


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SPEECH
AND
REALITY


Eugen
Rosenstock-Huessy



SPEECH AND REALITY

*All the sciences are interconnected as by a chain;
no one of them can be completely grasped without the
others following of themselves and so without taking
in the whole encyclopedia at one and the same time.*

—René Descartes
Opuscles de 1619–21



SPEECH AND REALITY

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy



INTRODUCTION BY
CLINTON C. GARDNER




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Introduction

WHEN W. H. AUDEN FOUND twice as many quotations from Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy as from Voltaire for his *Viking Book of Aphorisms*¹, *The New Yorker* magazine was moved to quip "Rosenstock-Huessy, who is he?" Attending a meeting in East Berlin on the future of theological thought, Harvey Cox found as much interest in Rosenstock-Huessy as in Tillich and Bonhoeffer. A former President of the World Council of Churches, J. H. Oldham, has described Rosenstock-Huessy as "one of the remarkable figures of our time." Reinhold Niebuhr, Lewis Mumford and Carl Zuckmayer have hailed his work. Yet in the United States, where he has taught and written for thirty-six years, he remains largely unknown.

Why has Rosenstock-Huessy remained, in Cox's words, "an extremely influential but little-known thinker"?² Part of the reason is technical in that his major works have appeared only in Germany. But the principal reason appears to be that what he says is so new that it has no constituency. The entrenched theologians, philosophers and sociologists will not touch this man. He threatens the very basis of their existence, for all his writing and teaching is, in effect, a storming of the academic trenches. As Martin Marty wrote in *The Christian Century* in 1965, "in 1946 Rosenstock-Huessy was ahead of his time—and he still is today."

This lack of a "constituency" explains why this book is being published by an unheard of publisher. It is, in fact, this publisher's first book. Along with two other books by Rosenstock-Huessy, *Out of Revolution* and *I Am an Impure Thinker*, it represents Argo Books' initial effort to introduce this "underground" thinker to an audience in this country. Argo also expects

¹ Auden, W. H. and Kronenberger, L. *The Viking Book of Aphorisms*. New York: Viking, 1962.

² Cox, Harvey. *The Secular City*. New York: Macmillan, 1965, p. 268.

to publish works by or about related contemporary thinkers, like Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber, and precursors of these men, like Johann Georg Hamann and Ludwig Feuerbach.

The connection of Rosenstock-Huessy with Franz Rosenzweig may be the best beginning for an attempt to locate him in the spiritual and intellectual life of our time. Rosenzweig is generally acknowledged to have been one of the greatest Jewish thinkers of recent history. His epochal book, *Der Stern der Erlösung* (*The Star of Redemption*)³ made him known throughout Europe in the 1920's. What is not so widely known is that, in Rosenzweig's words, his "main influence" in writing the book "was Eugen Rosenstock; a full year and a half before I began to write I had seen the rough draft of his now published *Angewandte Seelenkunde* (*An Applied Science of the Soul*)."⁴ This work of Rosenstock-Huessy's pre-dates Buber's *I and Thou* as the first expression of the new insight into the meaning of speech.⁵

Rosenzweig and Martin Buber became widely known in Europe during the 1920's for their development of a "new thinking" based *not* on thinking but on "speaking." Buber's *I and Thou* became the best-known work to introduce the "dialogical principle," and both Rosenzweig's and Rosenstock-Huessy's rather different interpretations of "speech-thinking" were overshadowed by it. Even more important than the fact that all three men had different formulations of the "new thinking" is the fact that Rosenzweig and Buber were all too quickly identified as "religious" and even "Jewish" thinkers, so that their thinking has had relatively little impact on the academic disciplines. While Rosenstock-Huessy is occasionally interpreted as a "religious" thinker, such a categorizing, even more than in the cases of Buber and Rosenzweig, is quite misleading. This book will help to explain why.

Rosenstock-Huessy has not led the model academic life. All his

³ Holt, Rinehart and Winston expects to publish the first English translation in 1970.

⁴ Rosenzweig, Franz. *Kleinere Schriften*. Berlin: Schocken, 1937, p. 388. Also see Glatzer, Nahum. *Franz Rosenzweig*. New York: Schocken, 1961, p. 200.

⁵ *Angewandte Seelenkunde* is now in print as the last chapter of *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, Vol. I. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1963, p. 739.

many books and almost countless essays have grown out of the circumstances of his life. As these circumstances changed, he would be off on a new tack, rather than spending time on the academic function of neatening up and clarifying his previous work. Therefore, many of his best essays have yet to appear in either German or English. Recognizing this problem, for the past few years I and a number of his other students in Germany and the United States have been collecting and listing all of the unpublished and untranslated works in order to prepare for a systematic program of getting them into print. *Speech and Reality* and another book being published this year, *I Am an Impure Thinker*, are the result of this work. The latter may well be read as a companion volume to this one, since it moves from the method based on speech to that method's revelation in human experience.

As the reader will soon discover, *Speech and Reality* is a rigorous work. This book is Rosenstock-Huessy's *Discours de la Methode*. And its specific purpose, in fact, is to dethrone the Cartesian method as the basis of all science. That objective method, the doubting of everything whose physical and measurable origin cannot be proven, dates from Descartes. It is the method which pursues reality by means of the one language, mathematics. Descartes's *Cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) proclaimed in 1637, opened the era of the natural sciences. Unfortunately, in Rosenstock-Huessy's view, when the social sciences began to blossom, some two hundred years later (Comte's *Course of Positive Philosophy* dates from 1830), they adopted that same Cartesian method. In other words, the social sciences, down to our day, have more or less agreed with Descartes that he had discovered a new metaphysic, a universal and true view of reality which could be directed toward *any* investigation, be it of matter or man

It is Rosenstock-Huessy's objective here to show that:

1. Descartes's mathematical and objective method pertains only to the natural sciences, not to the social.
2. A method for the social sciences *can* be found, and its origins lie in the patterns of human speech.
3. This "grammatical method," unlike Descartes's, *is* universal; that is, it pertains to *all* of reality. The Cartesian method, indeed, turns out to be one of its four elements.

Why, then, if *Speech and Reality* is the key to Rosenstock-Huessy's work, the revelation of his method, was it not published earlier? Its author, at 81, has several major works in print. The answer may lie in the same reason that Descartes himself waited eighteen years between his first discovery of "the foundations of a marvellous science" and the publication of his "wondrous strange" *Discours*. Rosenstock-Huessy has called this gap in Descartes's revelation a "grand hesitation."⁶

Let us consider the similar "grand hesitation" in Rosenstock-Huessy's work. In his case, the first discovery dates to 1916 when he sent *Angewandte Seelenkunde* to Franz Rosenzweig as both were fighting on the front during World War I. Here we have a "hesitation" of 53 years! While he did publish *Angewandte Seelenkunde* in 1924 and did continue to write on his method, only at age 75 in 1963 did he finally publish a work which, like the present one, concentrates on speech and the speech method. Published in Germany, it is entitled *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts* (*The Speech of Mankind*).

The main reason for this delayed disclosure of Rosenstock-Huessy's discovery, I would suggest, may lie in his overwhelming sense of its importance. It appears that Rosenstock-Huessy preferred a lifetime of working out his method's consequences to an early recognition. Both Rosenzweig and Buber, who similarly realized that human speaking was full of undiscovered secrets, have been widely published and discussed. Rosenstock-Huessy, however, who was the only one of the three to fully articulate a method based on speech, has remained an "underground thinker" throughout his life.

Why was a working out of the new method's consequences important to Rosenstock-Huessy? Only if he could show how his method interpreted *all* of human experience would its profound significance be revealed. Only then could it lead toward a time when reality might be perceived whole rather than, as at present, fragmented into the different points of view of natural science, philosophy and theology. Therefore, he undertook, between 1920 and 1963, to apply his speech method to history, to sociology and

⁶ Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. *Soziologie*, Vol. I. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1956, p. 322.

psychology, and to theology. His major historical works are *Out of Revolution* and *Soziologie*, Vol. II.⁷ His primary sociological and psychological writings are *Soziologie*, Vol. I and *The Multiformity of Man*. His theological interpretations are in *The Christian Future* and *Das Alter der Kirche (The Age of the Church)*.

We can conclude, then, that Rosenstock-Huessy wanted his method to be born *alive*, not as a cold theory but as a living interpretation of all of man's experience: personal, sociological and historical. Further, if it could provide a new interpretation of man, it would provide, indirectly, a new interpretation of nature. This would follow since man, in Rosenstock-Huessy's view, is the animal who is both natural and yet capable of rising above nature —by speaking. It follows that physics, chemistry and biology find their place within the all-embracing understanding of reality disclosed by the "grammatical method."⁸

Now it would be foolish to contend that this present work is a complete "open sesame" to perceiving why Rosenstock-Huessy has discovered a new method not only for the social sciences but for science as a whole. This stupendous possibility may dawn on the reader, but it will probably not become clear to him until he has read further into Rosenstock-Huessy's historical and sociological works. Only then is he likely to perceive the whole import of what has been accomplished.

In any case, if Rosenstock-Huessy's work has, indeed, accomplished what is suggested here, it will take many years for this to be realized and absorbed within the social sciences, to say nothing of the time required for it to be recognized as a universal hermeneutic. Nevertheless, I would suggest that his work is nothing if it does not point in this direction. Either he has made an epoch-making discovery for the future of man's knowledge about himself and the world or he is a minor essayist.

While it goes beyond the scope of this introduction⁹ to make

⁷ See Bibliography for all Rosenstock-Huessy book references.

⁸ See Rosenstock-Huessy's statement to this effect in the epilogue to *Out of Revolution*, pp. 742-3. Also printed in *I Am an Impure Thinker* as Chapter I.

⁹ For a more extensive introduction to Rosenstock-Huessy's work, the reader is referred to the recent book by Harold Stahmer, *Speak That I May See Thee*. New York: Macmillan, 1968.

a complete statement of how Rosenstock-Huessy has applied the grammatical method in his historical, sociological and theological works, the following paragraphs will attempt a brief formulation of how this is accomplished.

In his historical works, Rosenstock-Huessy shows that mankind was formed by four kinds of speech. Tribal speech oriented man to his ancestors, his past. Templar speech, such as arose in the Egyptian empire, oriented man to the stars, the world outside him. Greek speech oriented man to his inner self through poetry and philosophy. Finally, the speech of Israel oriented man to his future by way of prophecy.

With the coming of the Christian era, these four ancient modes of speech were fused. After Christ, men no longer felt bound by a single orientation. They felt free to participate in all four forms of speech. They discovered the rhythm which moves a man from listening to the imperative of prophecy; to the subjective questioning of his response; to the narrative listening to how others, in the past, have responded; finally to the objective or outward speaking which is his particular response to the reality which he had first heard in the imperative form.

The history of the Western revolutions unfolds in this pattern, as does any significant human experience. The imperatives established by the Christian era made each of the western revolutions necessary, from the Papal Revolution to the Russian.

In his sociological and psychological works, Rosenstock-Huessy shows how man discovers himself by speech and how his institutions can all be analyzed in terms of the grammatical method. Whereas Martin Buber described in *I and Thou* how man discovered himself in a two-fold reality, Rosenstock-Huessy shows that man really discovers himself in a four-fold reality.

First, as a listener to the imperatives which address mankind collectively, he hears himself addressed as *Thou*. This is his call to make the future. In gratitude for having been so addressed, he discovers his *I*, his subjective, singular and inward self. He then seeks to return the gift of having been addressed by being creative himself, by contributing to the generation of man. As he does so, he must form a dual, a *We*, as in marriage or any other history-making attachment. Finally, in the outside world, in the plural

groups of which he is a member, such as his business or professional group, he becomes known in the third person, a *He*.

These four orientations to reality, to future and past in time, to inward and outward in space, form a cross which Rosenstock-Huessy calls "The Cross of Reality." The grammatical method may also be understood as the crucial method since it interprets reality as cruciform. It is speech which creates inward and outward space (*I* and *He*) as well as backward and forward time (*We* and *Thou*).

Finally, in his theological writings, Rosenstock-Huessy says that what the church has identified as the Holy Spirit can now be identified as the "speech of mankind." Man's divinity consists in his speaking and listening. The flow of life-giving speech from generation to generation, the renewal of speech in particular inspired men—these are the manifestations of the Holy Spirit in history.

The supernatural is not some power competing with electricity but man's ability to speak beyond himself, thus to live beyond himself. Man's resurrection and eternal life does not occur as the continuing existence of a lonely soul above the clouds. It occurs in his being listened to by future generations. God is not a supernatural being but "the power who makes us speak." We experience him in every moment that we reach out beyond ourselves, saying the word that needs to be spoken. That word is the timely word, the word that moves man into the future. Sin is the abuse of the word, the speaking of words that destroy the peace and the truth that all language seeks to establish.

In terms of the Trinity, it is the Holy Spirit which inspires us in the imperative; the Son is our subjective reply; and we hear the Father when we listen to the narrative of our creation. As we speak and listen we represent all three persons of the Trinity. And, in so doing, we complete their action: we speak openly in the day-to-day world—objectively.

Perhaps the above brief formulations of how Rosenstock-Huessy has unfolded the grammatical method in all his major works will help the reader to perceive the method's universality. Descartes and natural science have not really been dismissed.

They have simply been relegated to the objective front of our four-front experience.

The essays in this book do not follow one another in any logical scheme except that the first chapter is the most all-embracing statement of the theme. The essays were written at different times, but they all intend to disclose the same as yet unrecognized truths: 1. That speech is man's matrix. 2. That speech precedes thinking and contains it. 3. That a new method for the social sciences (and indirectly for all science) can be erected on the basis of how men speak and listen.

May the reader share the excitement which two generations of Rosenstock-Huessy students have known: the realization that something new is here a-borning. Precisely because it is new, it may seem either too difficult or too naive. But it is rare that a reader is offered the opportunity to share in an as yet unrecognized discovery. To the extent that you can share it, you will be participating in the disclosure of a new science.

Clinton C. Gardner

Norwich, Vt.
August, 1969

CHAPTER 1

IN DEFENSE OF
THE GRAMMATICAL METHOD



1. *The Unity of Social Research*

IN DEFENSE OF GRAMMAR, this essay is written. Grammar, we pretend, is the future organon of social research. In this way, following the astounding developments of dialectics and mathematics, from ancient analytics and arithmetics, to their modern standards, grammar, too, will ascend beyond the grammar school, and become from a dry-as-dust textbook-obsession, the open sesame to the hidden treasures of society. This our belief is more than a belief. Ludwig Feuerbach, one hundred years ago, was the first to start a grammatical philosophy of man. He was misunderstood by his contemporaries, especially by Karl Marx.

During the last three decades, three quite separate developments have brought Feuerbach's ideas to the fore again. First, in the many social departments, history, ethnology, sociology, the problem of a plurality of aspects, a multiformity of patterns, became so pressing that thinkers more or less instinctively turned towards a method that would guarantee this plurality as the basic phenomenon. This already means a groping in the direction of the grammatical method. For in grammar only is there performed such a multiformity within unity. Second, in the central field of general philosophy, a group of "language-thinkers" emerged, especially in Germany; now, however, among Anglo-Saxons, too, in the persons of A. A. Bowman and N. R. A. Wilson. Third, the linguists themselves began to look in the direction of society.

Up to 1900, linguistics more or less constituted a parallel to the economics of the Adam Smith style. Reasoning about the origin of language was fatally handicapped by Robinson Crusoe ideas of a first individual corresponding to the homo oeconomicus. A man like Rudyard Kipling could address the students of St. Andrews with his startling speech on: the liar as the first person to speak really. Besides, the abstractions of the eighteenth century enlightenment still lingered on sufficiently to veil the struggle for existence that is implied by every word we speak. The body was delegated to the struggle for food and shelter; the "mind," however, with the optimism of the age of reason, was contemplating the truth of the matter.

Neither did the romantic school of the Grimms conceive of the perils and diseases of our mental life. They liked folklore and oral traditions. They did not bother with the insanity, the follies, the downfalls, of the mental life of mankind. We are warned today, by psychoanalysis, by Nietzsche, by the revolt of the masses, that the struggle for existence is a struggle within the social body of language and fails as often as it succeeds. The destruction of the German language between 1933 and 1939, is, I believe, one of the speediest and most radical events of all times in the field of mind and speech. And witnessing it with our own eyes and ears, we cannot separate the linguistic or the spiritual collapse from the social. Language, logic, and literature, as I have shown in other essays,¹ define the fate of a society, and they express every political change; in fact, they embody and change. Language is a process that can be weighed and measured and listened to and can be physically experienced. It goes on before our eyes and ears. Is it not strange that the science of this life-blood of society, should not be exalted to the rank of social research?

Our defense of grammar is provoked by the obvious fact that this organon, this matrix form of thinking, is not used as a universal method, hitherto. We propose to explain why the two accepted methods of science do not work in the social field. We propose to explain to the social research worker that he has ad-

¹ See p. 67.

hered to the appropriate method, however reluctantly or unknowingly, for a long time. We hope to have found an objective terminology for the grammatical phenomenon which is free from mere verbalisms. And although the positive handling of the new method will be presented in later chapters, we hope to follow a procedure, in this chapter, through which the old are confronted with the new in a definite and in an irrefutable manner. The different methods will be compared in the peculiar form in which they have been stated by the older scholars themselves. We shall show that, by taking them literally and as they were meant by the founders of the methods now in use, they exclude application to society, by establishment.

Medieval and modern thinkers never have laid claim to a method by which they could explain the changes of society. Hence, their present day disciples in the fields of history, ethics, psychology, sociology, economics, philology, who insist that our social knowledge must either be "scientific" (the usual attitude) or cannot help being theologically informed, *all do wrong to their own authorities*. The originality of social research hinges on the existence of a method that is neither stolen from theology nor from natural science. We intend to prove, in the terms of grammar, of theology, and of natural philosophy, that such a particular method exists, and that by using it Roman Catholics and Protestants and Free Thinkers are united in a common enterprise. Without such a unity, among all parties involved in social research, the revolt of the masses must find the various intellectual groups in a helpless division, as helpless as in the new war, the single neutral country in Europe is found. We hang together, or we shall hang together, is the future of the intellectuals. We must discover a common basis for social thinking. Or the masses will do without us, in our ununderstandable division.

2. *Social Dangers Compel Us To Speak Our Mind*

What is wrong with society? That there is war, revolution, crisis, and decadence in it. Without these evils, we should live in the Garden of Eden, and that means, without self-conscious re-

flection on our social situation. Social disintegration is a blessing in disguise since it compels us to wake up. The grammatical method insists that the negative aspects of society compel us to think, to speak, to write, to study, and nothing else makes us think really. Our analysis of the dangers and evils of society will omit all the individual evils of the single and lonely human being. We do not inquire into the problems of disease and death, suicide and lunacy here although they reflect social ills or correspond to social ills. We shall speak of social ills only in the sense that they comprehend more than one generation or more than one locality. At this magnitude of two generations or two local groups, the social problem is perceived most distinctly.

The evils, then, prove to be of not a very great variety. The evil of *anarchy* prevents translocal units from cooperating. Its members or classes do not care to come to an agreement. They are not inspired by unanimity, and they fail to meet each other regularly for a sincere restoration of unanimity. They break up the unit into sections. Everybody is making his pile, grabbing more than his share, and exploiting his membership in ways unforeseen. Anarchy, or, in economics, the crisis, the depression, is caused by a lack of cooperation and of common inspiration. The good that would cure the ill, is unanimity. For, then, the different agents in space would function as one body politic whereas now each agent is pursuing his own interest only.

Decadence not only means that people do not have children, it also means that they do not prove to have the stamina of converting the next generation to their own aims and ends. Decadence is the disease of liberalism today. We must not think of it as a biological failure, merely; it is a weakness of the whole man. It is the disease of the "Last Man" of Nietzsche who twinkles: "What is love? What is a star? What is happiness?" and blasts the future because he only could enter the future by inspiring the next generation, and this precisely he declines to do. "Decadence" means to be unable to reach the future, in body or mind or soul. The decadence of an older generation condemns the younger generation to barbarism. Decadence of parents leaves children without heritage. The only energy that can fight this evil is faith. Faith, properly speaking, never is a belief in things

of the past, but in the future. Lack of faith is a synonym for decadence.

In *revolutions*, the new men, the future generation does violence to the existing order and to the people formed in and by the past. The old are "liquidated," "eliminated," because they are considered "past men."

War introduces power and government into regions hitherto not organized by the warring government. And the high strung army organization of a country at *war*, by its own machine efficiency, is a symptom for the special effort that is made to make the government more efficient, more powerful so that the territory that hitherto was *outside*, now may become incorporated. Wars try to incorporate external territory. Anarchy tries to disestablish unity within one body politic, it destroys its *inner* unity. Wars disregard *exterritoriality*. We are compelled, by the two facts of anarchy and war, to distinguish between an inner and an outer space in society. The twofold character of space is that, in any society, a border-line, like the skin of an individual animal, cuts the world of space into two parts, one inner, one outer. And no society exists which must not make the distinction between the front that faces inward, towards unanimity or anarchy, and the front that is confronted by the problem of war, of efficiency against resistance, by the problem of power in external space.

This discussion has given us an undebatable basis for the social system. For the two axes of time and space, with their fronts backward, forward, inward, outward, are not merely verbal definitions of the social order; they are open to a unanimous experience and an identical consciousness of all human beings. They are universally valid as much as any mathematical and logical truth. That society is imperilled by four diseases threatening one of its time or space fronts, compels man to become conscious of the social process at all. And the first statement that he, then, is compelled to make is that society cannot survive indefinitely any one of these four ills. The four fronts of life perpetually must be balanced. The complete victory of any one of them: total war, total decadence, total anarchy, total revolution, is the end of society. And it would make all thinking about society utterly superfluous. With these evils rampant and unchecked, no social

research is meaningful or possible. Social research is imprisoned in a reality, in a cross of reality between the four simultaneous tasks to cultivate faith, power, unanimity, respect, all four. Social research is the search for the restoration of the perpetual balance.

The four dangers of the social order shake us up out of our illusions and dreams. But what means are at the disposal of society to fight these dangers? The means are perhaps most easily envisioned by starting with war. War between two territories ends with peace. What does this mean? People who have not been on speaking terms, begin to speak again.

Peace, after a war, has to be concluded; peace has to be explicit. It took ten years after World War II before the victor tried to speak. There was then no peace from 1945 to 1955.

When decay ravages a civilization, the old no longer have the enthusiasm for teaching the young their own faith. Again, a lack of speech. It is not exactly that the young are not on speaking terms with the old. However, the words that go back and forth, between parents and children in a decadent age, do not reach the ears of the young with the power that carries conviction. Something is wrong with the content of language. It seems mere verbiage, dead formula, a petrified ritual.

That "anarchy" means a lack of unanimity, of common inspiration, is a tautology. Words are used as though it were all one society. But the words (like justice, welfare, commonwealth) do not have an identical meaning among men. Though being one crew on one boat, they yet do not speak one language. The words do not fly like the winged words of common song; the words are murdered by mutual diffidence, or at least, mutual-indifference. Two languages are spoken under the hypocritical veneer of one. Tower of Babel.

In revolutions, all the language and traditions of the past are devaluated like an obsolete currency. The sterling value of old terms and of classical values is ridiculed. A new language is created.

This short list may suffice, for our momentary purpose, to suggest that the four evils of society which compel us to think, do something to language. They all hurt language. Why must they do so? For the simple reason that language is the weapon of

society against those four ills. The four diseases dismantle society, by breaking down one of its fronts in time or space. All speech defends these four fronts.

The evil of decadence is the lack of faith in the future. The evil of revolution is the lack of respect for the past. The energy opposing revolution normally is loyalty. Royce's attempt to extol loyalty above all other forces in society, is a truly conservative philosophy. We are not loyal to the future; we are, however, loyal to the past.

And now the fourth evil of society, war. War rages when anarchy between two groups is replaced by the violent effort of establishing unity. War rages between one group that is unanimous inside—and any army is a model of unanimity, or it would not be an army—but is so far powerless to impose its will peacefully on another group. It is stopped by some not integrated part of the world outside of it. Wars prove the weakness of the peacetime system. It lacks power, by its organization in space. Wars make up for the lack of power in peace. The evil of war is a rift in space between two parts of the earth. The good that overcomes war, is efficient government. And government is efficient organization of space, of territory.

evil: anarchy (=crisis),	decadence,	revolution,	war,
no unanimity	no faith	no respect	no power
good: unanimity	faith	respect	power

Is it possible to classify the evils and goods of social life in a manner that is concrete and complete? I think we can.

Between two generations, either the old or the young may be at fault. Decadence condemns the old order of things, revolution brands the new. Or, more clearly still, in a decadent society, the past is out of order, in a revolution, the future is brought in by violence. Decadence and revolution are evils of social time, of social evolution through time.

As to anarchy and war, they are symptomatic of the evils of the order of society in space. A more careful analysis of these two diseases in space is fruitful. The division of the time axis into past and future, is obvious. Taking our stand in any given present of society, we shall credit the past generation with decadence,

the future classes with revolution, or the past with sufficient faith. The fact is that time is twofold, expanding in two opposite directions, into the past and into the future. This, although in direct opposition to the physicist's erroneous view of time, is obvious to anybody who speaks within society. The past and the future do not exist outside a present of which they are the future and the past, and, to it, appear as either good or evil.

It is more obscure that space, too, is of a twofold nature. Anarchy, however, and war, are of a strictly opposite nature. We only speak of anarchy where we expect unanimity. When a war rages between two far distant countries, as between Canada and Germany, this is not anarchy. Nobody had a right to expect unanimity between them. War breaks out because one of the two had no power to organize or to govern the other. States are outsiders to each other. Anarchy exposes the internal disruption of an inside unity.

3. *Society Lives By Speech, Dies Without Speech*

Vital speech has as its *raison d'être* the conquest, the perpetual conquest, of these four trends.

To the four diseases, four different styles of speech bring relief. Men reason, men pass laws, men tell stories, men sing. The external world is reasoned out, the future is ruled, the past is told, the unanimity of the inner circle is expressed in song. People speak together in articulated language because they fear decay, anarchy, war, and revolution. The energies of social life are compressed into words. The circulation of articulated speech is the lifeblood of society. *Through speech, society sustains its time and space axes.* These time and space axes give direction and orientation to all members of society. Without articulated speech, man has neither direction nor orientation in time or space. Without the signposts of speech, the social beehive would disintegrate immediately.

When speech is recognized as curing society from the ills of disharmony and discontinuity in time and space, grammar is the most obvious organon for the teachings on society. If the name

“grammar” may seem equivocal, in face of the shortcomings of the grammar school, it suffices to say: a science is sought by which we may diagnose the power, vitality, unanimity and propriety of the lifeblood of society, of speech, language, literature. Instead of descriptive linguistics and remedial sociology, our method represents remedial linguistics, testing the powers of peace and war.

We have two recognized methods in organized science, logic and mathematics. Logic celebrated its triumphs in scholasticism. A new logic arose in wrestling with Aristotle and Augustine, when dialecticians were forced to admit the paradox alongside the rule of contradiction. *Jesus est homo; Jesus est deus;*² is the fundamental paradox. *Nihil fit ex nihilo; Mundus creatus ex nihilo,*³ is another. A logic that keeps the paradox, is placed on a more realistic, more comprehensive, and more understanding plane than the logic of antiquity. Hence, scholasticism is unsurpassed in its logical subtleties.

Mathematics is the organon of the new sciences. In wrestling with Euclid and the discovery of the rotation of the earth around the sun, appearance was stripped of its authority as much as, in scholasticism, flat and plain logic. Mathematics is purification of experience, keeping the data of experience but stripping them of mere semblances. The world of space, of expansion, opened up under this new organon, as much as the realm of values had been represented successfully by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura.

It may be asked what we could wish more. Is there a need for a new “instauration” and a new method? We have claimed that a new or, at least, an unexploited method exists, the grammatical. For the time and space of society, language is the lifeblood.

Now and here, we are living in a twofold time and a twofold space. As living beings, we are responsible for the conservation of the accomplishments of the past, the fulfilment of the future, the unanimity of the inner, the efficiency of the external front of life. In order to live, any organism must face backward, forward, inward and outward. It was the mistake of former biologists, refuted by the Uexkuell school, that organisms could exist without the

² Jesus is man; Jesus is God.

³ Nothing comes out of nothing; the world is created out of nothing.

distinction of an inner and an outer space, a distinction unknown to dead matters. And it was the error of former sociologists to treat social time as being a straight line pointing from the past through the present into the future. Instead, any living being, and the social group as well, has to defend a present under the simultaneous stress from past and future. To live means to look backward as well as forward, and to decide, in every moment, between continuity and change.

The now and here of all of us, means that we are living in a twofold space and a twofold time. And the term twofold is literally true, because time unfolds itself in two directions, past and future; the deeper, the more vitally we do live. The extension of the past, the prospect for a future, increase, when we look backward and forward with intensity and courage. And in the same manner, space unfolds itself more and more, the more we throw ourselves into the process of facing the outside world and the inner process of agreement and harmony within the respective unit. Forward, backward, inward, outward lie the dynamic frontiers of life, capable of intensification, enlargement, expansion, and exposed to shrinking and decay as well.

And we speak lest we break down under the strain of this quadrilateral. We speak in an attempt to ease this strain. To speak, means to unify, to simplify, to integrate life. Without this effort, we would go to pieces by either too much inner, unuttered desire, or too many impressions made upon us by our environment, too many petrified formulas fettering us from the past, or too much restless curiosity for the future.

The grammatical method is the way in which man becomes conscious of his place in history (backward), world (outward), society (inward), and destiny (forward). The grammatical method is, then, an additional development of speech itself; for, speech having given man this direction and orientation about his place in the universe through the ages, what is needed today is an additional consciousness of this power of direction and orientation. Grammar is the self-consciousness of language, just as logic is the self-consciousness of thinking. As an adept of grammar, man acquires the capacity of resisting the temptations of a primitive logic and its unwarranted application to man's place in

the universe. This primitive logic is especially characterized by the assumption that time is built up out of "past," "present," "future," in this order, so that the present simply results from the past, and the future is caused by past plus present.

Equally thoughtless is the assumption of this same logic when it operated with a space of three dimensions, width, length, and height. The modern fashion of a four dimensional universe is not better; for it, too, leaves space undivided in an outer and an inner circle, in contradiction to every experience and observation of living beings. However, we sustain the time and space axes of our civilization by speaking, because we take our place in the center of this civilization, confronted as we are with its four aspects: its future, its past, its inner solidarity, its external struggle. And in this delicate and dangerous exposure to the four fronts of life, to the inner, the outer, the backward, and the forward front, our words must strike a balance; language distributes and organizes the universe, in every moment, anew. It is we who decide what belongs to the past and what shall be part of the future. Our grammatical forms betray our deepest biographical decisions.

When I say that the table is round, the word "is" may seem (wrongly)⁴ to be a "copula" because it is applied to a thing. But when a member of society says: "I am happy," the small and inconspicuous verb "to be," assumes its full place in time. "I am happy," means that I say this now because only at this moment is my happiness so complete that I must speak of it. I may have been happy before, I may be happy later on. Nevertheless, it remains true, and this qualifies the "I am," that I say it now. So an "I was" preceded the "I am," and "I shall be," will follow; both are times when I said or shall say other things because other things will fill my consciousness. The "I am (happy)," then, implies that it stands between "was" and "shall be." Any assertion in the present is biographical in that it presupposes past and future, for the speaker or the group for which

⁴The great and highly significant blunder of the past grammarians to discriminate against the "is" of the copula as lacking in verbal quality, is abandoned by all linguists today, although our school children, probably, and our students of logic, will go on learning it for quite a time.

he speaks. "We are" and "I am" (much more clearly than the shadow of the "it is," as it is used for things in space), always decide, "cut off," and single out and judge.

Whether I say, in our days "Europe was a great civilization," or "Europe is a great civilization," passes judgment on the life and death of Europe. I either relegate it to the past or I credit it with a future. And whether I say: we all should have peace on earth, or: these dictators should keep quiet, proves where I draw the line of inclusiveness or exclusivity, respectively, between myself and the people whom I consider "we," on one side and some unspeakable people, somewhere in the outside world. And this last judgment on social matters is passed daily all over the globe, by our speaking social universe.

The author has developed the grammatical method at great length in other books.⁵ The present book does not intend to repeat all of the arguments and examples used in these writings, but to advance the discussion by challenging the scientists and theologians (among these especially the Roman Catholics), so that they might give room for the new thought, on the basis of their own admissions, about their own first principles. By inviting them to welcome a method left open by them, according to their own definitions, we may hope to contribute to the pressing process of securing the independence of the teachings on society from theology and natural science. We must see both: our own independent task and the last achievement of the two other branches of knowledge, the latter by restoring theology to the rank of a science, and by reducing the natural sciences to the sciences of space only.

Grammar grants or expresses or is liberty, peace, contemporaneity. Without common speech, men neither have one time nor mutual respect nor security among themselves. To speak has to do with time and space. Without speech, the phenomena of

⁵ Especially in *Soziologie* and *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts* (See Bibliography). In the English tongue, the only other contribution, apparently forgotten today, is Magnusson's brilliant Ph.D. thesis (University of Minnesota) of 1893, on the grammatical tenses; today, see the posthumous book by Archibald Allan Bowman (Princeton and Glasgow), *A Sacramental Universe, Being a Study in the Metaphysics of Experience* (Princeton University Press, 1939). In German, the writings by Ferdinand Ebner, Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber point in this direction.

time and space cannot be interpreted. Only when we speak to others (or, for that matter, to ourselves), do we delineate an inner space or circle in which we speak, from the outer world about which we speak. It is by articulated speech that the true concept of space, and that is its being divided in an outer and an inner sphere, comes into being. The space of science is a posteriori, and just one half of the complete phenomenon of space. But the truly human phenomenon of space is found in the astounding fact that grammar unites people within one common inner space. Wherever people articulate and vary one theme, they move in an inner room or community as against the world outside.

And the same is true about the phenomenon of time. Only because we speak, are we able to establish a present moment between past and future. Because I am telling you all this here and am waiting for your answer, is it possible for you and me to forget past and future, and to call this hour an hour, this paper a unity, this time one moment, one time span. By human speech, space and time are created. The scientific notions of time and space are secondary abstractions of the reality of grammatical time and space. Grammatical time and space precede the scientific notions of an outer space or of a directed time. For they presuppose an inner space between the scientists and some contemporaneity between them, too. Without the preestablishment of one inner space of "science," no scientific analysis of time and space holds water, or even can take place at all.

Through the dangers that threaten society, man is compelled to pass judgment on the trend of affairs in society. Is it decaying? Is it disintegrating? Is it going to last? Is it going to live? Behind every one thinkable problem of our social sciences we can trace this major preoccupation of distinguishing between the living and the dead elements of the social pattern. The danger of death is the first cause of any knowledge about society. The opposition between history and nomothetical (legislating) knowledge is overrated as a distinction between knowledge about the past and knowledge about the future. However, in history, as well as in ethics or legislation, the knowledge, the expert understanding, is

proven by nothing else but by this sense and tact for the survival value of the various facts mentioned in the tale.

"*Vom Tode und nur vom Tode fängt alles Erkennen an.*"⁶ This is true of all knowledge. In the case of social knowledge, it is the fate of the group whether this group is doomed or going to survive, that builds up the grammar of society. "Ascent" and "decline" are the somewhat mechanical terms for this ambiguity in every social phenomenon. Without the distinction of the plain-spoken: "it will live," "it lives," "it has lived," man would not know anything. Anarchy, decay, war, revolution, are four forms of social death. Because they are death in its social disguise, and because man is in constant search of life, these social perils, in their variety, compel us to speak our minds.

We speak our mind. Any thought about the life and death of our own group compels us to convey it to others. We cannot keep the thought to ourselves forever, however slow we may be to talk to our neighbors about it. We write books, let it slip into our teachings, our last will and testament, our letters, our conversation, our vote. Why is speaking to others, why is communication, the best verification for the fact that we are involved in social research? The life of society survives the living generation, it is polychrone. The average scientist today thinks of thinking as going on between contemporaries. This is not true for our field. Any reader, any listener, any student, is younger, less tormented and less worn out by experiences than the writer or speaker. This, at least, is the assumption under which the writing of books, etc. (except for examination papers) is meaningful. Death cannot be fought in society except through engaging younger men to join the battle-front (younger perhaps not in years, but certainly in this special experience by which I am moved to speak). Social disintegration compels older men to speak to younger men. Education is not a luxury for the sake of the younger individual; is it not very often their ruin? However, society needs allies in its fight against decline. The true form of social thought is teaching. Social wisdom and social research never are communicated to contemporaries as are physics.

⁶ "From death, and from death alone, springs all knowledge."—Franz Rosenzweig, *Der Stern der Erlösung* (Heidelberg, 1954), p. 1.

In physics, the lapse of time between old and young physicist is neglected as much as possible. In true social "*Erkennen*"⁷ the lapse of time between the speaker and the listener is of primary and constitutional importance. Natural science is based on pure reason. Theology is based on the purity of the creed. The validity of social knowledge wholly depends on its being based on pure teaching. The great new discoveries are communicated *coute que coute*, and in the communication itself is to be found the key to their being verifiable knowledge, "science." The meaningful character of science about society depends on its being able and willing to fit into the polychrony of society, since society is a container for an infinite number of ages; "pure teaching," without any immediate utility either for teacher or student, is the central process by which true social knowledge may be tested against "mixed teaching" which would be the usual teaching with an eye on examinations, prestige, current events, etc. For "pure teaching" is the guarantee of the scientific level of this teaching, and it is perhaps the only guarantee for its scientific purity.

Our science is not based on a critique of pure reason, but on a theory of pure teaching. In harmony with our subject matter, society, we ourselves operate when we are subjects of social research, as organs of the social process of speaking, teaching, writing.

