Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy on the Structure of Significant Lives

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Professor Rosenstock-Huessy was intrigued all of his life by biography, the intricate story and struggle of exemplary lives, and he commented on the subject extensively. He approved warmly of an actual course on biography taught at Dartmouth College by Prof. Arthur Wilson, the author of a prize-winning biography of the *philosophe* Diderot. Such a course was a rarity in higher education anywhere, but Rosenstock would have been happy to see the example spread beyond Hanover, New Hampshire.

In the Preface to his *The Christian Future, or The Modern Mind Outrun* (1946), Professor Huessy called attention to Ambrose Vernon as one who "twice has founded a college department for biography—at Carleton and at Dartmouth." Vernon, according to Rosenstock, believed that "the life of Christ . . . would meet the students through the lives of other great souls in history, if the spiritual core of biography could be opened up to them as a lawful order," that is, as an understandable pattern yet dependent upon the unpredictable movements of the spirit.

I don't know what Prof. Arthur Wilson taught in his class on biography, but I am guessing, despite Rosenstock-Huessy's approval, that Wilson was primarily interested in the literary or historical art of writing biography, the methodology and the problems faced by the biographer, and not so much in the "spiritual core" of the life portrayed. Such an approach would not have been of much interest to Rosenstock. As was typical of him, he looked for both universal and distinctive configurations in significant lives, particularly the turning points, or "conversions," although not in the usual religious sense.

He pointed to the meaningful suffering that may beset a person living in advance of his time, and he examined the matter of timing itself, the study of what he called the "too early and the too late." At any given moment, all those alive are not necessarily contemporaries, he stressed. Some will be "distemporaries" (in his coinage), who are too far behind or too far ahead to be socially or intellectually accepted and thus can find no solace or sanity in community.

Rosenstock, in fact, urged the serious study of the "science of timing," although what that might mean in practice is not clear to me. Whatever the case, he had no doubt that Shakespeare had it right: "ripeness is all" as is said in *King Lear*. It is the right action or the right word at the right moment that rule the tides of history. If the timing is wrong, even the truest words will fall on deaf ears. **(1)**

As a historian facing the perennial question of whether it is so-called impersonal economic or social forces that determine the course of events or particular men in particular circumstances who principally effect change, Rosenstock would certainly favor the latter, if for no other reason than the pragmatic: such a belief encourages individuals to make sacrifices and take risks for human betterment. Is God's will evident in historical developments? We can only guess at that, and pray, but if it *is* the determining factor, it is manifested solely in courageous, groundbreaking, individual *human* action—the "human spirit," as we say, triumphing over the forces of darkness. For Rosenstock, "human spirit" is simply the modern euphemism for the old fashioned "holy spirit" of religious discourse. But despite his recurrence to the traditional vocabulary of Christian doctrine, do not look for any beyond-this-earth, magical interventions in Rosenstock-Huessy. God exists in time, not in space, and it is He who calls *us* into a better future. But the voice we hear is not from the clouds: it could be that of your friend, relative, neighbor, colleague, or indeed a word spoken centuries ago that has somehow, at a particular moment, affected us profoundly and given us a new direction.

In an essay by Rosenstock on "Holderlin and Nietzsche," written in 1941 and published in English for the first time in a new collection of essays by and about Rosenstock entitled *The Cross and the Star,* Rosenstock makes a remarkable comment about Friedrich Nietzsche. He confesses that with few exceptions he was little impressed by the contents of any of Nietzsche's books, but what made Nietzsche of imperishable importance in the history of mankind, in Rosenstock's view, was not only Nietzsche's brilliant writing but "his life." Reflecting back on his own academic career in Germany in the 1920s and 30s, Rosenstock commented:

In the heart of the German university tradition, in the [field of] Classics, a man had achieved success and abandoned it. The one universal ambition of any German, to

become a professor, he had reached and transcended. . . . An unseen new trail had been beaten by Nietzsche around the times which surrounded me, free from any requirements of institutions, but imperative for our real life in the future. Never have I doubted, never have I shaken off my belief, that in Nietzsche something final had happened, an avatar of the divine ended. He had stepped outside of his time. **(2)**

Always in Rosenstock's thinking, the radical changes in the progress of mankind are effected initially by individual actions, that is, by living example first, not by detached ideas. The embodiment or incarnation of a wholly new idea, evident in the *life* of a person, comes first, from which we may thereafter draw a lesson, or a moral, or derive "values," as we like to say, and thereby be freed from a prior social constraint (or perhaps fall under a new constraint). The point is, nothing is proven or established until it is first lived. Ideas in themselves are plentiful and cheap. **(3)**

The exceedingly brilliant student of Classics, Nietzsche, permanently undermined a German ideal, or idol, indeed a false god, by his devaluation of an academic career. In this respect, Nietzsche emancipated Rosenstock himself. The revelation by deed precedes the later articulated abstract "truth" —"there are greater things than a chair in Classics" – –although our worship of human "reason" leads us to believe proudly, after the fact, that we knew it all along, adhering to the vanity that values and ideals are generated first by our mind's concoctions and followed later by embodiment. In the beginning, it might be said, is the incarnated word.

Since the singular, concrete, pathbreaking accomplishment is usually quickly followed by countless similar feats, the bravery and originality of the pioneer may easily become depreciated. But no subsequent action is as difficult as the first, when it was unheard of. Columbus's 1492 voyage was duplicated in the decades after by numerous other Atlantic crossings, and soon it is claimed, "anyone could have done it," or anyone could have thought it.

We see a similar perception to that concerning Nietzsche in Rosenstock's commentary on the two greatest philosophical intellects in American history, Jonathan Edwards and William James. Rosenstock knew and admired *the writings* of both men, but he also could not resist calling attention to their humanity and to some telling

episodes in their lives. The concept of the thinker who somehow transcends the turmoil of mundane existence was implausible to Rosenstock, and he delighted in referring to himself as an "impure" thinker, one who was subject to myriad unheroic weaknesses, as are all humans. The only serious question is: What enables us, despite our weaknesses, to sometimes lead and to serve bravely, to manifest the human spirit and create new futures for mankind when we are mired in an unacceptable present?

Rosenstock saw in both Edwards and James (and in many other lives about which he commented: St. Augustine; the French social thinker, Henri de Saint-Simon; Cardinal Newman, for example) defining events that settled their course of action or in the end helped to elevate the person to greatness. Jonathan Edwards was the most prominent Congregationalist minister in New England in ca. 1750, one of only a handful of Americans at the time with an international reputation, and he was no compromiser. In mid-life, with a large family to support, he was shockingly dismissed by his congregation in Northampton, Massachusetts, over issues of principle about which he would not retreat. Although other choices were open to him, Edwards chose to go into exile in Stockbridge, a kind of frontier village in Massachusetts at the time, in the lowly position of missionary to the Indians. The seven years in Stockbridge turned out to be the most productive of his life, and they were followed by an invitation to become president of the College of New Jersey (later, Princeton University). We may see this episode as a kind of profile in courage, a moral example, but Rosenstock had much more in mind than that in his biographical studies, as will become apparent. **(4)**

In his 1942 lecture, "The Soul of William James," Rosenstock describes the debilitating depression James suffered in his late twenties, brought on it seems by a mechanistic cosmological view, much the fashion at the time, and by his struggle with the problem of evil. James was rescued by his encounter with the work of the distinguished French philosopher, Charles Renouvier, who became the greatest single influence on James's thought. They corresponded over a period of years, and James finally met Renouvier personally in 1903, shortly before Renouvier's death. Rosenstock refers to Renouvier as "the *converter* of William James." And James himself wrote: "Yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished Renouvier's definition of free will. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will." And later James wrote, "Since years ago, I read

Renouvier, the center of my *Anschauung* [philosophical view] has been that something is doing in the universe and that novelty is real." **(5)**

The two narratives—concerning Jonathan Edwards and William James— are totally different except that both are examples of death and resurrection in Rosenstock's terms, or of despair and renewal, and (including Nietzsche), are exemplary, as well, of lives that break the mold, defy the conventional expectations of the time, and open up new paths for others to follow. **(6)**

How could he not believe in the bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ, Rosenstock would ask, when he had himself experienced death and renewal in his own life more than once. In his teaching and writing, Rosenstock drew attention to rebirth in the lives of numerous great, creative men, although there is no implication that being "born again" is confined to the great, and certainly no implication that being born again is somehow strictly or exclusively associated with evangelical Christian churches. Rosenstock believed that what the life of Jesus and his disciples revealed to the world had universal application, and the discoveries they made or contributed to human freedom sometimes needed to be extricated from entanglement in conventional churchliness. Those "born again" in the evangelical Christian tradition are a less exclusive club than they may imagine. To be resurrected in this life is a universal entitlement in Rosenstock-Huessy's view. **(7)**

The more famous the name, the more reason to look for the *crucial* moments, "the spiritual core of biography," the crises, the awakenings, the commitments, the sufferings that reveal both the greatness of a man (or woman) and the actual, concrete means by which humankind slowly, painfully moves towards its destiny.

