Nietzsche's functional role in the Christian world and in the chaos of theology and philosophy.

Nietzsche went mad over his time and over himself. We allow people to die for their time or for their ideas. Christianity takes it for granted that Jesus died for us. Nietzsche claimed that he went mad, for us.

One thing is certain: he did go mad over one thing is certain, he did go mad, his era, the era of prudery, syphilis, progress, humanism, profound scholarship, and the idol of music as its God-Ersatz.

Nietzsche had all the elements listed as the symbols of his age, prudery, syphilis, modernity, humanism, scholarship, and musical enthusiasm of the highest rank. And he knew that he was the sign to his age that it could not last and had to be overcome.

And in a frenzy of patient impatience, of cheerful melancholy, he sat out to bury his age, at the price of his own mental balance. If we admit that a cross or a bullet on the battlefield may have meaning, we cannot deny the right to ask the historical question: Did Madness enter history, perhaps, in the person of Nietzsche, as a historical force?
Theology and philosophy had achieved the very thing for which Balliol College, Oxford, is so famous: Effortless superiority over every problem, especially over the problem of God.

In every classroom, from every pulpit, in every magazine, God was discussed as though we were sure of his absence. He was an object of discussion, a topic, a he or it. The ego was assigned to every patient in the psychologist's office. The only Ego in the world which exists, God, was a concept or a formula.

Now, theology cannot help treating God in his absence. Anselm of Canterbury knew that his only excuse for writing
Of course, to introduce such an unheard-of form of sacrifice, must sound scandalous to many ears—not so much of pious souls as of clever minds. And so, in a last part, we shall place Nietzsche face to face with the intellectualty of theologians and philosophers. We shall try to explain why both, theology and philosophy, have "changed rapiers," in the scuffling, like Hamlet and Macbeth, in the duel of the monster, genius, child, decadent, imbecile, heroic. Friedrich Nietzsche and his era, the period before the two World Wars, recognizing themselves in the light of this duel, neither theology nor philosophy can carry on as they did before.

II

Let me begin with the well-known story of the two English pilots who were seen in a New York Night Club furtively exchanging glances at two o'clock a.m. They were asked which secret they had; blushingly, the younger man replied: "Oh nothing; only 24 hours ago, we were over Essen."

This story is circulated under the slogan: the annihilation of space. If we wish to gain perspective for Nietzsche, the best manner of doing it is to compare the annihilation of space with his great task: The annihilation of time. I propose to enlarge on this contrast until some very simple contour lines can be seen. My first obligation, in preparing this comparison, is, of course, to remind you of some fundamental historical events the chain of which made possible the conquest or annihilation of space which we witness today.

How long did it take to conquer space? From the invention of wheel and barge, the history of technical civilization may seem to be one continuum. For the sake of simplification, however, it is more adequate to focus attention on that moment from which downward to us the annihilation of space ceased to be an accident. There is a certain epoch when the conquest became the universal dream and therefore the common reality of Western Man.
I find that the task of conquering space was exalted into an enterprise of religious and universal significance in the eleventh century. In the investiture struggle, the Reformers declared that the Church could not be renovated as long as the pope was not elected by all the bishops of the orb, all forming one global and simultaneous constituency for the pope's conclave. This is a new vision which even today has not come true really. In the twentieth century, still, the Italian bishops constitute at least 50% of the electorate. All the more, then, may we be impressed by the new vision of the eleventh century quite unknown to the ancient or Oriental Churches that the space of this world should be organised as one, not for external purposes, but for the salvation of mankind. Indeed, the Eastern Churches always felt that the west had a revolutionary experience and we can put our finger on this experience: it was the experience that heaven should come down to earth, that space should be organised.

Before this dream became real, theologians and philosophers laid down the law for such realisation. Before the world of space could be mastered, certain premises had to be ascertained. A number of attributes had to be attributed to space if it should become conquerable. I shall list here only four of these attributes contributed by Thomas Aquinas, Nielsens Cusanus, Paracelsus, Descartes, in turn. If you lend me your ear for this list, we will have taken the biggest step for understanding Nietzsche. The list of attributes concerns the one- and singleness of the world, its infinity, the solidarity of its observers, and the extrapolation of the observing mind from the world so observed.
Number One, Singleness. Thomas showed that space could not yield results to the sciences if it was not accepted as one and single. Pluralism was thrown out not as impossible but as impractical for man's endeavour to understand the world.

