

calculation

prejective

subjective

trajective

objective

And indeed, the subjunctive of grammar, in the life of a great nation, is represented by music, by poetry, by all the arts. The equations of our calculating logic are spread out in all the sciences and techniques. The trajective, linking us with the living past, lives in us through all the traditions. The prejective is represented by prophecy, ethics, programmatic movements.

The four great professions:

lawyers (trajective)
 preachers (prejective)
 artists (subjective)
 scientists (objective)

are nothing but expanded forms of human grammar. Any society contains them, regardless of labels. They are a constant because our relations to time and space are constant. All the time and all over the place, we decide what is past and what is future, what is part of us, what is facing us.

The whole intellectual life of a nation—literature, legislation, politics, sciences, song and slang—is subject to a grammatical analysis of its health.

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| 1. Imperative | Politics |
| 2. Subjunctive | Literature |
| 3. Recording | Ceremonies, history, customs, holidays |
| 4. Analytical | Sciences, statistics |

The four types of cognitive sentences: song, command, calculation, story, we may call macroscopical phenomena because they all occur in any individual's own sphere daily; they are enlarged to telescopical magnitude when we think of the whole world's literature, the whole social world of orders given and obeyed, the whole universe of scientific facts, and the whole firmament of rites and traditions. On the other hand, they become microscopically small in the particles of the isolated sentence. When the grammarian dissects a Latin phrase, he has a minute¹ cellular structure under his scrutiny. But it is one and the same life of the spirit, in its phases, which we have before us in:

- | | | |
|---------------|--------------|---------------------|
| 1. verbs | imperatives | politics |
| 2. adjectives | subjunctives | literature and arts |
| 3. nouns | narratives | tradition |
| 4. numerals | indicatives | sciences |

Under number one, man is thrown forward under the impact: Establish a precedent, Act! Become the agent of something not yet in existence except through you. Under number three, the agent has disappeared behind the act, the doer behind the fact which now is transmitted and recorded for posterity. Num-

ber two describes our state in the doing, the mixed feelings, the lyrics of the situation between becoming the agent and having established the act. And four classifies that which has required, moved and gone on record, by analysis. In this way, the individual's attitudes in speaking have furnished us with one universal terminology for all processes of the spirit. The cycle of:

prejective
subjective
trajective
objective

applies to the greatest and the smallest and all the human phenomena of speech and thought.