The use of the word "crucial" above is not arbitrary in the case of Rosenstock-Huessy. We are all— the famous and the infamous, the notable and the obscure— inescapably suspended on a figurative cross throughout our short existence on the planet, The basic alternative vectors of time and space—forward and backward (or past vs. future), and inward and. outward (or inside vs. outside)—threaten to pull us apart with the incessant questions of when and where. Choices are regularly put before us that in the end may be reduced simply to these four alternatives: Do I act now or later? When do

I take a stand, if ever? Should I be here or there, inside or outside of this group, this cause, this movement, this marriage? Choices may be postponed, we may achieve a temporary equilibrium, but we are bound to be challenged and tested in the course of our life, if it is an intelligent life at all. On the other hand, what we see in some lives are moments that lead to a permanent resolve. Doubt always remains in a sane person, but the sustained singleness of purpose derived from an inspiration, that is, a gift of the spirit, may free us from some of the uncertainty.

In an imaginative leap, Rosenstock made the crucifixion of Jesus emblematic *in extremis* of the nature of the human condition in a general sense. Rosenstock believed that, historically and uniquely, Christian teachings set us free from the domination of any single past and from the confines of any one group, as had never before been true of any segment of humankind. With freedom comes choice, but also agony.

Christianity, Rosenstock writes, "assumes a turning point in any person's life, or rather it *inserts* such a turning point into each life. It smashes the generalization 'life.' The days of a life cease to be merely equal fractions of a 'whole' life that supposedly proceeds uniformly from cradle to grave. A Christian's year is not made up of 365 individual days; a Christian's life is not made up of 70 individual years. The movement of 'life' is separated into several creative acts. Before and after rebirth, people live in different worlds. The soul ceases to live an 'additive' life. It progresses in jolting steps, in creative acts." **(8)** Always Rosenstock disdained the mindless application to human affairs of the physicists' concept of time, made up of equal increments and suitable only for measuring dead things. The "scientism" of the social sciences carried over from the natural sciences is, of course, the greatest perpetrator of this destructive practice, which reduces man to an object. **(9)**

Paracelsus

The longest piece of writing on biography in English by Rosenstock-Huessy may be his ardent fifty-page essay on Paracelsus. The work, with the title "The Founder of the Science of Life: The Tripartition in the Life of Theophrastus Paracelsus von Hohenheim, 1493-1541," was composed at Dartmouth College in ca. 1937 and survives in

mimeograph copies. **(10)** Rosenstock admired Paracelsus as a pioneering physician and biologist, the anti-Galen, but the focus of his biographical sketch of Paracelsus was the structure of this scientist's life, which Rosenstock formalized into a paradigm of the life of that rare breed in human history, the founder of something entirely new. **(11)**

There is much in Rosenstock's essay on Paracelsus to distract us from the main point addressed here, which is the question of the approaches available to us for examining the structure of biography. The essay is, for example, an instance of Rosenstock's determined attack, found in various of his works, on academe's overly vaunted and glorified view of Renaissance Humanism. It was the Humanists who, as it happened, hounded and ultimately destroyed Paracelsus because he refused to believe that the study of the Classical texts was the key to progress in medicine and biology. **(11a)**

Paracelsus's "fatal conflict with the Humanists of his time," Rosenstock writes "is of so gigantic dimensions that modern scientists like [William] Dampier who try to give a history of science, remain helpless before this tragedy." Dampier, subservient to the Humanist mirage, could not believe there could be any falsehood in the official record. **(12)** But innumerable, deliberate falsehoods there were, and Rosenstock condemns, as well, the Humanists' successors into the twentieth century, who ridiculed Paracelsus without reading him, blindly carrying on a tradition of disparagement and perpetuating calumnies.

Paracelsus was so extraordinarily ahead of his time that trouble with his contemporaries was inevitable. He formulated a method based upon observation above all, and not just static observation, but varied observation, that is, looking at varying instances of a phenomenon in as many venues as possible. One must turn the pages of one's art, he said, with one's feet, that is, by travel and by "surveying with [one's] eyes the characteristic element of each place." Today this is enshrined in natural science as field work.

Judging most of the existing book learning in medicine as nearly worthless, Paracelsus fraternized with all levels of society, looking for information and clues relating to bodily illnesses. He talked to peasants, Rosenstock writes, and to those who, above all, had *first-hand* experience.

In 1526, this heretic in the eyes of the learned was improbably invited to teach at the University of Basel. He had restored to health the famous printer Johann Froben, whose press was located in Basel. Froben was much admired among the Humanists and had even worked closely with the great Erasmus. Paracelsus's medical success with Froben was enough to overcome the opposition and get him a lectureship. Yet, Rosenstock writes, "two contradictory forms of thought, of research, of social standards and of faith clashed in the tragedy" that ensued.

To begin with, Paracelsus was required by university rules to teach in Latin, and secondly, he was not permitted to teach his own findings as a physician. He was expected to teach from the books of the so-called "authorities," that is, the ancients, who knew far less than he did about disease and its causes. Paracelsus was a perfectly good Latinist, but he insisted on teaching in German, keeping "his feet on real mother earth, his mind on real data," in Rosenstock's words. He was the first man in the Western world who lectured in a university openly in his native tongue, according to Rosenstock, and he taught not from the books of others but from his own research. "Smooth talk in different languages does not make a physician nor the reading of many books; he is made by the knowledge of the material world and its hidden powers." So Paracelsus told his students.

Paracelsus lasted only one year at the University of Basel, unsurprisingly, but it was the formative, the generative year for him and it shaped his mission in life, or Rosenstock might say, his "commission" thereafter. Rosenstock writes:

This one year marks an epoch in the whole rich production of Theophrastus. It seems as if every sentence spoken at Basel, every question put to him in these few months, every idea articulated under the pressure of regular teaching . . . , was, by its belonging to this extraordinary year, indelible, forever asking to be further developed. Like the promises which an honest man makes good, these words were followed up by weighty and voluminous works.

Paracelsus's character "crystallized," to use Rosenstock's metaphor. He acquired his indelible character, and what might be thought of as his "appointment by God," as a result of "his conflicts with the men among whom he had to live by the odd appointment to a professorship."

Like the light from distant stars, Rosenstock writes, generations may pass before the new illumination from a genius truly reaches us. “Is it not true that the light generated by a human heart undergoes similar laws of irradiation? . . . When a new light shines up among men, in its first year of appearance it is hardly visible.” The thoughts of men ahead of their time are as delayed in their passage from their first appearance to the minds of other men as the light of the stars is delayed. “It is not to be wondered at that the students . . . [of Theophrastus von Hohenheim] were not prepared to understand the new deity of experience and experimentation and her prophet. . . .”

From his dismissal from the University of Basel in 1527 until his death in 1541, Paracelsus wandered in a “sandy desert,” according to Rosenstock-Huessy. The Humanist physicians and other enemies labored to destroy him and blocked the publication of his work. The desert presented not so much the danger of starvation as “the permanent danger of complete oblivion.” Yet Paracelsus also made friends, a few people “intimately affected by something inexpressibly great in the man. These people became the trustees of his knowledge and the manuscripts which he dictated. . . . During constant medical practice and traveling thousands of miles, he managed to produce about ten thousand pages of manuscript in these fourteen years.” **(13)**

The year 1527 became “the axis” of Paracelsus’s life, Rosenstock argues. “Losing his office as a professor, he made his life the profession of the new office that he felt himself to hold.” As with Rosenstock’s comments on Nietzsche, the shape of the life becomes a legacy equal to the work, a life such as no one had ever lived before, indeed, a new type of man. **(13a)** Northern Europe at the time had room for but two classes of learned men, Humanists and Protestant clergy, but von Hohenheim could be identified neither with Erasmus nor with Luther. “One might almost assert that [Paracelsus’s] light was so far away from his incidental contemporaries that they did not see him at all.” Two halves of learned mankind could not place him in their picture of the world.

We can talk about natural science today as though there was always a place for its practitioners in society. What is not understood, Rosenstock maintained, is that “a new form of thought must be lived first before it may be externalized into endowed institutions. And that is exactly what Theophrastus did: He lived that same life of

immediate, encyclopedic, unprejudiced, experimental research on which modern society bases its existence."

One sees in the biography of Paracelsus three "distinct forms of existence," according to Rosenstock: the thirty-three years before Basel, when he was still "unchallenged, unattacked, growing"; one year at Basel, when Paracelus was initially honored and expected to carry through with recognized duties; finally, the fourteen years after Basel and his encounter with the establishment, "a target of slander, persecution, danger and illness." In his essay on Freud, which I discuss below, Rosenstock spoke of three kinds of time, rather than three distinct forms of existence.

"The highest times of men are whenever heaven and earth, world and inspiration, seem to meet . . . " Rosenstock writes. When that is the circumstance, "external position and inner life seem firmly balanced on all fours." But such moments rarely last. A person in a position of responsibility, let's say for an institution or an organization, learns that to "succeed," compromise with the "world" is a necessity. The "ordinary, natural" man knows how to distinguish between ideals and realities. He may call himself an idealist, but he acts as a realist under the watchful eye of those to whom he is accountable. Paracelsus at Basel, however, was "beyond the interests of the natural man. The pursuit of happiness [is] now meaningless to him. . . . He will use and exploit and outwit and overreach his own nature to make her the carrier of the message that is entrusted to him."

"His own life is a tool now," Rosenstock writes. Paracelsus experienced "the existence of the divine inspiration beyond any doubt . . . . He is left as a witness of the higher life, as a herald of its promises and potentialities. . . . He is under one single obligation: What the world rebuked and refused to accept has to be proved to be the acceptable gift of future life." The founder may not survive the ordeal. One hopes that there are at least a few loyal followers who will do the work of translating the initial act of grace into a lawful order.