The grammatical method reconciles the process of the man in research with the processes he describes, by recognizing his place in the temporal process of speaking and listening, teaching and studying. We speak in our anguish or in our curiosity to minds whom we try to make into our listeners, readers, students. This is the intellectual responsibility shouldered by the most sceptical and most uncommunicative thinker. Even Sorel, who shouts for violence, in his doctrine, actually, and first of all, shouts for readers for his treatise. The first outcry of human self-consciousness about society is the word: Listen! And as long as this word is not recognized as the corner stone of our whole building of a social science, this science will never come of age. "*Audi, ut vivamus.*" "Listen and we shall survive," everybody is saying who

⁷ The German word "*Erkennen*" suggests the process of getting an insight, or of acquiring a certain knowledge.

talks at all on social questions. "Listen and society will live," is the first statement and the perpetual promise of any social research.

The Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) proves its failure to explain the process. Our formula also is at odds with the medieval: *Credo ut intelligam* (I believe so that I may understand). In *Out of Revolution*,⁸ I have discussed at great length a formula that, though parallel to these two, would give expression to the mental attitude that introduces into our science the fact of the second person who listens, as essential to any theory of social research. However, our formal "listen, and we shall live," does not preclude the useful character of the theological and the scientific formulas, *Credo ut intelligam* and *Cogito ergo sum*. Only it claims to contain them, and to be of equally a priori value as the two formulas that have commandeered the loyalty of centuries.

Audi, ne moriamur. Listen, lest we die; or: listen and we shall survive is an a priori that presupposes a power in man to establish relations with his neighbor that transcend their private interests. The formula, by its own supposition, denies the Marxian idea of thinking as pure self-interest; it also precludes the idealistic idea of thinking for the sake of thinking.

Beyond the natural life and death of two individuals in mute isolation, "survival" constitutes an enhanced explicit life thanks to listening. This, however, is not our concern at this moment. We wish to defend the introduction of the grammatical method here. By introducing the listener, the "you" that is expected to listen, something is achieved that science fails to do; the dualistic concept of a world of subjects and objects is abandoned. Grammar does not know of two but three persons, I, you, it. And so does social research know of the teacher, the student, and their subject matter. To prove the scientific equality of this method with the existing methods, we shall now trace these to their scientific foundations. In the march of science through the last millennium, some assumptions had to be made which we all share whenever we deal with non-social problems.

⁸ See Bibliography.

4. *The A Prioris of Theology and Physics*

Human survival and revival depend on speech.

The delineation of the topics to be approached with the grammatical method will become clear when we ask the fundamental question what logic and mathematics or what theology and science promise to achieve. If they leave a whole realm of experiences untouched, it will not startle us to see that modern society is in need of a new method for our unsolved social problems. This defense of grammar is intended to give us the good conscience of not trespassing on ground that is the property of others.

In order to condense this undertaking, we will try to formulate the theological and the scientific intention in two Latin formulas. We use Latin not for any snobbistic reason. In Latin, we are allowed the careful study of every word of the formula in a more detached and carefully weighing manner than in our own tongues. A translation will be added.

Anselm of Canterbury has summed up his research in a phrase which is apt to serve as the pattern, with the respective changes, for science and for the social teaching, too. By taking Anselm's formula, we shall be sure to be in touch with the thought of the theologians and logicians themselves. As to science, we shall try to model the formula, as far as possible, according to Descartes. Anselm says, in *De incarnatione verbi*, c. 4, that he wrote his famous two booklets "*ut quod fide tenemus de divina natura et eius personis praeter incarnationem, necessariis rationibus sine scripturae auctoritate probari possit.*"⁹

The subject matter of theology is divided into two parts: 1. divine nature and trinity; 2. incarnation. No. 1 is a matter of logical discussion and deduction, No. 2 of historical and personal experience. The science of theology, with its organon logic, is based on one irreducible datum in experience, the Crucifixion; all the rest is given to free research and disputation. Without the one irreducible experience of fact, this theology would not

⁹ "So that what we hold by faith about the divine nature and its persons, except for the incarnation, can be proven by necessary reason without the authority of the Scriptures."

have been Christian. Without the free discussion of everything else, however (and modern agnosticism overlooks this immense scholastic freedom often), there never could have been a theology.

The truth formula that medieval theology tried to prove by necessary reasoning about God, except for the incarnation, is absolutely comprehensive for the activities that are signified under the name "scholastic." In the formula, it need scarcely be said that the words "except for the incarnation" do not mean that the incarnation is without influence on the reasoning process. The term "except" is misleading if it is interpreted literally.

"Except" means that the necessary reasons cannot explain our traditions and memories of the historical life and death of the founder of the Church. Anselm says, at another place, that he can prove negatively that mankind could not have found peace without this historical experience. In other words, theology can go so far to prove the negative situation of a world and a humanity without the incarnation. From this assertion, it is clear that the fact that is excepted from reasoning, the incarnation, is not an annex. It is present all the time in the mind of those reasoning. The combination of speculation and tradition, then, is quite subtle: the historical experience forces the speculation on a level that it could not possibly attain otherwise. For instance, a world and a humanity without the incarnation can be proven to be incomplete, to be in the red, to give a sound basis for despair and pessimism and agnosticism. If this is so, the cohabitation of two sequences of facts really is the basis of theology, in all its mental activity. Christianity is not based on a myth or a legend. It is its honor to be an historical faith, based on events plus reason.

Now let us construe the scientific thesis of Cartesius and all his followers and fellows in modern philosophy and science of nature. Natural philosophy is Descartes's and is modern man's task. I propose the following formula for their basic concept of nature and science. *Philosophia naturalis et scientiae naturales operam dant, ut quod sensibus tenemus de physica natura et eius elementis, praeter expansionem spatii et motum, necessariis rationibus sine mundi speciosi auctoritate probari possit.* Natural phi-

losophy and natural science endeavor that the facts which we obtain through the senses about physical nature and its elements, may be proved, *with the exception of space and its expansion*, by necessary reasoning without the authority of our impression.

That natural science reduces nature to a system of rules about waves, movement, weight, etc., has often been discussed. The whole hierarchy of the sciences tries to reduce chemistry to physics, biology to chemistry, anthropology to biology, sociology to anthropology. At a meeting of the psychologists of this country at Dartmouth, the president read an address that gave a mathematical formula for all psychological research. A famous geometrician published a book, *Laws of Divine World Order*, in which everything was based on geometry. This was towards the end of the nineteenth century. Two hundred years before, Spinoza had written his "ethics *more geometrico*." It is less often stated clearly what the *conditio sine qua non*¹⁰ of all these calculations is, a condition that cannot be demonstrated but must be accepted by intuition. Yet, the fervent discussions about the dimensions point to the fact that the intuition of space and its expanded nature is at the bottom of all these discussions, as a premise from intuition or as an irreducible datum. The words "except for the intuition of space" seem therefore justified. This becomes more evident when we see that the term "dimension" is used whenever the word space is left out of the discussion. The word dimension is very often carried over to the concept of time. However, the very term or label dimension is primarily intended to label a quality of space, or of higher mathematics. All efforts to make it mean time, are metaphors. Time as a dimension of space, and the four-dimensional universe, are, it is true, terms that are widely used today. Yet, this does not make the original premise any less a concept of space. When we extend a fundamental category so far as to contain some other fundamental concepts, it may show that the other concept, here the concept of time, is giving us trouble. It does not alter the fact, however, that we cling to the space-category as having the right to leadership.

¹⁰ The condition not to be missed.

The fourth dimension for "time" is in itself a capitulation before the one category that can not be parted with: space and its so-called three dimensions. It is a poetical metaphor when used for time. And for instance, neither Descartes nor Spinoza have found it necessary to reason about time. Descartes declared time to be miraculous, a daily creation of God. Spinoza tried to treat it as a wrong impression which, in favour of space and timelessness, should be looked through as deceptive, just as in Hindu philosophy *time is not reasoned about but reasoned away*. In natural philosophy time is either a fourth dimension of space or a mere impression. It does not rank either with the one intuitional exception from pure reason which is space and space only,¹¹ or with those mathematical realities of necessary reasons. Time is neither a category nor a fact, in natural science.

So much as to time. On the other hand, God does not come in as a premise, either. To the strict scientist, God is a hypothesis for which he finds no need within his own system. We never get anything out of a system which we have not put into it first. And the very concept of nature, in the science of the last four hundred years, is reducible to space by establishment, and to space only, with the intentional omission of God or of time.

In our grammatical philosophy, or in our grammar as the organon of a new science of society, we concentrate on the phenomena of time. That man must make contemporaries by conversing, by speech, by teaching, that we read Homer and Shakespeare today, that we sing songs, in a chorus, and pass laws for the future, is the odd situation of society and man in society. Our new formula reads: social philosophy and the teachings of society are based on the assumption that the contents of our consciousness about the social changes can be proved, *except for the experience of peace*, by necessary reason without the authority of the empirical statute law. *Philosophia societatis et doctrinae sociales operam dant, ut quod conscientia tenemus de societate eiusque mutationibus temporalibus, praeter pacem, necessariis, rationibus sine staturorum auctoritate probari possit*. This state-

¹¹ The book by A. A. Bowman, *A Sacramental Universe*, is especially rich in material to prove the space-obsession of science. I shall gladly accept the term "time-obsessed" for myself.

ment is built in strict correspondence to the two other methodical claims. Before going into detail, we may pause lest some points in the structure of the three formulas remain obscure.

1. *Theologia et logica scholarum operam dant, ut quod fide tenemus de divina natura et eius personis praeter incarnationem, necessariis rationibus sine scripturae auctoritate probari possit.*¹²

2. *Philosophia naturalis et scientia naturae operam dant, ut quod sensibus tenemus de natura et eius elementis, praeter spatium et motibus in eo, necessariis sine auctoritate mundi speciosi probari possit.*¹³

3. *Philosophia socialis et doctrinae sociales operam dant, ut quod conscientia tenemus de societate et eius mutationibus temporalibus, praeter pacem, necessariis rationibus sine statutorum auctoritate probari possit.*¹⁴

An analysis, by no means exhaustive, shows the following parallels:

1. All three formulas have as their subject two intellectual enterprises: one a general philosophy, the other a specific science, or a number of them. This double subject is descriptive of the fact that we have before us enterprises of a vast character; enterprises that were and are carried on by an army of thinkers who get the general question of their work tendered to them by a philosophy, and who set out to answer the innumerable specific questions in a specialized manner as scholars in many departments.

2. All three movements represent an attempt to replace one knowledge by a knowledge of scientific character. The first knowledge may be called, in a broad sense, empirical knowledge; the scientific task is to change this knowledge into knowledge of universal validity (*necessariis rationibus*). The three types of empirical knowledge are: a. The teachings of the Bible. b. Since nature has no Bible, its empirical authority is the world of our senses, the world of phenomena (like sunrise and sunset), which, in our phrasing we have given as "*mundus speciosus*," the specious world. c. The empirical authorities of the social order are

¹² Theology and the logic of the schools endeavor. . . . see footnote p. 25.

¹³ See translation pp. 26-7.

¹⁴ Translated in preceding paragraph.

the statutes of all groups which, although they lack the quality of scientific necessity, are nevertheless as binding on its members as the Bible to the believer or the appearances of the world to the layman.

3. All three sciences must keep one fact that cannot be demonstrated but that must be accepted before any discussion can start and before reasonable questions can be asked. This is meant by the word *praeter*.

The incarnation, for the Christian thinker, the expanded space and movement within it, for the scientist, and peace, for the social teacher, are singled out as facts of this irreducible character. Why "peace" is such an a priori fact, we shall discuss at greater length later on. Here, we only call attention to the circumstances under which the three parallel facts are realized. Every one of them reaches the individual mind before he sets out for his scientific task. They appeal to him not in his quality as a scholar on research, but in his quality as human being within society. The medium through which the three facts reach the layman within the scholar so that, on their basis, he may start work, differs in each of the three cases. Of space and movement in space, the man knows by intuition, by his individual sense apperception. Of the incarnation, he knows through the living traditions of the church down through history. And of peace, the individual is informed by social experience within his group whatever this group is (tribe, family, community, school, camp, etc.). The empirical data, in all three cases, reach him through different channels. One is his sense equipment, the second history, the third daily life in the group.

In addition to this analysis, it may be stated that the a priori fact "*incarnatio*," "*spatium*," "*pax*" may have to be enlarged. For instance, Thomas Aquinas taught that not only the incarnation but the Trinity also was inexplicable by mere reasoning. Others may add some other element to "*pax*"; and I myself have admitted movement, *motus*, as having equal status with space as a primary datum. This vacillation, however, has no influence on the main structure of the formula; the word "*praeter*," except for, may be followed by one or two data. We are concerned only with the feature of the formula by which two different

groups of data are discriminated: those that must be given to the observer or thinker before he becomes a scientist, that must be given him as a human being, and another series of facts not communicated to him except when acting as a scholar in his field.

I think that the neglect of the completely disparate character of these two sets of data has done much harm. For it has separated the sciences from common sense, without further discussion of this all important question of what scientist and public keep as common intellectual possession. Before any scientists can do research, laymen and experts both are joined together as a people by these fundamental experiences of love for Christ, of motion through space, of peace within. This survey will suffice to show the similarity and yet, the important differences of the three methods. But it is time to turn to the analysis of the third formula.

5. The Metanomics of Society, or Teaching

The laws of a country tell us positively whom to obey, whom to exploit, whom to trust, whom to fight in war. This is no science, it is empirical knowledge, based on the allegiance to a particular country. The social philosophers try to prove by scientific reasoning that the different contents of the consciousness of all citizens of all different social groups have a proper place in time, that society is a meaningful phenomenon in time despite its changing contents and changing membership. But no social science can communicate any truth to a student or reader who has no experience of peace, and for that reason, of the evil conquered by peace. It is hopeless to teach social doctrines to boys and girls who had no experience of peace at home or in school, to unemployables or people who had to live like hunted animals.

Without the intuition and consciousness of the peace that precedes human understanding as a primary fact, all our teaching falls to pieces. With this in mind, the reader will easily understand why the young Germans who saw no peace between

1914 and 1923 were unable to be educated by the old German teachings. The premise was not there which, tacitly, had been at the bottom of every student's conscience and consciousness in former days. Anarchy, decay, war, revolution destroy social teaching as well as society, or more than society.

The reader will also understand why I myself, between 1919 and 1933, tried to put every young German in a situation in which peace and fellowship could be realized before words of interpretation were spoken. The experience of peace by students of society must be secured before the content of any teaching on society can bear fruit. And since in modern society, many conflicts, class wars, disintegration, anarchy, are experienced, the basis of the social sciences is reduced. Also, since the sociologists decline to admit this one undemonstrable premise, they often miss the point in their research to which their findings will have to converge.

Most social scientists abhor the idea that they are not scientists in the sense of natural science. I think that they are right in this sentiment in so far as they are afraid of having to bow, perhaps, to a religious authority. When the choice is between faith and science, it is a natural temptation for a social scientist to join the natural scientists.

However, the figure we cut in society, is a figure in time, not in space. The problems of tradition and progress, change and continuity, are before any social scientist whenever he opens his mouth or fountain pen. For, without a student who gives his time, without a reader who sacrifices the notorious "reading time of two minutes five seconds," there is no such thing as a social knowledge. I have not seen a sociologist who had not written or was not going to write a book or magazine article. Books, however, are temporal phenomena in a changing society, and books change their meaning with any change of society. Hence, the social philosopher, with every thought and every word, is doing something in time and with time himself. And whatever he describes, history, constitution, cases, habits, is a social phenomenon within time limits.

If we know when a phenomenon is in order and when it is out of order, when it is a part of social peace, and when it is

a part of social war, we know all we can know about it. When we know the books a college boy ought to read, we have selected his contemporaries, despite all the distances through time. We have looked forward to the goal we desire him to reach and we have looked backward so that he may take with him into the future the important luggage from other ages. We have stood by him, although older than he and waited for him so that he might catch up with us. And in waiting for him, we ourselves have moved out of our own individual time and built for him and us the college and the classroom as a place of communication and contemporaneity that overcomes the division between the generations, to a certain extent at least. In presenting him with representative thinking of other times, we have vaulted a present that stands out between the past that our teaching represents, and his future that his learning is anticipating.

The first embodiment of the new grammar of society, then, is education. For, in education, two "distemporaries" meet so that they may become contemporaries as the *De Magistro* of Augustinus taught us, in our interpretation of this dialogue.¹⁵ The teacher and the student are the two social agents in which the time element is outstanding. The teacher is more than an experienced man who tells stories from his life's personal experience. Any teacher represents more than his personal knowledge. He brings in mankind's traditions, and so he is the channel through which the quintessence of the past is passed on. Any student as a student is more than a young man. To get an education means to have more future, more direction, more responsibility than the uneducated hobo who tries to make a living from day to day. The fact of the student's studying divides his lifetime into a time of preparation for life and of a later life. And so, the student is emphasizing the time element of a future that is distinguishable from the present just as much as the teacher emphasizes the time element of the past by which he must bring to the present moment the valuable possessions from the past.

¹⁵ Read before the Augustinian Society at Harvard, December 17, 1938. See also the chapter on the *De Magistro* in *The Breath of the Spirit* (see Bibliography).

That it is possible, in teaching and learning, to weave a pattern of contemporaneity around people of different classes, is the great example of pacification in society. Hence, the dialogue in the class room is not the logical phenomenon of which we think in the Platonic dialogues, nor the mathematical agreement of which we think in the physicist's laboratory. It is important to stress the third side of the dialogical situation: it is a victory over natural differences in the temporal order of men, and the fact that any conversation between distemporaries is a victory over nature, exalts the educational process to the one social process of primary significance. As there is pure reason, there is pure social process in education. Education is not a part of nature. In education, at least, we are not in the realm of nature. At this point, society is *sui generis*.

No reduction to phenomena of space is possible or even meaningful. The grammatical method, and the grammatical subject matter is completely distinct from natural phenomena. And the same is true, of course, of the fundamental distinction of education and theology. The situation is not evading the issue of temporal flux. The notorious expression of a "specious present," in some modern American philosophy, for the true achievement of contemporaneity between distemporaries, is, however, evidence of the need for a clarification of this independence of social time and social research. Education is, in its form and method, not dealing with eternity. Eternity may be made its content. But the educational process itself is secular, temporal, untheological, social. It aims at peace between classes, between groups of different times. And it presupposes the desirability of peace.

We have stressed, in Anselm's formula, the one thing that must be presupposed and assumed, the incarnation. We have stressed, in the scientific process, the presupposition of dimensional space and movement in it.

In stressing the minimum datum of the social sciences, peace, we may have a similar task of shifting the emphasis to something usually not mentioned and never analyzed, in its methodical importance, as a constitutive act for the process of social teaching itself. And yet, for our enterprise, it is worthwhile to consider what happens when these prerational assumptions cease to be the center or a priori. One has to concentrate on the fact

of space in order to see with scientific eyes. Nature vanishes without space and motion as first given. We get Christian Science, superstitions, Hindu mysticism without this basis. One has to concentrate on the incarnation in order to give all the logical investigations about human values in our era their proper place. Without the incarnation, the logic of values must lead to polytheism. And modern value philosophies nearly all are polytheistic. Their values are manifold. And a mere phenomenology of values without unity is the result of any philosophy of values without a universal standard for the perfect man.

Now, the same trouble has to be admitted for the assumption that peace is implied in all social research, as at bottom the central and intuitive social experience without which we cannot have social knowledge or direction. We have a lot of historians, sociologists, etc. who either are unaware or are openly hostile to this assumption. Also, we have not, perhaps, succeeded in clarifying our thesis that peace is the one experience of time that is essential for making our notion of time complete and real and irrefutable. So one more word about the relation of peace to time.

The full implications of this relation belong, of course, in the more lengthy chapters of my grammatical organon.¹⁶ But the concept of time, in the sense of a fourth dimension of space, deprives time of its peculiar quality of change. Now, change is more than movement. All change is ambiguous. It can be just as well change for better as change for worse. It may lead to death or to new life. If time were to be studied just because everything in time will change like the New England weather, the temporal phenomena would have no criterion of order, among themselves, as to sequence, righteousness, justice, desirability, etc.

The idea of peace, however, transcends a quality of change, and thereby of time-relations. Peace is the experience of change at the right time. The best change is a peaceful change. Peace is not a situation that obstructs change or history or reform. Peace is presupposing change and time processes. It is made through the birth, aging and death of the members of society. Man's mortality is the simplest guarantee for constant social

¹⁶ *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg 1963/64.

change. But peace is that quality of change by which it is approved and supported by all people concerned. Peace, then, means that the change is accepted unanimously. Since peaceful changes are unanimous changes, peace adds to the external and natural element of time as treated in physics, the one, essential, quality of human participation in this time process by our own consciousness. Peaceful change is the more desirable change because it means that the greatest possible number of members of society are participating in the flux of time, consciously, and are approving of its due process.

The inner relation of time to consciousness is borne out by this qualification of the temporal order as an order that should go on, if possible, in peace, not in war. Because only in this way, is the consciousness that we have of society, and its lawful order, a consciousness that is scientifically and critically purified. How could the social scientist have real knowledge, knowledge that claims to be universally true, if his consciousness cannot be shared by all other men? Hence his inside in the lawful changes of society must be capable of being shared by all other members of society. It is then a *sine qua non* for the existence of a social philosophy that change can be made peacefully; for only then can he hope that his own philosophy of the social changes is universal and that means, is tenable because it is valid for all.

Peace, then, is used here in its dialectical sense of the event that after strife and struggle and war or anarchy, restores the time and space axes of society. We said that speech sustains the time and space axes of society. We also stated that anarchy, war, decadence, and revolution were the four major disturbances of these axes and the cross of reality formed by them. Then, we proceeded to state that any cure, any medicine for these disturbances consisted in somebody speaking his mind to his listener. Since any social evil was of a polychronical character, involving more than one generation, the first remedial way of coping with it was to invite somebody less informed, less hurt, less worn out, so that he might share our shock, our dismay, our insight, our solution, as our listener and student. We summed up this basic rule of social research in the phrase: listen so that we may survive.

Now, we can add to this one more statement: peace is the

experience of this survival after social catastrophes. Peace embodies the survival value of the previous catastrophes of humanity. It is not just the innocence of paradise, but historically acquired immunity from certain dangers and evils of society. Each peace is a concrete and specific victory over a specific disturbance of previous peaces. It is the synthesis to which all social knowledge, according to Ward's one word definition, aspires.

Intellectual synthesis is the peace of our mind, the reflective correspondent to peace in society. Peace and synthesis are twins, the Latin stem, *pax*, rightly dealing with the world in which Rome was dominant, and the Greek word synthesis, dealing with the parallel realm of thought.

When Ward saw Haeckel and Ostwald in Germany, they argued a one word definition of science. Haeckel gave: Genesis, Ostwald, the chemist, defined: Analysis. And Ward said: Synthesis. Here we have the three ways of thought pretty clear. Genesis, is theology, and Haeckel, the evolutionist, who forged a picture in favor of his faith in the solution of the *Welträtsel* (the puzzle presented by the world) is revealed as a theologian in disguise (and all German philosophers were theologians in disguise). Ostwald, in using the term analysis, is true to the Cartesian tradition: he is a true scientist, of modern times. Ward, however, saves the independence of social teaching. Dealing with the creative efforts of our social life, teaching must, in its own method, contain the same germ of responsible creativity. Synthesis is the widest application of the principle of speech as used by the teacher of peace. The creation of peace, then, is the problem of the subject matter and of the subjects dealing with social research as well. At least we must establish peace between ourselves, speaker and listener, before we can communicate truth.

6. *Meta-logic, Meta-aesthetics, Meta-ethics, or the March of Science*

The question of what to call the organon of social research, is by no means quibbling over words. The march of the sciences is well staked by the changing terminology for their underlying

method. This changing terminology, and this change in method, is, in itself, a great chapter in the education of mankind. And since we have seen that education is the primary experience of how mankind establishes peace between distemporaries, it is obvious that the change from method to method occupies the interest of all modern sociologists, beginning with Saint-Simon and Comte. Saint-Simon asked himself: why was scholasticism progressive, scientific, regenerating? Why is modern theology apologetic, timid, reactionary? Why is the same science vital at times, and second rate at others?

Comte also divided the evolution of the sciences into three chapters. And this historical scheme has a parallel in logical investigations about the necessary number of methods for covering the elementary fields of human inquiry. In the last generation of the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian schools, Lask, Hans Ehrenberg, Jaspers, and others advocated the coordination of three basic doctrines that should take the place of the all too simple metaphysics of the enlightenment and its present day adherents. Metaphysics, it was stated, should give way to three independent "meta" doctrines: meta-ethics, meta-logic, and meta-esthetics. These three doctrines should be the respective bases for our research in the social, the natural, and the value-universe. The significance of all our research and teaching, they claimed, depended on our willingness to base society, nature and values on three, not on one foundation. Neither Comte's scheme of history, nor the neo-Kantian logical discussion has convinced the social scientists themselves.

We here take up their task in combining them; and by comparing the real concrete march of the sciences through time with the ideal types of scientific method, we shall, perhaps, be able to state their quandary in a more practical manner. It will appear, from our comparison, that the two sciences advocated by philosophers, meta-logic and meta-esthetics, exist long since; the two have transgressed on the third field. And because they have transgressed, they wore labels under which the modern social scientists are accustomed to expect enemies instead of allies. Only when the social scientists can make peace with theologians and natural scientists, both, and yet preserve their independence, will

the teaching in society prove convincing. Teachers who cannot establish peace among their departments do not deserve the confidence of their students.

Meta-logic already exists. In the beginning of the twelfth century and not earlier than that the term theology came into use for the task of organizing "on the crypt of the Bible the eight stories of dialectical theology." It was a revolutionary term. Too many people today, even among educated and scientific groups, confuse Christianity with theology. But theology got its name as a science to solve problems that had arisen from an unsatisfactory functioning of the Church, after 1000 years of existence. In this sense, theology is absolutely a twin to our own enterprise of a social science for a society not functioning satisfactorily. The century that preceded the coining of the new phrase "theology," had discovered the paradox as the primary obstacle to a scientific treatment of the problems of the Church!¹⁷ Theology is meta-logic, forcing the logic of one-line reasoning to the altitude of the paradoxes with which vital thought deals. *Nihil ex nihilo; mundus creatus ex nihilo.*¹⁸ *Paulus apostolus Romanus et non Romanus est.*¹⁹ *Panis et vinum corpus Christi est et non est,*²⁰ etc.

For meta-logic, it was important to stress the fact of the relatively late creation of the term theology for it. As to metaesthetics, the basic science that transcends the empirical knowledge of nature, we have an ancient term, but, with the Renaissance, a completely new meaning. Metaphysics, with Aristotle, is the term, familiar to all of us. And most people imply that modern metaphysicians have the same topic as Aristotle. This is not so. Nature, in modernity, is not the ancient cosmos with which Aristotle dealt. It is nature minus the values and secrets of the gods (or of God), in modern time.

The concept of nature to all modern metaphysicians, is puri-

¹⁷ The Berengarian disputes, after 1050, were raging on behalf of the paradox that was to become the constant problem of scholasticism: "*est ipsum et non est ipsum.*" This is well shown in the recent publication by Gerhart Ladner, *Theologie und Politik vor dem Investiturstreit* (Baden bei Wien, 1936).

¹⁸ Nothing comes from nothing; the world is created from nothing.

¹⁹ Paul is the Roman apostle and not Roman.

²⁰ Bread and wine are the body of Christ and they are not.

fied, leaving aside the problems discussed by Christian theology and history. Metaphysics is ancient metaphysics minus the mysteries about God in history. It deals with nature and the god of nature only. In calling attention to the fact that modern metaphysics actually are the knowledge transcending man's science of the world of phenomena, we correct the too comprehensive conception of metaphysics. A term that, in Aristotle, was merely a literary accident: that the book was placed after his physics—became restricted in modern times to considerations of the meta-esthetical kind. That which must balance all physical observation of the natural world of appearances, is the subject matter of this Renaissance rival of theology, metaphysics.

Thus, the neo-Kantian demand for meta-esthetics has been satisfied by metaphysicians, beginning with Giordano Bruno and Descartes. This is a perfectly good word since the physical world is the world of sense apperception (=esthetics), of aisthesis. And the so-called "esthetics" in the sense of beauty, of the *universalia in re* are part of this quest in so far as the general conditions that bodies in the world of appearance must satisfy, certainly are qualified by the category of beauty, this being the unity of appreciation for our sensuous system.

I have justified in my book *Out of Revolution* my choice of the word "metanomics"²¹ for the organon and epistemology that is needed for any plunge into the material questions of society. I do not think that my choice is arbitrary. The terms ethics and meta-ethics are impossible, as a pair because of the highly specialized use of ethics as moral discipline. It seems impossible to restore to ethics the character of an empirical science. The empirical sciences feel that ethicists are concerned with standards more than with facts. Economists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, lawyers are the standard-bearers of the empirical knowledge in the social field. In this case, the term meta-ethics is useless for it would not be in clear opposition to those descriptive activities but to the moralizing ethics only. Metanomics rises beyond any partial and particular field of legislation of lawful functioning in society. It deals with the law of legislation in society. And it

²¹ "Metanomics" from the Greek *meta*, beyond, and *nomoi*, laws.

is in the enjoyable position, as a name, to be in clear polarity to the law as well as to economics.

The theology of Anselm and Thomas is meta-logic; metaphysics of the 18th century style on the God of nature is meta-esthetics. My task is the meta-ethical and that is pressing today because of the coexistence of antagonistic laws of society. Meta-logic was needed when a new paganism disrupted the Christian Church in feudal and local worship. Metaphysics was needed when coordination of physical facts, discovery of America, etc., a system of distant continents and countries and bodies became compelling. Metanomics, or meta-ethics are, in the time of radio, the result of the pandemonium of propaganda for different systems, different types of man, different social orders that compete in our ears incessantly. We must identify the historical names and the Kantian terms, and we shall find that humanity has followed a *remarkably* steady course in going from meta-logic to meta-esthetics to metanomics.

I have listed the endeavor of metalogic as the *concordia discordantium canonum* on the workings of divine truth: the concurring of the paradoxical utterances of the spirit. Concurring science is meta-logic. I might list the passion of the last centuries of natural philosophy as the passion for a system that coordinates far distant bodies and relates the hitherto unrelated facts of the world and also, as metaphysics, explains that very passion for a "system." A systematizing science is natural science, meta-esthetics.

And my own direction of thought, probably, will have to be listed as the meta-ethical search for a synchronization of mutually exclusive social patterns of behaviour, as "the metanomics of the great society" which must contain contradictory ways of life. My grammar of assent, my grammatical organon, is devoted to the task of supplementing the statute law of any given society with the metanomics that explain and satisfy our enthusiasm for the synchronization of the distemporal, of old and young, black, brown and white, government and anarchy, primitive and refined, highbrow and lowbrow, innocence and sophistication, all at peace, in one human society.

Perhaps, it is safe to say that meta-logic, meta-ethics, and metaphysics all concur in trying to prove one and the same thing for

the mind, for society, and for nature. After all, they are wrestling with the question of the omnipresence of God. Theologians wrestle with this omnipresence despite the confusing maze of rational statements and propositions. Metaphysicians try to interpret the phenomena of the world of our senses as being capable of cosmic harmony and beauty, as being natural, despite the confusion of the phenomenal world.

Metanomics, then, might be interpreted as the search for the omnipresence of God in the most contradictory patterns of human society. No wonder that though they all concur, they also must use different methods; the logical, or dialectical, is in use for explaining the contradictions of propositions (nothing comes from nothing; yet, God created the world out of nothing), the mathematical and physical: the smallest unit is the atom; no, the smallest unit is the wave. The grammatical or dialogical: all men are identifiable; no, all men are different. In this latter proposition, I feel that we are in the center of all social problems of the future. The paradox of the human being in society is just this: that man is a separate unit with separate interests, and that he is a fellow with identical interests as well.

The picture of man, under the hegemony of meta-logic, theology, was that man was an abject sinner, in his individuality. The picture of man, under natural philosophy, was that he was everybody else's equal. The vision of the social teacher is metanomical. He knows that the economics of society differentiate us incessantly; the variety of mankind is perplexing. By metanomics he reclaims man's power to identify himself with others despite these differences. The equilibrium between the special social sciences in which man appears to differ, and the social philosophy which make him appear eternally the same human being, is the secret of all research in the social field. We cannot give up one side of the social paradox, either by identifying all men as being the same, or by allowing them to become so different that they lose their power of identifying themselves with others. Peace is the term which expresses the existence of this paradox in society: that different people by having peace together, are identifiable.

With this paradox at bottom, social teachings are placed on the same basis as the medieval and the modern sciences. No research,

no intellectual enterprise on a large scale, can get going without the preservation of contradictions. Man is in a contradictory position because he is alive. God is contradictory because he is the living God. And nature is paradoxical because she is in movement. Empirical human thought is not vital enough to reflect the contradictions of its subject matters: society, values, nature. It is only when the scientific stage is reached, as in scholasticism, or science, or now in social research, that the empirical and mechanical workings of the individual mind are sublimated to a common enterprise of mankind. In it the thinking process is mirroring not one aspect of its object, but all its contradictory aspects.

Whenever a province of life is conquered by science, the mind rises beyond the first empirical assertion to the higher plane of the paradox, of contradictions. Many bodies, one space; many truths, one God; many times, one peace. And the teaching of social order and disorder must be built on the contradictory vision of man at war and at peace in order to become the pre-eminent intellectual enterprise of the future.

7. *Theses*

Speech sustains the time and space axes of society. Grammar is the method by which we become aware of this social process. Grammar, then, offers itself as the basis for the meta-ethics of society. We have called this new discipline not meta-ethics but metanomics of society, for the obvious reason that economics, bionomics, theonomy, deal with the laws (*nomoi*) of the different realms of science.

The aim of this new organon is synchronization of distempories. Any educational process does this very thing in empirical fashion. Peace is the datum that must be given in immediate personal experience to the student of social teachings. Peace cannot be deduced rationally.

The two previous scientific enterprises are the meta-logic of the middle ages, in the form of theology, and the meta-esthetics of modern times, in the form of metaphysics. Meta-logic (theology)

concorded discording truth, saved the paradox of living truth against the laws of contradiction and of the excluded middle. Meta-aesthetics (metaphysics) saved the unity of matter and movement, the unity of space in a system of distant bodies.

8. Schematic Survey

abstract term:	Meta-logic	Meta-aesthetics	Meta-ethics
concrete field:	values (gods)	nature (space)	society (time)
intellectual			
tool:	dialectics	mathematics	grammar
historical			
name:	theology	natural science	"metanomics" proposed
task:	<i>concordia</i> <i>discordant-</i> <i>ium</i> <i>canonum</i> concording contra- dictory eternal truth	coordinating movement of <i>distant</i> bodies: system	synchronizing antagonistic "distempo- raries"
starting			
points:	1050, Lanfranc 1142, Crusades	1543, Coper- nicus 1620, Descartes Thirty Years' War	1808, Saint- Simón World War

CHAPTER 2

ARTICULATED SPEECH¹



ARTICULATION, ARTICULATE SPEECH, TO articulate, form a family of words that lead a rather modest life among professional linguists. The general public might be interested in speech in general, or in the word that was in the beginning and with God, with the origin of language, or with thinking and philosophy on the other hand. It is unusual to tackle the mysteries of our spiritual and mental life not by going back to the inner thought nor to the historical development but by facing the problem of articulating.

We are proposing to make the sibling "articulate" interesting and important. We think that when it is not put in the center of discussion, speech and thought, both, lose their social reality. And the power of language among us, then, remains inexplicable. We say that language is powerful only because it is articulate, because not in speech and not in thought but in the grammatical processes of articulation is to be found the process of transmission which makes for peace in society. Peacemaker language is dependent on its quality of uniting free and independent persons. And articulation is the means by which freedom and unanimity are blended into the miracle of a peaceful community life.

We are advocating the grammatical contemplation of articulated speech because then, and perhaps only then, does the contribution of language to society become transparent.

Everybody knows that the worst mistake for a man who tries to impress his will on a sober group of people is to yell or to shout

¹ This is a chapter from Rosenstock-Huessy's "Magna Charta Latina," a Latin grammar written for his son in 1937.

only. That is not enough, and mostly obnoxious to his own ends. Yelling and shouting are one thing; articulate speech is another. Articulate speech recognizes the existence of other wills than the speaker's, it believes in powers that are far bigger than the time and space of the present moment, it commits itself to much higher and more ambitious ends than a shout or yell or cry or laugh. And, simultaneously, it places the speaker himself as well as his listener, on a far higher and on a more risky level. These four points we must demonstrate first before it may seem worth while to deal with language at all. Words are trifles, to most men. They have heard them too often. It is all fake, advertising, propaganda, lying. Indeed it is. But why is there so much abuse of language? Only important things are imitated and abused and perverted. *Corruptio optimi pessima* is a Latin dictum. It means: the corruption of the best is worse than any other.

From the unending abuse made of words, the power of language may be deduced, at first sight. To speak is a great and noble risk.

We repeat that we wish to make four points, on the power, the authority, the faith, and the ennobling quality of articulate speech.

Riding horseback in a foreign country, I saw a stranger on the other side of the river. I wished to ask him where to ford the stream. I pointed somewhere upstream: *and the stranger shook his head.*

I accepted his shaking as negating my suggestion of a ford in this direction. Much later, I was informed that in the stranger's idiom, shaking meant affirmation. I missed my way on account of this misunderstanding of his sign.

No word was exchanged between us. Yet, I experienced the four important facts about speech.

Speech is a communication inside humanity which is distinguished by four features. Every human being prides himself on being able to communicate. The parties concerned believe that the common possession of a truth or an understanding or an agreement is possible and should be tried. The communication takes place through formative signs in the external world, signs that may be sounds or gestures, but are all specific and yet

recurrent. (This man did not shake his head at me only; but he always did when he wanted to affirm some truth.)