This is not difficult to understand because most of us still hold on to this doctrine of the unity of the world, as though it were not a question of belief but of fact. Infinity is more remote from our conscious interest, perhaps. However, this notion which was vigorously introduced by the Cusanus, in his docta ignorantia in 1440, plays some part even in modern politics. Democracy cannot proclaim the equality of all men except in the light of the infinity of God. If men are compared among themselves, they are not equal at all. Only when compared to God's infinity, do their differences disappear as negligible. The Cusanus applied this to the world of things, radically. Today, we find a solar system in the atom, and the infinitesimal small contains exactly the same physical structure as the infinitesimal big. The concept of the infinite created equality between the finite.

This was the unestimable fruitfulness of the conception of infinity.

Two further attributes were attributed, but this time not to space but to its conquerors. When Thomas and The Cusanus spoke of singleness and infinity, they applied divine notions to nature. Paracelsus and Descartes applied divine attributes to the conquerors, the stemnists of nature. Paracelsus said that no science was possible unless all observers all over the globe got together, submersed their subjective knowledge to one vast experience of universal character, and thereby created the solidarity of all observers of the world.
We owe to this new principle of solidarity our modern physics as you may read in Einstein's formulation of this law of solidarity. Einstein seems ignorant of the man who created this assumption, first. But all our academies with their corresponding membership and this very conference today is an outcome of this attribution of solidarity to all observing minds.

If and when all observers form one mind, this mind may be extrapolated from the world observed. This very bold and very questionable extrapolation was step number four and was made by Descartes. The scientific mind, in its solidarity, has no extension in space, he said. Hence, it is not a part of this world of nature which the mind treats as its object. Descartes deepened the split between mind and body until they nowhere coincided any longer, one being in the realm of ideas, the other in the realm of space. The very word body, originally meaning the living embodiment of a soul, in our modern language became a corpse of a purely physical nature, and it means corpus, a living body, only secondarily.

These four notions: 1. Oneness or singleness of the world of space also called Nature, 2. infinity of the whole as a basis for the equality of all finite things, 3. solidarity of all observers all over the earth, 4. the extrapolation of these observing minds qua minds from the observed world of bodies, clearly were not in existence in the eleventh century. They
This is only to show that we live today in the aftermath of the destruction of the unity of man and mind. The majority of scientists have abandoned the faith in the unity of the world and assume it to be the result of an accidental event. Since the scientists believe as scientists, the plurality of worlds can be supposed by those who do not posit some ordering of an accident. The solidarity of all observing minds is, from Bolshieva for natural science, and from Halley for mathematics, and the separation of mind and body may still be believed by some as well as Lord Russell, and very badly. A plurality of worlds as the cause of the world end assume it to be the result of an accident.

And the general public has abolished the law of thought. Is the premise of any science of nature, of bodies or space, or space collapse with their theological bases, the faith in God, and solidarity and extrauniverse nature with our faith in the unity of man, before our eyes. It would be for the scientist to expect the unity of the world and assume it to be the result of an accidental event. Since the scientists believe as scientists, the plurality of worlds can be supposed by those who do not posit some ordering of an accident.

Similarly, space be similarly infinite, on one hand.
And yet, these undemonstrable things are the premises for the continuous process of scientific research. Before this process could start, the people had to be filled with faith in the unity of all science, the unity of all scientists, the unity of all bodies, the unity of space.

It is true that these undemonstrabilities became as much our second nature, that a few years ago, the notorious but important book by Lewis, "Time and Western Man" could appear. It might have borne the title: "Time be Damned; Space suffices for us." It was a panath to Western Man as he inhabits his self-made space unshaken and unshakeably, and laughs at time.

When this vain self-glorification was printed, Nietzsche's precedent had forced a serious mind all over the West to take up a new line of thought, toting at the conquest of time.