Paracelsus was "a new type of man, moving in a new world, using new language, and living with his fellow men in a new fellowship. . . ." Of course, no institution "will endure the contact with a creature that had never existed before. He is howled down from the chair, and the world does all it can to make sure that he will be down forever. He now

faces despair, or compromise, or thirdly, the slow road of waiving comfort, peace, and rest, and re-building, brick after brick, the palace of truth that before had appeared to him gratuitously." **(14)**

The English poet Robert Browning got it right, Rosenstock believed, in his long poem "Paracelsus": "He is sure that God never dooms to waste the strength he deigns impart." **(15)** Grace, the commission, the calling, the infusion of the spirit is thus transformed into a new "descendible law. We repay, by our faithful masonry, ploughing and building up from the ground, our load of gratitude for the inspiration, the abundance of inspiration, that fills us in our best hours."

No one will again be Paracelsus, nor does the generality of humankind ever experience such extremes. But yet Rosenstock believed that a similar tripartition of life, although more pallid, is "a common experience of all true humans." **(16)**

Always eager to breathe new life into the ancient vocabularies of theology and religion, Rosenstock repeatedly in his writing and lecturing attempted to rescue from misconceptions certain irreplaceable descriptive terms—such as "grace," "spirit," "soul ," "conversion". In what Rosenstock called our "post-theological" age, none of these enduring words need be associated with the mystical or the supernatural when they are properly translated into everyday common knowledge. It is a handicap that such terms—which describe aspects of life that are not material, measurable, or spatial— are not part of the acceptable language of science, which establishes what is "true" these days. It is stupidly asked, for example, Where is the soul located? Few people understand the severe limitations of scientific description, how it excludes about three-quarters of life, which is experienced mostly in categories of time, not space, and in the imperative and subjunctive moods, or as personal narrative, not in the indicative language of science. **(17)**

Needless to say, grace is not an angelic whisper in our ear accompanied by organ music. It can just as well be an e-mail. Rather, what sets grace apart is that it does not fit into the ordinary, billiard-ball-to-billiard-ball concept of causation or even into the more sophisticated concept of invariable sequence. It is not reducible to a mental or material

cause, nor is it explicable in the terminology of natural science, which as a matter of strict faith in its own methodology cannot concern itself with any phenomenon not reducible at some point to a universal law. But the permanent uniqueness of an event does not make a moment of "grace" somehow weird, since it is quite commonplace for persons to be reached, touched, moved, and energized into action, and usually fruitless to look for some concatenation of "causes" behind it, whether mental or physical, other than speech, written or spoken. "Speech is the body of the spirit," Rosenstock wrote, and mysterious though its effects inherently are, speech itself is quite material, made up of air and flesh, or breath and the motion of throat, lips, tongue, and so forth. Yet the scientific study of the extraordinary human capacity for speech will never tell us anything about grace. **(18)**

Rosenstock considered it utterly ridiculous, or even tragic, that Cartesian notions relating to the behavior of matter—a body will remain in its present state until another body affects it—ended up being adopted by the *human* sciences as universal principles and as a criterion for truth. All that anyone needs to do is to look at their own life experience to see how useless such a "law" is beyond the study of the motion of bodies.

When in the course of a moment or a month or many months or even years, we "find ourselves," as we say, find direction and know what we want to do with our life, or maybe because of some particular encouragement take a chance on the future, such deliverances may be categorized as "gracious" precisely because they are inexplicable and irreducible, not part of a simple chain of causation. Human experience, whether in macro-history or intimate biography, is full of events that can never be simply explained in scientific terms. To accept that fact does not make one a devotee of the para-normal or the occult. **(19)**

Although it is necessary and laudable for the historian to "determine," retrospectively, the cause of the French Revolution or the cause of the Civil War, only a fool believes that the foundations are thus laid for a science of history that in the future will enable us to predict the moment of revolution or the outbreak of war, let alone the moment of inspiration that shapes the life of an individual. We are thus in the strange situation that the investigation of moments of inspiration in the lives of individuals, which *beyond all else shape the course of events*, is deemed a lower order of research than what occurs in a

chemistry lab, and is relegated to departments of religion, where there is supposedly less rigor. Rigor means reducible to quantification or visual inspection. The confusion is such that in tomorrow's news there could be a headline "Brain Scan Discovers Area Where Inspiration Occurs," and most readers would see this as a sign of progress.

In autobiography, as in history, we may profitably look back and try to understand how our destiny unfolded, often quite unexpectedly in relation to our youthful aims, and why we chose what we chose and did what we did, but such recollections and recapitulations are all long after the fact. Such a retrospective view, Rosenstock said, is the last stage of any event, the analytical or scientific phase, when all the vitality that was present at the beginning is long passed, in fact quite dead. "Genius has its everlasting, spiritual laws," Rosenstock wrote. "As soon as we place grace where it belongs, in the center of life, as its inspiration, its directing force, life ceases to be arbitrary or accidental or casual or boring. . . ." **(20)**

The Exemplary Life of Sigmund Freud

Let us now look at a case four centuries after Paracelsus, the exemplary life of Sigmund Freud, another physician. No one would ever describe Rosenstock-Huessy as an admirer of Freudianism or of Psychoanalytical theory. On the contrary, he tellingly pointed out the inadequacy of the psychological structure of ego, id, superego, and external reality, and the unremitting internal struggle such a conception of the human portended. Yet he gave credit to the man Sigmund Freud, and as with Paracelsus and others, Rosenstock saw in the elements of Freud's life a paradigm, although he used a different terminology than he did with Paracelsus to describe its elements. **(21)**

In volume one of his *Soziologie*, long in the making but first published in 1956, Rosenstock devoted some ten pages to what he called the "tides of time" or the "transformations of time" that can be extracted from looking at the stages in Freud's life related to the founding of Psychoananalyis. **(22)**

Our focus here is on the succession of the radically different *kinds of time* that can be perceived in the stages of Freud's life. Yes, "kinds of time." Rosenstock was aghast at the simplemindness of the common idea that defines time as merely the fourth dimension

of space, when time has its own dimensions and is the medium of human culture, the stream in which we live and die, the basis of Judaeo-Christian thought and of the Western legal tradition. We could just as well consider space a dimension of time, but that is another story. **(23)**

To some degree Freud's biography parallels that of Paracelsus, although there is the major difference that Freud witnessed in his lifetime the formation of a clear succession for his ideas, that is, the Psychoanalytic movement, whereas Von Hohenheim died far more isolated, lacking the organized community of devotees that gathered around Freud. In comparison to Freud, the normal grammatical unfolding in Parcelsus's life was distorted.

There are, Rosenstock begins, "stations" in Freud's life, as in all exemplary lives. Stations are not in permanent opposition to each other, but they are distinct temporal experiences connected by the vitality of a single life. Freud fell into his own life-course, according to Rosenstock, when he overheard an off-hand remark by the great French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot relating to the origins of female hysteria — "C'est toujours genital." From this passing comment at a social gathering came a vocation, Rosenstock writes. The process Freud actually went through is rather compressed in Rosenstock's telling, but there is no doubt that in listening to Charcot's lectures at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris, Freud developed the deepest respect for the French doctor, to the point that any words from Charcot's mouth carried exceptional weight.

In this instance, time came to Freud as a "decisive moment, as the beginning of a trail, just as a noble Great Dane picks up the scent which the hunter throws before it. With Charcot's expostulation, Freud was thrown onto his life's path." He was, in Rosenstock's vocabulary, "prejected," that is, led into a new future. A "preject" is not a "subject," that is not an ego or an "I," nor is he an "object," a "him" or an "it". At the beginning of his great accomplishment, the founder of Psychoanalysis, rather than willing something into existence, is initially passive, a patient not an agent, a receptor, intrigued by what he has heard and captivated by it. **(24)**

"Such a moment is a specific manner of experiencing time," Rosenstock writes. Such creative moments "cannot be measured with a stop-watch. They can last for years. They

depend on the concentration of time, the cutting away, as mere coincidences, of all other temporal events that take place at the same time. He who experiences time as a moment experiences it as a selection," as when one is in love and is blind to all distractions. We are alive, Rosenstock believed, only insofar as we are able to experience such moments. The first station in the transformations of time that constituted Freud's life thus consisted in his allowing this soon-to-be fundamental concept of Psychoanalysis, "C'est toujours genital," to have a lifelong effect on him. **(25)**

The reception of the inspiration, or the commission, is followed by the tension that characterized Freud's life's work. Building on the creative moment, in response to this call or command, Freud combed through human history, including Greek myths and the Bible, thirsting for relevant knowledge to establish his claims. The period following the creative moment is suspenseful, when the inspiration transforms into action and Freud strives to make his case, with no certain outcome. Freud's great literary achievement pours out from this tension, with Freud now a "subject" with will, an ego that is driven to communicate. **(26)**

In this subjective time of suspense, the subject asks himself: Will I be able to communicate what I have discovered? Do I have the strength to carry out the commission that has overwhelmed me? Long periods of doubt, worry, and conjecture about the future are integral to this phase. As contrasted with the first station, which springs from the imperative mood, when one receives a kind of command—"Sigmund," Freud tells himself, "you must act on what you have heard"— in this second phase the grammatical mood is the subjunctive, where everything is contingent or conditional.