Finally, these formative signs to which we must commit ourselves when we communicate, are exposed to failure; they include a number of risks: the sign may be misinterpreted; the sign may be a means of cheating. The speaker may be wrong; he may be unable to articulate that which he means to convey.

The unity of faith in all people who try to speak, the inevitable risk of failure, the pride of the individual to be able to speak, and the continued use of specific formative elements, these are the first layer of facts about language.

Grammar books are dull only as long as we pretend that we all and always are able to articulate. A thing which does not include a vital risk is boring and we call any such thing mechanical. But in any given moment, society is imperilled by the loss of common speech between generations and classes and nations and continents. And the reality of this danger increases today because language is abused today on a colossal scale so that whole groups will turn off the radio or not buy a certain book because they mistrust this source of information forever. Hence, new efforts must be made to restore the power of language against these tremendous odds.

1. *Our Four Responsibilities in Speaking*

There is a second layer of facts about speech known to everybody, and yet unconscious in most of us.

The other day, I yelled across the fence to a boy playing there: Ooooooh, trying to attract his attention so that I might ask a question. He, however, like a character from Helen's Children, hurled back a prolonged oooooooooooh, to his visible satisfaction. In this duplication of my yelling, there was no communication, no speech. It was noise, amusing or annoying, according to viewpoint. What was lacking for its becoming speech? Two things were lacking: one on my side, one on his.

1. I did not know the boy's name. So I could not repeat that word under which he could ask to be addressed, as being ad-

dressed in the proper way. This is very important because had I said: Mortimer, he could hardly have shouted endlessly (as he actually did shout ooooooh) Moorrrrtimer. So, I led him into his failure, with my own, myself.

2. He did not answer to my appeal with a response but with a repetition. Now, these two things were lacking: the proper name for the person to whom I wished to talk, and an answer. Instead, we had a yell and a repetition.

Obviously, then, for human speech, two things are essential: names and answers. (And again, we wish to tell the experienced reader, that linguistics are dull as long as they don't wonder enough about the secrets of using names and making answers. Both, names and answers, as far as we can make out, are not mentioned in grammar books, as constituting the long range frame work for all speech.) Names and answers place the momentary attempt of the two people who speak in the series of all attempts ever made before and ever going to be made later. Names and answers exalt the momentary contact between two specimens of Homo Sapiens into a historical event in the evolution of the race.

This may seem a pretentious claim. However, I find myself unable not to learn four far-reaching lessons from the two observations made across the fence:

1. By using the proper names and terms, in introducing ourselves and our topic ("Dr. Livingstone, I presume?"), we enter into a communication of humanity of long standing. Proper language respects the history of mankind from its very origin. And by this is explained the astonishing fact that our language actually reaches back much farther than any other institution we have. It is at least six thousand years old. We never start all over again when we speak. Because the success of speech depends on its being "proper." Proper language yields more power to his owner than property.

2. When we answer, we neither repeat merely what the first speaker has said nor do we start in our own language. Had I succeeded in calling him Mortimer, he would have not repeated, but answered. Perhaps it would have been: "Go to hell," or "Yes, Sir," or "I am coming." Now, when we analyze his

answers,—and they all would have been between these three extremes,—we see that he would have developed my call into the three possible directions, in which any answer can be developed:

a. direction towards the interlocutor: “Go . . .,” form of the second person, trying to make him act, *Imperative*.

b. objective statement of fact, leaving the interlocutors out, and even putting the partner in the distanced form of the third person, “Sir,” for achieving the utmost of objectivity and immobility. *Indicative*.

c. direction towards the answering person himself, using the I-form, and announcing the Ego’s intention. *Intentional*. (=Subjunctive as we shall see).

In cases a, b, and c, we always vary the previously existing language by a new combination. We develop it in one of the possible directions. This modulation of the existing material makes my utterance into an answer. The language, the linguistic materials which are to be used, is prescribed by the first speaker. It makes no sense to answer a man in a language in which he does not want to talk, but inside this framework I am free to introduce variations, to enrich, to specify, in short to articulate. In articulated speech, we create a variation of the existing linguistic tradition.²

To articulate, then, is a highly complicated act that implies both: identity and variation. Without identifying ourselves with the language as it stands, and as we find it, we cannot say our word, and without varying and deflecting this material in a specific direction that is constituting a new situation created by our own choosing, our entering the ring of the speaking folks would be useless. To chat is this kind of useless, playlike speech. It may not be quite useless, in the last analysis. And yet, in the fight against mere gossip, there is sound judgment; because the irresponsible way of using ready-made slogans and judgments in mere repetition without making them ourselves here and now, under our own name, is a vilification of language. Words wither by this use. Whereas any answerable person revivifies the words

² It is the merit of the Dane O. Jespersen to have re-asserted this feature in all speech among philologists. Its neglect has made an understanding between grammarians and thinkers impossible for thousands of years.

which he chooses and which find their way slowly from his heart to his lips.

The variation-character of any answer is especially plain in cases like "Come"; "I am coming." Here one and the same word is varied. Latin had no other way to answer an "*ama*," "love," but by repeating the same word and varying it according to circumstances. There was no objective answer "Yes, Sir." Antiquity was so much interested in the two interlocutors that one either spoke *to* the other or *of* oneself. You had to say "I love," "*amo*."

However, this literal identity of the same word or stem is only the clearest symptom of the situation between two people that talk together. It is always true that a conversation implies identity and variation, both. They must converse in one orbit of linguistic material and both must contribute and use it in different manner. Otherwise, they are a chorus, and not interlocutors. It is strange that most analyses of language start with a lonely Ego that presumably talks on the stage of the Alhambra to nobody. But this is quite abnormal. Language means the liberty between two people to modulate in complementary ways one and the same word or idea or topic or language. This is true for a talk about the weather, for the polemic of scholars, for the speeches between political parties or in court, for the debates between orthodox and heretic. Both articulate: both are committed to a ballet which they execute together, and which makes sense only when danced together. No party speech, no theological innovation, no scientific discovery, no part of any dialogue in the world makes sense if it is not understood as a variation of something the speaker and his public have and hold in common, yet as a variation by which the speaker leads into a new future.

Compare this with our two failures in speaking: yelling is not speaking because it does not recognize the proper word. Repeating is not speaking because it does not vary it. Articulated speech always is evolutionary: it identifies and varies, both in one breath. It contains the miracle of transformation and yet formulating, in the same way as every flower does in spring. To speak is, indeed, a biological phenomenon of metamorphosis. This biological fact, however, takes place within the kind, not within the individual. For, it is the rebirth of that element which binds

together the whole race, speech. And which makes every one of us one verse in the universal song of creation, as Augustine called this participation.

Facts one and two, the proper name, and the new variation, we have deduced by separate analysis of my own and the boy's behaviour.

Now let us look at them once more, as a combination, or in their combination. And two more facts will be noticeable.

The first of this new pair, and I shall list it as number three (3), is: I wished to attract the boy's attention; I expressed a *desire*. Language expresses intentions, desires, emotions; language is expressive of something inside of man.

(4) It is equally true that the boy was impressed by my voice, and that, in other cases, too, we simply register by a word or sign spoken to others or to ourselves, an external process which is making an impression on us. In fact, an event which we do not record or register, is identical with one that makes no impression. An impression made on our senses, here on the ear, is not fully digested when it has not been transformed into some form of conscious observation.

(3) and (4) are equally important. Neither the inner life of man nor the outer processes in the world are completed before they are voiced or registered by human articulated speech. To speak is a part of the world's facts. As food passes through many phases in the process of complete metabolism, the same way, at a certain phase, any inner movement requires to be expressed and any outer process requires to be registered by human speech.

2. *The Cross of Reality*

Four facts were disclosed by my little speech-disease (diseases are the best way to reveal what health is).

1. When we speak we are connected through the millenniums with the dawn of humanity because we try to use the *proper* words.

2. We are tending towards the completion of its evolution because we combine the heritage of the ages in an *answerable*, and that means in a new way.


3. We *express* the inner man's intentions and emotions, and thereby complete them and "get them out of our system" as one says in slang.

4. We register the external processes which touch our senses, and we are not satisfied before our sensations have been *clarified* in scientific language.

Now, is it not possible to discover some unity in these four particular facts about human speech? Are they separate truths, or are they interdependent?³

When we look at the four statements once more, they show man in a very obvious situation, and this situation is nothing but the situation of any living organism within a living universe.

Whenever we speak, we assert our being alive because we occupy a center from which the eye looks backward, forward, inward, and outward. To speak, means to be placed in the center of the cross of reality.



Four arrows point in the four directions in which any living being is enmeshed. A human being, when speaking, takes his stand in time and space. "Here" he speaks from an inner space to an outer world, and from an outward world into his own consciousness. And "now" he speaks between the beginning and the end of times.

That time and space are the pattern of our existence is a commonplace. But among grammarians, only one as far as I know, Magnusson in 1893, has made grammar the philosophy of time and space which it is. We shall see that the tenses and cases, etc., of the grammar book are not dead formulas but biological statements. "The same inflexible laws of time and space which

³ The author has developed the following facts at great length in his other writings, especially *Soziologie* and *Out of Revolution, Autobiography of Western Man* (see Bibliography).

govern the phenomena of perception, also govern the forms and rules of speech." (Magnusson) The trouble is not that people have overlooked the fact about our moving in time and space. The trouble is in that they did not analyze the time and space in which we move. The time and space of living organisms differs widely from the time or space used in mechanics for dead matter.

In mechanics it is assumed that a body at present is only influenced by causes working on it from the past. As Laplace has said, "The present is caused by the past; and the future is the result of the past and present." Now this is simply nonsense for our lives. In nature no present whatsoever exists. A razor-blade moment separates the past and the future. The present is man's creation; any present is created under the pressure from the future and past. You and I are suspended between the past and the future; and we know it, and must make the most of it. What we say, we do say under pressure from both times.

That is why every word that we say is old as well as new, traditional and evolutionary, both. We steer between the origins of our patterns of language, speech, thought, and our destiny. Real time has two directions: backward and forward, it extends into the past and into the future from now when we speak. The mechanical picture of a straight line starting at zero in the past and going forward towards the future does not apply to the living being which has to strike a balance by facing backward as well as forward and weigh both, achievements and exigencies.

Mechanics also give a wrong aspect of space. They show us immersed into one huge space of three dimensions. Life, however, is not found except where an internal system and an external environment are discernible. The distinction between inner and outer space is the *sine qua non* of life, of metabolism, growth, assimilation, individuation. Real biological space is two-fold. And in speaking we are aware of this bipartition. The interlocutors are, in their common speech, moving in an inner circle as against the outside world. When people are at war, they don't speak together. Or, in a private feud, they are not on speaking terms. In both cases, the inner orbit has broken down, and, then, their speech is gone, too. They treat each other as mere external parts of the world. The existence of an inner and an outer space

is the condition for human speech. Man, then, is between two fronts of space, one facing inward, one facing outward; and this corresponds to his being facing backward and forward. The cross of reality is around us all the time, as long as we are struggling to survive as a community of human beings.

Now and here, we are living in a twofold time and a twofold space. And we speak lest we get lost under the strain of this quadrilateral. We speak in an attempt to ease this strain. To speak means to unify, to integrate, to simplify life. Without this effort, we go to pieces by either too much inner, unuttered desire, or too many impressions made upon us by our environment, too many petrified formulas from the past, or too much danger and emergency from the future.

So, a person who learns grammar, becomes conscious of man's real position in history (backward), world (outward), society (inward), and calling (forward).

As an adept of grammar, he acquires the capacity of resisting the temptations of a mechanical logic that assumes a time built up of past, present, future in the one direction past, present, future; and that operates with a space of the cubical nature of three dimensions.

For living beings (and this applies to plants and animals as well as to men) space is a conflict of inner and outer processes.

For human beings (and this also applies to plants and animals), time is a conflict between responsibilities toward the past and the future.

But by speaking (and this does not apply to plants and animals) man can evolve the boundaries of inner space in any given moment so that they become more and more inclusive. One rose is always a rose. But man is a member of a family, of a town, of a kingdom, of a race, of a civilization, of a church, of the human kind, as far as he cares to create the language that is appropriate in these communities of different size and destination. On every day of our journey through life, do we speak and read and write and listen so that we may balance our tendencies backward and inward and outward and forward. If we do not re-balance these four fronts, we become inarticulate and even speechless.

To speak means to treat all the four aspects of life as capable of unity. You can prove this fact to yourself by analyzing any simple theme of language, like "come." "Come" as an imperative is heading towards the future. You, the speaker, depend on somebody else's changing the world by complying with your demand that he move towards you. But you also may wish to record the fact that "he has come," the historical event that by now belongs to the past, with the same linguistic material "come," by a variation of the theme. The same is true about your own inner attitude towards his movement which, perhaps, you express by a sigh ("may he come"), or by describing the external process of his moving through the visible space: he is coming.

Come!

He has come

He is coming

May he come

reflect processes that belong to quite different orbits of experience. "Come" heads toward the future. "He has come" *can neither be seen nor heard nor wished nor effected*. It can only be *remembered*. "He is coming" is conveyed to you by your senses; you may see or hear him move. And "May he come" reveals something of your inner life.

And for all the four realms, that come into being because you shift between facing forward, backward, inward and outward, you use one and the same theme "come." Past and future, inner and outer processes, to us, seem susceptible of identical language. To speak means to be a leader (come), a scientific observer (he is coming), a historian or chronicler (he has come), and a poet (may he come), in the nutshell. We recognize all events in time and space as coherent.

From this little example we may learn that all language contains scientific, political, historical (or institutional), and poetical elements. Poets, politicians, scientists, and administrators are only specialists of one branch of the cross of reality. There is no all round man. Because our reality is not a circle but a cross. There is only humanity trying to do justice to all four fronts of life, and to recognize their inherent unity.

To speak, then, means more than to be a scientist or a poet

or a demagogue or a narrator. It means to insist on the essential unity of all these four types of language. They all are needed, they all interpret each other. It is nonsense to believe that the scientist or the historian or the politician or the poet alone can know the truth. The truth is in the man who can speak all four languages with sincerity by using one and the same materials for all, and who does not disrupt the unity of speech by running away into a merely scientific, a merely poetical, a merely petrified or a merely revolutionary language. The truth is in the man who can equate and identify the times and spaces of his life.

The analysis of "come" may be matched by the analysis of a group of words that display the cross of reality in their variety. Take "act, action, agent, actual, active," etc.

Act! as a challenge is one momentary point, the narrow gateway into the future; the agent and the actor are permanent embodiments of acts. By repetition and by having acted before, they institutionalize temporary acts into action, a thing in space. The word "active" applied to a man describes his inner attitude towards the world. "Agile" and "actual" are descriptive of external features. "The Acts" are, so to speak, frozen or petrified imperatives that once before they were done, read "act!" as imperatives in the ears of the men who achieved them. Now they can be stored away in the memory of mankind as "acts." An "act" is a "then it was an imperative."

At this juncture, a word must be said about the treatment of language by philosophy. In self-defense, the speaker in us must rise against the constant attempt made by a so-called scientific age to ruin our language by trying to persuade us that philosophy is more than grammar, thought more than speech, concepts more than words. The danger is, in the world we live in, quite real. Because we are told in our schools that the scientific language of mathematics is the only perfect orientation on our way through the encircling gloom. And so philosophers have tried through the ages to reduce language to one function only, the logical or mathematical. They have looked down upon the confusing sight of human speech in its perplexing variety: a whole school of thought, at present, tries to develop a logic of grammar.

We already possess a little masterpiece of this dissecting and reducing method⁴ which just because it is perfect makes one feel that we are all going to give up the spirit soon because language is illogical, stupid and always wrong against logic. This condescending attitude is illustrated by the word of the philosopher, Leibniz: "I despise nothing, not even the discoveries in grammar."⁵ Now the reader must reach his own conclusions about the discoveries in grammar by which humanity is building up its orbit of cooperation within the world and towards its goal.

The one thing that he ought to understand, in addition, is what exactly philosophers have been driving at, in their shadow-boxing against the alleged imperfection and befoggedness of language. Because the particular art of thinking is, of course, one very important part of the life of speech among us. And from the center of the cross of reality, from the standpoint of the speaker or listener, we may see more clearly than the philosophers themselves what they are doing and why they are doing it, and how far they are valuable, and how far they must be checked.

When we know this we shall be able to defend grammar against the usual condescending abuse, and, also, shall take advantage of the real contribution philosophy can make to the universal language of mankind.

3. *The Pillars of Time and Space*

In our analysis of the theme "come" or "act," we might limit ourselves to mere statement of facts: he is coming, it is coming, she is coming. Strictly speaking, these three statements are the only safe and pure statements of fact. "They are coming," may be added, as another observation in the outside world which you can see as well as I.

Every further step leaves the circle of direct observation and of facts absolutely controllable by everybody. For instance, "he has come" is a mere assertion. You cannot see it. It may have been a hallucination. You must take this on faith. *And I rely*

⁴ Josef Schaechter, *Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Grammatik*, 1935.

⁵ In the edition of his works by Gebhardt II, 539.

on my memory, and not on my observation when I make this statement. So, only in a very few forms does language lend itself to scientific statements. In fact, the number of these statements is startlingly limited.

He is coming, they are coming, it is coming, she is coming; these sentences can be analyzed as follows:

"He" is not "she"; "it" is neither "she" nor "he"; "they" are more than either "he" or "she" or "it."

They plus he or
they plus she or
they plus it may be more
than "they" alone.

In other words, the careful analysis of the indicative and the statements that are controllable by observation leads into the realm of logic and of arithmetic and mathematics. She = Non-he. But it = it. And plural and singular can be distinguished and be put into a sequence, as, for instance: it + he + she = they (in this case = 3). The logician discovers here some fundamentals of his science ($A = A$, etc.)

All thinkers of this type treat language as imperfect because they wish to extract from it nothing but indicational statements of controllable, uncontradictory and enumerable facts. Speech is imperfect, they say; mathematics and logic are more perfect. Well, for the mathematician or logician, this is and ought to be a truism. For he wants to be a mathematician, a man calculating, and not a man speaking. He has the purpose of being the analyst of any statement put before him. He cannot make statements himself. All mathematical propositions are hypothetical. In other words, they are not valid if the statement is not observable in the outside realm of facts. All logic and mathematics is under the curse of being the science of "ifs." Whether he has come, or shall come or will come, no logician can ever tell. But if, yes, if he has come, he is here; and then his coming is over and will not happen in the future. And if, yes, if *he* has come, then it is not proven that *she* has come. But if, yes, if *she* and *he* have come, then *they* have come, etc.

Now, this analysis superimposes on naive language a kind of critical reflection. It is, indeed, reflection, or critical reconsid-

eration of the statements made in human speech. It is "second thought." So-called scientific thinking or rationalizing, is second thinking, re-thinking of the things said before. And, when a man makes this critical reflection his profession, he will be inclined to superimpose this, his own aim, upon everybody who handles language and condemn all first and primary language as being a misfit. And again and again there have been mathematical philosophy, symbolic logicians, geometrical ethicists, men who have scolded language for using metaphors like "sunset" or "sunrise" or "pulling your leg," because, at second thought, they prove to be non-mathematical or illogical.

The general public, today more than ever, is warned against uncritical language, and invited to become analytical. From chemical analysis to psycho-analysis, everything is analyzed. Our bread is so well analyzed that nothing is left in it of the illogical grain and that vitamins have to be injected into the flour afterwards to make up for the losses by too much analysis. And the soul is analyzed so well that all our loyalties and all our wishes and all our dreams are abandoned as just so many frustrations and chains and inhibitions.

The analytical phase of treating our words is a middle zone between naive and restored speech. It is an interlude, taking place in our reflection. But to reflect is neither the first nor the last attitude of living beings. It is an intermediary stage.

Language is a biological act. *Through speech human society sustains its time and space axes.* Nothing more and nothing less. This, however, is in itself quite a task, is it not?

We sustain the time and the space axes of our civilization by speaking, because we take our place in the center of this civilization, confronted with its future, its past, its inner solidarity and its external struggle. And in this delicate and dangerous exposure to the four fronts of life, the inner, outer, backward and forward front, our words must strike a balance, and must distribute and organize the universe, in every moment. It is we who decide what belongs to the past and what shall be part of the future. Our grammatical forms in our daily speech betray our deepest convictions.

Creative is this way of speaking, as against the critical and analytical character of second thinking, of reflection.

However, we are able to place this reflective process in one special branch of the cross of reality. The scientist's thought belongs properly to the branch that extends from speaking humanity into the external world of nature. The outer sensations are best observed when simply and impartially registered. A thermostat, a barograph, a telescope, a microscope, are the refined senses of man by which he can register and record pure impressions. Against the outside world, we indeed use our power of counting it. When the Prussian general Moltke visited Queen Victoria, he was bored by the court of St. James; so, he took up, as a pastime, counting the candles that were burning in the halls. They were very numerous, and so he could spend quite a time every evening in this manner of observing facts, controllable facts in the outside world. Whereas the rest was given to conversation, he concentrated on observation. And the result was figures, numbers, accounts.

Now, Moltke would not have been there, and he would have had no candles to observe if, yes *if*, there had not been hundreds of courtiers flocking into the dining and reception halls for fulfilling the ceremonies and the ritual of royal receptions. Things must go on in order to be present to observation. And these boring courtiers repeated the formula of ceremonious speech, and ritualistic behaviour, day after day, because they protected the front towards the past, the glorious past³ of the British Commonwealth. The branch of speech that covers the backward front of life is just as important and rich and comprehensive as science. How do you do? is the first word of this language, and in this language the emphasis is on propriety. Everybody is given his full name, or even his title as "Mr. President," "Your Excellency," "Lady Asquith," etc.

All habitual, liturgical, legal formulas pertain in this category of precedent where time stands still because the past cannot be changed. It is that which it has become, forever. "Oyez, oyez," the "posse" of a sheriff, "*habeas corpus*," are famous illustrations of the language developed from the How-do-you-do? principle.

Since we cannot live either by reflection or by formula, alone, we also have developed a rich language based on the simple word "come." Politics are the development of this suggestive invitation. All education and teaching belongs into this branch that deals with the future. And the pure scientist cannot help using suggestive invitations. All mathematicians and logicians who boast of their being merely observing facts are politicians. For any man who prints a book sends out an invitation: come and read and buy and learn and hear and digest and apply and understand. In any scientific publication any number of political acts is implicitly expressed. There is no science without the political and educational act. For the scientific thought is trying to make its way into the world, and that means changing the world, changing society by getting a hearing, being given a chance, getting an endowment, getting students, becoming a textbook, and taking possession of the brains of unsophisticated young people. The "*actus purus*" of science makes no sense without the "*actus impurus*" of publication.

Again, however, political and educational challenges and suggestions would exhaust themselves soon if they were not nourished by the inner life and desire of the writers, prophets, leaders, and scientists. A society in which people act and make propaganda without first having desired and dreamt themselves must decay. Politics without poetics are a failure. Propaganda must exactly correspond to the inner life of the people who propagate; or it will fall flat. As it fortunately does everywhere where people try to build up propaganda as a machine that invites other people's thoughts without first giving free range to the inner growth of thought in the speakers.

Hence, we get a fourth branch of speech, based on the joys and sorrows of the man who sighs "May she love me" or "May I not live to see this happen." This language, of course, is the language of poetry. And it is as true and as real, and as vital, as science, formula, education. A merely scientific, or a purely educational society or a ritualistic society or a poetic society—everyone of them would cease to live.

The life of mankind does depend on *the integrity of all its members to shift between the four ways of speech freely.* The

liberty of man is to be found in his right to sing, to think, to invite or lead and to celebrate or remember. These four acts cover the four aspects of reality. By these four acts, the artist, the philosopher, the leader and the priest, within every human being, is regenerated daily. Whenever we use articulated speech we are artists, philosophers, leaders and priests of the universe. We cannot utter a single sentence without using:

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. a metaphor | = poetical language |
| 2. judgment | = scientific language |
| 3. historical material | = ceremonial language |
| 4. selection | = political language. |

Everybody may celebrate the existing order, analyze the processes going on, express his heart's desires, and govern the course of events in the future. Many escape from this tremendous task. They either betray themselves or others, and they begin to talk just one specialty, or they become hypocrites by using other people's language.

Because time and space are real challenges, and not abstract mechanics, the individual responds to these challenges always in an imperfect way. Nobody except the perfect man is a priest, an artist, a king, and a philosopher, at the same time. We have mentioned the fact that to speak involves the speaker in the risk of failure. This is the opportunity to acquaint ourselves with the faculties within the individual by which he tries to get his grip on reality. The four fronts of life have built into every individual a "bastion," a foothold for themselves. We have memories towards the past, emotions about the inner space, reason for the outer space, and love for the future. However, these powers fail us. Sometimes we forget instead of remembering. We hate where we might love. We are mad instead of using reason. And we remain indifferent where we might boil over.

No mortal can boast of having reason, memory, love, and complete feeling for all and everything. We have memories, and are forgetful; we have loves and hatreds in the plural; we have emotions and are indifferent; and we have reasons, and are unreasonable, or mad.

People don't like this true picture of themselves. They ascribe to man memory, love (or "will"), feeling, reason, in the singular, as something absolute. And many misunderstandings about grammar and speech and psychology and society root in this subtle replacing the plural "memories plus forgetting" by the proud singular "memory." If this were true, every man were God almighty. He would not need the rest of mankind for his mastering of reality. If the cross of reality were one for every human being in his lonely existence as a physical and bodily specimen, we would have no speech, no communication. Everybody would live his own history, his own salvation, his own esthetics, and his own philosophy. And millions are brought up under this terrifying creed: and weak as they are they give up all art, all philosophy, all history and all salvation. They are overasked; and they escape into the mass man, rightly.

If man had "a" "memory," "a" "will," "a" "philosophy," etc., all for himself, he would go mad. Because he would have no means to know whether he was true, real, valuable. Nobody else could tell him.

Fortunately, we already know that to speak means to participate in the evolutionary adventure of speaking humanity. And this whole race may be said to have "a" memory, "a" world—literature and art, a universal science, and one human history, indeed.

I possess memories in the plural only, loves, desires, observations. The whole race is making up for my forgetfulness, my indifference, my fears, my madness.

Mankind has a destiny, an origin, a self-revealing art, and a universally valid science. A universal history of mankind and universal peace are real tasks before us as much as a universal science or a universal language of the human heart (think of music). And we all try to accomplish all four tasks by participating in speech. And in every given moment of its life, society must instill the same linguistic material into the realms of art, science, institutions, and politics, for otherwise the poets, leaders, priests, and scientists will disintegrate and the confusion of tongues will happen again. At bottom, we aim at the same thing at whatever front of the four we fight. For the four fronts

together represent that life in twofold time and twofold space which we are called forth to live.

Language is not an imperfect first attempt of reducing us to logic, but an attempt to integrate one and the same cross of reality into every human heart and brain. When we are taught to speak, we are given the unifying orientation for our way through life with all other men.

And when we think, we are as much within the speaking universe as in singing or commanding. Everybody tries to think truly, to understand. And who could understand really without thinking in the face of the whole universe. What we think must be correct in the face of the whole world and all men. And this it cannot be if our thought is not valid in universal terms.

Let us sum up the content of this invitation to grammar as a worthwhile occupation for any man who speaks.

To speak means to believe in the essential unity of past experience, future destiny, inside feeling, and external sensations. For we vary and modulate the same verbal material to express emotions, register impressions, record historical facts, and meet future challenges. *We use one language for four states of mind.* But no individual could unify his inner world, his environment outside, his history, and his destiny, on his own behalf. It takes the common adventure of all mankind, and the constant translations of one type of language into all other types to save us from madness, indifference, hatred, and forgetfulness. These four deficiencies of all of us often block us. We have to overcome these obstacles to reach the level of speech. When we speak, despite our forgetfulness, our indifference, our stupidity, our fear and hatred, we fight for the unity of all future destiny, all past history, all human poetry, all scientific observations. To speak means to overcome four real obstacles.

We never "have" "reason," "memory," "salvation," or "sympathy" as a secure possession. Instead of reason we "have confusion"; instead of memory we "have" a blank, instead of sympathizing we "are" neutral; and instead of salvation we usually have fear.

But since in our modern world everybody is allowed to speak and listen in all the four directions of reality, we can become

masters of our destiny, conscious of our history, shot through with sympathy, and clear about nature. To speak means to sympathize, to clarify, to direct, and to know that you cannot have one of these qualities when you do not cultivate the other three as well.

In every moment, the four acts, clarification
consciousness
direction
sympathy

must be welded into one language. And they are, thanks to the constant efforts of politics, science, the arts, and history-telling and history-writing.

The modern languages, the great branches of mathematics, literature, education, have taken over this task in a division of labor. It is true that all four languages are spoken in the family, still the family is the complete unity of all four tendencies of time and space, albeit in a very rudimentary way. In studying Latin, we enter a phase of language similar to the intimacy of family life. The Latin language still unifies, as in a lucid mirror, the cross of reality in its grammatical forms of every one theme. The wealth of forms in Latin grammar as compared to English is nothing but the immediate application of the cross of reality to every particular particle of speech. We moderns speak a long time "science only," or "poetry only." We may read thousands of books that do not contain one suggestion for action, or a book of verse filled with nothing but imagery of the soul. In Latin grammar, every one theme is still disclosing the full complexity of real life. The daily food of modern people speaking English does not contain, in every cell, so to speak, the full life of speech; the Latin does. And when you compare the real obstacles to efficient speech: confusion, indifference, fear, forgetfulness, to the minor difficulties of learning Latin, you will understand why people have learned Latin for so many centuries. It is difficult. But since it is so difficult to speak at all, we can hardly criticize too harshly the difficulties of learning another language. If you and I were divine, speaking without deficiency, and unifying the world of past and future, inner and outer space, successfully, all by ourselves, the trouble

with an ancient language need not be taken. Because we all would speak one language of love, sympathy, clarity and remembrance, anyway. Now, however, the obvious deficiencies and discrepancies of your and my power to speak must be healed by special efforts, and special vitamins injected into our linguistic diet.

It is in the light of the real dangers of mankind that linguistic studies must be evaluated. No commercial use for Latin, gentlemen. No easier selling of rubber shoes. No professional preferment. Nothing but the unity of mankind, the unity of religion, politics, science, and the arts. No personal profit from grammar.

Your stomach is your own, and that is for profit. You speak (before you advertise) because you are a high dignitary, the pope, emperor, philosopher and poet of mankind. And these four words *papa*, *imperator*, *philosophus*, *poeta*, have come to us through and in Latin. And we learn Latin to live up to these four dignities. We shall not make the attempt to "sell" you Latin on behalf of some mysterious virtues of its authors, without relation to our own troubles. We cannot occupy the places assigned to us in the universe without outgrowing the swaddling clothes of our first language. And so, Latin is our second growth. It is language once more conquered, after the deficiencies of our primary language become obvious.

CHAPTER 3

THE UNI-VERSITY
OF
LOGIC, LANGUAGE, LITERATURE¹



A Program for Collaboration

EUROPE CELEBRATED THIS YEAR the centenary of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). And an attempt like the present to unify the cosmos of thought, literature, speech, can find no better patronage than the name of Wilhelm von Humboldt. For his ambition had been the *human* cosmos. His brother Alexander, after his travels through America, wrote the famous pages on the cosmos. Wilhelm rivalled with him and set off against the natural "cosmos" a second world no less complex or startling. He studied all the languages in his reach, not only the Semitic or Indoeuropean but the Chinese, Basque, Amerindian, and South Sea tongues as well, because he believed that the structure of language contained the secrets of national individuality, of history, of man's creative destiny. He treated languages as a historian of philosophy might study the many schools of Greek thought, not for their own sake but for a complete picture of the possibilities of the human mind.

Humboldt's legacy was left unused. It is only in the last years that scholars have begun to take stock of the 250 or 300 languages of mankind as one great and marvellous disclosure of the

¹ Address first given to the Philosophy Club at Dartmouth College in 1935.

human mind. To Humboldt, language was a finished product rather than a process of production. Therefore, the way a child learns to speak could not furnish the clue to the creative process handed down to us in language. On the contrary, any comparison drawn from the children's nursery must be misleading. It is in the highest zones of our own intellectual life that we must look for analogies when we try to discover the energies which created speech and are regenerating it today.

Under Humboldt's auspices, then, I am waging war against the venerable superstition that philosophy can be successful without philology, or vice versa. To me, language, logic, literature are various forms of crystallization in one process. With this hypothesis I seem to violate the central dogma of philosophy. But *amicus* Plato, *magis amica veritas*. And I am afraid the solution will not satisfy at all the behaviourist or even the pragmatist or any partisan of a more or less monistic school. We are neither idealists nor materialists. There are many predecessors in the field, Thomas Carlyle, John the Disciple, in his character as the author of the Gospel of St. John, Friedrich Schlegel, Hamann. Especially in the last twenty years, men like Majewski, Ebner, Buber, Cuny, Royen began to develop forms of thinking which may enable us to describe the unity of thought, speech, and literature.

This new trend is by no means an accident. Without such an effort, the confusion in the social sciences and in the humanities would increase. The deplorable lack of method in the social sciences springs from the sterilizing attitude of the philosophers. Pride always acts as a sterilizer. And it was certainly the pride of philosophy that it was beyond speech and not at all at the same level. Language was material, thought was idealistic. Thought was in process, language in being. What if Humboldt is right and language is in process?

What if Carlyle were right, and thinking is precisely as much of myth-weaving and dancing the dance of the seven veils as any sartor resartus can produce? Before going on, I had better admit that the correct title of this paper would be "Thought, Language, Literature," or, on the other hand, one could have coordinated the three sciences involved: Logic, Linguistics, Lit-

erary criticism. In one case, the enumeration would have embraced three activities represented in the division of humanities; in the other, their three subject matters. However, the alliteration of the three "I's" proved too strong an enticement. Thus my mind fell into the trap of language at the very beginning, and I am giving myself away as a pointed example of language's power over a man's logic.

Logic, Philosophy, wishes to be a science, the science which can tell us when something is true. Being a "Science" of truth, philosophy scoffs at the suggestion that language has to be interpreted and bookwriting as well when thought is examined. Whenever a critic called the thinker a mere myth-weaver or a sartor resartus like any poet or maker of books, philosophy paid no attention. The logician, proud of his scientific character, prefers symbolical logic to the modest confession that he is a writer of books and a speaker of words. It is strange that departmental wrath should be roused by a statement which allows the philosopher to bridge the gulf between the scientists and everybody else. Should he not be proud to be the model man who is allowed to represent the genuine liberty of man to speak his mind? But to come home from the Odysseys of the special sciences, to the common truth for all, seems less satisfactory than to be an expert in a special science of truth.

In stating now the case of the philologist, we cannot quote individual opinions so much as the departmental situation. This situation does not suggest that languages are in need of any philosophy. I studied Greek, Latin, Arabic, Gothic, without ever hearing of any linguistic principle. The departments are simply divided according to languages. When Rudyard Kipling produced his notorious speech as Rector of St. Andrews, in which he asserted before the student body that the first man who invented speech must have been a liar, a man who wanted to cheat his fellow men, there was no roar of protest from the philologists to call him to order. Modern linguists do not think that the power of language is intimately connected with the power of truth. They do not assume that, as Aristotle said, truth is the obvious aim in speech, and lying only secondary. The whole idea of levels in speech depending on its nearness to truth is

unheard of. The science of truth and the sciences of languages are separated. Language is thought of as being a tool, a gadget at man's ready disposal to serve him whenever he wishes to put up this or that air. Looking down upon the age of revelation, we are safely embarked on an age of revelation, words being degraded to the level of brass tacks.

Turning to the third group of activities, literary criticism and comparative literature, things are somewhat different. Not that the philosopher learns from the critic, but the literary critic sometimes makes the deepest remarks on logic and language which fatally remain unheeded by logicians and linguists. I remember, for example, certain lines in Mr. Thibaudet's book on "Trente Ans de Vie Francaise" which may serve as an illustration how even laws can be discovered which completely escaped the logician or the linguist. Thibaudet focuses on the fact that Bergson's famous use of the word "Durée," duration, is a deviation from common usage:

Une chose qui dure signifie d'ordinaire une chose qui ne change pas. Au sens bergsonien, durer c'est changer, changer comme on change en vivant. Dés lors dans "je suis une chose qui dure" le verbe être n'est pas à sa place. Le mot "je suis" empêche la durée de couler. C'est que la langue est l'oeuvre d'une métaphysique substantialiste inconsciente et que la philosophie devrait, si en elle était capable, se créer un autre langage, quelque: je deviens un avenir qui dure. Mais il est conforme à une loi plus profonde encore que la philosophie, s'insérant dans un langage qui est fait contre elle en épouse la direction pour la dépasser.²

So here the critic drops the utopian suggestion that the thinker should invent a language of his own, and assures us

² A thing that lasts signifies commonly a thing that does not change. In the Bergsonian sense to last means to change, change the way one changes while living. Hence in "I am the thing that 'lasts'" the verb to be is not in place. The word "I am" hinders the flow of duration. Speech is the work of substantialist, unconscious metaphysics and philosophy would have to create for itself, if it was capable of doing so, another language like: I became a future that lasts. But language conforms to a law still more profound than philosophy, and philosophy has to fit into a language made against it, and must go in language's own direction in order to become capable of surpassing it.

that according to an even more profound law, philosophy must be interpolated into language like an insertion, must go with the language in language's own direction in order to become capable of surpassing it. What a depth! What tremendous consequence for the history of language! What a teaching to the philosophers who always try to extrapolate language and to become fishes on land. We learn here that the philosopher speaks. Still he uses the word in an extreme sense and thereby surpasses the limits of the word's meaning. Words return into language changed and transformed, sometimes petrified and paralyzed after having passed through the thinker's mill.

Now if words cannot leave the realm of thought unchanged, any philosopher's mind is the seedbed of language. Words die in our brains and are resurrected. To think means to translate from one language into another better language. At this moment we are not so much interested in the final truth of Mr. Thibaudet's discovery as in the fact illustrated by our quotation that thought does something to language. It kills words, for example. If this is true, philology must inquire what logic does to language. And logic can no longer remain indifferent to the fact that it has duties towards language. That is why we wish to speak here of thought, speech, and literature as one united effort of mankind to disclose or to conceal the truth.