"Time has become the topic of all serious thinking in our days."

**) I only list three names: Bergson, Rosenzweig, Heidegger, Bousit. Recommendable as faulty in detail, Karl Loewith, Temporality and Eternity, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research III (1942), Iff. who treats Heidegger and Rosenzweig. He does not ignore and yet feign to understand the Christian position, the proceeding from eternity into time, and he does overlook that time cannot be known in the manner of space, but must be "existed": Misi easst anima, non easst tempor; Loewith thinks that time can be an object or topic of us ioa without doing something about it. Nietzsche, of course, holds this Christian position, without however defining it clearly since his components, the Jewish and the Pagan, first had to become consistent, in Rosenzweig and Heidegger, be...
Klosterw began to conceive of the next great venture of humanity, the annihilation of time. His dream no longer is untimely. I might read out a long list beginning with remants of Henry Adams who challenged the American historians to look out for a mastery of time, in the approaching catastrophe of speed, i. e. of progress overdone. However, I shall rest my case after one single instance. So and see Thornton Wilder's play 'The Skin of Our Teeth', in Klotzsche's vein, Wilder treats time as annihilated. The hero, Mr. Antwheat, lives in all ages at the same time. He is in the Ice Age and in Mr. Hitler's contemporaries, he is Chesterton's Man Everlasting, but has the power of knowing it, too, and disposing of all times. You will think this funny. Let us not burn witches today as when space was conquered, we declare the adventurer of the new idea, a lunatic and force a nervous breakdown upon him. Then, he is discredited. The witches whom we burned make a terrible vengeance today: their offspring are our psychiatrists and psychologists who triumphantly declare instead anybody who still believes in God or Devil, in growth and miracles, in creation. N.'s knew that he would be called a fool and
a madman because he chose to blend eternity and time in ecstasy and to start from the dionysian experience before he would only and scientifically analyze this very same experience. Motion made him inventive about the ways man may experience time. He simply applied the old Aristotelian rule: Move a separate, non-event tempus. Any expert on time, then, had to give the reins to the soul, first, before time could become real and analyzable at all. Nietzsche makes the ecstasies of Jesus scientifically respectable, and he calls this aspect of Christ, the Dionysian experience.

That this experience in our times must be universalized, has practical as well as theoretical reasons. Wilder's play is called, 'By The Skin of Our Teeth', from Job, because it is crucial for us to become the masters of time. We cannot escape the article in question by the sect who will in the end accept the becoming ill, present catastrophe! But if the conquest of time is understood to be meant as the only escape from the firetrap of the present necessity of a conflagration, the necessity of a conflagration of Nietzsche becomes clear. Their is no frivolity or arbitrariness in his undertaking. It came in the nick of time.

Conquerors of time can do little or nothing with the four principles which Thomas, Ousana, Paracelsus, Descartes had made the scientists believe. Let us take up one after another.  

1) Beautifully said by A. Andler, vol. 21, p. 22.
four years ago, emphasized that geology and prehistory may well
make us dizzy with regard to time as Copernicus did with regard
to space. These millions of years make the event in the little
corner of Palestine in the midst of time look pretty shadowy.

From 6000 years, man's history has increased immeasurably. I am
not a complete unbeliever in the new large figures given us for
this history. However, I do admit that these are the lunatic fringe
around a new feeling for vast time spans, thousands of years. Not
in objective figures but in our subjective feeling, the change
takes place. While we may have learned to keep our equilibrium
in the vastness of space, we have not yet learned what discipline
millions of years may impose on us. Nietzsche scents that to
think of these time spans, will take a much more ascetic discip-
line. The matters of Man must cease to be, in Cotton Mather's
phrase, the matters of one age, 'res unius aetatis.' Space-thinking
makes time at best a fourth dimension of space, and so time has
only the one dimension of the immediate present, of this generation,
and it may be called monogenic. Nietzsche invites us to this
'theory' of one time

"polygeny, through many generations."