It is indeed true that Freud faced a fiercely negative reception to his ideas on the sexual etiology of neurosis, especially from the medical establishment in Vienna. By 1895, according to his biographer, Ernest Jones, Freud felt that "he was leading a crusade . . . against the accepted conventions of medicine," yet, Jones says, "he accepted his mission wholeheartedly." **(27)**

The third station is still a different type of time, neither the creative moment, when we feel we have been elected or chosen to bring forth something new; nor the suspenseful time when without knowledge of the outcome we work obsessively to fulfill the

commission. This third transformation of time Rosenstock calls here "immortalization," or "eternalization," when the achievement exceeds any individual will and becomes a movement, with Freud at its center. The movement takes on a vitality of its own and becomes monumental with its own capacity for renewal forever.

As the founder of Psychoanalysis, Freud was first of all transformed by an inspiration, or commission, and then he was transformed again by battle, so to speak, because, in defiance of the world, he endured the tension that comes with the effort to communicate something wholly new. But this prodigious suspense did not give way until he entered the third temporal modality, when the isolated ego, the "I" in grammar, becomes at last the plural "us" or "we." Freud "eternalized" himself in the emergence of the Psychoanalytic movement.

"Eternity" for Rosenstock is not simply the line without end that people imagine, like a line in geometry. Such an eternity, he said, applies only to dead things or to the infinity of space. In the grammar of the living "only he who can transform himself is eternal." In order to be eternal, one must die and resurrect, over and over. The stone on the ground is "ever" and "always," but it is not eternal. Eternal life belongs only to he who can survive death. From the time that psychoanalysts, Freud's progeny, have existed, Freud's death has become survivable. Now many more have stepped into the place of the pioneer. In this way and in this way alone does that which occurs in human time become immortal.

In this third transformation of time, the collective movement, the community of followers, the converted, will refer to themselves in the first person plural, "us" or "we". Those who become part of the arc of Freud's creation, the new "we" who share the time from the creative moment to Freud's death, immortalize him.

Freud is now captured by his past, the original inspiration has become crystallized. He is caught in the trajectory of his own life's work, part of an intellectual movement, and may be described, in the spectrum of time, as a traject, driven more by the past than by the future. In this third stage, the literary form is personal narrative, the autobiographical recounting of what "we" have done.

Finally, in the fourth and last transformation of time, after the creative moment, after the struggle to convince, after the eternalization that assures perpetual revival,

Psychoanalysis is perceived in detachment, as a development in the past that occupied a particular "space of time" with an objective chronology. Time at this juncture lacks the urgent "now or never" of the moment of inspiration, lacks the anxiety of hope and expectation that may go on for years and years, and it is not the entrance into the eternity of recurrent new life by the formation of a movement. Really, in this final phase, vital time has died off, Rosenstock says, and becomes the mere incremental ticking seconds and minutes of science. We now have before us the objective history of Psychoanalysis, Freud and his creation, as existing in a space of time, as "object," —in grammar the third person "it" or "they," or "he". Freud and Psychoanalysis are now embalmed in encyclopedia entries and hundreds of monographs. The grammatical mood of this work is the indicative, as in all scientific writing. **(27a)**

From this final perspective, Rosenstock writes, Freud and Freudianism are available objects for historical or sociological analysis. Freud visibly occupies a space of time, comparable to a phenomenon in nature that we *look at* for study. **(28)** He is a topic for historical examination handed to the scholar or critic. He is available "as evidence and can be retrospectively criticized." But, although this "space of time" that is the object of monographic study is no longer vital or living, we will always be regard Freud highly, Rosenstock writes, because at the beginning he "happened" in time, and this happening had a particular, grammatical unfolding, a sequence that Rosenstock believed is universal when something new is introduced into the world: from "thou" or "you," to "I," to "we," and finally to "he" or "they," or "it," in other words, from the imperative mood, when Freud is called; to the subjunctive mood of doubt and struggle, when he is transformed from a "thou" who is addressed to an ego or "I"; and finally to the personal narrative form, the story of what *we* are doing, when a movement develops in which many personally share, which opens the promise of life over many generations. The very final stage, the grammatical indicative, is characterized by detached scrutiny and discussion by those who never participated in the movement, and is at best but one quarter of the whole process of creation, yet it is the mode of discourse given the highest credence in the modern era. **(29)**

Rosenstock points out that his own criticism and analysis of Freud, like everyone else's, are dependent on Freud's first having accepted a call and creatively entering into a

new time. All criticism follows upon what has first been commissioned, and then finally enters the record. The final stage, the indicative mood in grammar, is always retrospective and supplementary. It is the time that engages the students of nature, who know only what is placed in front of them. The three earlier processes were lived, and are known only from direct experience. They enter the objective record only as cadavers. "Analysis is an appendix to reality, its death vigil." It is the modes of irreducible experience that are the vital sources of change. Life requires new creations, new inspirations, new struggles and loyalties but they are not reachable with analysis and objectivity, which in fact are deadly.

And then we hear a Rosenstock *cri de coeur*, one of his messages to academe which one day, I believe, will find its audience: "If only the objectivists, critics, and analysts were willing to admit that they are latecomers and supplementary! They could then become useful members of the human race again. As retrospective contributors they are always welcome. But they have wanted to pretend to us that their experience of time as retrospective is the first and only true and scientific one," which is untenable. Time as seen in this classroom-type thinking survives only as evidence of what came before and is now dead. "These analysts would have nothing to analyze if a glorious world were not previously created for them. Yet their own mode of thinking excludes all the other modes of time," which are the fount of progressive change. **(30)** In other words, grace is at the center, but it slips through the net of "scientific" inspection.

Rosenstock's description consciously overrode Freud's theories of psychological operation, with the functions of ego, superego, id, and external reality in never-ending contention. In a characteristic inversion, Rosenstock jabbed that Freud's picture of personal experience is inadequate to capture the unfolding of his very own life, or the life of any person who makes a mark in history. **(31)**

Freud's life, as we have seen, illustrates the higher law of grammatical progression that Rosenstock discovered and that he believed was his most important contribution to thought. Its implications are many and cannot be developed here. Suffice it to say that Rosenstock devoted his life to resurrecting the vital, primary role in all human affairs of the imperative mood or the command, that is, the elementary phenomenon of being

addressed, or spoken to, with the expectation that some action will follow. At the beginning, the whole person is called, that is, the soul is addressed and the soul responds when it is named: "Sigmund, go forth." From infancy the child is called into life with the parents' countless orders: eat, go to sleep, don't tell lies, help your mother, and on and on, and remains indispensable in adulthood when we all crave knowing what it is we must do, what our mission should be: marry me; make this business profitable; lead this group; become a monk; preach the new gospel of scientific investigation à la Paracelsus, or the influence of repressed sexuality on human behavior à la Freud; protect the environment.

The source of the command may be very humble in origin, and often appears to be no more than what we tell ourselves, perhaps reinforced by a friend. But importantly and essentially these imperative moments are not predictable and are not reducible to anything other than the spoken, or written, word: black ink on a page or the material breath of utterance, perhaps mentally re-created when we speak to ourselves. It can well be said, the spirit bloweth where it listeth. We are moved by the spirit (what else to call it), and sometimes by its commanding intervention we choose a calling or a partner or a direction, and our life is changed forever.

We can imitate Rosenstock and quote Browning's "Paracelsus" once again: "Dear Festus," Parcelsus says, "hear me. What is it you wish?/That I should lay aside my heart's pursuit,/Abandon the sole ends for which I live./Reject God's great commission—and so die!" (ll. 142-145). ". . . I profess no other share/In the selection of my lot, than in/My ready answer to the will of God,/Who summons me to be his organ. . . ." (ll. 303-306).

All of this makes sense most fully when it is put in the context of Rosenstock-Huessy's extensive writing on the fundamental role of speech as the connective tissue of human community in all its forms, from the family, to the nation, to the planetary realm, but that, too, is a subject that cannot be developed here. **(32)**

Time to sum up. This conference is on voluntary work service, the moral equivalent of war, the social representation of truth. What does it matter how lives are analyzed in

relation to these urgent subjects? Or the question might be, Why bring the matter down to the level of psychology? If one accepts the premise that change for the better—and humankind is always in need of change for the better—depends upon individual initiative, including the very smallest and most isolated of actions, which was a fundamental conviction of Rosenstock-Huessy's, then it is good to know from what sources, from what processes, such initiatives may spring. It is also important to know how a misguided psychology, or the social sciences in general, when they are obsessed with measurement as a criterion for truth, may fail to understand, or worse, may impede human growth and development. **(33)**

On the one hand, we are given hope, because we have faith that the spirit lives, that it leaps over borders and boundaries of every kind—geographical, racial, ethnic, social and economic— and over generations, indeed over millennia. On the other hand, it is discouragingly fragile and tenuous in the face of the great engines of this fallen world, such as morally deficient corporate power; hypocrisy and personal self-interest in the realm of politics; the double-edged sword of a triumphant institutionalized science; the careerism of the academic brotherhood and sisterhood, embracing novelty regardless of the cost to integrity; commercial capitalism, as in the world of entertainment and advertising, that inevitably sinks to the lowest taste in the hunger for attention. Even the spirit itself can be an enemy, emerging in counterfeit guises as demagoguery in multiple forms, and false prophets. Satan also may inspire.