Our hypothesis is that they are rays of one fire burning in man to communicate to or to hide from his fellow man his share of truth. And we throw out the hypothesis that thought, language, and literature, in so far as they are means of concealing or revealing truth to ourselves, to a partner, or to all men, are ruled by the same laws. Without such an hypothesis, our intention might be misinterpreted as analogous to the many warnings of wise men to give heed to language. These warnings are, of course, of great usefulness. Perhaps I may quote from Whitehead some lines on language: "Language delivers its evidence respecting the width of human experience in three chapters; one on the meaning of words, another on the meanings enshrined in grammatical forms, and third, on meanings beyond grammatical forms and beyond individual words, meanings miraculously revealed in great literature." It is one of the great

joys to find restated, in an age of prose, the contributions to truth made by poetry. But though grateful for Whitehead's restoration, we shall go a step further, for which we are not at all sure of his approval but which opens the possibilities of a wide realm of new information and research.

In some of Thomas de Quincey's Essays he gets near to our viewpoint. When he discovered that the Greek idea of an enthymeme³ was not limited to the formal omission of one link in a syllogism, but that the field of the enthymeme was the whole realm of life in which a man tries to give an account of life and reality without the help of expert knowledge, he faced the central situation in which thought, speech, and literature are all present in one creative effort. The utter contempt of philosophers for oratory must not blind us to the fact that any speaker on the platform tries to speak his mind in a lasting way, and that therewith, he is struggling with the living word in a unified effort. He has to think in the monologue we call thought, he has to speak to an audience by which he gets involved into a dialogue, and he is hoping for a lasting effect by which his words shall become detached from the moment and take on the power of outlasting more than one occasion. In this sense, one might say, a speech from the hustings of Athens, looked at not with the impatience of the Platonist but with the devotion of an ethnologist, discloses the threefold character of words: in the monologue the man is thinking aloud; in the dialogue, he is speaking to his hearers, and in the pleologue of "a'possession forever," he speaks for future recollection. By "*pleologue*" I mean a kind of speech which can be presented to more than one audience, pleo, pleion being already used in this sense in natural science. From the monologue, thinking branched off as a special realm, and from pleology was developed literature.

Today, with two thousand years of contempt for rhetorics behind us, we think of thought and literature as two activities which are practically separated from linguistic problems. We exercise our reason today by reading or writing articles and books. The intermedium stage of speaking our mind is rarely inserted.

³ Enthymeme—leaving out a link in the deduction when coming to a conclusion.

This creates the illusion that we can think outside the realm of speech. This belief is at the bottom of modern epistemology. And it seems to me this fallacy is also betrayed in Kipling's witty remark on the first speaker as being a liar. Kipling thought of his hero as a man who could tell lies because he knew the truth *outside* of his speech. The modern thinker conceals from himself the fact that no thought can come in the ken of the majority of man except in listening. Most people partake in the reasoning process by listening and answering. The electric induction of the dialogue makes us partners in truth. Once the social situation is over, we are empty again.

The idea that man is thinking all the time extends the special attributes of a thinker's situation to the man on a football team or the people in the kindergarten or a typist's office. In reality, we discover as many new things about ourselves or about the world or about our beliefs through speaking out and writing down as by thinking inwardly. The revealing and concealing process is equally at work in all three aggregate states. This could be overlooked by optimists to whom thought within a mind seemed to be always aiming at the truth. But man is as eager to betray himself as others, and uses as many tricks to cheat his own conscience as that of others. Thought is, in itself, no more proof against the fallacies of passion, prejudice, and interest than speech or writing. Thinking can be myth-weaving exactly as fiction is. And literature struggles for truth just as desperately as thought. We have no reason either for a special optimism in regard to thought's sincerity or for a particular pessimism with regard to the book writer's mendacity.

When we ask ourselves what can help us to reduce the forms of thought, the forms of language, and the forms of literature to one source-alphabet of forms by which man veils and discloses himself to society and by which society itself is disclosed or veiled, we can point to Goethe's remark on a "Source-Alphabet," *Uralphabet*, existing in mankind. This primeval statement was, after all, made by a master of the word, perhaps its greatest and most comprehensive embodiment for centuries. For Goethe was a singer and narrator of his folklore and mother-tongue, the most reflective philosopher of nature, and the cre-

ator and champion of the idea of a *Weltliteratur*. He had been told by a physiognomist that, judging from his skull, he was the born popular speaker. Not only were thinking, speaking, writing all equally powerful in Goethe, but he never doubted that they were at bottom one and the same process. That conviction makes his aphorism on a human *Uralphabet* important.

So let us again risk the assumption that man is essentially concerned with disclosure and relation. That man is divided from animal nature by the one fact that any group, nation, tribe, member, human individual, wherever we find him is occupied in justifying himself to himself, to others and to the kind. This explains why he is wearing clothes, why he is making speeches, why he is reasoning and why he is writing books. It explains also why we are all listening to the scruples of ourselves, to the gossip of our neighbors and to the wisdom of the books. Man is in every moment bound up with his kind in a way no animal is. At every given moment man answers for his attitude by true or false statements. He is perpetually active in disclosure and relation, perpetually passive in enclosure and reception. Mankind is present where a man exists. The ambassadors of the kind to its members may be the man's mind itself, or the ears of a partner, or the eyes of a reader, or all three. But they all speak and ask for information on behalf of the kind. And man answers, by revealing or concealing, all the time his attitude.

With this as a basis, it is not improbable that a uniform structure may permeate the mental, linguistic and literary processes by which man answers for his behaviour. Why should we in thinking with ourselves use a structure completely different from the structure of an account written for the public, or a response given to our parents in so many words? Differences like that between slang and Oxford English may exist between shorthand thinking and longhand writing, but there is, for example, not the slightest reason why in writing a book we should be expected to know the general subject first and the paragraphs and sentences much later, while in the reasoning process, we are presented as marching forward from one short syllogism to the next. It is more probable that a man's thought is one great

unity, precisely like a book. And the logical connections between the shortest particles of this great one book of thought within himself are of little importance either to God or himself. A logical error would then have the weight of a fly sitting on an elephant's back. The structure of the elephant thought is not altered by a break in the chain of syllogisms. The philosopher's notion that he has refuted his opponent when he has proved a logical slip is a poor idea. A man's real thought is not even touched by this kind of argument. A man's thought is as much of a piece as a nation's literature.

The great process in man which is expressed by the polarity of disclosure and dissemblance, we may perhaps call our answerableness. This perpetual stream of answers is given in the face of the man's world, under the eyes of man's God and to the ears of man's kind. Mankind, world, God, whoever is addressed, still one of the three is addressed and must be addressed either by thought, speech or book by every human being in every moment of his life. Often the group acts on behalf of its members, declaring to other groups what it stands for. But declarations of independence or declarations of interdependence are made incessantly by humanity.

The calls, expressed in these declarations, may reflect intentions, or memories, complaints or war-cries, doubts, or certainties, desires or fears. It is always an *apologia pro vita sua*, whether a nation, a great poet or a burdened conscience explain to Geneva or to posterity or to God what they are actually compelled to become. We say with purpose "compelled to become." Because the alleged activity of man is greatly exaggerated by all those thinkers who forget man's answerableness. Man's activity is pretty much limited to the choice to conceal or to disclose the truth of what is happening to him. To him who does not like to betray himself, the most he can say of himself is that he did not make himself or his so-called actions, whereas he was indeed able to decide about his amount of hypocrisy about his actions. Our contribution to our biography is essentially our decision how far we can go with the truth. We all cannot go very far. But the classification of a person's power is greatly derived from the differences in this respect.

In other words, man's real action is contained in the myth-weaving or truth-disclosing business. This is our action. For the rest we belong to nature. Now, a venerable tradition pretends that thought is theory and that hands are practical. From the point of view that man is an answerable creature, thought, speech, and literature are his greatest actions. Because society is constantly determined by a man's choice to obey his fear and to dissemble the truth, or by his courage to tell himself or others what is the matter. Society is constantly changed and transformed by these confessions or suppressions of what just happens in our minds, our groups, our destinies. And this is a material process also, as Erasme de Majewski pointed out. Anybody knows that words can be noisy, that our senses are strained by hearing and following an argument, that a long meeting can ruin our nerves.

Still we are constantly denying the obvious truth that it takes energy, physical energy to tell the truth. That most cases of lying are just so many cases of mere weakness, because we have not the nerve to tell the other man quite what we think of him or ourselves. Our statement that man is involved all the time in a process of reportage and self-justification can now be supplemented by the other that man is often not in a position to obey this challenge. The spark which he is expected to send into the network of electric current in the community does not come because he feels too weak and wishes to conceal his weariness. That makes him lie or reticent in times where he would speak, it makes him obdurate where he would listen if he just felt strong and healthy enough.

Concealment thereby is losing its equality with disclosure. Velation is shown to be the escape from disclosure. It is dependent on the fact that there is disclosure of truth all the time. Like cold as compared to warm, or ill as compared to healthy, lying is nothing in itself, but a possibility furnished by the existing precedents of truth. Society is based on truth, on the truth of its members' answers, because all efficiency of lying and hypocrisy is based on the successful usage of means sanctified by their connection with true statements made before. We can only play safe because others were foolish enough to speak their mind. Thus we can quote them.

Now we have enumerated already, in a casual way, some modes of behavior in the process of disclosure. A man can hear a command, he can intend to go somewhere, he can announce an emotion, remember a common experience, or he can try to describe simply what happens to him whenever he takes up the receiver and begins to trust the electric current of the living word. Perhaps we can find that language, literature and the sciences taken here as the realm of thought show traces of a certain equilibrium between these different forms or modes of expressing the truth. In case the different ways of informing the kind form a certain system, the original source alphabet of the human soul would become real.

Let me begin with a most simple statement. It is a trite truism that poetry may be divided into dramatic, lyric and epic forms. It is or seems a platitude that grammar knows of imperative, indicative, subjunctive or optative. It is not difficult to see that in an offhand way the comparison between lyrics and the optative is more striking than, let us say, the participle in grammar, that the march of dramatic action fits well into the scheme of a grammatical imperative, and that the epic style and the indicative of grammar reflect the same mood.

This offhand remark must of course be deepened and corrected. Now, the dramatic plot and any imperative have this in common, that both are pointing forward to an unsettled future. In primitive Greek drama the unsettled thing is often only the recognition of older facts, the *anagnorismos*; still, the "*Heimarmene*," fate, is felt on the stage even in such a case. How much more if—in modern tragedies—the end is left uncertain till the last minute. Likewise he who acts under the dramatic compulsion of an impetus which leads on into an unknown future is involved in a process in which he will be moulded. The uncertainty about the future combined with a disregard of the past, the paradoxical dependency on the future despite its risks is felt in the case of the imperative and of the drama.

Compared with drama, any epical description like the shield of Achilles in the *Iliad* or the lyrics of Anacreon are both relatively timeless. They are both much less interested in the time element of the experience they try to convey. An external fact is described, an inner movement is pictured. As to the memories, quotations,

formulas about the past, the unavoidable conventional elements in any poetry, they are turning the man and his audience to the past. Epic and formula in poetry are often taken to be one. But it is more fruitful to discriminate between the hieratic elements in poetry—like the Homeric *Ton d'apomeibomenos prosephe nephele gereta Zeus*,⁴ this collection of nouns and participles, and the descriptive elements which indicate, by their vigorous verbal indicatives, the active and present observation.

Indeed, the past found quite a different expression in grammar than the simple indicative. The perfect with its frequent reduplication as in the word memory itself, in *dedi, perdidit, pepuli*, etc., shows what sharp a tension exists between the short root of the imperative *dic, duc*, go, march, the indicatives “it rained,” “it snowed,” and the reduplicated or prolonged form by which man tried to characterize the miraculous standstill of the past: “*Ewig still steht die Vergangenheit*.”⁵

Now on the level of complete literary works, there seems to be the same contrast between the dramatic and catastrophical suddenness of explosion in a tragedy and the wide-swing, well-balanced formula of the conventional language of the law for example with its breath-taking regarded, regarded furthermore, whereas . . . whereas . . . and so on for pages. Here, or in Homer's recurrent lines, a quieting influence is secured because the past is fully represented and resumed, the known precedes the unknown, and before our speech turns to the future, we dwell in the past.

To point forward and backward in time and to look inward and outward ourselves in space are four perpetual situations of man. In any given moment, a living being is exposed to the possibility of repeating the past or cutting him off from his past, and it is given the choice to withdraw into its inner self or to look and lose himself in his environment. In all these respects man is not distinguished from other life on earth. His distinction comes from the fact discussed before, that he must give an account of his choice as to past or future, inner being and outward action, to the world, to God, or his kind.

⁴ Answering him responded the cloud gatherer Zeus.

⁵ “Eternally still stands the past.” (Friedrich von Schiller)

Now it is obvious that he can describe or disclose his choice as well by one word as by a whole book. As a matter of fact, one book is only one thought, or at least the good books are. All the wealth of ideas in a book must not conceal the fact that one book has its significance from its unity, not its variety. And as such a unity, it is only one thought, one word, one exclamation of man. The chapters, the paragraphs, the sentences and the words are mere particulars out of which *monumentum aere perennius*⁶ of the book was built. Therefore the attitude of a book being one thought and one word only, can well be defined by asking ourselves how far it is concerned with the description of an outward process, or wishes to reflect an inner movement or pushes forward to a solution in the future or is reproducing the past.

Naturally, any book can mix these four attitudes, but it must use these four cardinal attitudes precisely as a man who speaks can shift from perfect to imperative, from indicative to subjunctive (or optative) and still is bound to move within these forms of decision about our situation in time and space. As long as the biologists overlooked the polarity of inward and outward, and the philosophers that between the past and the future, the identity of the grammar of society with the grammar of language could be overlooked.

The identity is repeated, as I have shown in my sociology, on higher and higher levels of life. Here it may suffice to follow the division of inward lyric, outward epics, backward-looking formula and forward-pushing drama upon the next higher level of literature. Poetry is only one form of expression. And our suspicion must be raised by a division which seems to identify the classes of poetry with the forms of grammatical flexion. What about other forms of speech? Prose, legislation, prayer? one asks immediately. Indeed, poetry itself is only one type of expression, and we can say that prose is its natural peer. Even orthodox linguists are looking now into this direction. Meillet showed some years ago that the earliest Indoeuropean language had prosaic and poetic words for the same processes and forces, like heaven, earth, fire or water. And Royen drew the conclusion from similar

⁶ A monument longer lasting than ore (Horace on his verses).

discoveries that language could well be imagined as pluralistic, inasmuch as it would differentiate things and concepts simultaneously under different systematic principles. Indeed, nobody can speak one language only. Man's reality is at least fourfold.

The four forms of lying tell the same story. Fiction, lying, hypocrisy and cant are four styles of concealing our truth. The imperative is the form which abhors lying most. For to use "cant" means only to repeat participles and formulas, to lie means to conceal external facts, fiction is the arbitrary invention of inner sentiments, but a hypocrite dissembles the imperatives of his actions.

Scientific prose is, though not the only one, still a match for poetry. Prose leads to figures and equations, poetry to analogies and semblances. If this shall be true, prose must be at least as differentiated as poetry. The unity poetry we had found to be divided into the descriptive, the formula, the lyric and the dramatic element. Inside the realm of scientific prose we find as many completely different departments of language as in poetry. The grammatical forms of imperative, indicative, optative and participle are recomposed in prose by oratory, mathematics, philosophy, and history. Political speech is the articulation of an imperative; philosophy reflects on our inner thought. Mathematics analyze relations in space and accomplish the creation of a language perfectly objective. A mathematician is able to express himself in language valid for all. Any philosopher, by the very fact which we learned from Thibaudet that he corrects words, retreats into an inner world into which not everybody can follow him. And that among scientific prose, all pure narration looks backwards and tries to conjure up the past and to quote its speech and utterances as faithfully as possible needs hardly saying.

Balancing new prose and poetry as units—and by prose I am speaking of prose in the sense of science and rationalization—weighing them in their functions in society, we feel that prose is less an expression of our wishes and desires, of our inner emotions than of our external observations. Poetry is the guardian of the inner processes. But the fact remains that both prose and poetry, even taken together, are only in charge of two modes of our conscious life, of the elating optative of our inner self and the analytic indicative of the external world.

The two other wings of man's expansion into time, present and future, are occupied by two other types of speech, the past by ritual, the future by all the imperatives mastering our life, beginning at the bottom with "keep right," and ending at the peak with "do right." At first sight, we may seem to compare un-comparable weights. Is the imperative and the participle really of equal importance as the bulk of prose and poetry? Here, the bookish tradition of two thousand years is visited upon us. It is true, we do not meet the imperative and the ritual in the class room, or the lecture hall or the laboratory or the library. For the imperative this fact was eloquently stated by Wilhelm Horn in his book on *Sprachleib und Sprachfunktion* (*The Body of Language and the Function of Language*).

He says: "The great influence of the imperative on all the other forms of the verb is not astounding when one observes our daily ways of speaking. It is possible to read many pages of a book, or to listen to long lectures, without coming across a single imperative. In the spoken language of everyday life, however, in the give and take of talking, the imperative occurs frequently." And we know today that in Greek and Latin the second person of the indicative was formed after the model of the imperative. "Das," (you give) for example, sprung from "da" (give) in Latin.

And it is equally easy to vindicate the ritual, this powerful realization of the past. It would be a superficial statement to think that ceremonies are simply in decay in the century of progress and that they are not fit to hold a candle to descriptive prose or elating poetry. The everlasting formula, the reduplication which guarantees us against the inroad of an uncertain future must not be of ecclesiastical shape. In these United States the lawyers are the priesthood of the formula. In fact, modern democracies find their most sacred ritual in parliamentary speech and procedure. At all occasions, whether suitable or not, the "anybody second?," "the motion is carried," and so on, show the tremendous power of the formula for binding society together.

It is this binding power which alone deserves to be termed religion. And perhaps this is the point where the change between the new realistic school of thinkers and the traditional can be seen most clearly. Meillet is perfectly willing to admit that religious ceremonies practically always use a language that differs

from that which a man uses in the ordinary course of life. "Whenever they perform rituals men return to manners of speech that are peculiar." This could be reversed with more propriety. For it is a logical mistake to seek the ritual outside the speech and to ascribe a special speech to the ritual. The special speech is the ritual. That's just it. Regardless of the contents of a man's speech, his degree of religious "boundedness" is marked clearly by all the occasions where he will use a conventional, a ritualistic, a solemn language. Established religion knows about this bondage, atheists try to forget it.

Man is answerable for reality and he fulfills this calling by preserving the full life of reality. All reality tends backward, forward, inward or outward. This means four original approaches to reality, and four different aggregate states for the speaker:

Man is beyond the It and I.
The "I" is boundless; "It" asks "why?"
By "you" I'm changed into your "thee,"
And all together sing their we.

And this is equally true of a nation which puts up legislation, sciences, arts and rituals, or when a writer shifts between novel, drama and lyric to express himself, or when the man in the street tours between his grammatical forms. To him who is interested in a more subtle terminology, let me say that I find myself in agreement with him that forward, backward, inward and outward, is perhaps too simple. Plasticity, conventionality, aggressiveness, and elation are more exact descriptions of the human attitudes. A man is plastic under the impact of an imperative, he is aggressive where he dissects the world by figures, forms, and the calculus, he is elated where he trusts his inner revelations, and he is conventional or repetitive where he reduplicates the past.

Reduplicating, plastic, elated and aggressive are, then, the potentialities of man as revealing or concealing truth. Thought, language, literature obey the same forming principles. The group, the high-strung artist, a nation like Italy today or Russia yesterday, an educated man or a savage—all are compelled to answer for one or more tendencies of self-realization whenever they think, write or speak. And realization is approached not in one way but by a

plurality of moods, the plastic, aggressive, elated and conventional. One cannot speak of man without listening to his own remarks about himself. He knows more than the indifferent scientist about the tragedy in and around him.

These discoveries imply far-reaching results for history, for psychology and sociology. I shall not try the patience of my readers by enumerating all the scientific problems which can now be tackled with a sure method. On the other side, I fear that without any practical application the new categories may appear too abstract. I think, therefore, one example might be taken from each of the three activities so that the results become tangible. These three activities of man being speech, thought, book-writing, we ask: what is the immediate contribution to our customary concept of grammatical processes? What is changed in our general outlook on literature? And third, what reaction can be expected from philosophy?

Ordinarily, our scheme for linguistic processes divides the tenses, the *modi*, the pronouns and the declension. We get a nice list: I love, thou loveth, he, she, it loves, we love, you love, they love. In learning a foreign language the "amo, amas, amat, amamus, amatis, amant" is a permissible scheme. But it betrays to me an unforgivable lack of imagination when a child is shown such a synopsis of his mother-tongue. In our mother-tongue we ought to know the deeper coordination of modes and tenses and pronouns.

Some pronouns belong to some forms immediately, and were imitated only superficially by derivative forms. "Think"—as an imperative—is an original, an eternal and perpetual form. "We shall think" is artificial, and "they shall think," also. Why is that so? The imperative is closer connected with you and thou than the indicative or the participle. One might even say: there would be no thou except for the imperative. The I, on the other hand, belongs especially to optative and subjunctive. And the it, not the he, is the original form of the indicative. In other words, a thoughtful grammar, a philosophical grammar, would stress the fact that three forms of the verb are related to three forms of personality. The synopsis should run: *ama, amem, amat*. Here

we have genuine and direct forms. The *we* belongs to the participle *perfecti*, perhaps.

In any case, the real creative effort and the later analogical extension are placed today in a misleading way before the child. As long as nobody had to learn his own language from the grammar book and dead and foreign languages were the only objects of philological treatment, the corpse could be treated as a corpse. Our own language should be disclosed to be our own living self, not a pedantic bed of Procrustes. Such a new synopsis would put an end to the easy objections to the "substantialism" or the "wrong metaphysics" of language about which we heard Mr. Thibaudet—and so many others—complain. The philosophers could no longer excuse themselves with the inadequacy of their "instrument" of expression. For it would become obvious that words and forms undergo a permanent circulation in any given period of time. Words which meant verbal action must be used as nouns the more often they are repeated, and thereby become incapable of expressing their original verbal meaning.

The transition from futuristic to finite significance, from motion to standstill, is the inevitable fate of living words. Tools, like an anvil or scissors, need not die. They are dead. And when it was thought that words were tools, one only thought of them as dead things. But life cannot be obtained without its price. And the price to be paid for life is death. That is why any generation, any speaker musters a churchyard of language and has, by his speech, to resuscitate the dead.

So much about the disguise of truth by our grammar books. In literature I wish to emphasize another side of truth. We can see now why a nation's health and hygiene in mental affairs depends on a sound equilibrium between the four tendencies of describing, and thereby dissecting, of singing and thereby elating, of listening to orders and thereby changing, and of thanksgiving and thereby perpetuating reality. Thus any special literature could be characterized by the proportions that are shown between its four central moods. Or take the literary aspect of the nineteenth century with its wealth of science, novels, and historical research. Liturgy, prayer, rituals practically dying out, the substitutes for a genuine occupation of the trend backward had to be invented.

Historicism replaced the ritual. It certainly is true that history looks backward. But it does this only as a subspecies in the sphere of prose. Prose is always analytic, dissecting, aggressive. So the part played by history writing during the last hundred years is explicable as an emergency-measure. But its failure is also explained because it was but a substitute. History-writing could accompany the triumphal march of the natural sciences, these clearest outposts of our outward tendency, but it could not hope to keep the full balance, because it remained enclosed in the general field of prose.

This fact explains the shift today to a decidedly unprosaic imperativic literature. It is no mere guess when we assume that the health of an individual and the wealth of nations may depend on a balance between prose, poetry, ritual, and imperative. This can be expressed grammatically by saying that any individual or group must remain capable of shifting freely and at the becks of fate from the subjective I to the objective it, and further to the listening thou and to the remembering we.

With this formula, we already encroached upon the proper field of philosophy, where I owe you my last example. There is nothing so well safeguarded by philosophers as the naive arrogance of the school that reality can and has to be divided into objects and subjects. This division is taken to be the division of the world. Alas, the world would not survive this division if it were to be taken seriously. It springs from a concealment and velation of the simple reality that the attitude in which we face the outward world as a subject is merely one perfunctory and transient function or mood among other functions and moods.

He who looks forward, for example, cannot know of any such division of the world. He acts, as we saw, under the compulsion of an imperative. He is initiated into the future because he is still plastic. He hears a command. The great fact of any ethical imperative, whether coming from above or below, from out or inside, is that I am not the subject of the imperative which I hear. Take the philosopher himself, setting out for thirty years of mere thinking. He called his basic axiom *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am). Thereby he gave it the innocent form of a scientific and prosaic statement. Dealing with science he

wished to express all the truth about himself in the style of indicative. But nobody can believe when a man at twenty-four resolves to devote his life to thinking that he is taking this step in a descriptive attitude of the *cogito ergo sum*.

Descartes listened to an *imperative*, the old imperative of the serpent: *Cogita et eritis*.⁷ And, it is true, by thinking he became what he was finally. But the *cogita* was not spoken by the same voice within Descartes which then set down for work. The *cogita* was spoken to him, not by him. And when he listened to his calling he was in that moment neither an I nor an it, neither a subject nor an object. "Cogita" cannot be said to be an object. And it cannot be said to be a subject either. Subjects and objects, both cannot obey to human speech. In any case, where we have an imperative, he who gives the command is an I, and that I will always be of superhuman size in the imagination of the person who receives it. The things which the philosopher is called forth to think about are his objects. He himself is something which is neither subject nor object.

The truth about man is that he can, luckily, never dream of becoming a pure subject or an object cog in the machine. It is always a degradation when a human person is treated as an object. And it is always an impermissible deification when he thinks of himself as a *prima causa*, as a real subject. Did he make himself? The exclusivity of the division into subject and object can no longer be defended on philosophical grounds since before man can make this division he must have obeyed the imperative "cogita," and this imperative is meaningless without an I that commands, and myself in the position of neither an "it" nor an "I," but a listening "thou," flying like a projectile from another, stronger arm's bow. Under the spell of being addressed I find myself in the plastic attitude which allows a man to be transformed into something different from what he was before. The thinker who divides the word into subjects and objects would not be able to do so had he not passed through a stage in which he was no analytic dissector. It is curious that reasonable persons believe in the universal validity of the division between objects and subjects.

⁷ Think and you will be.


For it is obvious that the lack of a third and a fourth noun is the real cause for this belief. People who have lived together, who have shared an experience, all those who can say "we" to each other and from each other are as little objects and subjects among themselves as the person named in the command. They, too, must be signalled out as a different kind of order. They are transformed by the common past. One could, therefore, offer a soothing drug to the pains of transcendental idealists who believe in objects and subjects only, by speaking of *prejects* for the "thou" or "you" under the imperative, and of *trajects* for the result of union in the we-participle. Once there is a word, everybody will begin to believe in the existence of the essence behind it. And let me say this: a name wrested from our lips in honest struggle for truth is in fact in most cases the standard bearer of a part of reality. By its name, a thing is called forth into life and put under the protectorate of the whole human society.

Man's prejectiveness, his "*Geworfenheit*," is the problem of many modern thinkers, like Kierkegaard or Heidegger. Any child is "prejacent," i.e., nearer to the front of life, compared with its parents. On the other hand, we all crossed the stream of life several times before we came into our own; and each time it was a different crew that experienced despair and faith, success and failure in the same boat we were in. The term "we," i.e., those who were trajected in the same boat from one side of the river to the other, is a concept by which a common experience is stated. It is the reward of any life-history to make us members of a commonwealth or group which is willing to share our thanksgiving. Most of us are little exposed to the temptations of scientific aggressiveness or mystic subjectivism; we are satisfied with our trajective conservatism or blinded by our revolutionary prejectivity.

It is, then, no arbitrary choice to pick the words prejectivity and trajectivity so that they may rival henceforth with objectivity and subjectivity. As Mr. Thibaudet said, "*une loi profonde*," a profound law, governs the circulation of speech, thinking, and writing.

When I began thinking I was harassed by the allegedly scientific terminology of objects and subjects. I forgot all about this

division and began to determine my own system of coordinates by looking into life and society around me. Biology and sociology can agree on our cross of reality:



We then saw that man is not talking or thinking *about* these four potential situations in *one* language but that he is somebody different himself whenever he begins to listen or to think from one of these four angles of his real life. It is not given to man to cover his complex reality by one single style of his consciousness before our consciousness can claim to have recomposed our reality. If I understand Professor MacIver right he, too, wishes to vindicate a plurality of styles for "any science which makes the life of man its province."

No marriage would become the reality it usually is if there were not the four styles of (1) the divine command "love me"; (2) the elation of the honeymoon; (3) the hard reckoning of household economy; and (4) the security of the evening chatter and the common holidays. Any one phase of speech or style does not suffice to express our full experience of the life within and outside, before and behind us.

The mistake of all "isms," especially of rationalism,³ but of mysticism too, is that they pretend to reach by one single attack or emotion what is only given to those who are less short of breath. The process of perpetual re-inspiration differs widely from the tyrannic strokes of momentary inspiration. Thus, we had to look out for a vocabulary which would give a pointed description of the human styles rooted in those four different angles of our existence. When we called them Plasticity, Reduplication, Aggressiveness, and Elation, we certainly were naming them "a fortiori" which is a good rule in the process of giving names.

Nevertheless, these new names remained within the circle of our present article and discussion. They were perhaps striking, but they sacrificed to this quality their "pleological" value because

they were not reconnected with our traditions. Mere private words move in a vicious circle. Technical terms must become detached from our subjective theory; they have to enter the field of merciless competition and selection in the schools. They ought to be tested whether they are really indispensable or not. When a man knows two colors only, black and white, our problem is not to have him learn new terms for black and white but to make him see blue and green.

In a similar way we could not extrapolate the long academic history of objects and subjects. We had to respect the existing language. However, we could disclose the fictitious character of all claims for exclusivity raised by either subjectivists or objectivists. And so we reached a compromise. We kept the old terminology but limited it by two more technical terms. Thus we sacrificed beauty to continuity because we are writing scientific prose after having given vein to our poetical inspiration. To speak is itself a political action. And political action is always re-connecting new events to old forms of life. That is why true politicians always revel in compromise and why the poetic and creative inspiration of the first moment is always replaced by a prosaic technique. That is why both mere subjectivism or merciless objectivism are bad philosophy. And this is finally why our own program of the new method went itself through the different styles of self-expression till it could feel its way back into the great tradition.

This great tradition was a tradition within the schools of thinking. In these schools all possible ideas were taught and analyzed. But teaching and analysis are both rather late processes in the biography of words and forms. And for the very simple reason that the truth which a student is expected to grasp is supposed to be in existence when he enters the school, one fact was not mentioned in this academic tradition, nay it was shunned: that thinking takes time. The appropriation by the student—that took considerably much time. But this secondary process seemed unimportant to the pre-existence and everlasting of the truths themselves. The heroic fact that every moment truth comes to us like Pallas Athene from the head of Zeus was transmogrified into the hilarious experience of the academic vacations. When

the students left school for the long vacations that happy vacuum between two inspirations was produced which is one of the conditions for the perpetual process of re-inspiration or—and this is only another expression for re-inspiration—for the growth of truth. The emptiness and forgetfulness, these breathing spaces of a vacant mind, are no accidents in the process of thinking. Nobody can, shall or may think all the time! And we incorporate truth not without re-thinking the same problems. Thinking takes time.

That does not mean that any quantitative amount of seconds, hours or days is needed—as modern barbarians try to figure out. In our assertion that thinking takes time, the term time is used in the sense of “all the possible qualities which color time” or of phases of time which by their lawful sequence from impression to obsession to expression to definition represent a process in reality. “Time” is not meant as a merely external flux of astronomic units. It is meant as the ever changing flux of experienced time. The formula: thinking takes time, then, contains two statements: (1) our thought is dated; it comes to us as a moral obligation to think now and here. We must be willing to devote ourselves to this duty now and here, the 10th of July, 1935; (2) a plurality of various stages of the mind must be passed before we can pretend to have done our duty. To conceive or to understand a definition cannot be called a complete mental process of reasoning. Various phases must be experienced before thought can claim to have covered reality. Thought is a sociological⁹ and biological process. As such a process it can only be realized by circulating through a number of phases or stations. Thought, speech, writing are creatures and behave like all other creatures.

If thought is the crowning process of vitality, it can be made clear to the dogmatists why in the social sciences, or in life or in any book except in mathematics, definitions cannot come at the beginning but have to form the end of the mental process of which the book or the speech or the meditation is the expression.

Definitions are results. Any man of fine understanding knows this instinctively. But it can now be proved why this must be so and why mathematicians, legislators—in their legal definitions—and similar types are in an exceptional position.

A definition is man's last word in a series of words on the matter. It is true that last words can be handed down in classrooms for some thousand years as long as the credulity of the students will repeat them. But this transmission of the products to the latest generations has little to do with the process of finding the truth in actual production. The process of thinking *leads up* to the definition precisely as a trial ends in the defining sentence of the court. All language in a court or in a parliament leads up to a decision. But the decision is meaningless without the proceeding debates of plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiff argues on the objective break of the law; the defendant urges his subjective right to act as he did; the precedents bring up the past in order to enable the present court to form an opinion how far the case is the reduplication of former events. Finally the decision comes down upon the unsettled new and shapeless pre-jacent case and presses it into a legal form.

The due process of law contains all the elements of the mental process which we discussed previously, but represents or invests the different phases of the process in different persons. The attorney, the defendant, the counsel for defendant and the judge are four people. It is a complete misinterpretation of the process to take these people as speaking the same language. They are expected to sing in a different tune. The complaint of the plaintiff was, in former days, the real dirge. The murdered man was carried by his friends into the court, and loud and passionate "*planctus*," uttering loud cries and putting ashes on their heads, the relatives of the dead man forced attention and hearing upon their bereavement. They asked whether this was right or not. The criminal or unlawful event was made present, was embodied in their yells and gestures. When the corpse could not be brought into the court, a part of the body at least had to be presented. So naively had to be introduced the break of the law—what we call evidence today. The event had to be made *visible*.

The defendant would not allow the plaintiff to surpass him in dramatic activity. He would begin to unfold before the community his inner self. (The court, in those day, was the community.) He, of course, had great difficulties to reveal his inner state of mind, as he has today. His most sacred feelings, his al-

legiances to God and men, his religion, had to be disclosed. At this point, the remark on speech as a disclosure of truth gains its full significance. The words of a defendant must reveal his inner state of mind, the purity of his conscience, the absence of burdening memories, the harmony and peace of his interior. The old law used two devices for so perplexing a purpose. The defendant would dig up the deepest roots of his consciousness, conjure up the most remote ramifications of his motives and he would ask his nearest friends, two at least, but very often seven or twelve or more, to accompany this process of solemn self-denudation with a plain-chant in which they would assert his good faith in this process of dismantling his inner self.

While the sufferings of the murdered man had to be voiced most emphatically by his friends in dramatic complaint, so had the defendant, in his dangerous process of self-revelation, to be protected by his friends. So tremendous seemed the task to make a man speak his inmost mind that the deeper he was asked to delve the more helpers would stand around him. It was as if they should outweigh, by their solemn assertion of his good faith, the scar which is conveyed to any member of the community by a too public confession of his inner soul. We cannot reveal without breaking through the veil of convention and of reverence.

Shame is a mental attitude, without which man would not be under the degree of pressure which is needed for the production of truth. An important element in the process of language, thought and writing is man's bashfulness. In the due process of law, parties overcome their natural shame by a ritual of emotional excitement. Of this whole creative effort of former times little is left over today. Few people think of an oath as of a process of tremendous profound psycho-analysis, intended to lay bare a man's relations to God. In taking an oath, a man committed his whole future to the vengeance of his gods. He bound his presence in court, this short moment of a day, to all the rest of his life. Whereas the complaint brought the crime into the court from outside, the oath revealed the entire inner life, the hopes and fears of the man under accusation, to his judges.

What is so difficult for us to grasp is the meaning of the solemnity of the oath. External evidence is stated by rational speech.

But inward evidence has a style of its own. The superficiality, the plainness of mere description, trustworthy as it is in dealing with material facts, is utterly out of place when a soul is challenged to overcome its reserve and to tell the truth about inner facts. Our age mixes the spheres. It has lost much of the old wisdom which knew that the inward secret could not be stated in the same language as outward reality. Outward reality is secured by as *many* dates as possible. Inward reality is procured by intensifying speech up to a climax of white heat passion! Quantity for external evidence, but quality for internal evidence is the rule in court—and in philosophy. The oath is an attempt of intensifying, of condensing the utterance. It may not be successful any longer, but it indicates the pluralism of styles in any due process of law.

An impatient reader may object, at this point, that though he was willing to admit the pluralistic character of speech in legal procedure, he did not see its relationship to the process of thought in a philosophic debate; furthermore, is not the decision outstripped of all the preceding arguments and speeches? Can it not rest upon himself? What is the use of going backwards to the arguments of passionate parties after the debate is closed?

This brings us back to the central stream of our argument. The due process of law includes the different styles of human disclosure of reality because it is one of the models of complete human speech. It condenses into the proceedings of one day facts and feelings, memories and plans which stretch out over indefinitely more time and space. The definition is the quintessence of this condensed process. Now, the juridical and legal process is the matrix of philosophical reasoning. The Greeks carried it over from the *Polis* into the Academy. Plato never begins with a definition. How could he in a dialogue? We cannot begin with the last phase if we are not the appointed *legislators* of society! In framing a law, the legislator has full power to rely on trajected experience, collected from passionate and rational evidence. He derives his credentials from a community, from a "we"; hence his words are not his private words but the language of his community. When he formulates the law his words have undergone the full development of normal speech. They have been used in all their connotations. His words must have migrated over

their whole "area of meaning"—as Gardiner calls it—before he can nail them down to that concept which he wishes to convey by his formula.