*) I have always held that the oldest date of history was not be-
fore 7798, and I am delighted to find that H. E. Winlock has
For this purpose, we have to imagine time as infinite. Otherwise, our little life, one man's biography, and the life of the ages, can not be squared. If Jesus, a man who walked in the public eye for three years, and the history of mankind shall be measurable, the infinitesimal small and the infinitesimal big chunks of time must behave identically. Biography of the individual and history of the race must reflect the same laws.

As a result of this new interest, space may become finite with Nietzsche and with modern science, time takes over the quality of infinity.

2-Go, Thomas and the Cusanus are superseded. What about the solidarity of the meereaxax observers, all over the globe? It is emphatically denied. Each man, in his lusting for power, construes the world from his own center, with a peculiar perspective. No two pairs of eyes see alike. To measure is already to use our own power. It surprises you, this denial of an identity of perspective. You have only to compare Paracelsus' starting point with the one Nietzsche, and you will understand.

XXIIIIIIIII Hofshenhein certainly knew of the fight for survival far more from experience than Nietzsche. However, he defined research for doctors trying to help their patients all over the globe. The so-called objective standards of our natural sciences were developed in the refinement of the medical professions. New professional service means that a man deliberately foregoes his immediate own will to power in the service of his patient, client, pupil, etc. (morgan, What Nietzsche Means p. 282 with ample references.)

*) continuation from p. 11:

Given the shorter era (2773 B. C.) in his magnificent study The origin of the Ancient Egyptian Calendar, Proc. American Philos. Soc. 63(1940), 447-464. Simultaneously, Sidney Smith in 1940, followin Fucks-Baingin's publication in the Revue 'd' Assyriologie 34(19) reduced the Mesopotamian chronology, thereby correcting the current f. i. used in the Cambridge History. It is disappointing to see the theologians now cater to the public by bowing before the endless dates of science. They certainly have forgotten to be the representatives of eternity within an hour.
Our professional men made the attempt to rival in objectivity and serviceability with the clergy of medieval times. Nietzsche starts from the opposite end. He bewails the specialist attitude which the better it is may save the idiot, the decadent, the weak, by their very services, and may lose sight of the norm, the strong, the healthy. All the professions make sense by having their members abdicate in the service of somebody else. Nietzsche is concerned with this somebody else. He protests against pushing this somebody else into a dark corner. This is the goal of creation, is the right kind of man, the man whom the specialist serve, but who is at his best when he does not need them.

Nietzsche's is concerned with this somebody else.

How can we have identity of perspective with anybody else since God moves him to new shores? Is not God eternally original? But Nietzsche makes up for this destruction by giving him as in his hero solidarity through the ages. He may not maintain a constant being because he most need all times equally vigorous.

Nietzsche wishes us to possess the whole course of time in its total measurable extension. Not only shall the whole future be Nihil; the whole successive process in its plenitude shall be carried over into the new realms.

This solidarity with all times is abhorrent to the product of our education. History has, by its scientific turn, estranged away from the past. I am a senior in college, in 1940; I think that the boys of the class of 1917 were fooled; and with this conviction that I am far beyond them, I shall concern myself with a man who died in 428 A.D. (St. Augustine, that is.) Why? This is neatly put the wisdom of the century of progress from a genuine student's paper. Ours is a mentality of contemporaries. We rely on simultaneity with the current events and the spirit of the times. At the same all men try to think the same or at least to argue about the same even though they may split on its Yes or No. Against this immersion into one's own time, Nietzsche reacts violently by proposing solidarity with men not of our time.
This implies that human solidarity cannot be based on the concepts and thoughts of the minds. For, the mental process proceeds and changes incessantly. Concepts are for contemporaries, and conceptual agreements between Plato and the atomists through the ages do not really connect Plato with the correspondingly powerful thinker of another age, do not link men of the same rank through the ages. Hence, Nietzsche seeks his own disciples. He asks for a relation with men of his rank. These will have to deny his concepts simply in order to be of his rank.

This is the cerebral, intellectual culmination of the love thine enemies, which offers a new degree of integration and of vitality by creating higher contradictions, and the Church who accepted the command of the love of the enemy, who later founded the occidental universities on the principle of having two men teach in the same place on the same topic opposing opinions, may simply take stock of this further application of her old vitalizing principle, by Nietzsche.