What can Rosenstock-Huessy offer in the face of such challenges? He certainly had no utopian illusions. He was too alert to human failings for that. Confining my response to this very large question solely to the study of biography, here is what I note. There are many failures of reform by individual initiative, or apparent failures, because the timing was wrong. The seed may yet sprout. We have to learn to wait— "Thy will be done" — but not necessarily without continuing to nurture a cause that deserves to live and spread. Most vast "programs" for improvement are, by their very nature, doomed to fail or run thin. Rosenstock distrusted any project with large beginnings. Let's invest millions to promote, let's say, "leadership," or "innovation," or "ethics." Such efforts are not wrong in themselves, but their advocates can be deluded by the notion that money and size are the great determinants of fundamental change, without personal inspiration and

individual sacrifice. None of the examples I have given above of significant lives includes clearly the sacrifice of one's life, martyrdom, for a cause. Rosenstock believed that the only causes the world will ever take seriously are those for which someone is willing to die. **(34)** Real change is no light matter. He also believed that no drive for improvement that does not span at least three generations can leave a permanent mark.

Vital questions cannot be settled by discussion, Rosenstock believed. Against class hatred, for example, "sacrifices alone can help, sacrifices of a completely irrational character, sacrifices which . . . impress themselves by their symbolical potency. . . . Our faith in forces greater than man's intelligence, a charity greater than any social intelligence ever warrants, and unbending hope in the victory over the worst fiend, animate those who by their personal decisions and sacrifices enable . . . us to cooperate and to live inside of some semblance of order." **(34a)**

The stories and analysis above are but an elementary foray into Rosenstock-Huessy's ideas about how humankind advances. Leaving aside the superficiality that equates any new technology with human "progress," Rosenstock saw progressive change, great or small, as possible only through the gifts of the spirit to individuals — inspiration, followed by sacrifice, suffering, and fellowship. As he said in "The Soul of William James,"

Exactly as children are begotten, so the gifts of the spirit,

the fertility of goodness, the contagion of enthusiasm, the fecundity of thought, the influence of authority, are interhuman processes which spring to life only between people. No man is good. But the word or act that links men may be good. And by linking men evil has to be constantly combatted.

One need not attribute to this paradigm a "religious" or transcendental meaning. But clearly religion, as a practice world-wide, has lessons that may be generalized in all realms of human endeavor.

In the course of preparing this paper, I came to realize that there is need for a comprehensive treatment of Rosenstock-Huessy's thought relating to human psychology.

Much of what he has to say regarding psychology I have not even adverted to here, in particular his conception of the proper stages of human growth or development, which he divided into intervals of more or less seven-years. He spoke in one place of ten such stages of healthy development, and in another place of twelve stages. **(35)** These stages are not just descriptive, as in Shakespeare's famous lines in *As You Like It,* "All the world's a stage/ . . . And one man in his time plays many parts,/His acts being seven ages. . . ," but normative. Rosenstock was interested in how it *should be* in a healthy society.

The names alone of these stages, taken out of context and without explication , can be very misleading. But here they are: 1. Listening (or obeying); 2. Reading (or conceiving); 3. Learning (or wandering); 4. Playing (or singing); 5. Doubting (or withholding); 6. Criticizing (or protesting); 7. Protesting (or rebelling); 8. Suffering (or persevering); 9. Leading (or legislating); 10. Teaching (or educating); 11. Prophesying (or warning); 12. Testator (or endower).

One parallel that I know of is Erik Erikson's list, where, as in Rosenstock-Huessy, one stage builds upon another and the correct sequence is of vital importance. A systematic comparison of these two lists would be extremely revealing and enlightening. I am guessing that in the end they are more complementary than in opposition. **(36)**

Other topics that would have to be explicated in a treatment of Rosenstock-Huessy's psychological theories are the five levels of human functioning that Dr. Hans R. Huessy, Rosenstock's son, referred to in a paper he presented at the Waterloo conference in 1982. At the bottom is the autonomic, such as the cardio-vascular system, of which we are hardly even conscious. Next are basic material needs, such as eating, sleeping, playing. The third level up from the bottom is work and other purposeful activity. The fourth level is that of "love and the recreation of values." And at the peak of human action is heroism and self-sacrifice. Level five, Hans Huessy writes, "is seldom achieved and when achieved it is only for short periods of time." However, our understanding of man, according to Hans Huessy reflecting his father's beliefs, should come from studying the highest levels in order to gain insight into the lower, not the reverse, such as beginning with mice. **(37).** "Any work men do that does not flow downhill from the highest life," Rosenstock wrote, "is dead."

Rosenstock's concept of the "multiformity of man" is another subject that deserves close examination in the context of psychological theory.

Finally, attention should be given to Rosenstock's description of "metanoia," a biblical word that in his interpretation is a *turning away* from what is dead or outgrown in a person's life, escaping from suffocation, as Rosenstock put it, in contrast to conversion. Conversion is a *turning towards*, a process that Rosenstock equated with orientation, in the literal sense of finding our bearings, as at sea. "Metanoia," he writes, "is not an act of will. It is the unwillingness to continue. This unwillingness is not an act but an experience. The words [around one] make no sense, the atmosphere is stifled. One chokes. One has no choice but to leave." Moreover, as distinguished from conversion or inspiration, there is no clear direction forward. One does not know what is going to happen. All one has is "the faith" that this "subzero situation is bound to create new ways of life. . . ." **(38)**

Very early in his work Rosenstock pointed to the attraction of various occult psychologies—spiritualism, fortune telling, astrology, and, these days, what is called "New Age"—as expressing real hunger for recognition that human beings are somehow integrated into the cosmos. More legitimate "practices," such as yoga, take it as the ultimate goal to be at one with the cosmos. Any psychology that hopes to be comprehensive in relation to the nature of men and women cannot just pretend that we do not at times have a sense of connection to a universe much greater than ourselves, which is to be expected, since we are in fact literally composed of star dust, as the Nobel laureate scientist George Wald used to say. We are not only stardust, we are also saltwater.

Freud reduced the so-called "oceanic feeling" associated with religious belief to a mere carry-over from infantile states and dismissed it. But astrology and the like will not go away until we are offered a science of man that has escaped completely from the grip of Cartesian mechanics. Rosenstock offered his grammatical method as the key to such a revolution.

"Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and the Structure of Significant Lives"

NOTES

1. See: *I am an Impure Thinker* (Argo, 1969), "Teaching Too Late, Learning too Early," written in May, 1940: "The time has come to build up a science of timing. . . , its *Novum Organum* will be the timing of teaching and learning, because they are its basic phenomena." "Man is peculiarly a temporal being, ever but an exile and pilgrim in the world of space." pp. 91- 92.

2. *The Cross and the Star: The Post-Nietzschean Christian and Jewish Thought of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig*, edited by Wayne Cristaudo and Frances Huessy (Newcastle on Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2009), pp. 18-19.

3. "I have been the sworn enemy of philosophical idealism all my life because it separates mind and body, spirit and incarnation. I prefer a child to an idea, and Lincoln to any abstract principle." "Teaching too Late" in *I Am an Impure*, p. 108.

4. ERH referred to Edwards many times in his lectures at Dartmouth. I cannot find now an exact citation. For Edwards's exile in Stockbridge, see George Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards* (New Haven, 2003).

5. "Soul of William James," p. 2. I am working from a mimeograph of the 1942 typescript, with handwritten changes by ERH, not the version in *I Am an Impure Thinker* (1969), which varies here and there from the original and does not reprint many of ERH's footnotes.

Much of ERH's understanding of James came from Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James* (Boston, 1935), 2 vols., which ERH described as "the fundamental book on James." On Dec. 29, 1869, James wrote to Henry Bowditch, "I have been a prey to such disgust for life during the past three months as to make letter writing almost an impossibility." (Perry, I, p. 320). See also p. 323, Perry quoting from James's diary, April 30, 1870: "My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will." This after reading Renouvier's 2nd essay, but before he knew Renouvier, with whom he did not begin to correspond until 1872. By the 1880s, James was publishing articles in Renouvier's journal, *Critique philosophique.* Perry writes: "Renouvier became . . . the greatest single influence upon James's thought." (p. 465). And then again, p. 633: "That Renouvier was the greatest individual influence upon the development of James's thought cannot be doubted."

ERH's "The Soul of William James" is as much about the concept of "soul" as it is about James. Defining "soul," in the face of the prevailing views in psychology and philosophy," was a preoccupation of ERH's. ERH noted that James used the word "soul" "incessantly in his conversation and correspondence," but regarded it as a useless term in

his psychology. James wrote about "soul": "Some day, indeed, souls may get their innings again in philosophy. . . . They form a category of thought too natural to the human mind to expire without prolonged resistance. But if the belief in the soul ever does come to life, after the many funeral discourses preached over it, it will be only when someone has found in the term a pragmatic significance that has hitherto eluded observation. When that champion speaks, as he well may, sometime, it will be time to consider souls more seriously." ERH responded, "In times of crisis, the term 'soul' is of 'pragmatic significance' because it signifies our power to survive mortal fears. When Thomas Paine exclaimed, 'This is a time which tries men's souls,' he did not mean men's bodies or men's minds." (pp. 3-4). See also n. 17, below.

6. One of the basic questions that Rosenstock implicitly asked is: What tools do we have for understanding such personal crises? Empiricist or behaviorist psychology, and materialist philosophy are not up to the task.