The philosopher cannot begin as a legislator. He is without authority to speak the last word in the quarrel. As a schoolmaster, he can dictate. But this kind of dictatorial teaching which fills bluebooks of students with definitions has nothing to do with philosophy. The philosopher is not sure of his community. Before he can decide anything, he must have waited for his community. He must have found his belongings, the group which is willing to share his problem, to hear his complaint, to act as his jury, to be moved by inner or outward evidence or by precedent.

There is no reason to complain that words have a wide area of meaning, are full of shades and are apt to lead to misunderstanding. The wideness of their area of meaning is their great quality. Without it, I would be unable to persuade the reader that some of the connotations of a word are less important for our common purpose than others. I could not carry the reader or listener to the point where he understands my intention to limit the word henceforth to a special task. I could not awake his interest in one special side of it.

Now this process of persuasion is the process of research in the social sciences. He who begins with the definition tries to escape from the rules of this process. He can be a mislocated legislator whose will for power seeks an outlet in writing and teaching. But he is no social scientist. For he declines to think loudly and to make thereby acceptable to his collaborators his process of reasoning. That is why I entertain some hope that the terms of preject and trajet might prove useful. I did not choose them in the first phase of my own private reasoning. I did not use them when I pleaded my cause before the reader and recommended it passionately to his interest, as a fruitful discovery. They came to us as the finale. Any existing and tested thought is reduced into the directory like a telephone number under which we can call again. This is the value of a concept. We can call upon the reality condensed into it. A stranger coming to a place without any friends will find little comfort in the possession of the telephone directory of that place.

Concepts like preject or subject are on the border line of speech and dogmatism, life and petrification, research and library. Definitions are quite literally defining the frontier between studio and museum in man's art of thinking.

People who define on the first page analyze coagulated words. They start exactly at that point where the vital process ends. Coagulated speech, in its aggregate state of conceptual truth, is a corpse the anatomy of which can be highly useful. But anatomy of corpses knows nothing about life. Life includes precisely all the processes preceding death. That is why abstract reasoning is not the only reasoning process. It is not true that a man has reason, will and feeling as three departments of his vitality. Emotions, will, and memory are loaded with reasoning processes precisely as objective contemplation is. We are using our mental power equally in art and science, in education and in religion. The picture of a man shifting between will and contemplation (Schopenhauer), or between irrational mysticism and cold rationalism is a caricature of the nineteenth century.

The human cosmos is represented to completeness in every microcosmic act of inspiration. Man, like any living creature, is exposed to the four directions of time and space—forward, backward, inward and outward—in every actual process of thought or speech. The difference between his emotional, his imperatival and his rational state is one of arrangement, not of complete separatedness. Perhaps it may help to use numerals for the four elements, 1 for memory, 2 for imperative, 3 for rationality, and 4 for inner experience. Then, each process of thought will contain all the four elements; but the arrangement or sequence of the elements will vary in the different states of our mind.

- 1, 2, 3, 4 may describe ritualistic reasoning.
- 3, 1, 2, 4 can serve as formula for scientific prose.
- 2, 4, 1, 3 would do justice to the order of elements when we are projected into obedience.

We can say that man is unable to think or to speak without using all four elements simultaneously. It is not the elements that differ in poetry, science, politics or religion. It is their arrangement. Man's mind is always complex, because it has to reflect the cross of our reality. Man's mind is rooted in a soul

which is able to take on the different forms of traject, object, subject and preject because it has to fight on all these four fronts of life in every given moment.

At this point, Mr. Karl Buehler's investigations fit into our own discoveries. However, it cannot be the purpose of this paper to deal with his studies in detail since he separates thought and language throughout. Our main purpose is the unity of the human cosmos, and the due process of life, death, resurrection, through which all mental energies flow.

Several applications have been given. In grammar, our mother-tongue should be presented to us as the introduction into the secrets of personality. In literature, books are all failures or gains for the sound equilibrium of national consciousness. Any one-sidedness of literature will be visited upon the nation by fatal suppressions of reality. And in philosophy the "cogita" obliges us to limit scientific thought to its proper field and time. Nobody "shall" think twenty-four hours a day, and nobody can use his mental powers in one "style" only. He is bound to alternate between them.

The "cogita," this charter of the scientist, is after all a subspecies of the general "Hark, Hear, Listen" which we extend to all man so naively whenever we lecture or teach or write books. And it is at this point, or better, this end of our rapid sketch, where we can reap the finest fruit of the new method. The only possible content of any human ethics which does not overlook man's most human capacity completely is revealed now. Any set of Pelagian rules for good behaviour will always end in utter failure when it pretends to go beyond pure conventions and utilitarianism, because it denies man's freedom and our life's incalculability.

Any substantial ethics aims at the non-human side of our experience, the zoological mechanics of outside happenings. But the quiver of true ethics holds no other arrows but the imperatives derived from man's talk with the universe. They run all like the first commandment: Hark, give ear! It is man's duty to hear and to listen to the voices of love and wisdom and the law. For the rest he is free. There is no such thing as an ethical material code. For might he not hear a voice louder and more

true than all these? The only ethical command which church and society can impose on man is: Give ear, think it over. The first thing society must guarantee to its members is time for recollection and reconsideration. It is the first need in our laws about marriage, for example.

Wherever a man thinks, he answers to objections made audible by his own conscience and memory; wherever he listens to his friend or foe he is a "*heteroakroates*," the hearer of somebody else; wherever he reads a book he takes part in the dialogue between absent or former partners. It will take a new and better collaboration among the disintegrated body of the sciences which are in research about man to describe completely the processes of language, literature and thought as aiming at the everlasting man who lives under the three commands *Audi! Lege! Medita!* (Listen! Read! Think!) These three commands are our human dowry. They are our only moral prescriptions of general character. They make human society the delicate, frail, loveable creature it is. And they are only three forms of one command. And is not all education based on this assumption? How could we dare teach students without believing in these three commandments? They are the only possible justification for the arrogance of man to write and speak and lecture.

It is the emergency in which we find youth, ourselves, society, which justifies our attempts to force their attention in the direction of our problems. It is because mankind is in need of new elements of reintegration that our new principles offer themselves as a method for the social sciences and the humanities. It is the pressure and seriousness of the imperative form on which depends the fruitfulness of all our indicatives.

CHAPTER 4

GRAMMAR AS SOCIAL SCIENCE



OF ALL THE DOGMAS of antiquity, the grammatical dogma is the last to persist. The schools have shelved Euclidean geometry, Ptolemaic astronomy, Galenian medicine, Roman law and Christian dogma most radically. Ancient grammatical dogma still dominates.

This essay tries to show that grammar need not be dry as dust but the fruit of our actual experiences of reason, creativity, authority and communion. It tries to deliver our educational system from a basis that has become obsolete. It is felt generally that this basis is bad. Hence people found it necessary to reinforce this weak basis by a number of social sciences, like "human relations," "psychology," "sociology" etc. It will be simpler and more effective to change the basis.

If the social value of grammar could be tapped in the beginning, it would be superfluous to bring in all kinds of remedies against the ravages wrought in human hearts and brains by the grammatical dogma.

As these grammatical prejudices are polluting the mental stream at a very early age, the harm in most cases is never repaired. Later epochs will look with amazement at the grammatical rack on which we torture ourselves and our little ones.

The worst sinner always must be made the first convert before a specific sin can be healed. Grammar being the most obsolete and poisonous element in our social instruction, society cannot expect much health unless this element is converted into a positive asset. I propose to show that the low grade grammar of

our primary schools can be graded up. Higher grammar, as well as higher mathematics, are available. When witches were burned, higher mathematics came to our rescue.

Higher mathematics by including infinity, enabled us to decipher the secrets of mass and energy, time and space of nature. The world ceased to be magic and bewitched. Its electronic order stands revealed, with the help of higher mathematics.

Higher grammar, by including emphasis and drama will enable us to decipher the secrets of social movement, masses and persons, diseases and cures of the body politic. Higher grammar will develop the same respect for the dignity of the social processes of speech which higher mathematics have bestowed on nature's laws. Low grade grammar has degraded speech into a wilful tool of a man's mind. Higher grammar will reverse this. Speech will stand out as the field of energy within which man receives or loses his mind, changes or opens it. The dogmatic grammar belittles speech as a tool of the mind of our school children. Higher grammar will make it look great and lawful. It will prevent many cases of schizophrenia which stem from the terrors of the grammatical dogma.

The worst sin is, of course, its Greek origin, our grammar school's tradition from Latin and Greek sources. The Greek and Latin names and tables of grammar have been handed to us even when we had to learn French, German, Spanish or Russian, or English itself. The wrong Alexandrian table of grammatical values is with us everywhere.

This table looks quite innocent. It usually runs:

<i>amo</i>	I love
<i>amas</i>	thou loveth
<i>amat</i>	he loves
<i>amamus</i>	we love
<i>amatis</i>	you love
<i>amant</i>	they love

or: I kill, you kill, he kills, we kill, you kill, they kill. And we all learn these lists to gain access to a language. What can be important about such a list?

Permit me to contrast this list by another immediately. Our "crucial" list would place:

<i>ama</i> (amate)	love!
<i>ame</i> (amēus)	that I may love! (that we may love)
<i>amatus</i> (amant)	loved (they love)
<i>amavimus</i>	we have loved

as equivalents in emphasis. In this list, each personal state, thou, I, it, they, we is identified with a special fundamental social reaction. In the Alexandrian list, all persons are put through the same drill. They all seem to speak in the same manner. It is here that the fatal error has crept in. Much of our confusion about social relations and much of our ignorance about speech can be directly traced to this error.

In listing *amo*
amas
amat
amamus etc.

the impression is conveyed that all these sentences can and should be treated as of the same social character. The effect on any reader of such a list will be that any indicative is spoken with the same degree of emphasis. We contradict. We say that *amat* and *amo* and *amas* are worlds apart in social emphasis and therefore cannot be taught as homogeneous. The Alexandrian list is insincere. It is a very late compromise in which superficially all persons seemed to have access to one and the same mode, the indicative; in our lives, to this day, the indicative forms no continuum of *amo amas amat*. Nor must it ever form it. To the contrary, we must get rid of this list because it induces people to think and act wrongly in society and to overlook the difference in emphasis between *amas, amo, amat*.

I am confident that I can prove these points in the following pages.

1. *amat* is spoken without emphasis, as a fact. *Amo* and *amas* cannot be spoken without grave social consequences. Hence, they presuppose emphasis, whereas we must learn about emphasis as the social element in grammar.

2. The political qualities of our various crucial utterances can be evoked by an up-to-date grammar or they can be repressed and destroyed by the prevailing grammar. The crucial proof of 1 and 2 is furnished by the current confusion between history and science. History has an emphasis which science cannot have. History cannot be science because it requires emphasis.

1. *Amatur*

Amatur, he is loved, is an objective statement. Some fact is reported of somebody who is neither the speaker or writer nor the listener or reader. He usually does not know that people speak of him. On the other hand, it is equally noticeable that neither the speaker nor the listener has any stake in the sentence "*amatur*." In "*amatur*," the process of love has been made powerless. This is no small achievement. Of love we can only speak in fear and trembling if we speak of it in the first or second person. The third person neutralizes the power of love. The objects of science are made powerless. God in prayer, God in the ten commandments—is the living God. God as the object of theology is powerless, a mere third person.

If somebody third is said to be in love, the sentence ranks with "it rains" or "it shines." Usually, such a statement is called objective. This term is quite in order under one condition. The objective statement "it rains" or "he loves," not only abstracts from the speaker but *from the listener as well!* "Objective" then, is a two-fold negation of relationship. The objective is removed from the speaker as well as from the listener. Usually in modern thinking this twofold quality of "the objective" is neglected; "objective" seems to be anything to which the subject is indifferent or from which the subject has detached himself. This reduces the linguistic situation to a monologue of a thinking subject who thinks an object. We return to the plenitude of grammar by the important rule that "*amat*" abstracts from two people instead of from one. The "subject" to whom the sentence "He loves," is a detached statement of fact, must be dissolved into two people, a subject and a praject: the speaker

and the listener. Only then can we fathom the depth of the abyss between the objective third person in *amat* and the two conversing people who exchange their views about him as subject and preject. To come to real grips with any objective statement and to assign it its place in social life, it is useful to replenish the sentence *amat* into its full setting of a conversation:

John says *amatur*. Bill may reply "*amatur sed non amat.*"¹ In this dialogue, the reply may be affirmative or negative. In both manners, the addition of the reply makes it clear that A and B debate the *truth* about *tertius* (the third). A fact in the outer world is in a debate to which the two speakers do not contribute any personal attitude on their part.

2. *Amo*

If we now turn to *amo* or *amas*, these forms are not conveying objective facts primarily. They are, it is true, called indicatives, in Alexandrinian. But this omits one half of the sentence's significance: *amo* has a double emphasis compared to *amat*. A man who says *amo*, is doing two things at once: He is involved in an act and besides he confesses it. In such an entanglement, obviously his confession can only be undertaken if it does not cancel out the act. *Obviously certain acts may be cancelled out by being confessed!*

The first person who speaks of himself runs a risk which he does not run in speaking of somebody else! He runs the risk of destroying the act to which the sentence testifies. It is true that in many cases, I can admit that I am doing this or that without destroying the deed in the admission. Destroying in such cases seems an exaggeration. Why should I not say: I laugh, I scorn, I travel by train? Now it is true that these sentences usually do not brook destruction of the act they describe. But we have not claimed that they destroy. We have claimed that they involve a risk to the speaker. And of this, there can be no doubt: any act divulged while in process, can be interfered

¹ "he is loved but he does not love."

with. The first person (I) who says to anybody else what "I" am doing, makes his act vulnerable by intervention from the outside. Any act can be stopped. And the speaker who says what he is doing or going to do, invites disaster, or if he says what he has done, invites criticism!

A man in his five senses will not speak of his own deeds in the first person if he does not have to. The lid will be clamped down on his mouth by the pressure of risk and danger. And it is possible to determine the quantity of emphasis which is required to pry this lid open.

The emphasis with which a man is compelled to speak up, *amo*, must overcome the resistance of the social pressure which warns him not to invite interference! *Amat*, he loves, involves ordinarily no risk to the speaker. He may murmur detachedly and indifferently. But "*amo*" makes a difference. The speaker of a sentence in the first person cannot help changing his own social situation simply by divulging any act, thought, feeling, intention of himself. Therefore it takes an emphasis to say "*amo*" which is absent in "*amat*." This emphasis must be strong enough to break down the caution which advises us not to speak! For this reason, the most difficult sentence to pronounce of all human sentences is *amo*. For while the sentence: I eat, I sit down, concerns a moment of our lives, *amo* concerns the final direction, and its lasting destination. There is much more danger that people can interfere with my description of a lifetime act than with a ten minute luncheon. Hence, we do not say publicly *amo*. We say this perhaps to the person in question, but to nobody else. To our families we say: we are engaged to marry, which brooks little interference. And to the rest of the world we proclaim we are husband and wife which brooks no interference whatsoever.

amo

"*Promessi Sposi*" (Manzoni's
great novel) *sumus*

maritus et uxor

sumus

— I love

— We are engaged to
be married.

— We are husband
and wife.

could be enclosed in concentric circles.

Then it would be clear, that *amo* can never be as general or as public a sentence as *amat* because it invites the risk of rivalry, jealousy, wrath. To the world, if I am intelligent at all, I shall not say *amo* but *uxor mea est*. That is, I shall transform the first person sentence into a third person sentence. By saying *uxor mea est*, I have chosen the *objective term* which involves no risk of interference, which does not need any emphasis on my part and which does not have the character of a confession.

We conclude that *amo* is made of absolutely different stuff than *amat* and the history of language proves our point. *Amo* is an emphatic form, a subjective exclamation which is quite wantonly inserted into the Alexandrian table as an indicative. The first form singular did not originate with the indicative. The tables of the indicative borrow it. *Amo* is in a class of forms with *alas*, *behold*, *see*, *verily*, as an emotional form. *Amo* and *amat* belong to two different situations of expression.

3. *Amas*

The rift between *amo* and *amat*, however, is not wider than the rift between *amas* (you love) and *amat*.

For modern man, this second rift may even be more readily understood. For we have learned to be pretty objective and pretty indiscreet about ourselves. People keep diaries, are analyzed, confess, write letters and therefore say things in the first person, nobody dared to utter three hundred years ago except under an objective veil of sentences in the third person.

But as modern men we may take great liberties with ourselves, and divulge all our secrets. Hence the first person and the third no longer seem miles apart. But how is it with the second person? We not very often can take the same liberties with the person to whom we speak. I may well know that you are in love with so and so. But before you are engaged to marry, I have no right to tell you face to face you love him. It is you who first has to tell me! If you have condescended to make such a confession to me, I later may quote your own sentence in some ways like these: Since you love him, if you love him, before you fell in love with him!

Any speaker needs some permission on the part of his listener before he can "tell him off!" Take a child and his mother. The mother may say: you are pretty naughty today. But why? Because she is the child's mother! The mother is in authority. Also the doctor to whom a sick person comes for advice, is free to say: You have diabetes. This means that statements of fact in the second person ("*amas*") presuppose establishment of a specific social relation. The speaker's *right* to say "*amas*" is derived from a covenant under which a certain amount of authority to speak was granted him!

The mother is required to say: You are naughty, by her offices with the child. The friend is entitled to say: *si amas*, because he has been authorized to know this fact, by this conversant or in some other legitimate manner. In communicating to the person I speak to something of which this person is the agent, I base myself on a relation wholly absent of sentences in the objective third person.

And who is the foremost second person who must listen willy-nilly to my statements about himself or herself? It is the person to whom I have the right to address wishes, orders, complaints. The second person in *amas* is not somebody or anybody, but is you in particular for whom I have become in some degree responsible. You may have asked for help and advice, or you may be under my care by law or by army and navy rule. In any case, *amas* is not said without emphasis. However, the emphasis of *amas* is not of the same type as in *amo*. The break which it takes to say *amo*, is part of an impetuous victory over the inhibition of keeping any mouth shut. The emphasis which it takes to say: you are a thief, is that of an impetuous victory over the inhibition of the listener to open his ear! The mother's authority, the doctor's office are needed before the patient will be patient enough to listen!!

Most modern men belittle this secret of emphasis which is needed to make people listen! The editor of our student paper with 3,000 copies daily seemed to abuse his tribune. I said to him: "After all 3000 people read your stuff." He naively answered: "Oh, I am only one of 3000. Anybody can say or write what he likes." He had a printing press. He had a paper as

his mouthpiece. People were prepared to read this paper. They were not prepared to listen to Johnny or Jack. A more important case is the modern union. In a trade union, the ears of the members are usually closed to everybody, including the President of the United States, in labor matters. This is the real impact of a union, that its members cease to listen to words about work read outside their established journal.

The man who says "you are a fool," needs no emphasis to say this. But he will fool himself if he says it to somebody who is not prepared to listen to him. And this *preparedness* comes from an emphatic and emphasized relation between listener and speaker! Sentences like *amas*, you sulk, you are naughty, would be powerless unless the listener has an intent to listen to the speaker. This intent must outweigh the natural unwillingness of any individual to hear other people interfere with our own affairs! Why is advice unasked for never given successfully? Because it has no power to unlock the recipient's ear. In "*amat*," no power is required to state the facts. Our indicatives require a knowledge of the facts; they do not presuppose any social power or authority over other people. But the quality of any sentence in the second person is graded by the degree of authority which the speaker wields over the listener. He must have converted the listener into just that—a listener. The action of saying "*amas*" is a forceful act because it has not only its content: you love, but besides must evoke an intent on the part of the listener which cannot be taken for granted.

4. Comparison

We now can compare the three persons in a sentence: the speaker of *amo* has made up his mind to break his silence about himself although this means running the risk of intervention. The listener of *amas* has made up his mind to invite interference. The speaker and listener of *amat* have nothing to readjust in their own political attitude before they listen to this fact. They are neither defying nor inviting interference in their own affairs.

Out of this comparison of *amo*
amas
amat,

a most important conclusion results: whereas *amat* is debatable as to truth, *amas* is debatable as to authority, *amo* is debatable as to wisdom.

Tertius amat, yes or no, is paralleled not by a You love, yes or no, but by a "you are in love," I beg leave to tell you. And the man who dares to say, I am in love, may do well to consider the wisdom of such a statement, neither the truth nor the right of this statement is dubious—for he should know whether this is true and he should have the authority to speak for himself. The decision to speak of my own actions is debatable as to its political propriety.

In grouping our three sentences as modes of behavior, *amat* stands disclosed as a dualism of our power to know, *amas* as the evaluation of a decision of our power of authority, *amo* as our power to reveal our secrets.

Hence, knowledge	third person
authority	second person
communion	first person

are faced with three different hurdles. Reason, knowledge faces problems of fact, of truth or falsity, of information or observation. Reason may be wrong or right about *tertius*.

But authority faces the dilemma between the listener's freedom and his necessity. "*Amas*," is a sentence which interferes with your freedom, if I find it necessary to tell you, it is because I assess our relation to be of such a nature that it is necessary to tell you.

And communion faces the decision between being silent and speaking out. The man who says in the presence of a lady, "I sweat," overcomes his shyness about his secret and not his doubt about this fact! And he probably would not think of telling her "you sweat" although it may be both true fact and be known to him. But he has no authority to either state the fact or reveal his perception of it to the lady. To do so would imply his social superiority.

The social discrepancy between *amat*, knowledge of facts,

amas, authority to tell, *amo*, revelation of secrets, is enormous. They represent three different social processes between man, fellow man and the outer world.

5. *The Teaching of Grammar*

Is it wise to teach generations of men in our mechanical columns of grammar, that *amo*, *amas*, *amat*, *amamus*, *amatis*, *amant* is a "natural" list?

It seems to me that we positively obstruct our own and our children's insight into the currents of speech by these unquestioned fictions of Alexandria (2200 years ago) which we faithfully repeat. The conflict between the real person and our educational system may largely be attributed to the educational blindspot about grammar, as a social science.

All the other social sciences are now-a-days desperately at work to remedy the false dogmas planted in the grammar school and high school. Whether our mother tongue or foreign languages are concerned, the social abstruseness of the doctrines in grammar is the same.

It would seem to me that it is simpler to tell the truth from the beginning, instead of first ruining a child by our wrong education and then overlaying our wrongs with psychological and sociological correlatives.

This could easily be achieved if the Alexandrian table of grammar were discarded. It has in its favor prescription, and prescription is a great deity. But it contradicts all the experiences of society and of us in society. While we all instinctively know that to speak of our visions is of very different emphasis, grammar fills us with the opposite consciousness.

In our modern society, *amo* and *amas* are treated as though they too were mere statements of fact as *amat*. And psychological shamelessness, social name-calling, the tyranny of the physician and the analyst, are a few results of this lack of wisdom and authority from the grammatical table. Every man is told to think of himself or herself in a matter of fact way, as though he or she were a third person. This puts his or her human rela-

tions on a wrong, objective, basis which devaluates it. For objectively, we speak of those who are absent and who therefore need neither blush nor listen. Human relations thrive where we attribute secrets of communication and loyalties of listening. Human relations die where all our statements only contribute facts.

6. *History or Science*

This may be shown in our fourth form of grammatical statement which is much abused today and which its official custodians have surrendered to the form of indifference in "*amat.*" This is the form, *amavimus* (we have loved), *vicimus* (we have won), *fuimus* (we have been). In this form we have a plurality of subjects claiming to have done as one man one and the same act in the past. "We" in *amavimus* is a merger between speakers and listeners. One man's word and the other man's listening have led to action. This common action we now can give the tale. All history is the tale of acts in which some speaker and some listener have become one. "We" always has to come about by speech. As animals, we have no "we" status in us. When a man has asked a woman to love him and she has responded, there exists a "we" who can experience together. When soldiers have obeyed their officers, there exists now an army whose campaigns may unfold! But never is there any animal "we." All "We's" are historically created by a successful fusion of some speaker and some listeners.

History then is the inside story of a We group—if it is history! But our historians who are not historians, but scientists by intent, pretend that "we" and "they" are words of the same quality. That our history and the history are purely descriptive and therefore they write scientific histories. In these third person histories, the villain is not in us but in the outside world. We are made to believe that we, the historians and the readers, of the historical books, are seated in some grandstand of the opera as onlookers. Mr. Toynbee and Spengler have popularized this view.

If anyone asks how to discern the We of genuine history-writing from the "they" stories of the alleged science of history, it is very simple. All scientific history books must foster a plural of histories. Toynbee has 21 civilizations, Spengler has six. The average college teacher of history distinguishes Spanish, French, Croatian and Mexican histories and innumerable others; the more scientific history becomes, the more numerous do become the histories. "They" can be said of any group and nation, big or small. Harlem has a history, the Bronx has a history, Manhattan has a history, it would appear. The subdivisions of a third-person-history crave multiplication.

But our story would not be our story if it were many. Our history is the story of us who have spoken to each other. We who have our history to tell, first must have been on speaking terms with each other! To have spoken to each other is the indispensable base for our right or capacity of saying "We!"

All "we's" are historically produced by processes of speaking and listening to each other. And the very term "we" sponsors the successful fusion of speakers and listeners into a noticeable and more or less perpetual unity. Hence the normal sentence with we will be a story, and the verb of a story normally will be in the past. *Amamus* (we love), therefore, is not as original a form as *amavimus*.

The modern mind deliberately declines to distinguish between "We" and "they" statements. For the modern mind is based on a dogma. And this dogma runs: Natural man speaks. Speech is part of man's nature. All people can say "we" or "they" as they please. This academic lie makes of Thucydides and Tacitus and Macaulay and Gregory of Tours and Voltaire scientists of an objective world despite the fact that every one of them felt himself a faithful child of the history which he tried to rewrite as "our history."

Again the Alexandrian grammar is in favor of this lie as

amat
amamus
amatis
amant

follow *amo*, *amas*, without delay. How can adults rid themselves

from inveterate habits which have surrounded them since their seventh year?

It is only in grave catastrophes that we have to dig beneath such inveterate habits because they threaten our very existence. In today's crisis, the simplest reactions of a citified product of our educational system are uncertain. He is so objectified that he has lost his roots in his "We" history and his direction towards the people for whom he has to care. For twenty years a young lawyer or doctor or teacher or minister has been filled with a picture of his social relations which ultimately hails from Alexandria's decaying society.

The crisis of our human relations has awakened me to the necessity of elevating grammar to the rank of a social science. Higher grammar tells us of our innate faculties of reason, authority, wisdom, experience. A higher grammar must reinstate the reality of speaking and listening people in the place of the nightmare of a speechless thinker who computes a speechless universe. The Alexandrian table of forms, *amo, amas, amat, amamus, amatis, amant* then will be discarded. It is the end product of a secondary process which has tried to obliterate the foundations of speech. The primary of speech to this day allots different forms of statement to different states of man. As he, as I, as you, as we, Charles William Jones leads a different life.

Hence his sentences are spoken in a different vein. To teach

the Alexandrian list

I love
you love
he loves
we love
you love
they love

suppresses the difference in emphasis. The child is made to believe that I love and you love and we love may be said in a similarly flat voice as he loves or they love. And this, indeed has been the result: our educated classes have come to deny emphasis. But the volume of emphasis which goes into I love, or we love, or you love, is the specific value of these sentences. Their emphasis sets them apart from the sentence "he loves." The sentence "he loves," is justified if it is true and not false.

But the sentence "I love," is justified if it is an act of faith and not shameless. The sentence "you love" is justified if it has a healing and not an insulting quality. The phrase "we love" is justified if it is based on experience of a common life and not on an abstract dogma.

third person:	Truth	Falsehood
first person:	Faith	Shamelessness
second person:	Love	Hate
third person pl:	Life lived	dogmatic assertion

Emphasis is the strength of tone. And the strength of tone reflects the degree of our immersion into what is said.

In a different state of aggregate, we intone differently because the atmosphere in which we speak differs.

An illustration of this fact is offered by the Society of Friends. The Friends thee and thou, among themselves. And a modern storywriter tried to imitate their conversation by letting them speak in sentences like "thee go." He slipped. The Friends use thee as a third person. They use the emphatic thou as the vocative of God in prayer. But the accusative thee is treated as a third person. They therefore say: thee lives, thee goes, thee speaks. When we ourselves speak of "poor me," we also go on to phrase our say in the third person: poor me is sick. Old one is tired. Me, thee, he, are accusatives. They are not of the same volume as I, thou, Socrates. They are governed—as accusatives by the objective world outside the subject; hence, the speaker of the me-sentence does not feel its action to flow from his own center.

Me is sick, I say because I look at myself as an objective fact. I have painted this, I have spoken, puts the indelible stamp of personal decision under my word. The accusatives of the personal pronouns share the impersonal character of the third person and of the indicative. The case which we call accusative, neutralizes the "accused" so that his own subject as man or woman is renounced in favor of his now being an object of perception for everybody else.

The Quakers in saying: thee lives, the speaker by saying: Me does not know, disclaim any pretense to personal emphasis of either confession or imposition!

In these factual forms of, thee lives, me does not know, our own theses are confirmed by contrast. If the speaker and the listener wish to objectify their own existence, they place the unemphatic mask of being third persons upon themselves, and they conjugate the verbs accordingly as though thee and me were third persons. It follows, that I and thou have a different quality from me and thee and therefore I go, *amo*, is in fact linguistically an old optative or subjective! Originally, the indicative did not exist except for third persons. To this day, a vestige of this is preserved in the distinction we make between he is and I am. "Am" is taken from a very different source of inspiration compared with "is." The two words have nothing in common. The original list of the indicative was

me is
 thee is
 he is
 it is.

The original ego-centric ejaculation, I am, stood far away.

But that is as it should be with us, too. Children and adults should feel that whenever we say "I" we combat the pressure on the lid of our mouth, which advises us that we speak of the Ego. The Alexandrian pest has removed this feeling. But human nature has come back with a vengeance. Stammerers and stutterers, self-conscious and shy people testify to this. As the schools try to make I and thou as unimportant as the he or it, the shy person is apt to overemphasize the subjective character of any sentence, and he will not even utter the most harmless sentence in the third person. Once the fundamental distinction in emphasis is jettisoned, the school teacher and the timid soul both are right. The teacher by requiring that I and thou be pronounced as indifferently as he or it; the timid soul longing to say nothing at all, as to speak of him or it is misconstrued as being as shameless as to say I or thou! Once the ways of speech are confused, the brazen intellect will obliterate all distinctions by speaking of everything: the intellect neglecting the real social life between speakers and listeners. The timid soul will obliterate the distinctions by speaking of nobody: the soul

neglecting the neutral objects which do not involve the speaking or listening people.

Brazen objectivity and whispering shyness are social malaises which spring from an insecurity of grammatical distinctions. And they will abound, if grammatical distinctions have ceased to function as expressions of social realities and states of emphatic living.

This example may help to illustrate the purpose of this essay. The reclamation of grammar as the Baedeker of social relations is not a luxury. The Alexandrian lists of grammatical forms cauterize the social sensibilities of the objects of our educational system. The falsehood of our grammar is the reason why we should begin to build up higher grammar. For the wrong grammar is not ineffectual. It does positive harm.

CHAPTER 5

HOW LANGUAGE ESTABLISHES RELATIONS



IN DEALING WITH LANGUAGE, investigators have tread several ways. And since we propose an avenue hitherto untried, we shall warn the reader against mistaking our approach for one of those with which he is familiar. Which are the usual gateways?

The one aspect is through phonetics; the physiological fact of our moving the organs of our body when speaking, is analyzed. Breathing, the membranes of the throat, lips, gums, and teeth are used to explain the various sounds, gutturals, dentals, explosives, etc.

The other aspect is through meaning. The signs are compared to the purpose pursued in pointing to things and acts and qualities. The semantics are systematized.

A third way is historical. The invention of writing, of literature, and the origin of language itself is described.

Our approach differs from all three without denying their great value. We may make our point clear perhaps by using a comparison first. The processes of heredity and decadence, today, are widely discussed in medicine and eugenics. However, decadence is a mental and a psychological phenomenon as well. Healthy children of healthy parents may suffer from the impotence of their parents to convey their own convictions to their children. Whole generations may prove decadent because they behave as though posterity did not depend on their intellectual severity with their progeny. This is decadence, social decadence.

But without particular qualification, we moderns restrict decadence nearly always to the curse of inheriting diseases or disabilities. And we narrow arbitrarily the system within which decadence may take place, just as we do when we tackle language by physiology.

In language, we have a physical medium of social intercourse to establish relations. When I shake hands with a person, this obviously is a physical action. Yet, I do not ask the physiologists to have them explain the act of shaking hands, although the action of the body is absolutely important. And I propose, in a similar way, that we shall treat language as a way of shaking hands, of establishing relations. When we do so, we have a physical process, in space and time, shaking the air, instead of the hand, yet having a social significance.

The relations between people are established by physical and physiological processes. Although more remote from the physical organization of the partner, than sexual intercourse or shaking hands, the physical organization of people is involved and serves the establishment of relations. Instead of serving the process of generation or digestion, our bodies serve here for the establishment of social relations. The functioning of the larynx, the mouth, the ear, in functioning to this purpose, cannot be isolated from the social system into which it fits. Without a system of respiration, the function of our lungs cannot be interpreted. Without a system of social relations, our phonetics and our linguistic technique remains meaningless. The respiratory system, the organs of eating and the ear and eye collaborate in two or more people to span a bridge of which the interlocutors are the bridge heads. Upon them, something is laid, between them a process goes on to which they are subjected. In shaking hands, everybody realizes that an intimate connection is established. The Greeks called the act "being planted into each other's hands," thereby stressing the biological character of the union. They try to be rooted in each other like one tree. And so, in the shaking-hand process, all corporate acts of unities united in root and branches are pre-signified.

Is it possible to trace similar solutions of social grouping in speech? When people ask, they also listen to each other. But the

ways in which they are arranged in speaking and listening differ widely. During the time that one person speaks, another or several others will listen. Otherwise, he would not speak. However, this very general division in speaking and listening, in every particular case is tinged by a different social relation. And it is at this point, of the specific relation established between speaker and listener, that we shall try to organize the different acts of language, systematically. This system, later, will be derived from other angles, independently. But it will lead to the same classification. And in it we try to explain speech as a function of the various elementary social relations, just as breathing is a function of respiration.

Man is incalculable; man is free. Yet his incalculability is set to work on a limited number of physical and social possibilities.

The fundamental classifications of grammar and the fundamental classifications of social relations coincide. Discovering the one we discover the other. Grammatical classifications in themselves would remain arbitrary without such empirical backing by social reality.

When two or more people are together, their relations are not of an infinite variety. They may be combinations or pure forms of the following types:

1. The speaker and the listeners are unanimous, of one spirit. They agree.
2. The speaker and the listener are "dubious," split, and of two spirits. They are strangers.
3. The speaker depends on the listener, whom the speaker expects to act on what he has to say.
4. The listener depends on the speaker because the speaker has acted already.

In all four cases, we need not analyze any social relations between the people involved, outside their momentary effort of speaking to each other. These speaking processes themselves and the various social relations are established. However, in the four cases, this has to be done in four absolutely heterogeneous manners.

We are accustomed to the interplay of two interlocutors, one asking, the other answering the question. Others may sing together a song, a chorale, a dirge; or we have the recitation of

an old text at a ritual, a *Te Deum* at mass, a legal ceremony in court where an old formula is recited that has been reiterated through the centuries. Finally, we see two men exchange words, one using command or order and the other acclaiming or consenting.

Let us analyze the four situations.

However, before going into them, we may well be curious about the phase preceding the utterances of the interlocutors. This situation consists of silence. And silence, too, is an actual social situation. I may be silent because I am alone, because the other man has not turned up. I may be silent because nothing new has flashed my mind that I must tell him. Silence may mean that although more than one person is present, they are in perfect agreement and have no issue to raise. And, silence may prevail because a number of people don't find a way of speaking together, from shyness, embarrassment, misgivings, hostility. In one and the same situation, silence may result from the lack of something:

1. Lack of a person to talk to; lack of an audience.
2. Lack of a person to listen to: lack of authority, of content, of something extraordinary to be said.
3. Lack of relations between two people. They may be strangers, different.
4. Lack of distance, too close relations between people, so that they think they need not say anything.

In 1 and 2, the moment has not come yet. The partner or a new subject matter is lacking. In 3 and 4, the scene is not set. In 3, the strangers move in peculiar and separate rooms; in 4, the unity and intensity is too great to allow for the distance in which alone language can fly back and forth. The time element is prohibitive in 1 and 2, the space element is prohibitive in 3 and 4.

Social relations need a medium distance in space and time. Too great distances and too small distances, both, are obstructive. But all these relations correspond to the great situations of decadence, war, chaos, revolution.

Language is a system of social relations. And grammar we shall call the scientific process by which we become conscious

of this system of social relations. The term grammar, ever since antiquity, has been limited to signify classroom considerations about the use of forms in speech. However, there is no reason why grammar should not be lifted to the level of a social science, of *the* social science, perhaps.

Great difficulties block the road of grammar, however. The terms used in grammar books are, in part, accidental, luggage from Greek and Roman misunderstandings of old standing, like the term "Copula" for the word "is," which is one of the most inveterate signs of the fact that grammar has not been treated as a science of society.¹

We shall have to be very cautious in building up a terminology which is free of a scholastic dogmatism. We must try to reduce the processes of speech to a system of social relations. Not all relations are based on speech. But all lasting relations are and have to be. That our organs of sex lead to social relations is an accepted fact. However, they only lead to marriage when speech intervenes. That our hands can organize the surrounding objects by craft and by work is admitted. Now the hands as well as the lungs, the throat and the mouth, our shoulders (in shrugging them), our head (in shaking it), the whole body, in fact, can be used, and is used for the purpose of establishing relations with other human beings.

This effort, however, becomes language properly speaking, when the relations are mutual and reciprocal. When I speak and you listen, when I formulate and you repeat, when I object and you explain, when I sing, and you fall in, we have human language.

Human language is not complete without the democracy of universal participation by which an undying speech, through the ages, is ascertained. We all speak and listen, formulate and repeat, object and explain, start and fall in. And all the objections, explanations, songs, formulas, etc., are restated and remodeled incessantly. Language survives any individual speaker.

¹ Few errors have been this persistent. This one has been fortified by metaphysical ideas which were attached to it. The philosophers, misled by the name "*verbum substantivum*," have opposed the substance with the accessories. A whole system of logic has been based on the primary existence of the verb 'copula.'

—J. Vendryes, *Le Langage*, 1921, p. 146.

Thus, language is obviously not restricted to building up temporal and passing relations. It tries to build up recurrent and remembered relations. In speaking, the acts of mortal men are lifted up to the level on which they become unforgettable because they are communicated. In speech, the processes of the universe are recorded and mentioned forever. Every sentence that we form today contains actual records of the acts to which our sentence as it is spoken now compares the act described in our sentence. And these former acts are contained in the words, the morphemes (word forms), the phrases that we are using, and we bring to life again these processes and facts of the past simply by speaking today. One cannot speak of the French or of America or of polo without recording, through these words, all the processes that led to the existence of France and the Americans and of the game of polo.

By speech, we convey acts to people who are unaware, ignorant, remote from the acts in question. Or we raise objections to the conveyance of such acts through us as a medium. Whatever we do, communicating, transmitting, obstructing the communication, we render a service to the acts that go on in the universe by making them accessible to those who have neither seen nor heard what we have seen and heard. We duplicate and triplicate the intensity of life on earth by bringing all separate processes, dispersed through centuries and over thousands of miles, into one stream of continuous conversation and recording.

To speak, as we usually say, "about" the world is a misleading diagnosis. When we speak about something, we do less than we are expected to do. When we chat about God and the world, our mind is on a vacation. And this chatter, gossip, talk, is the shell or the chaff of the real and full power of speech when things speak through us. It is a gross misunderstanding to judge speech by its play-variety, small talk. That is mere reflection on real speech. Through us, the world quite literally comes to know itself. We should not use the sloppy expression of talking about the universe. By taking cognizance of the universe and carrying it with ourselves to others, the universe is speaking to man everywhere and forever. The ubiquitous and

omnipresent character of life on earth depends on man, since through his traditions, his story-telling, his observations, the passing events in the remotest corner of the globe are kept as an eternal present before all the generations and nations of the earth.

This is man's contribution to the universe by which the whole life in the universe is changed. The universe is reflected in man, it is communicated by man to all other men scattered over the round of the planet. The cosmic acts, by our participation, gather considerable momentum. The earthquake of Lisbon in 1755, instead of killing some thousand people there, influenced all Europe, shook humanity to its depth, and was present to the minds of all humanitarians, directly or indirectly, for the next one hundred and fifty years.

Man offers his respiratory system, his ears, his gestures, and his body as a whole for the purpose of functioning in this cosmic mail service. Nothing remains undiscussed that man does experience. A never-ending stream of communication connects the first man to all of us as is shown by the fact that we speak the same language after six thousand years. And this cosmic service is to overcome the limitations in time and space of any cosmic event. We, all the time, spread the good and the bad news. And to spread news is the function of *homo sapiens*. In this way, he establishes a permanent system of coordinates in time and space. In this new time-space system, far remote events and far distant things draw together closely, by passing through the human mind till they are brought together practically, too.

When man began to speak, the existing universe began to be reflected a thousand times in the prism of human language. Before, the sun had risen. But now, men told each other: the sun has risen. And He rises in the minds of millions who don't see him rise, from their apartment windows. To speak means to spread or to communicate or to forward acts. In this sense, all speech is propaganda. For, as the waves carry to the universe the emanations of a source of light or energy, in no other way is the true word the expression, the forwarding energy of a real movement in the center, the center being either the universe or we ourselves as parts of it.

Malinowski made the discovery among the primitives that the language they speak is denotation of actions. This is significant. Although the word denotation is not fit for what he himself describes. The primitive, also, "communicates" where we "denote." To us, abstract and introvert moderns, language signifies the denotation of concepts or ideas. To the real speaker, it always will mean to transfer acts to other people:

Transfer it because I have experienced it: tale, story.

Transfer it so that it may reinforce my action: song, "let us go."

Transfer it so that it may eliminate resisting action about objections: "he actually is going."

Transfer it so that I need not act myself: command: "go!"

All speech is transfer of actions to other human beings, and thought is a subcase of such transfer. Thought is transfer of actions to the speaker himself, usually by overcoming his own resistance. When we begin to doubt, when we reach the age of discretion, when we analyze, we imply that the phase has passed in which we could be taken in by the irresistible force of other people's speech. We now need to go by second thought. However, that thought is the overcoming of a barrier within ourselves, is expressed by all words that express the process. *Dubitare, zweifeln*, make distinctions, discriminate, are all securing the introduction of a dualism within the person. An individual becomes a person by being able to represent speaker and listener both within one person. Logic is the faculty of restoring the unhindered flow of the words after breaking down the resistance by objections. And, as the word objections shows, objections are the inward-projection of outside objects and of the actions of these objects that at first sight stop the transfer of the actions of the universe to me in the form in which they first reach me.

No language is communication with others only, it is communication with the universe. We try by speaking to communicate our experience of the universe to our fellow men; by listening, reading, learning, we try to get hold of their experiences of the universe. To speak means to re-enact cosmic processes so that these processes may reach others. In every sentence, man acts within the cosmos, and establishes a social rela-

tion for the sake of saving the cosmos from wasting acts in vain. Man economizes the cosmic processes by making them available to all other men. Man, by speech, establishes the solidarity of all men for the acceptance of our universe.

Now, we are able to return to the question: how does language deal with the position of the second person, the listener, when this second person shall really be made a participant of the communication? If the transfer of the act shall be perfect, mere listening offers little guarantee.

I do not remember any analysis of the fact that the doer of the spoken word, not the mere listener, must be investigated when we wish to encompass what is done by speech. The social relation is not established when the man to whom I speak has gotten the acoustic impression on his membrane. The reaction to my saying may take a lifetime and more. But I must take the whole reaction into consideration in my analysis of the meaning of language. In certain cases, the reaction may be immediate and, perhaps, must be quick; in others, it is slow. But the time element, in both cases, is essential for explaining what I am doing by speaking at all.

We see that short-lived and long-lived relations are aimed at, by speech. And that, for that reason, language branches out in very different forms of grammar, of style, of expression. When I break into song, my mood is accepted by the fellow who goes along with me, singing, too, as well as he can. When a man has founded and started something, he longs for disciples who will repeat the good news in his absence and even long after his death. When somebody orders something to be done because he can or will not do it himself, the man who receives the order must relate it as given to him, he must respond, and make himself responsible for the execution of the order. When a soldier today acknowledges an order, he does it in a sentence. However, the simple Latin *venio* (I come) is not far away from being a whole sentence by repeating the command and acknowledging it by the affirmation "*jo, oh*" as the best answer, meaning: "Come? Sure!" The command itself reads "*veni,*" the additional "o" is the receipt. *Egō* the I, in Latin contains the same element, of course, of exclamation or acclamation.

When an object is announced by one speaker, the other may

understand or misunderstand it. The play of question and answer, for the indicative is the dialectical display of the mental equality between two men faced by a different part of reality, and attempting to compare notes and objections on objects in the surroundings. And, thus, we have four social relations established by the four different modes or moods of speech.

Old and young: people in succession, sacramental words and their reiteration.

Friends: people in agreement: soloist and chorus.

Strangers: people in disagreement: question and answer.

Leader and led: command and response.

When we analyze this further, we see that two forms are enacted by people because of their peculiar time relation; the two others on account of their peculiar space relation.

The repetition is needed where the two men are separated by age, one being older than the other so that the disciple must reiterate the word.

The command and response are needed where the older cannot go himself but must send somebody else to act or to make the experience although he may have gone through it before himself. Any imperative orders the other fellow to move; the commander is waiting for the other to act. He wants to transfer an act to his listener so that the act may take place, because it is the act just missing in the perfect time-space pattern that the speaker has in mind. Any imperative tries to convince the respondent of the next step that has to be taken to restore the universe of time and space, to its proper shape. This is the "growing" or "happening" or the "being in process" which is signified by the genuine imperative. Future is not at all what will happen sometime later. It is, at its root, the one act that is missing and that, by the word, is transferred to the listener so that he may act. Future is the "*unum necessarium*," the one thing needed of the New Testament, where the original function of the imperative is restored by Jesus.

The future depends on the fact of there being imperatives. Future is concrete. Imperatives are not placed *in* the future. But the future is what needs action. This impending and im-

perative character of the time concept "future" is overlooked in modern discussions.

When we sing together, we live together in an inner space. Our minds form one mind. We are animated by one spirit; we are unanimous and this unity signifies that we move in an inside, an inner space, compared with the rest of the world. The "inner" space is reflected by the fact of chorus singing. In it man's mind is not "his" mind, in isolation. Whenever he makes up his mind, he communicates. However, in singing, we are less remote from other minds than in other forms of communication. Here, the whole notion of different minds is subdued in favor of stressing the unanimity. The "inner" life of man is not a privilege of private individuals. Any group in the world has this inner sanctuary. Even big nations have their privacy where they sing, and their public discussions where they object and reverse the process of unity by meeting in the world outside which, always, consists of separate bodies, separate minds, distinct and antithetic objects.

Outside, everything is distant from any other object. External space has the one feature of separating all things. Our eyesight is given us to see the differences of things. The world, as seen through our eyes, is a very peculiar world of atoms, of distinct entities. Most people are ignorant of the fact that this world of our eyesight is just one world view among the others. They believe in the separatedness of things and minds, because we, indeed, have the freedom to bring everything under the scrutiny of our eyes as though it were not a part of us, but something independent and distinct. However, the minds that are objectionable to each other must remain on speaking terms if they are to live in peace together. In question and answer, two minds, otherwise not related, boil down their differences as two single minds.

The Platonic dialogue is based on this minimum of mutual understanding by which we, at least, may question each other. Unfortunately, this form of living together mentally has been treated through the ages, as "more natural" than discipleship, chorus singing and response to a command. It is not. The rational way of two minds meeting in the doubt of a question

is the best way for two strangers that meet each other on the market place. For traders, for the commercial world, this way seems to be the only way. But it is but one form of communicating among others.

Magister and disciple, singer and chorus, leader and respondent are of equal originality in their linguistic situation as the interlocutors of a discussion in the form of question and answer. By isolating the interrogatory mood, the origin of question and answer was inexplicable until today. As soon as we compare the prosaic process of question and answer to its parallels in historical tradition (formula and repetition), in musical unanimity (singer and chorus), in political challenge (imperative and response), question and answer are disclosed as one application of the general principle of social relations to be established through speech, the application to the meeting of two people from different spaces, and therefore of a different standard of objectivity.

When singers are absolutely sure of their unanimity, they may afford to sing in different voices, as a pleasure, playing with their inner integration to the brink. When question and answer pass between strangers, they may play with some inner agreement, just in their joy of successfully overcoming their difference of mind, as when Socrates does all the talking. And he only asks rhetorical questions. The rhetorical question: Don't you know? presupposes unanimity, in the form of a situation that presupposes the interlocutors being strangers. The rhetorical question oversteps the diffidence between strangers, by revealing their already being friends. This amiable form must not blind us against the original estrangement at the bottom of any logical discussion between two separate minds.

It is impossible, in the prose created for this cautious and rather external debate, to say: "He is a jolly good fellow." This sentence has to be sung, even in our days, because it stresses the inner solidarity with this fellow.

The clearest case of two strangers meeting is symbolized by our question: How do you do? The answer usually is suppressed; both interlocutors ask the same question. They establish relations, from the very foundation. The German salutations,

Grüss Gott, Auf Wiedersehen, boast of a unanimity between the two persons which allows them to unify their desires, their optatives. The Anglo-Saxon formula stresses the absolute right and insularity of the two gentlemen, both trying to let the other have all the possible independence of mind that goes with peace between them.

Now as to the means that serve the construction of these different worlds between people.

All language exploits large parts of our body, in making us serve as cosmic agents of news. In singing, however, more and deeper parts are set in motion than in parliamentary debate or scientific discussion. The reason probably is that in singing we are carefree, disarmed, and can let go. In rational discussion, we barely move our lips, and, with the rest of our body, we sit tight. In telling a story, the tale of things past, the epic rocking-chair tone is that of the man who has spent his real energy in the past of which he is going to tell the story right now. But the historian, the story-teller, distinctly uses a style and a voice that differs from rational argument.

All invitation to enter the future, to bring about the future, again uses a different intonation. Everybody knows that it takes years to acquire the voice of command that is without flaw and effort, neither shrieky nor embarrassed but irresistible. Some people think that it has to be learned in early youth, as much as singing, if it ever shall be first rate. The four types of intonation embroil the speaker and the listener into four different social situations. And upon these peculiar social situations the forms of grammar, the styles of books, and the eccentricities of whole national languages have been built.

In summing up, we may list our findings as follows: language establishes social relations between men as agents of cosmic communication. The actions going on in the whole universe, including our own lives, are re-enacted by the speaker so that they may reach the rest of mankind. Through speech, the life on earth reaches a new level of prismatic reflection on its own processes. On this level, any event, otherwise limited in time and space, may become noticeable all the time and everywhere.

The cosmic acts are either those that have happened before

or that are bound to happen (past or future). This is expressed by inculcating to posterity the reiteration, or by summoning listeners to obey the obvious imperative.

The cosmic acts either are familiar to all members of the conversation and only need re-enforcement through unanimous constation. All poetry and music appeals to human unanimity, as being inside one mind; or they are conflicting news because strangers meet, diffident of each other and each other's environmental data. All prose dialogue is based on the diffidence between question and answer, as though men were extraneous to each other.

The disciple, the chorus, the answer, the response, have to be taken into account to understand the system in which the speaker is serving as a function or cosmic agent. For his act is not completed before the reaction to his words ascertains his having spoken, in the true sense of the word, at all. The reaction proves that he has been able to do his duty as re-enacting the cosmic processes so that they may be endowed with the quality of being known, done, felt, and remembered. The past must be remembered by reiteration, the inner life must be felt, the outer circumstances and facts must be known, and the future must be done so that it may become a part of the unforgettable, knowable, experienced, and responded for time-space pattern called the universe. It is not so easy to accept the universe as Margaret Fuller thought.² It takes doing as well as remembering, feeling as well as knowing before the year of life is acceptable to men as its apostles.

The Classification of the Parts of Speech

Man has to convey to his fellow men the acts of the universe. These acts appear to him either in process of being achieved or as having been achieved. They appear to him as processes within one mind, or as objects that are exposed to various interpretations from different angles. We all need words that make clear with what aspect of the universe we wish to

² She said proudly: "I accept the universe!"

deal. The personal pronouns: We, you, it, they, I, mine, yours, only make sense when you are actually talking to people, within one circle of peaceful relations. All personal pronouns testify to the achievement of one spirit within many, in an inner circle.

Nouns are of the opposite nature. They classify the stone, the rain, the deer, the tree as beings outside, as objects of which we cannot be sure that they are brother sun and sister moon. However, we may deal with them differently, at different times. In poetry, sun and moon are real people; in science, they are not. It is perfectly reasonable that we should have two names for each thing, one from the inside, the other for its external objectivity. And we have, indeed. Since we all have two or three names. One is our name as a friend, inside one community; the other signifies our worldly existence, among a hostile world of demand and supply and the struggle for existence. By another name, or by the weight of the family name, we may trace our historical background, our past, or let it be traced by others. And that certain names given to us in the cradle, also contain a challenge to secure future action by the carrier of the name, is too well known. All ecclesiastical tradition believed in the vaccinating effect of name-giving.

Today, this aspect of names is in the decline because man has lost faith in the future. And immediately, we see him hide in his ancestors, his race, his country, or his class; and because he ceases to take his name as a challenge, he allows himself to be classified as determined by membership in a group, by exposure to environment, or by racial inheritance. The other perpetual temptation is to qualify the universe by its origins and causes. The first two words are "bad" and "good" when it comes to experience of history. Old ways are good ways, radical and revolutionary ways look bad since they are untried. Attributes usually are marks of recognition cast upon new events to compare them with events of the past. All legality and righteousness, for example, depend on precedent. Nothing is legal that has never happened before. Because liberties are given only for acts preconsidered, in general, at least.

It is futile to ask whether private property on the waves of

the ether is "right." These waves are known for so short a time that the old idea of private property cannot be applied to them without serious misunderstanding. These misunderstandings are committed daily. Whenever we qualify new events by right and wrong, good and evil, we try to convince ourselves and others that we know what they are. Adjectives are usually employed to describe new things by familiar names. The adjectival use of language, then, is tracing the unknown back to the known. When I say the table is round, red, heavy, I assume that the three adjectives are apt to be helpful in familiarizing us with the otherwise unknown table.

Verbs are used for the opposite purpose. They neither induce old or extraneous, or interior experience. The great sensation of verbs is that the universe is made over, in this moment, and is turning into something different. The imperatival usage in speech is, as mentioned before, quite obvious in the imperative that we address to somebody because we ourselves can't do what has to be done to make the world perfect. We shout at somebody else.

The languages, however, although they have given the imperative a prominent and creative role in the formation of the verb, also can express imperatival quality by more involved forms of the verb, or by using nouns as imperatives. "Light" may be used as an imperative to have the lights turned on.

From this last example, it becomes clear, that our grammatical classifications must remain aloof from any particular historical form of morphemes and endings. Yet, the nominal, verbal, pronominal and adjectival form of language is something eternal. No language can be without it. Wherever we are "within the group," we are moving "usward," as the old English phrase allowed to say. The whole world looks like a part of us, and "mine" and "thine" are separated from anything outside our unity. All language of a group, integrated and harmonious like a family or a club, is pronominal, and because it is, it is exclusive for non-members of this community.

The nominal usage, on the other hand, goes out to meet the stranger to discuss with him the facts that he and we can agree upon without being friends or brothers.

The adjectival language is connecting us with the past, with history, with the origins of our conscious life. And the chapter of Genesis that insists on dating our history back to the moment when people discerned wrong and right, is correct. From this moment on, all men have striven to speak one language or to restore the unity of language by building up again and again a consentaneous table of evaluations, of good and evil, valid for all.

The imperatival usage of language is creative. A new act asks for a new word. And the verbs seem to be that part of language containing the greatest originality and the most efficient fruits of creative gestures, new words. In every moment of linguistic life, there may be found two trends: one to derive verbs from nouns (as in the A conjugation in Latin or "book, to book," "table, to table.") And the other tendency of starting with a new verb, and then following it up with nouns derived from the verb (as in the Latin E conjugation, or in old English lose, looser; to pull, pull-over, etc.). But it seems to be plausible that more independence, more creativity is shown in the verb describing a new act, and then let the nouns spring from it as the verb leads to permanent agents and actual situations. The verb "to taxi," in flying, is perhaps an instance of a case where a noun was in back of the idea first, but ceased to be consciously envisualized, and the act became so intriguing that the verb became independent.

We now are equipped to connect the usual grammatical terminology of the schools with our social-relation terminology. All language may take four shapes, and so may all parts of speech: the experience asks to be called future, past, objective or subjective.

1. The *subjective* is called ours and mine by pronominal language.
2. The *objective*, as between strangers, is extrapolated as by nouns, nominal language.
3. The *old* is expressed as having certain qualities, adjectival usage.
4. The *new* is expressed as in process, as bound to come

off, imperative usage, because the success depends on the act voiced.

Or, we may table our findings as follows:

- a. The *inward* aspect stresses the unity of the interlocutors, who feel their unanimity: pronominal language. (Pronouns: we, I, ours, mine, you, thou, yours, thine, etc. Conjunctions: and, but, in spite of, etc. Optative, subjunctive. Poetry, Music.)
- b. The *outward* aspect stresses the freedom of each interlocutor who meets in an objective world: nominal language. (Nouns: stone, rain, fire, hail, tree, etc.; one, two, three, four, five, etc. Indicative speech. Arithmetics.)
- c. The *backward* aspect traces everything to its familiar qualities: adjectival language. (Adjectives: red, green, good, bad. Participles: loving, gone, been. Historical background, moral judgement.)
- d. The *forward* aspect accompanies the unfinished creation of the world of tomorrow: imperatival language. (Verbs, imperatives: Thy will be done, thy kingdom come.—or help! stop! listen! Political eloquence, prophesy.)

It always has aroused my attention that the preface of the Christian Mass, which is one of the most perfect documents of human speech, should begin with adjectives, and, what is more, with a considerable list of adjectives. It runs: *Vere, dignum et justum est, aequum et salutare, nos tibi semper et ubique gratias agere, Domine sancte.*³ We have seen that all language is an attempt to enact the processes of the cosmos always and everywhere. This prayer judges the always and everywhere (*semper et ubique*) from the aspect known to man by his experience, as dignified, just, fair and wholesome. It is historical and adjectival language at its apex because it describes the meaning of the historical attempt of all of us when we speak, and in tackling the very heart of language, it does this in the perfect form of one special style. *And true perfection in speech is not achieved*

³ Truly worthy and just, right and wholesome it is that we always and everywhere give thanks to you, o sacred Lord.

by mixing the four styles but by being completely devoted to one of the four at a time. The most important fact about speech is that it must remain four-fold, and no one style can communicate the whole truth of the matter we are trying to convey. No one style can be reduced to another. Rational, scientific language is one of four different languages, and must remain so.

CHAPTER 6

THE LISTENER'S TRACT



MR. J. VENDRYES HAS written a beautiful book, *Le Langage, Introduction Linguistique a l'Histoire*. This book, although written in French, has an index. In this index, the words that signify the acts of hearing, listening, obeying, understanding are not to be found, even the word "oreille," the ear, is missing. This is no accident. Our philology is built around the process of talking, speaking, writing. The process of hearing is left to separate departments, as military training for obedience, understanding to psychology, listening and learning to acoustics and education. All these are arts that deal with language incidentally only. It is, for instance, well known that a voice of the right kind is the most precious quality of a man in command. This, however, is not treated as a universal problem of human nature, but occurs in the soldier's education only.

Let us try to compare the system of hearing to the process of speaking. It is not improbable that the variety and ways of hearing may surprise us. Perhaps, we shall find that the apparatus by which men hear is not at all limited to the ear. Would not such an observation be valuable for the interpretation of speech? Is it possible to limit the process of speaking to fifty per cent of one unified process, to the operations that go on in the speaker only? May we limit any metabolism in our body to one arbitrary phase? Does not the final process only explain the intention of the beginning? In digestion, we take it for granted that chaff and bulk are necessary for the inner tract and that only a little amount of the food is retained in the body.

Is it not a justified question to ask ourselves how language must be composed in order to reach the listener so that he is set in motion and begins to acquire a fragment of the information and content of that which the speaker has said?

Perhaps this explains why we have to say a thousand times something that the students all grasp once. Perhaps this accounts for the fact usually overlooked that education for science, itself, cannot be scientific. The process of producing scientists is educational. And education is not applied science. To educate means to be a representative of creation. The long-range processes of listening: this is education. Years and decades must go by till the listener has caught up with the speaker, in a thoroughgoing education. Our analysis of listening, then, is the basic inventory of the means at our disposal when we educate.

The listener's tract is one-half of the social relation that is established by the process of speech. And this half is as varied, as complex, as the speaker's tract. We already know that a speaker represents the different fronts of reality by different language, that he communicates imperatival, optative, indicative and adjectival aspects of reality. How far is the listener moved to the same front of reality? How far do we paralyze the communication by overlooking the complexities of the listener's tract?

It may help us to observe, with *van Ginneken*, the Dutch grammarian, that in any act of listening and understanding, as of speaking, the human body is involved in at least four ways. The innervation of the whole system of respiration and oration, the gesture system of rump, head and hands, our sense of audition, and our sense of vision, all are occupied. We cannot think or realize certain spoken words, or conceive of certain things, when any one of these systems are occupied by other activities. By a study of the different types of aphasia (inability to speak) and agraphia (inability to write), it has been shown that in order to hear and to understand, we not only need our ears or our eyes. We also must feel free to innervate our larynx, tongue, mouth, etc., and we must feel able to re-enact some of the gesticulations of the interlocutor, or, in their place, some of the movements necessary to write the words down. Whenever one of the four

innervations, inner respiratory-oral tract, outer gesticulation (or instead, graphical movement), audition, vision, is jeopardized, disturbance results. They all are essential in the linguistic process.

Even the smallest unit, one word, is a combination of speaking and listening activity. Vowels are preferably that which we hear, consonants preferably that which we enact, in a word. The speaker hears his vowels and produces his consonants; the listener innervates the consonants spoken, unconsciously, and hears the vowels. The brilliant test for this interplay of two processes, is found in the transcription of *patois*, in poetry, like that of Molière, or Balzac. Satirizing the peasant or Alsatian, the writer is able to transcribe the vowels. Nowhere does he succeed to transcribe the consonants as actually spoken. He fails to innervate, to re-enact the sounds of the consonants as produced by the idiomatic speaker. Not his audition goes wrong—as proved by the vowels—but his participating innervation, in his process of listening. He mishears because he does not enact; and he ascribes a fantastic phonetics to the peasant.

That the graphic picture and the written language play a powerful part in modern man's understanding we all agree. Many words are pronounced on the basis of their arbitrary orthography; orthography changes phonetics. And the reproduction of the written picture is essential to our understanding, in our memory. However, it would seem that vision has always played a great part in language. From the very beginning, gesticulation rivalled with sounds. Gesticulation, in special cases, may take over the whole burden of speech. And it is possible that writing and reading are enlargements on this original share of gesticulation and vision, in speaking. That we should be helped in thinking by innervating the movement outside our body as well as inside our body, is not far-fetched. When Jesus drew lines with his finger in the sand, with the adulteress standing by, waiting for his answer, his was an eloquence of listening in which hearing and writing were fused in one.

The degree of intensity in speech and listening, then, may differ widely. When we sing the whole thorax is at work; when we whisper, we barely open our lips. Many forms of speech lie between these extremes. In a similar way, I may listen with my

ear, with my eye or with my whole system. In my own experience, I would say that sounds pierce from the ear right to the heart; pictures, written words and vision, never do this; they register with me in the brain. Frightful news, fear, penetrates under the diaphragm. And the ancients knew this fact very well. The fact that our eyes report to the brain, our ears not necessarily so, would seem to deserve some better attention by educators. However this single point may be, we here only have to record that any listener performs a long sequence of participating enactments in a perfect process of listening:

1. He hears noise, sounds, vowels.
2. He re-innervates the speaker's consonants.
3. He registers, records the complete word, sentence, phrase.
4. He recalls the conceptual meaning, its indicative content rationally (for instance, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony when mentioned in conversation, he will store away and classify).
5. He re-enacts the emotions behind the phrase; he is moved.
6. He re-enacts the representations condensed into the word.
7. He re-enacts the processes represented; he does something about the cosmic processes communicated to him, following them up by acts.
8. He gets the word out of his system, forgets it.

The whole process leaves the listener undamaged only when he can go through all the movements during his life. The news is good news for him, when he finally can forget about it because he has done something about it, and lives on. To forget a thing which we learned before we remembered or felt or acted would be wrong. Never to forget anything is an obsession. There is a time for memory as well as for forgetting. In education, we take little advantage of the two facts, as being equally legitimate because we do not openly assign them a moment in time.

The usual experience with instruction, of course, is that it is merely remembered. Although we feel that this reaction is inadequate, and feel choked, we do little about this. The reaction—as we now may see—must involve our whole system. Or the listening process has not established a social metabolism. It now makes us sick. The outlet, perhaps, should be tears, joy,

laughter, sentiment. Or when our alarm clock rings, the best thing is to jump out of bed. People who do not jump out of bed after the clock rings, usually have an unpleasant feeling, like a tremor. They feel shaky because they do not enact the best reaction: to jump out of bed, which would get the alarm out of their system.

Now let us parallel the speaker's and the listener's efforts. The listener follows the suggestions of the speaker. He is inclined to re-enact as much of the act of communication as the speaker intended to actualize. The listener tries to mobilize no more and no less energy than the speaker mobilized. The wretched experience of the devoted amateur with the hard-boiled expert always is that the amateur listens, heart and soul, and the expert coughs, with a suppressed yawn. Or the listener is bored, and the speaker shouts, as at an auction. This discrepancy is the most serious disease in society. When two experts talk, both with the augur's smile, it does not hurt. When two boys are intoxicated, everything is fine. It is the discrepancy that endangers our social system because speech is abused, in these inadequate responses, by one of the two interlocutors. It has been a lasting shock in my youth to find out later that the other person was not in earnest where I was. The protective coloring of youth against this danger is indifference; and it seems to be altogether not unknown in New England colleges. The boys are right. The danger is too great that they incur situations in which the teacher plays safe and leans back. And this fear is behind much of our failures.

The discrepancy between the speaker's and the listener's effort, to me, seems the central disturbance in the transmission of the cosmic processes through speech. The singer may think that he sings; the listener only hears a noise; no artistic pleasure is communicated. I make contacts to get action; the listener stores my communication away in his memory. This bears out a great and striking difference in the attitude of a speaker and a listener, in scientific reading. A scientist who is making a statement as the result of ten years of work reaches his listener's memory, only, in our modern form of learning. That means that the student places this statement into his organ for his-

torical facts. To remember something, transforms it into a part of our historical imagination. Oh yes, we say, that is so, and go on with new curiosity to the next item of news.

Teacher and student never register with the corresponding organ, as long as the scholar is a research man and conveys first hand knowledge. It will always remain second hand knowledge for the student. He will locate it in his memory whereas it fills the whole system of the scientist. Any philosophy is deteriorated by the fact that it is memorized by the disciples. They store it in a part of their body which is unable to produce similar effects in their own life as the philosophy produced in the thinker himself. Only when the philosopher can get his hearers to do something about it, to feel it, to remember it, and to register, only then has he found heirs to his bequest to posterity.

The paralysing effect of memory on the true meaning of a word said by a man who means business, who offers this as his last word, cannot fail to produce disastrous effects. The neglect of the need for memorizing would be not less disastrous. It is not enough to do "anything" about it. The disciples of Ruskin followed his challenge to establish a work camp. But when they got American money for this task, they changed their purpose to building a college for workers. They turned the words of Ruskin upside down, and this quite literally: Ruskin College is an offense to Ruskin's intention. They did something about it. But they did not remember what Ruskin had taught. Ruskin had deep feelings about manual work and its honor. The students had charitable leanings toward the poor.

The impulse "to do something about it" is very often today coupled with a perfect misunderstanding of the meaning. And the complete understanding of the idea is found in people who would like to kill the person who does something about it.

The tragedy of Greek philosophy was and is to be found in modern times again, in this misunderstanding of the process of hearing and learning. All the process of thinking in the schools of philosophy is a tradition of dialectical contradiction between teacher generation and student generation, with an endless chain that at the end produced a catalogue of all possible

-isms. No *-ism*, however, was more valid than any other. They all held sway over one generation. But all came about by the fact that the students stored the words of the master away in their memory. Then their own living experience came into play, in the heart and under the skin, and this personal experience asked for articulation. And it could find this articulation not in supplementation to the teacher's doctrine, but only in diametrical opposition. Why? Because memory is a faculty to keep the past, and the new experience was articulated abruptly.

The power of recognition that enables us to identify our own new experience with the record of past experience is a power that transcends logic and definitions. The power of identifying us with people who express their ideas in other terms requires a quality of the mind that is much rarer than logic or memory or sentiment. It requires the superior power cultivated by the church and in the family: the power of translating for the sake of mission and education the eternal truth into the language of the times. The power of translating fuses the different ways of understanding. But the memorizing student of Thomas Aquinas or of Hegel was perfectly unable to do just that.

Another tragedy becomes clear when we discriminate between the organs through which we complete our process of listening. This is the dilemma of modern propaganda. We all tell other people, we all persuade and spread the news and blow the horn. This is not propaganda, in any specific sense. To speak means to propagate the world's actions by communication. We propagate when one organ of speech is active on the speaker's side and the listener's organ of hearing is more powerful. When I sing and my listener is an effete aesthetic critic, he will abuse me for my innocent song which he takes to be a case for scientific analysis, perhaps as a mere critic. Instead of singing with me, he dissects my singing. The opposite happens when the propagandist coldbloodedly instills me with an opinion he has calculated to arouse my feelings. And which not even he himself thinks to be true. His mouth, without his deeper system, speaks; my heart listens and my feelings are roused. This inadequacy is so frightening in propaganda.

However, I do wish to work up my reader's emotions as

much as his actions, his intelligence and his senses. Or I would not educate. Scientific education is nonsense. As far as it is education, all education must create life, habits, understanding, memories, plus feelings. Or it just is not education. And also, it is legitimate to arouse emotions. The only condition is that the speaker himself is moved, too. That he shares the process of the listener to a certain extent. But, in propaganda, Mr. Goebbels acts differently. Climbing down from his hustings in the Lustgarten in Berlin in 1932, he turned to his friend Goering and asked: "Did I put in too much heat? Shall I be colder next time?" This is propaganda. All attempts to define propaganda without a negative qualification of the devil in our nature is hopeless. The devil tries to get something for too cheap a price. The cool speaker cannot buy and shall not buy a deep sentiment by his standing aloof. This is diabolical. And, the lack of courage to recognize that this has been called diabolical for eighteen hundred years, the fervent endeavor, on the side of descriptive science to treat propaganda as something more new than bad, more technical than eternal, is, I think, obstructive to its understanding.

The liar is as old as truth. Men have lied ever since they spoke the truth. And lying has various forms. One is the discrepancy between the investment made by the speaker and the speculative results he thinks he may produce in the listener. There are many other forms of lying, hypocrisy, positive lying, which in themselves, also, are diseases of speech that are highly enlightening as to the character of speech. The abuse of the listener's tract by technical means that conceal the lack of animation in the speaker, must be admitted as a special sort of lying that is rampant today because of the anonymity of the modern means of communication. Propaganda is impossible where the people who speak together also live together. In a community that shares their lives for a long time, words bear fruit (which is the literal sense of propaganda), and yet, nobody in such a community would be surprised that words beget what they were created for: memories, intelligence, feeling and actions. It is only when the speaker and the listener know each other less and less that the discrepancy between the effort and

sincerity on the side of the speaker, and the reaction of the heart of the listener, becomes intolerable.

We may draw a list of corresponding features between speaker and listener:

<i>Speaker</i>	<i>Listener</i>
1. Chats	smiles
2. Talks	listens
3. Tells	remembers
4. Teaches	learns
5. Sings	feels
6. Commands	obeys
7. Argues	understands
8. Prophesies	carries out

In all social disintegration the relations between the two sides of the process are confused or interrupted.

The purpose of speech is to animate the listener to the degree to which the speaker himself is animated. When the speaker is not animated, it is diabolical to animate the listener. For the purpose of speech is to communicate cosmic processes. And the only guarantee of their correct transportation and spread is the sponsorship by the speaker, in his own service as carrier of the news. The man who expects his listener to do something must have done something about it himself. The man who asks me to feel something about it, must have felt himself that this is heart rending and moving, etc. However, the listener has a great advantage over the speaker. A man who does something because he is moved to act by another man's challenge, does that which he does in response to a human word. And this fact is an incredible relief to himself, because he follows a predecessor. Most of the honor of men is in their listening so deeply that they feel challenged to act as the speaker expected them to act. It is one of the fallacies of modern argument that free men do not want to act under another's command. This is a complete misunderstanding. Love your neighbor as yourself and God with all your power is a command that does not take away from any man's freedom. The words "Love men as God loves you," again

is the most emancipating sentence. And *it must be said*, or man is not emancipated to his own full power and liberty.

Robert Frost has a poem about two roads in the woodland, and that he took the less beaten track of the two. Superficially, that seems to hint to the fallacious modern idea: Don't let anybody tell you. The less beaten track might seem to be the track less spoken of. This is not so, for otherwise Frost would not have tried to propagate the truth that man must follow the less beaten track. By writing, printing, and publishing it, Frost propagates this real experience of man's place in the cosmos and of the action expected from man in this cosmos. We are told to take the track that is new and difficult. We are told. We listen, and perhaps, we obey. The beaten track is not the track that people talk you into; it is the track people advise you to take because it has been taken before. The beaten track is not bad because it is talked about; it is the wrong track because it has been taken before. The track is wrong because it is a repetition, not because it is recommended. And against the speakers that tell the boy: become what we all know men usually become, Frost says: the only path that *deserves to be talked about* is of your own choosing. In other words, he draws attention to the fact that recommendations and advice, and commands must point to the future, the real, unknown and unheard of future in order to be meaningful. He restores the meaning of a path into the future. He does not dissuade man from telling the young what to do.

History narrates the beaten tracks. And education must avoid the pitfall of suggesting that the track beaten now was beaten when, on it, men made history. Yet, they made history with conviction because a speaker or many speakers had been victors in their teaching the actors of the historical drama. Alexander the Great was the disciple of Aristotle, and Charles the Fifth the pupil of Erasmus of Rotterdam. And Alexander conquered, and Charles the Fifth resigned his crown, both because they had the good fortune of having listened to inspired speech. Conviction is more powerful where one man is the speaker and the other the doer. The American educator, today, is frustrated by the general idea that the speaker and the doer must be one

and the same person. How may we teach if this were so? The merciful parsimony of the mental life allows one man to condense his life into telling and another's life into carrying out. To restore the power of teaching, we today must restore the honor of listening.

May I mention a personal experience? After the German defeat in 1918 and '19, life seemed to have gone out of the corpse of the empire. Nobody obeyed. Ten million soldiers, dismissed over night, tried to act, every one of them, for himself and they tried to work out their individual salvation. Anarchy, absence of government, signified the years usually known as the years of inflation following 1918. In trying to find a star to guide me in this night, I decided to serve, to listen. That was the thing not done, not approved of in the day's tumult. And so I forbade myself to teach, and became private secretary to a man who did not look for a private secretary, but whom I asked that he should allow me to obey and to listen. I have never felt better than when I took this step from a scholar to a servant; and serving it was, very literally. So, at least I know what I am talking about.