7. It is possible that I am making of ERH here too much of an Emersonian. It remains a question, despite his avowals, what kind of Christian ERH was? In the journal *Church History* (XV, no. 3, Sept. 1946), reviewing *The Christian Future* (1946), Karl Löwith wrote: "It is obvious . . . that Rosenstock's real concern throughout his book is the future of Western (Christian) culture and the creation of new communities, but not the original crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ and the imitation of his life. Likewise his concept of history as a history of judgment and salvation is entirely secularized. . . . The theological notions of the cross, last judgment and resurrection are subservient to a philosophy of life which confuses its own 'creative' designs and ambitions with the transforming power of faith in Jesus Christ. . . ." A work such as *Fruit of Lips* (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1978; originally written in 1954), however, gives a quite different impression of the depths and orthodoxy of ERH's faith than *The Christian Future* might.

One theme in ERH's work is that our supposed secularized Western civilization is anchored in Christian truths and values, although most people are hardly aware of this fact. To give an example of my own, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the United Nations in 1948) is a magnificent, wholly secular document although its drafting would be unthinkable without the path cleared beforehand by 2000 years of Christianity.

8. *Soziologie*, pp. 000, trans. Ray Huessy **[get details from Ray Huessy]**

9. Rosenstock was hardly alone in his concern about the disastrous overreach of the "scientific method" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Cf. Stephen A. McKnight, "Voegelin's New Science of History," in Ellis Sandoz, ed., *Eric Voegelin's Significance for the Modern Mind* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1991): Voegelin recognized the "distortion of the field of study produced by the effort to employ the methods of the natural sciences to develop a social science. . . . Voegelin's detailed

analysis shows . . . that the attempt to emulate the natural sciences does not produce a fuller, deeper understanding of man and society. . . . Adoption of the procedures of the natural sciences leads to a truncated view of man and society that reduces the life of ordinary human beings to a narrow range of stimuli and situates human satisfaction within utilitarian aims and material satisfactions. . . . Science is transformed from [its original purpose,] an empirical inquiry into the structure of the physical world into a knowledge system that [purportedly] supplies the means for transforming human nature, society, and history."(pp. 58-59)

10. The essay on Parcelsus may be found in *Rosenstock-Huessy Papers*, Vol. I, (Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1981), under the title "A Classic and a Founder," the first part of which is an essay on Michael Faraday, the classic, and the second part the essay on Parcelsus, the founder. In the absence of an intellectual biography of ERH, we are mostly in the dark regarding the development of his thought over a lifetime of writing, reading, and speaking. When did he first take an interest in Parcelsus? We know that as early as 1923, Rosenstock edited with Richard Koch a work by Paracelsus in a volume entitled *Theophrast von Hohenheim* (Stuttgart: Fr. Fromanns Verlag). To what degree, if any, did his thinking about Paracelsus change? Such questions remain unanswerable for the time being. About this book Rosenstock writes: "Paracelsus . . . wrote a beautiful chapter against voluntary martyrdom, in his booklet on invisible illnesses (as edited by R. Koch and myself in 1923). In this chapter, he makes fun of the ranters who triumphantly run to the stake of martyrdom as though it was a bonfire." (*Classic and Founder*, p. 70). What a timely subject!

11. My use of the word "paradigm" here will immediately suggest to some readers a connection to Thomas Kuhn's extraordinarily influential work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1968; orig. publ. 1962).) with its discussion of revolutionary "paradigm shifts" in the history of natural science. However, I am talking about a biographical paradigm; Kuhn about the scientific paradigm that governs the approach of a large body of scientists, as for example, in the history of astronomy, supporters of Ptolemy vs. supporters of Copernicus. Nonetheless, Kuhn's famous work is relevant because I believe that Rosenstock-Huessy's writing on the history of science and on the practice of science as a social phenomenon anticipated Kuhn by decades. A taste of Rosenstock's insights on this subject may be found in *Classic and a Founder*, pp. 65-73, which reads almost like a manifesto for reforming the history of science.

The following is from ERH's "Modern Man's Disintegration and the Egyptian Ka": "When a scientist follows his logical analysis, his laboratory experiments, his die is cast. He has responded to the direction of his life; he has acknowledged the imperative written over his own life: there shall be science and you shall be the servant of science. Nothing that this scientists thinks or writes or publishes within his scientific field makes sense outside this decision that he had made long before. He responded to the call of science

long before he knew what he would do during his life as a scientist. He got his orientation by moving along on the wave length that had appealed to him when his dialed his reception apparatus. . . . The response to science precedes any scientific statement in particular. Man is called upon by other vocations of a non-scientific character just as well. And any science of society must penetrate behind the decision made by the scientist, must see that the scientist is not the normal type of human being but just one among others, in order to discover the essential composition of the good society. . . . The orientation of an individual that makes him become President or scientist or baker is a decision that makes president and scientist and baker equals as responsive and oriented persons long before their various ideas of presidency, scholarship, and bakership begin to operate upon them. . . . The scientist must hold to the faith that every person that decides to become a scientist does so not as a scientist but as a human being who harkens to his deepest calling." *I Am an Impure Thinker*, pp. 49-50.

11a. The Renaissance Humanists of the 15th and 16th centuries, who were primarily responsible for the recovery of the Greek and Latin classics in European culture, have little or nothing to do with the present-day categorization of atheists and agnostics as "secular humanists". The term "humanism" is employed for all kinds of purposes, positive and negative. One thread, however, from the 15th century to the present, which ERH highlighted, is that the concept of the "Middle Ages," an alleged intermediate period of darkness from the decline of Rome until the so-called re-birth of learning in the 15th century, was the self-serving invention, initially, of the Lutheran Reformation, and then adopted by the luminaries of the French Revolution, who portrayed the Renaissance Humanists as forerunners of enlightenment after centuries of Roman Catholic error and subterfuge. The image of a trough between two great enlightenments, ancient and modern, is a stigma that the Middle Ages, for all of its brilliance and creativity, has only gradually been able to overcome, and it is an inherently anti-Roman Catholic concept. In a devastating remark, ERH observed: Yes, the Renaissance brought back to Europe all of the glories of the Greeks and Romans, including the revival of human slavery. Cf. *Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man* (1938), pp. 699-705.

12. *Classic and a Founder,* p. 20. Sir William Cecil Dampier (d. 1952) wrote extensively on the history of science. ERH is probably referring to *Cambridge Readings in the Literature of Science; being extracts from the writings of men of science to illustrate the development of scientific thought* (Cambridge, 1924), which he cites on p. 61 of *Classic and a Founder*. See also Dampier's *A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy & Religion* (1929), which has appeared in many editions to this day.

13. *Classic and a Founder,* pp. 27 - 42, passim. It is hard to resist the thought that Rosenstock, consciously or unconsciously, is in some general way identifying with Paracelsus. He says of Paracelsus that what he has to offer after the crisis must be "acceptable to God," whether or not it is accepted by man. This is a heroic challenge, "for

the tempter whispers, of course, smiling: neither man nor god is interested in your craziness. Under the spur of this inner temptation and the external disaster, the child of genius is turned into the fighting apostle." It is inspiration contesting against the hostile environment and against the fear that one is insane.

13a. As we will see below, ERH said the same of Freud: "That Freuds are able to exist is more important than Psychoanalysis. . . . " *Soziologie,* vol. I (Stuttgart, 1956), p. 305.

14. *Classic and a Founder,* p. 47.

15. The quotation is lines 366-367 (". . . Be sure that God/ Ne'er dooms to waste the strength he deigns impart") in the definitive edition of this long dramatic poem, "Paracelsus": John Woolford and Daniel Karlin, eds., *The Poems of Browning*, Vol. I, 1826-1840. (London: Longman, 1991). Browning did a considerable amount of research on Paracelsus, and the poem was to some degree influenced by Goethe's *Faust*. Many verses in the poem must have pleased Rosenstock and relate to the theme of this paper.

16. *Classic and a Founder,* pp. 43 - 51, passim

17. In *Practical Knowledge of the Soul* (Argo, 1988), trans. Mark Huessy and Freya von Moltke, pp. 54-58, ERH assigns soul, body, and spirit each a place in human experience that is indisputable:

"For men and women, everything about them that has to do with the total duration and unity of their existence belongs to the *soul.* Destiny, profession, marriage, children, honor, fame, disappointment, suffering, sacrifice, names—all these things are given meaning from the fact that they belong to one united line, one life story.

"One's *bodily*, material needs, on the other hand, start with daily bread and daily requirements of shelter, clothing, and urges. So from the material point of view, marriage is only an expansion of sex and reproductive urges; professions are only an expanded concern for daily bread, and so forth. . . . And yet there remains an immense difference. No matter how many daily wages are added together, they won't equal the course of a life; no matter how many sexual acts, they won't equal a marriage. So for men and women, the material things about them are summed up in the concerns for units of time shorter than the ages of their own lives. . . . This explains the limits of material concerns, which remain passing in comparison with the course of a whole life.

"The powers and needs of the *spirit*, by contrast, go above and beyond the time limits of souls. We call only those things spiritual which are destined and appropriate for more than one soul. . . . So we should understand all matters of the spirit as an inherited succession of souls. The spirit takes hold of more than one person—but when it does move one person, as in the case of a genius, then it is only in order to reach others through him.

"Spirit is a power of mankind, the soul a power of man or woman, the body a power of

nature in man. Once we understand that the specific essence of the soul has to do with time and tenses, it follows that time spans for the spirit are longer than those of the soul, and that time spans of the body are shorter than those of the soul. . . .