The listener may go much further than the person who, with great effort, and toward the end of his life, knows what deserves to be said and taught. The listener abbreviates the process of formulating, and instead may do something about it. Alexander the Great is the continuation of Aristotle; he is the good conscience, the superiority incarnate, of Greek thought, over the barbarians. And the amiable and catholic nature of Erasmus, his strength and his weakness are reflected in Charles the Fifth who devoured the new book by Copernicus, saved the unity of Christendom for another thirty years, loved his Titian, and gave up his throne, disgusted with the world. What about all the Aristotelians? What about all the humanists following Erasmus? Well, they, in turn, waited for their Alexanders the Great and their Charles Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth. And some of them may have found them. The best Aristotelian, however, testifies less to the mental powers of Aristotle than Alexander the Great.

We have compared the speaker's ways and the gradation in listening. However, we have omitted one decisive situation be-

tween speaker and listener that forms the first phase in the process of listening. The process of language is fifty per cent speaking, fifty per cent listening. Language is not speech, it is a full circle from word to sound to perception to understanding to feeling, to memorizing, to acting and back to the word about the act thus achieved. And before the listener can become a listener, something has to happen to him: He must expect. To the silence that precedes the speech, we may compare the expectation that should precede the fact of listening.

Silence is loaded with significance. So is expectation. Our education is handicapped by many gadgets that more or less ignore or cut back expectations. The expectation of the listener does not depend on the speaker; he has not spoken yet. It depends on the authority ascribed to the speaker by the world, the other students, by society. The problem of authority is nearly unknown today, as separate from capacity and from administrative power. And yet the educational process of the average college student cannot be arranged satisfactorily without the solution of how to awake his expectations. He must be hungry before we can feed him. He is blasé, he is indifferent, he is skeptical, he is shy, he is outside the world of which we talk and into which we try to talk him, the world of eternal life. Authority only can make him listen; authority, it is true, is often understood to mean power. Now, parents and college deans may force a boy to take a course. They, however, rarely are his authorities for expecting great things to happen. Authority is so subtle that it enters his system much more through the grapevine telegraph of humor, of gossip, of some electricity in the atmosphere, of the remarks of an uncle, etc.

We all know that a child sometimes has authorities who have no power whatsoever, and has people in power who have no authority. The material sword of power and the spiritual sword of authority are confused today. And few people would believe me when I say that the teacher, the power of an administration and the authorities of social evaluation, all three are at work to educate a student. Because that is so, to me most discussions of college curricula sound void of authority; ignoring the tripartite influences that must collaborate, they either give

too much to the teacher, or too much to the administration, of the responsibilities implied.

We cannot educate without the authority of those who make the student expectant. And I sincerely feel that our students are lacking in expectation because no public inspiration or authority sends them to us. We have before us the task of making the students hungry before we may teach them important things. It is useless to teach those who do not expect to be transformed. They may get memorial verses, instruction, facts. And they will either forget this instruction, these facts, or they will abuse them, only because the ingredient of expectation was lacking that would have made the meal spicy. Not our jokes, not our tricks, can lighten the burden of the student when he is not eager to learn. And why should he be eager when he does not expect the extraordinary?

In fact, his modern authorities all unanimously conspire to persuade him that college education is normal, ordinary, regular, the beaten path, that he gets something for himself there. And we hasten to prove to him day after day how much he gets. The introductory courses are evidence of our feverish anxiety to show him our best things right away. They say that it is no privilege, no service to mankind, no campaign for truth. And so it degenerates like all selfishness in boredom, drudgery, and the country club. All this because we have overlooked the first stage in the listener's tract of hearing: his expectations, and his authorities that open him up to the important and extraordinary idea that he should listen for four years till he is transformed into a soldier of truth, service and peace for society. Teachers are not facilities for students so that these may work out their own salvation. Teachers are obstacles and difficulties so that the students may rise to their opportunities for the future of mankind. However, we always mention his advantages, his happiness, his future. And so the college is his last school instead of his first campaign in the spiritual militia.

Since he has been to schools all his life, the college is just the next school which is rather degrading for the college by the simple fact that he enters a new school now for the fourth time. Could we not think of giving him a recess during which

to get hungry for the college as a really new situation? Perhaps he should work one year before coming to college. Or should we make him work, during his sophomore year after having taught him the facts about listening and expecting so that he would not waste his year of practical work, as happens now? Many things could be done; but some things must be done to restore the listener's alimentary tract that leads from expectation to hearing, to listening, to feeling, to remembering, to doing, and that corresponds to the speaker's tract of silence, cry, song, story, argument and command. It is up to educators to discover a curriculum that includes the revival of expectation.

Language is the complete social relation between speakers and listeners. Education is a model and sample, a yardstick, for the innumerable situations in which the student will have to speak and to listen, to expect and to act, to be silent, and to command. When we do not give him one complete experience of the whole process from the beginning to end, when we do not tell him and show him what authority, what the power to command, what the freedom to serve, mean, then, we cannot call that which we do education. On the other hand, I do not feel that it is so difficult to coordinate a college curriculum around this rather simple aim which takes him through the mental phases that homo sapiens, man, because he speaks, has to pass through. We must take him through these phases, show their existence, their validity, their purpose for our victories over the world, and their diseases and decadence by lack of mental faith, love and hope. And I suppose that that has always been considered the core of the traditions of a Liberal Arts college, of the humanities, of science.

How to speak to our students is more difficult than we thought it was. It does not depend on us alone whether we reach his ear, heart, imagination, or not. We teachers and scientists often cannot reach their brain except when the variety of idioms of speech is around them; effectiveness of our teaching depends on the effectiveness of the poetic and artistic life, the loyalties and customs, the family and politics of the country. We do not succeed because the other, supplementary overtures are not voiced, because the alimentary tract that we call listen-

ing needs massaging, in all its phases or parts. And difference of poetry, music, prose, mathematics actually plays on the different senses that take part in the process of listening. Only that which we hear with all the powers given man have we heard at all.

We have seen that education is insistent listening and speaking, otherwise, however, just the fresh language of mankind. For this reason, the language of education must always re-unite all professional language, all idioms, into one re-unified, re-translated language of one society. No theory of education is satisfactory because theory is speaking scientifically. Education is the full process of translating, out of the confusion of tongues, into one living language.

On the other hand, education and speech and listening in general now may be placed on one even more comprehensive plane of time and space. This plane is often overlooked when we think of the active processes in speech only. We already mentioned the problem of silence, and the problem of expectation, that seemed to correspond to silence, on the side of the listener. Education takes time out of the years of a student, and puts him, for a certain time, in a classroom. Education, then, is stressing the fact that to speak and to listen is impossible without two human qualities: to take time and to give time. Grown-up people take time before they make up their minds. They are silent before they speak. They have taken years to study or to do research.

Youth has an enthusiasm of giving time, to the point of waste. However, the boy who never has wasted time, never will become a man. Some abundance of giving his time in good faith is the condition of being young. The problem is, in education, how to make the student faithful enough to give his inner time to the process, and not just his physical appearance. And how to make him realize that the teacher has taken time. The teacher seems to give; the student seems to take. This is not, as we see now, quite so simple. Content is given by the teacher. But the enthusiasm of giving time, is all on the side of the listener. The importance of a speaker will depend on how much time he has taken out of his life to have the right

to say just this and to make this statement. The importance of the listening process depends on the recklessness with which the listener forgets all time limits, all end of class schedule, and listens, completely forgetful of any end of time. In taking and giving time, speaker and listener restore the injured time and space axes of society. In this sense, speech not only sustains the time and space axes, but actually recreates them and by laying emphasis on the otherwise forgotten elements of the world, speaker and listener insist on the resurrection of the otherwise forgotten, by resuscitating life "in the wise" of the word by which all things are made.

Therefore, we are mistaken when we ascribe to the imperative the content of being "in the second person." As the six persons in search of an author in the play of Pirandello, the imperative is in search of a subject. It is said to "whom it may concern." "Go" does not contain the second person "you" or "thou"; what it does is to create this person. For this reason, the imperative is pure verb without an ending. He who does just this, becomes the second person by answering the first person. The listener, who says "I will do it," becomes the person to whom "go" was addressed. Before, the speaker took the risk to speak to me without any guarantee whether I was human or reasonable or responsive or available, or capable of doing what he asked me to do. That I will go, places me in the position of the man who feels that:

1. he should respond, it is his business to respond
2. that the thing asked is reasonable
3. that he is free to do it (has time)
4. that he is able to do it (feels like doing it)

The listener, then, makes the following statements:

1. That he is meant, he is *selected* to produce the next act in the course of events. *Res ad triarios venit.*¹ Every imperative creates a hierarchy of people by telling who is next, by throwing out a net to catch the next fish who will swim toward the goal

¹ triarii—the third and last reserve in the Roman legion. *Res ad triarios venit*—the last reserve is called up—now it is getting serious.

suggested in the command, by putting up a flagbearer, or carrier or actor for the act that is said to be required.

2. The process suggested by the act to be "reasonable," does not mean merely that it is rationally explicable, by natural laws; it means that reason requires its coming into being. It is of great importance to see the shape given to the rationality of something in the light of the imperative. It does not give up its rational character; nomothetics, ethics are not non-rational. However, the reasonable is not concerned with causality, but with filling a gap, restoring an order, adding the thing missing to a universe otherwise perturbed. The reasonable appeals to an estimate of the situation which only asks for a comparative: Is it better to do this than to leave it? In other words: true imperatives are not asking: what?, they are concerned with alternatives: whether or not. Reason, in the listener's mind, is not in the void of innumerable possibilities. Any superlative answer to the imperatival or suggestive situation is out of the question; the question centers around: is this imperative better than a world without this act?

The social division between the speaker and the listener discloses its emancipatory character for the doer. Any actor must be able to hear within himself the clear-cut alternative: shall I do this, or not do this? Anyone who thinks of three, four, or five possibilities at a time is an intellectual stutterer and stammerer. He puts many questions at the same time. And so he cannot answer. This is the disease of our time: conflicting suggestions in great number. And it is in the face of the imperative that our prismatic reason falters. And I purposely stress the fact that the respondent to an imperative uses reason only for following up his answer to a suggestion. He uses reason not to find out an abstract truth about fact. He uses reason to find out how to go about a concrete suggestion.

All planning that starts by abstract reasoning and tries to deduce special solutions from them, twists the order of reasoning. The imperative precedes the use of analysis. The logical analysis is in answer to a specific mandate. Because it is in answer not about an object, but about an act that is in search for its author, the use of reason is concrete, and boils down to the

problem: is there enough suggestiveness in the proposition to interest the listener. To be interested means to be a partner, to be in it. An imperative asks: are you willing to be a part of this dilemma? Are you willing to be subjected to this act of filling a gap, of adding something to the universe, by doing the *unum necessarium*, the thing that, as my shout or cry suggests, is most needed?

"Listen!" "Be interested" is the most general imperative, or the generality behind the imperative. And it is this command that is behind any word spoken to any one. The imperatival feature remains, then, in all other statements, of purely logical or descriptive or narratory or lyrical character, as the sedimentation of the imperatival phase of all speech. And this command "be interested" means use your reason with a regard to a concrete decision; what reason does, is not to speculate about what to do? It only helps to decide whether to do the act at hand. And reason is at a loss to do much more. All questions of fact are subquestions in order to decide over an act to be taken in the future. No "facts" make sense without this primate of the future act.

This is true with respect to the facts ascertained by the layman and the facts ascertained by science. When we take the statement: the darkened moon, these three words may be pronounced in the following ways: poetically as beginning a poem:

1. The darkened moon, and nature looks dishevelled etc. The poet is under the impression of a disturbance, a great emotional experience.

2. It may be in a story. "We all waited till, after midnight, the darkened moon became visible."

3. The statement may be in an astronomical treatise: The clear moon has a blue or greenish light. The darkened moon is from gray to brownish. The darkened moon, here is the logical antithesis to the usual moon. The darkened moon is one object of observation and analysis; the moon in general looks different.

4. Only now, do we come to the proposition underlying all the three styles mentioned: Look, the darkened moon. All statements are intonated in a different way. The darkened moon is called to our attention emphatically. The darkened moon! When

shall we look at her? It is sung rhythmically when we put her in the song of poetic emotion: short long, short long, short long, etc. It is accentuated in the logical opposition: the darkened as against the moon in general. And it is put in its proper place in the story, as determining the order of events. *Emphasis* is used for the command: look at her; *rhythm*, for the emotion; *accent*, for the factual definition; and *propriety*, for the story.

Now, the emphasis is, to some extent, kept in the three other statements because in all cases, the listener is expected to pay attention to the darkened moon as something interesting. The quality of the command Look at her, subsists when grammatical transformation stresses rhythm, accent, or propriety. When we come to the scientist's treatment of the darkened moon, we meet with certain changes. The emphasis is nearly gone out of the textbook statement because everything about the moon is gathered here. Where, then, is the emphasis in science? However, it is there. It has retreated to the general basis of all scientific data; it runs: let there be science! Without this primary imperative, not one of the statements in a cut and dry textbook makes sense. The sentence now would read: Don't be interested in the darkened moon all by herself but only as part of a system of astronomy, or a system of nature. The emphasis, in scientific description, has shifted from the new fact observed, I see the darkened moon, to the system in which this event makes sense. Instead of science, or of astronomy, we might say, the statement is harbingered in the greater imperative: let us be systematic; let us build up a system.

The event, behind the factual statement: the darkened moon looks brown, on which we insist emphatically, is the event of our being scientific, and becoming more so all the time. The imperative: let us be systematic, let us be scientific, swallows up our gullibility by the small incident of one darkness of the moon. Nevertheless, it is the imperative: Let there be science, that commands our statement. Why do we discriminate between the brown and blue moonlight, between the usual and the unusual appearance of the moon? Because in order to build our system, we take every object apart till it can be put together again systematically.

The scientific analysis of the particular is the condition of the systematic synthesis which is our imperative. In this sense, then, all statements of scientific analysis, are merely preliminary to the urge of systematization. In this sense, our accents on one and the other object are preliminary: They are, quite literally, *pro-legomena*, prefaces, *exordia*, to the thing that really is upon our shoulders. The emphasis is on the big event of the future: the system. And the indicative does not use up all our breath. We speak, in science, or in mathematics, in a formalized, less emphatic way, nearly without sounds, in signs out of which the full strength of the imperative has disappeared because this power is saved up for the day of reckoning, the day of synthesis, the day of systematic victory over our scientific task; in this case: astronomy.

Scientists have said that science predicts. This is too simple. Science could not predict without promising or predicting a system of time and space in which all facts, new and old, are contained in their proper order and sequence. The system is predicting. And the future fact predicted comes in only as a part of the system. The system is the promise of science. For the system makes the emphasis on any peculiar fact superfluous. In its place and date, the darkened moon of 1945 is not more exciting than the darkened moon of 545 B.C. Every scientific monograph is a prologomenon to the system that emancipates us from rash impressions and haphazard observations, and overwhelming appearances, by the system. The imperative of the scientific undertaking is filled with all the emphasis that the layman puts on the peculiar event.

However, the objectivity of the sciences is based on the subjectivity of scientists applying to themselves the imperative: let there be science, in the fourfold application:

I am meant
it is reasonable
it is possible
I am free to do it

Under the clause "*subjiciendum est*," it has to be undergone, the individual scientist is swayed by the same reason that the layman

uses. This reason is not rationality, but suggestiveness of his response to a reasonable command or suggestion. The suggestion: let us have a system, strikes him as reasonable. The powers by which he gives his assent are not at all rational. For the thing has to be done in the future, the science does not exist, now. And so it is irrational that he joins the army of scientists. However, this is reasonable. Because in making his choice he has to choose between the possibility of a scientific solution and the sensational unrest of daily surprises in his world. And so it is quite reasonable for society to delegate some men to try their hand in building systems.

Now these same scientists, acting irrationally and reasonably themselves, preach that we should act rationally. This is inconsistent. It cannot be done. And our world goes crazy today because scientists have forgotten the basis of their own actions: that they have chosen between two irrational possibilities of the future: system or no system, the reasonable path of the system, without guarantee of success. Their choice is ennobled only by their willingness to take the consequences, to be condemned to be scientists, and to stick it out.

This same choice is asked by any bride, any employer, any farmer, in much the same way. Nowhere have we rational choices. Starting from zero, and determining among fifty possibilities, always, are we, in the use of our reason, restricted to deciding the dual of two alternatives. Or we lose our reasoning power in the thicket of possibilities. The word rational does not include the problem of living into the future. It is applicable to objects only. Rationality is impossible when the outcome is unknown, because it lies in the future. And rationality assumes that we remain unchanged and analyze objects. The future, however, is that situation by which we undergo a change and are transformed ourselves. The entities or selves of scientific analysis are outside myself. The progressive synthesis toward the future appeals to my power to survive myself and to enter a new phase of my own life by outliving myself.

CHAPTER 7

THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO SPEAK



1. *Everybody Speaking*

IN ALL THE FOREGOING chapters, speech connected people in responsory and correspondence. It was *interlocution* between beings who by such conversations became what they were called to be. This attitude is in contradiction with the usual attitude of the modern mind who wants to master language, who learns to make speeches. Our own times treat basic English or Spanish correspondence, or scientific German as purely "useful" studies. We think of speech in the first place as the question: do I speak? and as the fact that I, I with a capital letter, speak. Generally speaking, we may express this fact by saying: the individual, every individual is interested in his power and his right to speak. Language, in other words, has its definitely individualistic aspect.

From the individual's point of view language serves me and my purposes. In speaking without accent, a foreigner may gain access to a new community. "I speak," and "let me speak lest I choke," is everybody's experience at times. *What, then, does speech add to the individual?* What happens to me when I speak? This is the question of this chapter.

Our individualistic era may have to make its peace with the fact that all speech is One from Adam to the End of the World, that the spirit is One or not at all. But the world will never concede this point unless first every individual can feel sure of his own free speech within such terrifying unity. Hence

in this chapter we shall look at speech as man's *personal right*. And we shall worm our way into the heart of speech from a purely individualistic angle. By doing so, we may hope to discover some final terms for grammar because that which applies to every human being, would have the claim to be called valid.

In linguistics, it is not enough to have a theory about language. Since I at this moment am talking of talk and speaking of speech and writing of writing, my situation is much more desperate than when a zoologist thinks of toads. The toad does not listen in to the zoologist's lecture on the toad. But I myself as a speaking individual do indeed listen in to my own remarks on speech. The man who wants to speak and to be free to speak, within myself, listens in to my tirades on the meaning of speech. If the scientific Ego proposes any learned terms, my low brow "Me," must be able to feel secure, under such terms. The final terms for grammar can only be found if every human being under the sun can be made to realize that he himself is protected by these terms in his own birthright to speak freely.

But is man not real enough without speech? Does speech add to him anything except power? Is speech more than a tool? Man eats, sleeps, digests, mates, works, is young and gets old biologically. Is this not real enough? Why is it not real enough? Everybody knows that it is not enough. But when he is asked why, he often falters and doubts.

There is one simple reason for the answer: No. Biology is not enough because we crave for self-realization. And we do not call the larva of an insect the real animal. Neither do we give this name to the butterfly. Real is the insect in all its phases of life *together*. The *togetherness* of all the moments of life is the only real reality. Hence, the male in us is not the real man, neither is the female. The hoary head is not the whole human being; neither is the baby. "Real" always is more comprehensive than any biological segment. But "real" we crave to become. Everybody is called forth to realize himself and everybody lays claim to this. This fact that there is a contradiction between our physical equipment as merely male or female—male and female he made them—and our ambition to be human, rarely is exploited in any philosophy of language. And yet, this contradiction is at the bottom of politics and religion.

Of this, we have a great example in the last century. Karl Marx insisted that an iron law held labor down. Their wages could never go beyond bare sustenance of their own body plus "propagation of their kind." This formula conveyed something utterly insulting. To speak of human beings as nothing but "body plus propagation," denies them something though at first sight it may not be too clear what this something is. Quite logically, religion which so far had taken care of male and female for transforming them into humans, was declared, by the heralds of the iron law, opium for the people. By this declaration, the worker was degraded, in this existing world, to a member of the physical species.

The physical species does not know of any common denominator between male and female except by mating. Male and female need each other. *But in which sense are they the same?* Male and male, female and female do not need each other physically. But we can identify them. This is not at all clear of the two sexes, from a biological point of view.

The equality of men and women can never be demonstrated on the level of biology. It is a political, a religious, a literary, a language question. It is a demand which cannot depend on the external fate of being born with one or the other sex organs.

Neither worker nor woman can be satisfied with their dependence on the world of external circumstances, on material power as in the case of labor, on physical organicity as in the case of women. Innumerable people would be or are in danger of remaining incomplete and unreal if they should depend on marriage, conception, motherhood, on the one hand, or on material wealth, on the other. Physiology and material goods are important. But they cannot determine our fate ultimately and completely.

As this is our danger, the individual tries to belong to reality not by sex and labor alone. Greater vigor, greater intimacy, are needed for his integration. When a group of educators got together, they tried to define citizenship. One man said under general approval: a citizen is a man who is profitably employed. This was before our citizen-soldiers were drafted. The definition showed that even our educators were pure-blooded Marxians who saw nothing but labor in the average man. A citizen, of course, is not a man who is profitably employed, but *he is a citizen who*

potentially could found a city himself. And exactly this power comes to man by speech.

To a "city," we must belong, in order to be human. Daily and hourly we want to be sure of this belonging; and truly, it will have to be the plenitude of reality, the inner world of the human mind, and the external of the cosmos. Man demands freedom in all directions of self-realization. The ancient origin of all men and the newest politics of his own days, to participate in all these treasures of reality is felt by anybody to be a part of his bill of rights. And there comes the equality of all men in speech, an equality which is bestowed by any community on every one of its members.

In speaking, each member appropriates everything which has ever been uttered within the orbit of this group, and he learns it in play-like fashion. He is reminded of all the memories ever precipitated or crystallized, and thus becomes the carrier of the memories of his nation or tribe. As such a membrane, the blind singer is enabled to articulate centuries of Greek life, or an invalid who long ago was compelled to stop working, even today with his trembling voice can narrate to us the tales of this mansion or that village, and make this tale grow so that it finally has become a tremendous story. Or a young student in his songs builds up courage for the great future tasks of his community. The words of his songs, as well as their rhythms, predicate and in a way predict his life, by which they shall be verified one day.

Consider the structure of any language; is it not its greatest miracle that it permits a woman to quote the words of men, or that it presents a child with the thoughts of a hoary head? The greatness of epics or fairy-tales, of folk-songs or legend, consists in the fact that anybody can appropriate them. As far as one's mother-tongue has spread out, so far anybody becomes capable, is made an expert, and acquires power from anything which anybody else sang or thought in this same tongue. One's tongue is called, not the mother's tongue, but the mother-tongue, and there is a poignant difference. Physically, we are the children of our mother. Mentally, however, our national language is our mother-tongue. It is the matrix, it is—as we may well say instead of

mother-tongue—the mother-mind, of which we are the re-minders. We recall anything that has ever been called into existence by this matrix mind. Of course, we may recall it in a silly manner; we may learn to speak or to recall by rote, but our language offers a second description of the process by which we become the heirs at law of the matrix mind. We can learn things “by heart.” When we have learned to speak by heart, the property of this language has ceased to be an external fact. Within any language, millions of acts proceed perpetually for the metabolism or the re-translation of all the words ever spoken, because it is any man’s birthright to participate by heart in this great fortune of common speech.

We call this a fortune and not a treasure. The term treasure insinuates too much the dead goods in a warehouse. Too often, education or civilization are interpreted as treasures which are stowed away somewhere in a library or a museum. However, it is our fortune, good fortune as well as misfortune, that we wind our way through the language by letting it pass into us, and then by letting it go out from us, too. Language is a means of communication; that is one of the more platitudinous definitions of speech, but it expresses a very mysterious feature of language which is mostly overlooked by those who use this definition. For it is not said that one *understands the other fellow* when he speaks; the only thing we may assert is that one man *understands that which the other man says*.

Since I may not be able to say that by which I would make myself understood—who can?—the first thing that we know of any sentence is that the language can be understood by A as well as by B, the two interlocutors. When I see two people speak together on the street, I may very well doubt if they really intend to understand each other. It would be superficial to impose on them an intention which they didn’t have at all. They wish to talk *to* each other, neither more nor less. Only in rare moments do we use language for the purpose of recognizing each other in the spirit and in truth, and in unconditional surrender.

Any reasonable person knows that we do not recognize each other in the spirit unless love or hatred, solidarity or enmity,

open our eyes to our vis-à-vis. When we would thus penetrate into each other, we always would experience a sublime moment in which new language was born, and new human words formed. However, when those real powers of love or hostility are not entering my heart, I may instead exploit the matrix tongue as far as it goes, and it is in those very periods when my heart is relaxing or vacant that language and speech are of infinite value to me. It is true, they do not now reveal me, because I am lying fallow, but they do reveal to my interlocutor our common background of assonances and associations.

Conversation produces agreement, and this in itself is agreeable and important, and does not connect me with the other fellow at the core, but, so to speak, at our common roots. For this reason it is no small thing to be able to speak to each other, although it may be for both partners nothing but the indifferent talk about the weather. We cannot be personal all the time, because we cannot love or hate all the time. What, then, is keeping us alive in these long intermediary periods? It is the common will which we recall as our prepersonal and common heritage whenever we converse in the ready phrases of our mother-tongue. Certainly the mouth shall say that of which the heart is full. This however does not mean that our heart can be full all the time. Then we say to each other: "Isn't that marvelous!"—"How wonderful!"—"Ripping!" or some other slang expression, and we still shall be mouthpieces of truth because we let the old mother-tongue speak through us. Instead of our own heart, *hearts that have spoken before us are allowed to speak through us.*

When we do not sing a new song, we do quote an old song. To speak means either to create or to quote, and in as far as we conserve the existing language we are respected as an immense network through which all utterances of the common will flow. Like the leaves of an elm-tree, the assonances of a language whisper and hum. All these voices and sounds together articulate the implicit will of the community. Why are all thinkers in search of a system? If a man could voice the whole of language that would be the most faithful system, since, on the one hand, it would contain the greatest variety, and on the other, it would show the greatest unanimity. To speak means to be-

lieve in unanimity. This can be demonstrated by the strange fact that any language pretends to be complete. Whether the language has eight hundred words or eighty thousand, its speakers always naively assume that they can express themselves in this language on anything they want.

2. *English Spoken*

There is, nevertheless, a "but" to all this. We have many different languages. Languages conflict with great violence. If sex produces a fission in our species, the fission which rends man into linguistic groups would seem to outdo the cleavage of sex by far. Are there not hundreds of languages? Granted that any man is fortunate enough to appropriate the treasures of his one mother-tongue, it remains true that this is one language only; so, is he not shorn of his real inheritance?

It would be poor comfort to say that the individual never comes to the end of his own language, after all, for if we might admit this for the individual the people as a whole still would be deprived and robbed; and in fact, the peoples of this earth have rebelled against this isolation.

Two thousand years ago, an utterly new phase of speech was entered upon. Never since has any speaking group of the human race based its existence on the fact of one individual language. A new principle was proclaimed: all languages may be translated into each other. Practically speaking, all languages rest today on the common basis of translations of the Bible. The Bible has furnished the core of the linguistic treasures and concepts of any nation, and around this core, any number of new international languages cluster. They are the professional languages of all the arts and sciences. Today, the fermentation of all native languages through this central leaven of the universal Bible and the universal science has transformed the languages. They no longer can be considered as separate individualities. They are becoming varieties and idioms and seceders.

Just the same, seceders may build hard and fast walls between each other, and these prison walls of language occur time and again whether between nations or between professions. Hence it

is an important problem how to diagnose this fact. We shall not understand the life of language unless we know that it may die and does die, and kills the spirit of its speakers eventually. Let us try, then, to diagnose the conditions under which speech is alive.

It is the essence of language to be momentary, fluid, fleeting. Hence a word has its full truth only among the people between whom it spouts, and at the moment at which this happens. This explains the authority of the words of Jesus which today are quoted in baptism, at confirmation, at communion supper, etc. He did not intend to say anything beyond the complete truth of the moment in which they become articulate. They were words *rising to the occasion*, and for this reason, they were sincere and fluid. This fluidity, however, should not be mistaken for making these words purely accidental. The contrary is true: *a word which fully rises to a specific occasion* transforms the situation from an accident into a meaningful historical event. Jesus made no "occasional" remarks, but he spoke those words by which the event came to life fully, and it is in this life-giving capacity that we still remember them. That is to say, the more innocently an utterance is fully dedicated to this occasion and no other, the more original and eternal it may turn out to have been. Compared with the deep truth which is possible at one moment between two people, all other truth is more remote and less genuine, albeit a mathematical proposition, a law, or a book.

Truth cannot be tin-canned and sent around in boxes. Schools cannot teach the very best, because they usually are so far away from the best moment for saying the best. *The person for whom the word spoken is expected to have validity must participate heart and soul* in the event of which the word speaks. It is true that later on the important word may be communicated to those who were not present; I may call somebody in and say, "Now listen, although you really are too late." This newcomer or last-comer to the queue can hardly see what is happening or has happened at the head of the queue. For this reason the words in proceeding through the queue to him lose their meaning, which in the beginning had been obvious.

It is at this point that language becomes rigid, classic, formal, abstract, hieratic. It remains open word, yet it freezes down to

phrase. But the members of the individual group will not admit this, and because they don't admit it, the *division of speech* becomes inevitable. Because the words of these people are now spoken not because they are sincere, but because they are the proper words, the outsiders lose interest in joining this speaking unit. Who would stay away from a group which would always speak the truth in its present and fluid state? But when part of the time people stick to their words only because they are their words, and for no other reason, the foreigner is left out in the cold.

In a petrified language, in the respect before the formula which claims authority although it doesn't gush forth as in the author, we taste the decay and impotency of the reality which they tried to express. Of course, a child is willing to learn the language of the adults. In learning a language, we all give time to mere preparation. Nurseries and schools are precincts in which language is spoken in a preparatory mood. There is nothing wrong with this in itself, as long as the adults overcome the unreality of the classroom and nursery, and use language instead of formulae. However, schools, at times, seem to get the upper hand, to such an extent as we see it today. Modern doctrine has it that the children's language reveals to us the secrets of language, and that creative writing can be taught in classrooms. Once this is believed by a society, speech is definitely degraded into something second-rate, something childish and something unreal.

If speech were fully accessible to mere students, the reality of the adults would have to consist of a speechless universe. A speechless universe means madness for the individual, chaos for the things of the world, and *mere violence to keep order between man*;¹ for man will obey only those words which were not spoken in the French recitation-class or in a commercialized short story. Having lost faith in speech, he no longer may obey the order of the day which is authorized by its creative power,

¹ This indeed was the first fascist's, Sorel's, conclusion. On his death bed, in 1923, he cried: "We have destroyed the validity of all words. Nothing remains but violence"; and we took with us from Germany a last copy of a *Free Youth Journal*. In 1933, the headline read: "Words have lost their meaning."

in the necessity of the moment. This was meant, by the way, in the book of Exodus when God said to Moses: "There is no sky-world of astrology; you cannot hear what you have to do from the fourteen hundred and sixty-one year cycle of Egypt. My name is, I am here and now." This meant two things in one: first, it meant that man must rise to the occasion, now. Second, it meant that to rise does not imply a blind reaction, a hit-or-miss move. To rise to the occasion means to listen to the suffering of which speech is the healing. Reality which remains speechless must drive man crazy.

But the common will of any group tries to survive too long quite often. The language becomes ceremonious, and nothing new can really be said in such a group. We all know of official occasions where the truth can no longer be said. In our department meetings, in our churches, in our parliamentary procedures, we always seem to lag far behind reality. When a group is definitely unable to come to grips with reality in its speech, it is dead.

Even then, many groups preserve their vanity and go on in their terminology, only it is no longer a community of living speech. In Sparta, the famous city of Greece, we have a warning. It was in the time of the Christian martyrs and bishops, of Origen, the great thinker of Alexandria, of Tertullian, with his ferocious eloquence, and of the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius; but in provincial Sparta coins were minted with archaic Dorian inscriptions, and people were compelled to use a language of eight hundred years past in this little district of the Roman empire. This restoration of language no longer reflected the common will. It now was an external ceremony of aristocratic pretense. This language no longer had anything to say. The life of the times was not in it, but in the much-mixed and quite impure communal Greek, called "Koine," which was not beautiful, but powerful, not archaic, but up to the occasion.

3. *The Mental World*

Let us return now to the inner structure of language as it is placed before us in any simple sentence. At the start, we should

repeat that language is the common will which has become vocal. Hence its speaker never may be considered as a groupless individual, but as a voice of the group itself. Even the obstructionist, the rebel, who contradicts, speaks the language of his community just the same. If common will is basic to the process of speech, then the command—"Go!"—"Speak!"—"Come!"—"March!"—"Turn about!" is the root of the verb. A command presupposes a voluntary correspondence between mouth and ear. Mouth and ear—order and obedience, are like poles which form themselves inside of a group and befall its organs and members.

To command and to obey are two polarizations inside of one field of force of free will, or, as we should say, of voluntariness or spontaneity. To obey a person makes manifest the true character of human will, for an order is necessitated by some external problem. He who gives a command acts under pressure of a common want, or common duty, or common compulsion, or fear. But he who obeys simply wills, and is indifferent to the content. Hence, he who serves represents more honestly the pure attitude of the volunteer, *id est* the "willer." He is relaxed, harmonious, not tense. Any serving person, a page at court, a daughter in the house, remains more delicate. They do not need to be tough. They appear to be the embodiment of voluntariness.

A general has greater difficulty in keeping his freedom and equilibrium than his subordinates. The subordinates must allow the general to participate in their inner freedom and harmony which those who are at peace in his service may so easily preserve. They should then impart this mood to the superior. Then his order will burst forth in the most successful manner. That there should be some correspondence between order and obedience before the order is given may be tested by the intensity or loudness which distinguish an effective or an ineffective command. There are three degrees of voicing an imperative: if we just deliver it in the ordinary manner of speech, the order doesn't stand out sufficiently from the rest of the conversation. Such an order will not be taken seriously. A very loud and urgent order cannot be mistaken, but it roils the listener; although taken seriously, it makes for obstinacy.

The good imperative is voiced in a voice half-way between

these two. It is understood as an order because the ground-swell makes itself felt, and it is also carried out because it does not stir up resistance. The good officer in the army will neither chat nor shout. Because mouth and ear must exist in harmony before the order is given, it is correct to say that the whole speaks to its members. The imperative does not cleave the group since the man who gives the order does not step forward with any will of his own; he voices the common will, and he who obeys also is not isolated from the rest of the group; he does the same thing which is voiced by the other. The poor man who must say "go" relies on my going because he cannot go himself. If he could go himself, he might change the world. When he says, "Go," and I do go, we together change the world. Orders transform the world. Hence, the future is reached by imperatives, and only to the imperative shall the world ever surrender.

There is a different burden on a sentence when an inner process and an external situation are distinguished. When I say to somebody, "lift the stone," your will and mine constitute one common will, which is polarized into my mouth and your ear. To this community, an object is added which the common will does not encompass since it lies outside the unanimity of the group. That which is not contained by the communion of which we are the voices we call an object. All objects rate as an external world of resistance. *The object resists.* Resistance of objects, and the insistence of subjects who unite in a common will constitute two different worlds. When we speak with objectivity, we know that we are not among ourselves; it means that we are in the world, and have to expect resistance and difficulties.

Because modern man is so terribly world-conscious he has reduced his language to the style of objectivity. When a mother speaks to her child, or an officer to his men, they forget the whole danger of resistance by an external world. They rely on spiritual unity; the only merit of the commanding officer is that he knows the secrets of insistence. If the soldier is made to feel that this time his officer means business, victory is certain. Inside of the group, then, insistence is a speaker's achievement. But the opposite is true of the man in the world. When we consider our vis-a-vis as not related to us in fellowship but as having

other interests, then he becomes a thing of nature, and things of nature are tough nuts; they are hard and impenetrable. Towards an object, only one style of speech is open to us. We may take its measure, its statistics, its I.Q., its weight; we may take "into account," as we say so significantly, its tendencies and prejudices; and after we have accounted for all its objective qualities, and observed the trends, we may interpret, and estimate, and influence it, or we may buy it, or order it to be produced by scientific methods. For the objective world, measure and figure, calculating and accounting, ratio and mathematics are the right terms in which I speak of the objects of our actions so that we might break their resistance.

Another terminology comes to the fore when we tell a story. The story moves us out of the present into the by-gone past. In the inner world of insistence, and in the objective world of resistance the will to live is quite obvious. But our first assumption about the past is that it is dead; hence, when I enter the museum of the past with the lamp of historical enlightenment, and when I tell a story or write history I must bestow on the past the element of a living will. To speak of the past means to convince myself and my listeners that real life has gone on in the past; that it isn't all dead stuff of taxidermists. All histories speak first of all of great names. What's in a name? The history of the human race is in names. Our objective friends do not understand that, since they move in a world of objects which can be counted and numbered. They reduce the great names of the past to dust and ashes. This they call scientific history. But the whole meaning of history is in the proof that there have lived people before the present time whom it is important to meet.

History gives renown to the past. Any historical sentence in language has a nominative with it; a named carrier of the deed. Please compare these two sentences: "Lift the stone!" and "Caesar crossed the Rubicon." In "Lift the stone," the person to whom the sentence is addressed and the person who gives the order—both are in the dark. Out of the night of unconsciousness, two concepts emerge: the act of lifting, and the object, stone. This act of lifting obsesses the speaker, but since he

is incapable, for some reason or other, of lifting the stone himself, it is his obsession to transplant his own possessedness with the act and place it squarely upon the man to whom he gives this order. The imperative, "Lift the stone," is a success as soon as the stone is lifted.

And now turn to the sentence, "Caesar crossed the Rubicon." The whole action happened long ago. Neither the speaker nor the listener, therefore, can do anything about it. It's all over. Nothing about this act seems to matter; so the past would remain dead and uninteresting unless somebody crossed the Rubicon for whom we cannot help caring. If Smith had crossed the Rubicon, we wouldn't look up for a minute. Ever since there has been a Rubicon, millions of mosquitoes, mules, and men must have crossed it. Who cares? The scene changes as soon as we can say: "Caesar did it." The nominative of the man who did it transforms the past into a part of our own life. The very word Caesar still survives in "economic czars." Caesar is our own flesh and blood. Because we live with the spirit of Caesar, as Shakespeare knew, the past becomes inspired when we can name Caesar as the author of one of the facts of this past. Facts are objective and dead. Acts are historical, and thereby restored to life in the name of the author of every sentence we report. Acts differ from facts as actions of persons of renown, of tradition.

Without the persons of tradition, history would move in such sentences as: "The Rubicon was crossed," "Rome fell," "San Francisco was rebuilt after the fire." That would be history without a will. All history, then, moves between passive and nominative. When we try to collect mere data, we may concentrate on the passive: Constantinople was conquered in 1453; but then we add: by the Turks. In this sentence, "Constantinople was conquered by the Turks," the Turks are the real agent, the subject of the sentence. The old grammarians, therefore, called the expression "by the Turks" the ruling subject of meaning, despite the grammatical form of the sentence. The Turks are the reagents of the action. In Greek the expression used is of some interest. They did not say that Constantinople was conquered by the Turks; they would say that it was conquered "under" the Turks. Thereby it becomes quite clear that the passive process

which passes over Constantinople comes under the heading of the Turks; under their name this conquest of Constantinople is effected.

Something happens in the past, then, as though it were floating down the river of time. This is our historical date, but the name which covers the date, and makes it into an event of human history, towers above the dark waters of time as a bridge of tradition. Caesar, or the Turks, or Christopher Columbus, attract all the light of the event upon themselves. America was discovered in 1492 by Christopher Columbus. That America was discovered is purely descriptive, but that Christopher Columbus discovered it makes it into an event that is still important for us. For this reason the discovery of America comes to life in the Knights of Columbus. There could hardly be Knights of the Discovery of America.

So we may repeat, What's in a name? And now we may answer once more, we appropriate the past by the names of its authors, and in this act the data of history—1066 and all that—become events which deserve to be told. The deaf and dumb past enters our own conversation in the form of a narrative whenever the purely *factual* sentence of the book-shelf: "America was discovered" can be restored to its actual human powers—"Christopher Columbus discovered America." In other words, a name has to be added to the purely descriptive material before prehistory becomes history. Innumerable stories wait to be told because they wait for their author. There always is historical source material. We know that the wheel was invented, and fire was invented, and the harness of horses was invented; but all this is incomplete history. The finishing touch is added only when we can relive the story of Prometheus; that is, the story of the man who dared to do it, who risked his life, who made a reputation in the process. So we may say that the style of history always alternates between collecting new facts and narrating the deeds of great men. Adam, Noah, Abraham tell us something about history. Flints, beads, bones, tell us something about prehistory.

The passive and the nominative are the forms into which speech turns with regard to the past. You live the past by speaking of great names. We can hardly be surprised if we now turn

to the world of feeling inside us; and clearly, then, poetry, even lyrical poetry, lives by point and counterpoint, by theme and inversion of the theme, by two themes competing and fighting each other by contrast of two waves of sound expressing this suspense and the wavering of the soul. The soul experiences this torn-to-pieces-hood as divine but at the same time as hell. We are rich in this welter of feelings, and at the same time we are in anguish. Therefore, the subject of the musical experience of this inner man is nameless in the deepest sense of the word. He hasn't yet made a name for himself because of the overwhelming feeling. Being not too sure of himself, he doesn't know whether he will be called hero or coward in the end. He is in the state which quite literally could be called the pre-nominal state, the state in which we still wait for our real name in history and our objective place in the world of things.

This is very clear in the words used in lyrical poetry with the greatest effect. It is effective to use pronouns: you, I, mine, our, we, thou, are the true forms of the realm of emotions and mixed motives; and the grammatical forms attached to these pronouns are subjunctive and optative, which render the fact that these processes are mere assumptions of the inner experience; they have not yet materialized. In the sentence "Lest thou misunderstand me," the whole process remains within me; so much is it suspended that it is not allowed to come true. The same English language which has nearly discarded the optatives and subjunctives still clings to the sentences with "lest" which express negative desires. To admit negative desires in preference to positive desires is a typical Anglo-Saxon affectation.

In song, the power of language rests most within itself. While all language presupposes an inner room or space in which it can surge and connect the interlocutors, *id est* the group, singing penetrates, so to speak, to the very depth of this process. All speech hails from unity. Nobody could speak if he didn't believe in unity, and unity does not exist in the outer world. When we sing, we feel ourselves inside of a whole; we feel at home in the world. To sing, then, is to speak "in the second power." It is pure expression in the present, dropping the relation of speech to future or past or outer world. The singer is enchanted

by the chant, as our language with admirable precision reveals when it connects these two words. Incantation, for the singer as well as for the enchanted listener, and ultimately for the whole universe which is spellbound by these sounds, expresses the state of complete spontaneity. To sing means to volunteer, to exhibit one's free-will. One cannot sing well without eagerness.

Now, to be eager means to feel free. Eagerness is freedom experienced, or voluntariness. All the discussions of philosophers on free-will and liberty of choice investigate the question objectively on the outer front. But on the outer front, man's will is resisted by myriads of objective obstacles. Looked upon objectively, man's own self is the greatest enemy of man's free-will. How could it be otherwise? Once we put the glasses of outwardizing upon our nose, the universe only shows its objects and divisions. We "outwardize" anything at which we stare as we have to detach it *from* us.

Hence, to investigate free-will objectively must always lead to a demonstration of the same will's dividedness. Objectively, we are all torn to pieces. Why should the five fingers of my hand be considered one? Looked upon objectively and anatomically, they are five. There is no end to divisions in the outer world. But speak or sing, and millions are embraced, as in the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven. When the outer world or the respectable world of history, or the martial world of mortal danger repress our language into our own inner self, when we have to sing inside ourselves, so to speak, because external barriers silence us, then speech will go underground. Speech might be prevented, obstructed, forbidden, but to think, to speak within ourselves is unconditional freedom. Thoughts pay no custom duties, and they pass all frontiers. At the speed of lightning does thought travel.

Song did stand for us as the extreme case of voluntariness within a harmonized world, and now we added that thought exhibited this same quality of unconditional freedom. At this point we meet the ivory tower of the thinker. Does he talk to himself? The thinkers of all times solemnly declared that the underground river of thought was of a different quality from the open word. They said that words obviously belong to the social

community, but to think was a man's property. It seemed to be the product of his mind. The reason for this declaration of independence of the thinker is found in his experience of freedom. Doesn't he think what he pleases? But this arch heresy of the last century which separates thought from speech ignores three facts:

First, a man who thinks without opening himself to the truth, dreams. In other words, truth goes beyond my mind or your mind. We remain subjected to truth when we think, and truth is that of our thought which is still valid when it is communicated to others. Our thought, then, is validated or invalidated by our community. Madmen think alone. Sanity depends on communion. We conclude, then, that truth cannot be owned by us, but that it is imparted to us. If this is so, it is quite misleading to say that we think. It would be correct to say that we open ourselves to the truth.

Second: All wisdom of the ages and all linguistics of rank insist that the languages are not means by which we represent the truth after it is perceived, but that languages are means to discover hitherto ignored truth. The relation between thought and speech, then, is inter-action. We converse with ourselves in thought. For this reason, something may seem to us deep wisdom in a dream but when we awake and reply to it, it will have to stand the test of a real conversation. We have an idea, and we meditate, or mull it over. In this process, the speaking and hearing of two people is lodged within one. Children express themselves naively because they live in unity with the universe. Adults think twice.

What does this mean? Before we say anything to anyone else, we try to listen to it ourselves first. We anticipate the critical role of the listener. The idea is the creative act, the cogitation is the pondering, doubting, conceding reflection. When a thinker is able to persuade himself of the truth of an idea, then he is his first vanquished. He celebrates the first victory of his persuasiveness inside himself. To think is to say "Thank you" to one's own idea which has overcome one's own resistance and criticism. Objectively, we all resist the truth as long as we can, because truth is perfectly ruthless against our own self-interest. Hence it is not true to assume that the thinker will be too readily intoxicated by his

own idea. Any thinker of quality is amazed by the poor level of the criticisms raised against his theses, for he knows many more dangerous objections to his own ideas: he had to answer all of them himself before he became convinced. The soliloquy of the thinker reflects the unceasing conversation which pulses through all the members of the linguistic unit. *The mental world, then, is the duplication of the speaking world by unifying the speaker and the listener within one mind.*

Third: These two facts we could discover by careful analysis of the processes of speech and thought. A third point, however, leads us further than the commonplace; it is something essentially new which now has to be stated about language. Most men think that a dictionary contains the words of a language, and that a system of philosophy contains the thoughts of a man. If this were all, words would constitute the world of speech and thoughts would constitute the mental world. The connection between the two worlds would remain a great mystery, or perhaps not even a mystery. Modern thinkers treat the two worlds simply as two. The latest books on the philosophy of language never mention the fact that the authors themselves speak to us in their books. They do not see any vicious circle in the fact that they think and erect into a system their thoughts about the words in which they tell us their system. If this is madness, there is method in it. By restricting the language to the dictionary of words, the reason why we think becomes indeed inexplicable. To think seems simply to be endowed with an insatiable curiosity. Why we should respect each other's curiosity I do not know. I usually kill flies when they become too curious.

4. *The Healthy Person*

Fortunately the relation between thought and speech can be clarified on a higher plane. We already know that to speak does not mean only to speak of something in so many words, but to speak to somebody in the most effective name. If I wish to reach a person I must address him and I must use the right name for him and for the authority which I claim when I give him orders.

In the name of the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the United States my sergeant can march me a hundred times around the barracks, even though he may disguise the president's authority by shouting: "In the devil's name!" Everybody falls under the spell of names while he learns to speak. The unbelievable omission of Victorian thinking was that they thought of men as individuals who "later" on formed a society. Such societies do not exist, because we first of all are named and spoken to in the name of great powers.

I grew up in a family, with a mother and a father. Both these people never appeared to me as individuals; they were pillars of a roof over my head. They were the two persons of the great power of parenthood. Obviously, the father was not the mother and the mother was not the father, but neither were they separate. Instead they were the two bridge-heads of that great bridge under which I stood and which prevented the sky of panic terror from falling on my head. It was a social building much more solid than the George Washington bridge, in whose name they claimed for some inexplicable reason obedience and respect. The woman that had the right to call me by my name never was anything but my mother, and I believed that I had the name under which she addressed me. A woman whom I meet by accident would never have the authority to call me for my breakfast. My mother had.

There is a point, of course, at which names cease to have power over me; I rebel against their tyranny. I do not allow my mother to choose my wife; and my father may not choose my profession. I may scorn my mother's order to marry the perfect girl; yet if I wish to acquire the power to make the choice in my own name, I cannot marry for mere spite. Marriages built on *dépit d'amour* strike me as horrid. The positive act of choosing appeals to a man's freedom, or love, or responsibility, or right, or destiny, and we need to be fortified by these positive names. In the long run, the tyranny of names is not evaded unless we introduce the right names and put them in their right place. The world must become convinced of our power over names by accepting our terms. This means that we think with a purpose, and the purpose is to introduce the right names into society. *To think means to introduce better names.*

We think because we ourselves wish to speak with authority, just as we were spoken to before. In the name of that power which we have come to know through names, we wish to tell our own tale. We wish to speak up and explain how we disestablished and had to disestablish certain names and put others in their places. To think, then, is the stage in which old names are transformed into new, and in which all words except one become mere words for the time being.

It is only in one single name that the thinker in us remains dependent on the community out of which he withdraws when he begins to talk to himself. And we shall have to say a word about this one cable by which his own power plant still shows its character as a subsidiary to the main power line of speech through the whole race.

But first let us survey the realm acquired by the individual who—in our days—is expected to think for himself. What a change from the days when a slave was not even expected to speak but remained mute, a mere receiver of orders given. Now, the individual depicts, in himself, the whole City of Men, in all its ranks and classes. In the liberty to speak to ourselves, we are the real kings of the world. Thinking compares to speaking as flying to walking. The pedestrian beats the hard earth with each step and the ground reacts to each step. In the air, this perpetual interaction is avoided. Similarly, the thinker does not have to wait for the answer, the approval, the patience, the good will, of anybody else. The earth which in conversation is represented by the interlocutor, the audience, recedes while we think. While we really speak to others, we also have to listen. But while we think, nobody but we ourselves can contradict us or order us around or curse us.

This freedom of thought is very wonderful. How many boring moments, embarrassing situations, impossible people, have we survived thanks to our power and right of having our own ideas on the subject and of keeping our mouth shut but our mind wide awake.

Speech puts man on a throne. For any man who has something to say, thereby acquires an office in society. And thrones are seats of office. Thought gives man a kingdom. Is this kingdom a consti-

tutional state? Is the freedom to think the anarchy of despotism, or the government of due process of law?

We now shall round out the freedom of the individual to master speech and thought, by considering the constitution, the law of freedom.

A friend of ours had a charwoman working for her and, since they lived in a lonely valley, she knew that she could not find another woman if this one left her. The charwoman was dishonest. She was arrogant. One valuable after another disappeared. One day, our friend coming home, found the charwoman in her own dress, giving a party to her friends. Nothing was said.

Obviously, our friend became an accomplice to the thefts committed. The laws do not exist unless they are understood as orders telling you and me what to do and what to say. A law does not only say: Do not kill. It also says that you and I are obliged to speak up when murder is committed. Either we have to denounce it to the police or we have to tell the criminal. *But speak we must.* The tragedy of modern political science is that this greatest implication of all laws is not stressed. The law not only makes us act and behave. The law is helpless if it does not make us *tell the truth*. Part of the truth, in this case, was that the charwoman was a thief.

It did not help our friend much that she decided to say nothing. Things got worse and worse. And finally, she could not dare to have guests because they would be robbed, too. After some such unpleasant reclamations, our weak friend moved to the city and lost her home. "How many a time," she told me, "have I cursed myself for my initial weakness. I should have spoken up at the very first occasion; and I am sure Alice expected just this and she despised me ever since for not having reprimanded her. And her later frauds were a kind of contempt of court provoked by my failing her by not resisting her."

He who may speak, at times must speak. He who sits on a throne, at times must make speeches from his throne. And he who owns a kingdom as a sovereign, must govern this kingdom. As we must speak up, when a law is broken, so we must keep order among our thoughts. We must say to some destructive thoughts: away with you to the abyss of forgetting. We must say

to ourselves: Shut up. Kings are not happy people as they cannot do as they please. They have to govern, and they come to see too many things which are not as they ought to be. We have victoriously conquered the whole realm of thought to ourselves. That which former generations did not dare to think, Is there justice? Is this law right? Is my country right? Is there a God? man, for the last two thousand years, has taken upon himself to ponder freely.

We now shall give an example of this complete freedom of thought. It is two thousand years old. It is a great instruction in the constitution of a thinker's kingdom. It shows his freedom at its climax. And it is quite widely acclaimed by the modern colleagues of this example.

The Magna Charta of free thought was written by an adherent of Parmenides, of the thinker who introduced the unfortunate idea of "Being" which ever since has tortured philosophers. What do we mean when we say: a thing *is*? What is it "to be" or not to be? Well, this disciple of Parmenides radically answered this false question with the final answer:

Nothing has being. Even if something had being it would be impossible for anybody to communicate it to anybody else. The reason is that 1. the real things do not correspond to our terms and 2. nobody thinks the same thoughts as somebody else.² Gorgias the Greek nihilist, was perhaps the first who said that nothing has being, that we cannot say anything which is true and that no two people can think the same thing. But we all have inherited this his nihilism. In 1905, William James wrote an essay "How is it possible that two people can think the same thing?," as a tribute to this eternal dilemma. Where there is freedom, there always is abuse. We cannot guarantee to all people the liberty to think without allowing for libertinism. As all men may think, so all men may deny the existence of everything.

But what is wrong with Gorgias? Why is his and James' question a silly question? Or why is it unanswerable?

Here, our preparation on the preceding pages stands us in good stead. We there have learned that to speak is to participate in

² Gorgias, On Not-Being. Compare Gigon in *Hermes* 1936, 212.

and to contribute to the movements of society. To speak means to order or to obey, to listen or to reply, to sing or to meditate, to narrate or to worship great names, to analyze and to judge objects. To think means the array of all these processes of a whole community within ourselves. The philosopher is an abridgment of a whole city as a theologian might be considered the whole church contracted into one individual who tries to rethink her in all her aspects. In other words, to think means to play all the roles of society in our own imagination. To speak means to enact the various roles in society itself.

By speech, then, we contribute actual power to the life of society. By this, one thing becomes clear. He does not speak who talks *about* everything under the sun. The chatterbox does not speak in the full sense of this term because he does not speak with power. The man who says: Do this. Or: I will do it. Or: This is gone for good, says these sentences only in as far as he is going to back them up by his own actions. I say something the more, the more committed I am to this statement. He who says something and does not mean it, is a liar. He who says something and makes it clear that he does not mean it, is a chatterbox. Both types of man may say something but they do not *speak*. Speech enters the scene only when we are back of our words with our reputation, life, honor. A witness in court speaks because if he does not speak, he will have perjured himself. *Anything below this degree of veracity simply is uninteresting.* A soldier who reports "fortress taken," when it is not taken, is a fake.

Below the danger point of truth and therefore perjury, speech is not speech but gossip, chatter, prattle. As long as a man or woman says what they have experienced, have seen, wish to see done, and what they are willing to back up, they speak. This we know, since we have found that speech is not the act of abstract judgments or generalizations but is a response, an order, a correspondence, an expression, an account of our own realizations.

We may have freedom of speech but how can we "speak" where we have nothing to say? Our neighbors, our government, our family, all may agree: Let him speak. However, full fledged speech is not the making of remarks on the weather or on God and the world. A man makes a speech when he can do something

about his word. When Webster made his great speech, he went on to vote. And his speech without his vote, and without other people voting, would be a sham and a fiction. The oratory does not make the speaker. One can be a speaker without any oratory. That which is needed is a platform on which it makes sense to speak. And where does it make sense to speak? In a place and at a time when that which I have to say will have some sort of consequence.

Speech must be consecutive. It must have a place in a process or it is not speech, but an aside. And on the stage, the asides are permissible because they have some consequences with the audience. Speech cannot be understood or cannot be said to exist outside such a consecutive process of law, of voting, of experimenting, of taking notes for the exams; the grapevine telegraph, the gossip in the women's club or in the men's club, they all have consequences. In fact, the consecutive actions of these seemingly purposeless remarks is terrifying. A family may be hunted out of town by some of these casual remarks said in the right place and at the right moment. To speak, then, is to enter into a definite process of life at a certain point with a certain sentence. The sentence in which somebody is accused of breaking the law, makes no full sense unless it is said in due process of law.

Our degree of speaking power depends on our ability of making our words an actual contribution to the life of society. This does not depend on the speaker. Somebody must be willing to listen to him, too. Our friend with the dishonest charwoman did tell us. But we were the wrong address. The sentence: "She is a thief," cannot be spoken to a private person with full meaning. The sentence reaches its proper meaning only on the level of a formal accusation at police headquarters. Speech is incomplete when it is not addressed to the right address.

This is the reason why so many people cannot distinguish between real speech and pseudo speech. Pseudo speech is speech which externally says the same thing as the right speech. Only, it is not told the right person in the right place and the right time. Any truth has to be said specifically. If it is not said to this person at such and such a time, it usually does more harm than

good, or it does no good. The world is full of misplaced and mistimed speeches. It lives by the few speeches made at the right time in the right place.

The indications for right and wrong, good and evil, with regard to a sentence, are not of a logical or scientific nature. They are a problem of timing. The same sentence is right and true and good at a certain unique moment. This is true of any important sentence. Two and two equals four, this is true always. But the reason is that it isn't important. It is not a vital truth. Anybody who has crowded his friends into a car, knows that at times, seven are four. And that is important.

This case of seven in a car are four is a good instance to study the difference between 2 and 2 equals four and a vital sentence. That seven people should go into your car, is your own statement made on the spur of the moment. Your word might run: Get in all seven (although the car was made for four people). What is the difference between 2 and 2 are four, and: get in all seven in this car for four? The difference is that one is a judgment and the other an order. Now, mind you, my request is not made without judgment. I have gone over the situation; after all, it is my car, and I cannot be expected to ruin it. But I shall take a risk. And after I have passed judgment, I do say, just the same: Get in all seven. Such a request or order given, uses judgment and then moves beyond it or even against it. Imperatives are not pre-judicial or made without judgment; but they put the judgment in its place.

Imperatives appeal from mere facts to the real question what importance we should attribute to these facts. In the case of 2 and 2 are four, we do not think too much of the fact and in fact, we abolish the rule daily.

2 and 2 is a preliminary, advisory sentence. When I was a boy, my father took me through a thoroughfare on which it was written: No thoroughfare. And he said: My son, if this was not a thoroughfare, the sign, No Thoroughfare, would not be here.

For every truth, there is but one right process of law by which it ultimately can be verified. The more serious the truth, the rarer the occasion. Whether a girl might have married you, you can find out only as long as your "constellation" with her lasts. Neither before nor after, shall she or you ever know. Whether

Germany went to war with us, was decided between December 7 and December 8th, 1941. Whether you like Yellowstone Park, you cannot say before you have been there. And ten years after you have been there your censure of its beauties would not carry much weight either.

When a professor in his class demonstrates that God is a black cat chased in a dark night, he is right. In a classroom, the truth about God cannot be found. He is not an object. So he cannot be produced. He is not in space, so he cannot be contained in a container. So, how could he turn up in a classroom? Classrooms are atheistic by establishment. They are God's concession to our curiosity. "Intellectual curiosity," of which they make so much on campus, denies God per se. The rules for free thought imply that we should stress the limitations of free thinking. But God is only met when it comes to the statute of limitations. I cannot answer the sophomore who asks me: Is there a God? I can, however, help a man who is humble enough to ask: Can a man ask such a question for curiosity's sake? This man is groping for the conditions of his health, for the limitations of his kingdom of free thought.

The atheism on the academic campus is of the essence because colleges are the places for intellectual curiosity. At best, Plato can "contemplate" the Divine and have a look at the eternal ideas. On campus, man speaks of everything. Hence, God keeps quiet.

In war, it is different. The simple fact that there is a war, is a judgment over man's misgovernment of his own affairs which is quite evident and eloquent. In war, nobody doubts that there is a God, because there is so very little we can say. In war, we all long for peace because in peace, we are free to say something. In other words, in war, we long for our share in the divine power of speech, for our share in God and his truth.

God simply is the power to speak the truth, with such consecutive results that that which is said also happens. Everybody who speaks believes in God because he speaks. No declaration of faith is necessary. No religion. Neither God nor man need the paraphernalia of some religion to know of each other. God knows who speaks in his name and who does not. And man knows very well when he speaks in God's name and when in the devil's.

Soeren Kierkegaard is thought of as a religious genius. If so,

there is reason to believe that he was created into one by one terrible impression in his youth. His father, in a storm on a lonely heath—he was a herdsman—and in the presence of Soeren, seems to have cursed God in desperation. This moment made epoch in the son's life. He realized then and there that the father was in deadly earnest to do as much as was in his power to deny God. Kierkegaard became one of the few people who knew when and where we really are in touch with God, when not. Kierkegaard became famous as the man who distinguished between professors of the crucifixion, that is academic people who talked about God, and people who suffered from God, one way or another, by either trying to slay God or to do his will. The curse of his father was spoken in a consecutive context. And so, it was actual speech. This, probably, the father did not know. But we must not think that this matters much. For, speech is a fact regardless of what the speaker knew of what he was doing.

Now, we may come to the point which we made before: The free thinker may dispose of every sacred name, and every loyalty, during his life. He may bury his dead values as the man who leaves his parents to cleave to the wife of his choosing. But choose he must. The thinker who disposes of old names as rotten must choose. To think is an act of suspense. We can say: the ideals of my childhood were childish. We can say: patriotism is not enough. We can say: we are betrayed. But when we say so, we still say that we ourselves do not wish to be childish, do want that which will suffice, and do not intend to cheat anybody.

The pompous Mr. Gorgias in all of us who sits back in his chair one day—and this hour comes to most people—and says that nothing is, nobody knows, and nobody can speak to anybody else, appears always long after the event of our having heard and understood something very well indeed. The gorgeous thing about Gorgias is that he himself has very well understood all the arguments of everybody else, knows very well that which is and that which is not, has gotten through the chicken pox and the measles, has been sent to school, has learned how to speak, how to write and read. So, the poor man has experienced all the very truths which he now refutes so splendidly.

Philosophy and thought are just as much experimental sciences as physics. And the crucial test is that the Gorgiases even can make a name for themselves by the thesis that we cannot make ourselves understood. Every textbook on Greek philosophy gives his name and his doctrine to this day. Nihilism went under his name before Nietzsche and the Nazis carried Nihilism a considerable step further and so, there is little comfort for the Nihilist. We know him as a Nihilist. The world is so real, we are in being so much, that even the abyss opened by his negation finds a place in our positive creation. Gorgias' No reminds us of the typical bachelor who on the eve of his engagement forswears marriage forever. It is a *tonic*.

Our Yes is comprehensive, our No's are specific. Our Yes is One, our No's are many. The one Yes permeates everything, and even those things to which we affix a negation are still more supported by our yes, than destroyed by our No's. *Yes and No are not parallel or equals*, despite official logic.

The Yes is prevalent even in the mouth of the Nihilist with his innumerable No's. Poor No's, they have to be affixed to any one specific denial. It is like saying that this star is an illusion, and this, and this and so on to a million stars. The milky way has so many that he who denies the existence of a hundred million single and specific stars, still has not refuted the existence of the milky way itself.

Our No's start at the bottom, and at the atom. Our Yes starts with the whole.

Before Mr. Gorgias and Professor William James can write articles on how we can understand each other or that we do not understand each other, we all are agreed already that we can speak to each other and that we do understand each other. The Oneness of the spirit for all is the condition of all doubt, all curses, all negations and denials. The one name which thought or speech cannot abolish or deny because it proceeds itself in the power, in the light and in the name of this name, is the spirit. Everybody who has the freedom to speak and the freedom to think, enjoys these two freedoms in the name of One spirit for all mankind. Long before I can understand, myself, I know that people do understand. Before I know, I have admitted and am committed to the fact that man is allowed to know

better than I know now. I believe in the power, the truth, the light of speech and thought when I am quite hazy. Aye, the more I am in the dark, the more certain I am that I am in the dark, which is another way of saying: I know that there is light.

5. Yes

The one word which precedes all the pompous No's of my intelligence, is one emphatic Yes. This Yes no philosopher can abolish or cross out in his vocabulary. The whole bombastic article of Gorgias proves that he believed in this Yes of the Spirit. He was sure that they would understand and admire and approve of him, the people for whom he wrote his brilliant thesis.

Whoever speaks believes in the unity of mankind. And he believes that the unity of mankind is not produced by physical or political or economic or racial reasons but by our faith in speech.

He who says: No, by his very word No, affirms his Yes to the Oneness of the spirit. We all believe in the Holy Ghost and the stranger our own particular spirit of the moment, the more fervently do we believe in the Oneness above and around this our particular way of looking at the world. The individual's greatest freedom has as its corollary the spirit's greatest necessity. If all men are bound by one truth, then, my-truth makes sense. Otherwise it doesn't. If it does not, I go mad with my freedom.

It is quite unimportant whether a man knows that he believes in God or not. The power to speak is God because it unites me with all men and makes us the judges of the whole world. Back of any soldier, back of any rebel, back of any judge, back of any worker, God is the one and everlasting name who towers over the cemetery of mere words, the classrooms of our definitions, the brown studies of our reflections, as the power which urges us to speak, to be silent, to think. Unless we bow to this power, we must abuse our right to speak and to think. For either we try to use it right and to tell the truth, think the truth,

listen to the truth, or the tongue will dry up in our throat, and our ears shall hear nothing but cries of suspicion and hatred and despair. We will be cursed by posterity as the destroyer of peace, of power, of credit, of order, all things which Truth alone can establish.

The freedom of speech and the necessity of speech are one and the same thing. The belief in God and the right to speak are not two different affairs. God is not a religious proposition. Speech is not a political proposition. Thought is not a scientific proposition. Religion, politics, science, are all makeshifts, machinery, departments. Neither the real God nor the real man knows of them. The man who speaketh, speaketh only because God wants him to speak the truth. The man who listens, listens because he is eager to know the truth. And the truth gives me my place in time and space, between my sex, my background, my rank, my age, and the full powers of a human face.

All men form one Man who is conscious of himself. Gorgias, the denier, of course, is part of our consciousness. We all have him in us. All speech is conversation within mankind. All speech presumes that we all are one. The word "in-dividual" is a queer term. Literally, it means, that which cannot be divided any further, that which is indivisible. By the fact that the Word is given to us we all have become One Individual. We began by treating the individual's right to speak and to think. In the process, we discovered that there is only one in-divisible in-dividual, because we all are pledged to Oneness when we open our lips. By speaking, the individual makes himself a cell of one tremendous body politic of speech. Open your lips, and you have ceased to be yourself. You have become a member, and you occupy an office and you govern one kingdom of the whole world. And as little as Greece or Holland can be "sovereign" but is obliged to govern and to govern well, so you can keep your franchise of thought solely by governing your thoughts.

The name in which we have the right to speak to others, speak of others, and are spoken to by others, must be unshakable or we become devils. And he who thinks that he may destroy or abolish all names, even the name of truth in which he alone has his right to abolish some names, is a devil.

God cannot be proven and need not be proven. But the devil can be proven. I very well am able to see that the deniers of the one and only name eternal, make hell for all of us. The liar who reports a fact which he knows is not so, the hypocrite who pretends an emotion which he has not experienced, a commander who asks me to do what he is not willing to do himself, a scientist who plans us all except himself, they all abolish the commonwealth of speech in which I have my franchise of free speech and thought. They devalue my treasure. These devils, then, make my pursuit of happiness impossible. For my happiness depends on the existence of a universe of speech and thought to which I can contribute and in which I may share. What good does it do me that I am free to swim if all the waters in which I might swim, dry up? This is what the four types of liars do: dry up the ocean in which I feel free to swim.

In this ocean, in this One, One Individual of the Spirit, one man is as representative as another of the fullness or of the deficiency of any one cell. Everybody may say everything which can be said.

If we take this statement seriously, then it is possible to relate the individual's attitude to speech to the structure of the whole of speech and literature and science and art and poetry. For, then, in every one human being, the potential organ for law, for poetry, for literature, for science, must appear in some manner and degree.

We, therefore, now shall proceed to affix certain grammatical terms to these attitudes of all of us by which we "man" the various aspects of speech, the aspects by which we declare our relation to an event as before us or behind us, as outside of us or within us. Everybody may say: Europe will be a great civilization. Then he lets her rise from the dead. Everybody may say: The Americans are practical people. Then he looks at them from the outside. Everybody may say: I enlist. Then he becomes a part of the people.

Fantastic, that in one paragraph, we traced a man's power to put a whole continent to death or to life, his power to stare at this mighty republic from the outside, and to get inside of it, too. This witchcraft of speech and thought—where is it anchored in our organism?

6. *Some Final Terms for Grammar*

The individual, in his power to say

This has been

This shall be

I see this. This is.

I am of it. Let me be one of yours.

enters four orders of grammar. We shall call his powers to say: 'This is, his *objectivus*, and his right to claim membership of it, his *subjectivus*. These two terms are of old standing and everybody knows of object and subject though perhaps not always very clearly. But what of the judgment: Europe has been a great civilization and, we have gone through hell. This historical report we shall label the *trajectivus*, because we are ferried over a stream of time in these statements. Then it is not difficult to prescribe the proper term for the sentences of the character "Let there be light," "Come, love me." They are "*prejectivus*," the prejective throws us into a new, unprecedented situation.

The *prejectivus* corresponds to the dramatic

the *subjectivus* to the lyrical

the *trajectivus* to the epical

the *objectivus* to the "logical" manner of speaking.

So far, we built our nomenclature up from the real individual human speaker. Everybody finds these attitudes within himself. Now, we shall pass muster all linguistic phenomena in the light of this insight. The whole intellectual life of a nation must reflect this balance of power between

command	prejective
song	subjective
history	trajective
calculation	objective

And indeed, the subjunctive of grammar, in the life of a great nation, is represented by music, by poetry, by all the arts. The equations of our calculating logic are spread out in all the sciences and techniques. The trajective, linking us with the living past, lives in us through all the traditions. The prejective is represented by prophecy, ethics, programmatic movements.

The four great professions:

- lawyers (trajective)
- preachers (prejective)
- artists (subjective)
- scientists (objective)

are nothing but expanded forms of human grammar. Any society contains them, regardless of labels. They are a constant because our relations to time and space are constant. All the time and all over the place, we decide what is past and what is future, what is part of us, what is facing us.

The whole intellectual life of a nation—literature, legislation, politics, sciences, song and slang—is subject to a grammatical analysis of its health.

1. Imperative Politics
2. Subjunctive Literature
3. Recording Ceremonies, history, customs, holidays
4. Analytical Sciences, statistics

The four types of cognitive sentences: song, command, calculation, story, we may call macroscopical phenomena because they all occur in any individual's own sphere daily; they are enlarged to telescopical magnitude when we think of the whole world's literature, the whole social world of orders given and obeyed, the whole universe of scientific facts, and the whole firmament of rites and traditions. On the other hand, they become microscopically small in the particles of the isolated sentence. When the grammarian dissects a Latin phrase, he has a minute³ cellular structure under his scrutiny. But it is one and the same life of the spirit, in its phases, which we have before us in:

- | | | |
|---------------|--------------|---------------------|
| 1. verbs | imperatives | politics |
| 2. adjectives | subjunctives | literature and arts |
| 3. nouns | narratives | tradition |
| 4. numerals | indicatives | sciences |

Under number one, man is thrown forward under the impact: Establish a precedent, Act! Become the agent of something not yet in existence except through you. Under number three, the agent has disappeared behind the act, the doer behind the fact which now is transmitted and recorded for posterity. Num-

ber two describes our state in the doing, the mixed feelings, the lyrics of the situation between becoming the agent and having established the act. And four classifies that which has required, moved and gone on record, by analysis. In this way, the individual's attitudes in speaking have furnished us with one universal terminology for all processes of the spirit. The cycle of:

prejective
subjective
trajective
objective

applies to the greatest and the smallest and all the human phenomena of speech and thought.

Biography of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy was born in Berlin, Germany in 1888, the son of a Jewish banker. After receiving his doctorate in law from Berlin University, he taught law at Leipzig University from 1912 to 1914. In the First World War he was an officer at the front near Verdun.

During the war he and his friend Franz Rosenzweig conducted an extended correspondence on Judaism and Christianity. Rosenstock-Huessy, who had embraced Christianity as a young man, had almost convinced his friend Rosenzweig to do the same. Their letters, first published in the 1920's, have been widely commented on as a classic contemporary confrontation between Christian and Jew.

In 1914 he married Margrit Huessy and added his wife's surname to his own in the Swiss custom. After the war he did not return to the university but instead went to work for Daimler-Benz at their Stuttgart automobile manufacturing plant. There, in 1919-21, he founded and edited the first factory magazine in Germany. In 1921-22 he founded and headed The Academy of Labor at Frankfurt, a pioneering effort in adult education. Later, in 1929, he was elected chairman of the World Association for Adult Education.

He returned to university life in 1923, as professor of law at the University of Breslau. In 1924 he published *Angewandte Seelenkunde* (*An Applied Science of the Soul*), his first formulation of a proposed method for the social sciences, a method based on speech. This was followed in 1925 by an elaborated formulation of the method in a book entitled *Soziologie*. When his Roman Catholic friend, Joseph Wittig, was excommunicated, he wrote with him a book on church history, *Das Alter der Kirche* (*The Age of the Church*), and published it in 1928.

While at Breslau, in 1928-30, he organized voluntary work

service camps which brought together workers, farmers and students in work together on the land. This and his subsequent similar activities in the United States have been described as forerunners of the Peace Corps.

In 1931 he published a major historical work, *Die Europäischen Revolutionen* (*The European Revolutions*), a book which established his reputation in Europe. A completely rewritten version of this book was published in the United States in 1938 as *Out of Revolution*.

Immediately after Hitler came to power in 1933, he voluntarily left Germany and went to the United States. After teaching two years at Harvard, he joined the faculty at Dartmouth College where he taught as professor of social philosophy until his retirement in 1957.

With the backing of President Franklin Roosevelt, in 1940 he organized an experimental camp within the Civilian Conservation Corps. Camp William James in Tunbridge, Vermont was experimental in that it was to train leaders for a possible development of the CCC into a service that would accept volunteers from all walks of life, not simply young men in need of work.

He continued to write throughout the period 1940 to 1960, publishing *The Christian Future* in 1945 and a much expanded *Soziologie* in two volumes in 1956-8. The second volume is a universal history of man interpreted in the spirit of the new method which is the subject of volume one. In 1963 he published a major work on speech and the relation of speech to his method, *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts* (*The Speech of Mankind*).

During the 1950's he lectured at the German universities of Göttingen, Berlin and Münster. In the 1960's he lectured in the United States at Columbia and California.

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NOTE: In addition to the above, there are currently available a number of booklets and tape recordings by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. A supplementary listing of these works may be obtained from Argo Books.

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