"An individual man neither has spirit nor is spirit, as little as he is just body. Rather the spirit has the man, and the man, in turn, has a body, many changing bodies. . . . A person remains inspired only insofar as, and as long as, he finds himself within a structure that reaches out beyond him, and only as long as he lives and acts on the basis of it. Matters of the spirit are above the human level; in fact they transcend everything already organized. For although every corporation, every club, every country, and every profession has 'its own' spirit to which the members are subject, still, all of these collective groups are themselves subject to the One Spirit.

"Most of the spirit that touches and captures an individual man is this kind of middle-level spirit, not *the* spirit, but a kind of spirit, vis-à-vis an individual. Because our souls tend not to be up to the spirit first-hand, the spirit which seizes us individuals tends to be this kind of second-, third-, or fourth-hand spirit, the spirit of derivative collective personalities.. . .

"Even these derivations have to transcend the individual, or they cease being part of the spirit, and at that moment their spiritual power is extinguished. . . . Off-shoots of the spirit should exercise power over our souls only as long as they retain the strength of the original spirit from which they are descended, the strength to pull us beyond ourselves. . .

"A person who cannot think beyond his own advantage has been abandoned by the spirit. A family or nation which cannot do that has been abandoned by God and by the spirit. For the power of the future has slid away from it, the power which could have lifted them beyond the advantages and prejudices they have had hitherto. . . .

"In the life of the spirit, only the spirit itself is unchangeable. Everything it grasps, changes. So all individuals or communities that want to remain unchangeable are putting themselves on the same level as the spirit. That is presumptuous. The soul that is inspired should remain changing. Being obedient to the appeals of the spirit we have recognized as the life of the soul. . . . "

Practical Work was originally published as *Angewandte Seelenkunde: Eine programmatische Ubersetzung* (Darmstadt: Roether-Verlag, 1924). It contains ideas formulated by ERH as early as 1916. *Angewandte Seelenkunde* also appears in Rosenstock-Huessy's *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts* (1963), vol. I.

18. ERH wrote extensively on speech, and on no other subject, other than perhaps, time, is his work more illuminating and original. In a world supposedly disenchanted by materialism and positivistic science, the wonder of our capacity for speech (by which ERH meant more than just talk or "communication"), brings back a great deal of the mystery without a hint of the occult. See, e.g., his *The Origin of Speech* (1981) and

Speech and Reality (1970), both available from Argo Books.

19. The fact that an experiment can be repeated and produce the same results again and again is an essential element in the scientific method, so called. Unique processes, which are not reproducible, are basically unsuitable for scientific observation, Rosenstock wrote. "Hence much is true that is unscientific." (*Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts*, II, 231, 234)

The blending of grace and nature, of God's arbitrariness and His regularity, of His will and his wisdom, was a theme of consistent interest to Jonathan Edwards, culminating in the magisterial statement of number 1263 of his Miscellanies, written in the 1750s. Edwards held that God always acts according to strict laws in the realm of nature, but these laws are not necessarily deducible a priori. They must be discovered by experience. In this sense, despite the laws of nature, God is always the arbitrary sovereign. The Creation was not anticipated by reason. Yet the laws are fixed, and God does not capriciously intervene in particular cases. Number 1263 of Edwards's Miscellanies is ostensibly a defense of miracles, but the total effect of it is to diffuse the idea of a miracle along a graded scale, so that in the end one can speak only of the *more or less miraculous* in a natural world that is one great miracle in all of its parts. The arbitrary God and the God who is always limited by fixed laws are not altogether separable. The arbitrary act is "the first and foundation of the other and that which all divine operation must finally be resolved into. . . ." An arbitrary action, in Edwards's definition, or what I have been calling a unique event, should not be understood as an action opposed to the exercise of God's wisdom, i.e., his rationality. The original establishment of the laws of nature is itself an instance of arbitrary operation. God's arbitrariness appears in His supreme originality, not in whimsicalness.

A parallel may be drawn between God's arbitrariness in the Creation and man's freedom in comparison to the lower animals, plants, and dead matter, for man, made in God's image, has a "secondary and dependent arbitrariness" in that he is not limited in his actions to the laws of matter and motion. Human beings act in accordance with what pleases them and govern the motions of their bodies by their will. The bodies of all lower forms of created life, in descending order, are governed by physical laws of impulse, attraction, and so forth.

The higher one ascends in the scale or chain of created existence, Edwards maintains, up to the level of human beings, the more and more arbitrary are the divine operations, or "those communications and influences" with which God maintains an "intercourse with the creature."

It becomes clearer, as Edwards proceeds, that the meaning of "arbitrary" for him is the "new," the "unique," the "unprecedented," and the "particular," not the unconditioned. Thus, the first act in any series is arbitrary in a sense, or it is more arbitrary than the subsequent acts. As Edwards explains arbitrariness, it is perfectly compatible with the

strictest exercise of scientific reason. The so-called arbitrary actions of the deity differ from fixed laws only in that they are generally less common.

Spiritual relations are rare and refined occurrences, and in that sense arbitrary. God's will in these matters being largely unknowable on earth. But Edwards pointedly rejected the notion that spiritual relations are amorphous and fuzzy. Their precision, he argued, is not below that of mathematical physics, but *above it*, and because of that fact not measurable with man's rough calibrators.

There is much more in Miscellany 1263 on this subject, particularly relating to divine arbitrariness at the beginning and end of time. (See Norman Fiering, *Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and Its British Context* [1981], pp. 95-104)

20. *Classic and a Founder*, p. 48

21. It is wasted effort, I believe, to try to reconcile variant versions of Rosenstock-Huessy's fundamental ideas. Variations are not the same as inconsistencies. He was rarely blandly inconsistent. But it is exactly in accordance with who he was and what he taught that at different times he would see similar phenomena somewhat differently. What is consistent is that peering into biography, he looked consistently for the spiritual core, as we have noted.

22. For these comments on Freud, I have relied upon a translation by Susan Solomon of pp. 303-312 in Rosenstock's *Soziologie* (Stuttgart, 1956), vol. I. The pages on Freud also incorporate commentary on the varieties and meaning of time, a subject about which Prof. Rosenstock-Huessy made revolutionary and profound contributions, although as yet little recognized.

Much of ERH's work on time is not yet available in English. One recent commentary is Peter J. Leithart, "The Social Articulation of Time in Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy," *Modern Theology*, online, vol. 26 (April 2010) issue 2, 197-219. See "Teaching Too Late, Learning Too Early," in *I Am an Impure Thinker* (Argo, 1970), p. 94: "The present, whether it be an hour, a day in our life, or a whole era, is not only created, but created by us; it does not simply happen to us, it is not a natural fact like space, not a datum in nature, but a constant social achievement, and neither comes nor lasts except by our own making. Therefore, time is not a gift but a task. . . . "

23. See the brilliant piece by Knut Stünkel, "Nation as times. The national construction of political space in the planetary history of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy," in Albert, Mathias; Gesa Bluhm; Jan Helmig; Andreas Leutzsch; Jochen Walter , eds., *Transnational Political Spaces: Agents - Structures - Encounters* (Historische Politikforschung, Bd. 18). (Frankfurt and New York: Campus-Verlag, 2009), 297-317.

24. Freud did not anticipate the influence Charcot would have on him. He applied for a travel grant to Paris to come under Charcot's tutelage for a few months because of the prestige of such an appointment. All that mattered to Freud at the time, according to Freud's biographer Ernest Jones, "was to secure a standing in the medical profession that would hold out some prospect of [his] earning enough to marry [Martha Bernays]." Ernest Jones, *Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (New York, 1953), vol. I, p. 75. Little did Freud know, according to Jones, "what a critical moment this [time with Charcot] was to prove in [his] life. It was assuredly the experience with Charcot in Paris that aroused Freud's interest in hysteria, . . . and so paved the way for resuscitating Breur's observation and developing psychoanalysis." Freud was with Charcot for only four months, but he wrote of him in 1885, "No other human being has ever affected me in such a way. . . . " Freud was already a brilliant and promising neurologist when he abandoned that direction altogether to concentrate on psychopathology.

Rosenstock appears to have missed the irony that what for Charcot was a passing, even slightly cynical, remark, became for Freud the seed of so much of his future reasoning. Charcot never formally lectured on the subject of the sexual etiology of neurosis. In public Charcot would deny there was any connection between "the disease [hysteria] and the genital organs.. . ."

Peter Gay describes the occasion in *Freud: A Life for Our Time* (New York, 1989; orig. publ. 1988). "Early in 1886, during a reception at Charcot's house, [Freud] had overheard his host arguing in his lively way that a severely disturbed young woman owed her nervous troubles to her husband's impotence or sexual awkwardness. In such cases, Charcot exclaimed, it is always a genital thing, always. 'Mais, dans des cas pareils,' he insisted, 'c'est toujours la chose génitale, toujours . . . toujours . . . toujours." (91-92).

25. Freud himself pointed out, reinforcing ERH's analysis, that "there is a vast difference between a casual flash of intuition . . . and taking an idea seriously, working through all of the complexities surrounding it, and winning for it general acceptance." For ERH, this is the difference between an intuition or an insight and a life-changing commission. Gay, *Freud*, p. 248.

26. The ego does not come first; the imperative, the call, the vocative precedes it. In speaking of Paracelsus, ERH wrote: "This absolute certainty that directs our steps is possible only because we are sure that the power behind us is bigger than our weakness. We are precipitated from above. Man being the animal that changes his environment, the phase of inspiration is that phase in which sufficient strength accrues to the individual so that he feels empowered to change the environment for the group. Inspiration does no more than that. It dislocates and places us. We cease to be part of the environment, we are made the center of a new environment which, in our inspiration, is envisaged and anticipated by us. " *Classic and a Founder,* p. 50.

27. Freud was received by the medical establishment in Vienna, with his theories on the origin of hysteria, not unlike Paracelsus had been received. Ostracism and snubs were the norm. Jones, *Freud*, pp. 231-32, 249. Freud consoled himself with the conviction, not unlike that held by Paracelsus, that although "respect for greatness, especially intellectual greatness, belongs to the best qualities of human nature . . . it should take second place to respect for facts. One need not be ashamed to admit it when one sets aside reliance on authority in favor of one's own judgment, gained by the study of facts." (p. 236).

27a. The sequence, it will be noted, contains both space vectors and time vectors. (a) To be called into the future situates a person in time. (b) The suffering ego, the subject, is personal and inside, a matter of situating oneself in figurative space: I am alone here; will anyone else join me? (c) When a community of followers is formed who think of each other as "we," a new body of space is formed, a new, much larger, inside. At the same time, Freud himself is now caught up in his creation, and is part of temporal trajectory. (d) Finally, the objective study of what "they" did again relies on a spatial metaphor. Subject and object, which is all that most people know, always refer to the spatial, the inside and the outside; preject and traject, coinages of Rosenstock's, take into account the temporal in human lives, which is essential for full and accurate understanding of who man is, and indeed who God is, since God exists only in time.

28. There is a growing literature on the predominance of the visual in modern culture, to the detriment of the aural. Decades before this fact became a frequent subject of scholarly commentary, Rosenstock had written about it as a deleterious imbalance and explained its origins. Walter Ong, long an admirer of ERH, chose as the epigraph to his major book, *The Presence of the Word* (New Haven, 1967), the following quotation from ERH's *Soziologie*: "Erfahrungen ersten Grades, ersten Ranges, werden nicht durch das Auge gemacht." [Experiences of the first order, of the first rank, are not realized through the eye.] ---Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Vollzahl der Zeiten* (1957), p. 33. *The Presence of the Word* was reissued by Global Publications in 2000 with a new Preface by Thomas J. Farrell, an authority on Ong. It is almost laughable that Farrell, looking for comparisons to Ong, and influences on him, mentions all of the usual suspects—Derrida, Heidegger, Levinas, and others—and never once cites ERH, who was more important to Ong than all of the others he mentions. This would be more excusable if the epigraph were not right there before his eyes as a clue!

29. Cf. ERH's friend, Martin Buber, as quoted in Charles David Axelrod, *Studies in Intellectual Breakthrough: Freud, Simmel, Buber* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1979). "Buber discovers . . . that certain achievements when preserved objectively lose virtually all of their intelligibility." (p. 51). That

"The language of objects catches only one corner of actual life." (pp. 54-55). "For Buber, the distinction between objective speech and dialogue is significantly more deep-rooted than the simple relation between fraction and whole. . . . [Buber] refers to their distinction

as a formal 'opposition.'" "Dialogue cannot outlive its moment or escape its participants without losing its force and transforming its nature. Thus it is only accessible to its participants and only to the extent that their relationship endures. In contrast, objective speech has no feeling for its moment, or whether during that moment its speakers enter into an authentic relation." "Objective speech must be accessible to anyone at any time." (55). Buber and ERH had worked together on the journal *Die Kreatur* in the 1920s.

The imperative, by which Freud is first addressed, is inherently dialogical. The command waits for a response. Without the expectation of a response, a command, delivered into the air, is idiocy. One of ERH's essential criticisms of Buber's work on dialogue is that Buber formulated the relation as "I-Thou," rather than the more psychologically empirical "Thou-I." For ERH's response to Buber, see his important note in *Judaism Despite Christianity* (Auburn: University of Alabama Press, 1969), pp. 69-70.

30. *Soziologie*, p. 309. Charles David Axelrod, the author of *Studies in Intellectual Breakthrough: Freud, Simmel, Buber* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1979), describes his purpose as studying the process of a breakthrough *coming into being*, as distinguished from recognition of the completed achievement. This is quite like ERH's aim. Axelrod refers to breakthroughs as a sociological question, the tension between the individual and the group. How does society make room for breakthroughs. *Studies in Intellectual Breakthrough* is in part an attack on Thomas Kuhn (*Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, see n 11, above), who, according to Axelrod, is interested only in the results of a breakthrough, and who dismisses the question of origins because they are inscrutable. This is, of course, the very notion that ERH is opposing: what is not subject to validation in accordance with the certifiable method for determining truth is to be ignored or avoided. Scientific speech uses its authority and prestige to censor and control, Axelrod points out. "It takes as its mandate the authority to rule on the legitimacy of other speakers." (pp. 12, 22). Hence a breakthrough is always difficult.

31. This is a tactic of reversal that ERH employed often, demonstrating that a writer saws off the very branch on which he sits. "There is actually no place in Freud's system of reference for Sigmund Freud's own lifetime achievement. The same holds, by the way, for many other secular minds, for Schopenhauer, for Marx, for Nietzsche. In the worlds they envisioned, there was no place for them as creators, as authors, as commanded, i.e., named, 'thous'. . . . In a classless society an intellectual with his head in the clouds like Marx would be intolerable. For precisely that reason there will never come to be a classless society, because God evidently left space for Himself to be able to call on men like Karl Marx, or Freud, or Nietzsche." (*Soziologie*, vol. I, p. 305.) ERH made the same point about John Dewey. Dewey's theories of education could never produce another John Dewey. The life of the thinker, when properly understood, undermines his own theories.

ERH was preoccupied by the problem of how we reproduce men and women who have the virtues we covet and that we know are necessary in a healthy society. In a brilliant series of pages in *Out of Revolution*, pp. 73-90, ERH saw this as the principal defect of capitalism, which uses up resources but does not do enough to replace them, and he was thinking of human resources. "The irresponsibility of the employer for the *reproduction* of the forces he hires, uses, and eventually destroys or wastes, is the curse of capitalism." The "real injustice of an acquisitive society" is that since its "great aim is to produce goods cheaply, it has no direct interest in reproducing men."

32. See n. 18 above.

33. One thinks here of the so-called Humanistic Psychology movement, exemplified by Abraham Maslow, which grew out of dissatisfaction with Psychoanalysis because it was concerned mostly with pathology, and with behavioristic theories because they were reductionist. Maslow, a prolific author, pioneered in studying the psychology of healthy, achieving people. He writes, "I want to demonstrate that spiritual values have naturalistic meaning, that they are not the exclusive possession of organized churches, that they do not need supernatural concepts to validate them, that they are well within the jurisdiction of a suitably enlarged science. . . ." (***Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences*** (New York, 1970; orig. publ., 1964), p. 3.

This is a well-meaning attack on the limitations of a "scientific" psychology, but Maslow's concept of an "enlarged science" would simply attempt to objectify spirituality along with sal*i*vation. ERH's point is that objectification is itself the problem, not simply, let's say, materialism. Maslow wants to change the practice of science; ERH wants to segregate it as but one manner of engaging with reality and restrict it to its proper domain.

"Our times," ERH wrote, "saturated with natural science as they are, ruin the very conditions of a prosperous natural science by carrying over to subjects the rules that apply to objects only." *Classic and Founder,* p. 13:

34. note to come

34a. *Christian Future,* pp. 52-53.

35. One source for discovering ERH's thinking on the life cycle is his lecture series "Circulation of Thought," delivered in 1954, 26 hours of lectures. Cassettes and transcripts are available from Argo Books. See also, "The Twelve Tones of the Spirit," in *I Am an Impure Thinker*, pp. 69-76.

36. I am thinking of Erikson's wonderful lecture, "Human Strength and the Cycle of Generations," in *Insight and Responsibility* (New York, 1964), pp. 111-157. "Man's psychosocial survival is safeguarded only by vital virtues which develop in the interplay of successive and overlapping generations, living together in organized settings. . . . The

individual's life-stages are 'interliving,' cogwheeling with the stages of others which move him along as he moves them. Erikson speaks of "Hope, Will, Purpose, and Competence as the rudiments of virtue developed in childhood; of Fidelity as the adolescent virtue; and of Love, Care, and Wisdom as the central virtues of adulthood. In all their seeming discontinuity, these qualities depend on each other. Will cannot be trained until hope is secure, nor can love become reciprocal until fidelity has proven reliable. . . . " And so forth.

37. Hans R. Huessy, "Contributions to Psychiatry from the Writings of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy," in M. Darrol Bryant and Hans R. Huessy, eds., *Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: Studies in His Life and Thought* (Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), p. 140. Cf. Abraham Maslow's five level "Hierarchy of Needs": "At the bottom of the pyramid are the Basic or Physiological needs of a human being, food and water and sex. The next level is Safety Needs: Security, Order, and Stability. . . . Once individuals have basic nutrition, shelter and safety, they attempt to accomplish more. The third level of need is Love and Belonging, which are psychological needs; when individuals have taken care of themselves physically, they are ready to share themselves with others. The fourth level is achieved when individuals feel comfortable with what they have accomplished. This is the Esteem level, the level of success and status (from self and others). The top of the pyramid, "Need for Self-actualization," occurs when individuals reach a state of harmony and understanding." (Extracted from the Wikipedia article on Maslow).

38. "Metanoia: To Think Anew," in *I Am an Impure Thinker* (Argo, 1970), pp. 182-190.