If mentality can't serve as mortar in binding the men of all times together, some other tie must be developed. The legislator is connected with any other legislator through the sufferings of the change which he wills. This power to legislate Nietzsche calls superhuman. Nietzsche proclaims the superman who can legislate, abolish some allegedly cosmic law according to which people were divided into good and evil ones. The legislator is, by necessity, beyond the good and evil of the existing order. When Moses crushed the first two tables and was offered a better nation than Israel for a new start, he certainly was beyond his own good, identity with Israel.

Nietzsche's immoralism is meant on this level of Moses legislative choice. One minute before the promulgation of the new law, the legislator is outside the old good and evil and outside the new division as well.

This "outside" is Zarathustra, is the Dionysian ecstasy, is the tragedy of any hero of humanity.

If the power to forfeit contemporaneity is the feature of the valuable man, it may be permitted to coin a special term for it. I have proposed and used the term distemperancy for it. It is not a Nietzschean term.
The term "distemporal," however, marks the progress made in our dealing with "time," on the basis of Nietzsche's pioneering. For Nietzsche, this power meant divinity, and he hoped to see the time when anybody and everybody would confess with Thales in Plato's (1884) that he wished to be a God.

Now, we are prepared to face the Cartesian bifurcation of mind and "body." It is perfectly meaningless for legislators. They cannot be extrapolated from the world which they could into their own body. Although Nietzsche is not aware of the strange identification of soul and mind, many moderns will claim that we can "see the soul—" the mind—though it were the same. In (William) James can begin his "psychology" with the definition that psychology (soul-science) be the science of the "mental" processes and psychiatrists can confound all the "mental" and "moral" diseases; he scents the catastrophe which this identification has produced. In his books, he tries to speak of body again in the sense of the whole; in his letters and poems, the term soul abounds.

The insanity of this match quoted many times in composite forms by him, and the division between body and mind is left behind; but with it, the unity of the scientific mind is left behind. Nietzsche, however.

Let us step back since the steps of natural science and of a future "time" science are now comparable. Thomas, Gassendi, Hohenheim, Descartes, and said: unity and singleness of space; infinity, identity of all observers, opposition of subject mind and object body; or, more precisely, one universal mind analyzes all bodies in the universe.

Against every one of these great stratagems for the domination of space, Nietzsche turned: No two spaces are alike, space is finite, every observer has another perspective, man does not gain significance by ruling the bodies of space, a bodyless mind, but by incarnating his divine, everlasting power into mind and body.
This comparison may help to show the reasonableness of his 
program for something neither Thomas nor Descartes had dreamt 
of. On the other hand, we must hasten to stress the utter unreasonableness of this comparison.

On one side we have nine hundred years from Berenger 
of Tours to whom for the first time, the problem of space and 
broke away from the mental sphere; down to Dewey and Einstein, 
and on the other hand one man, and one man only, preparing a new 
start into an altogether new direction.

This does not make the comparison meaningless because 
the very principle of infinity allows to see in Nietzsche—an 
ten years of new science the seed of a millennium as long and as 
fruitful as that which started with Berenger and Anselm's 
thesis.

If not meaningless, this comparison abounds the inevitable 
tragedy. Long and well established forms of thought are 
merciless to embryonic beginnings. They will always declare 
that the embryo comes "too early". They made Nietzsche into 
a "posthumous" man. "May the living forgive me if at times they 
seem to me shadowy", he exclaimed.

Of his contemporaries, he was acutely conscious.
The decadence of European nationalism, the catastrophe of 
a war between Germany and the rest of the world, the abolition 
of Christianity by Germany, the witches sabbath of all free 
and merely free thinkers, had to precede his day, the day of 
Zarathustra. Anybody trying to line up with him, was bound 
to misunderstand him since he would not be steeped in the 
same dread of a complete catastrophe, before the world would come 
to its senses. The Foerster-Nietzsche's, the Oehlers, the Andlers 
and the Brintons fill this "in-between" time which 
does not believe in prophecy, neither in his prophecy nor in 
prophecy in general, least of all the Church. Nobody, except 
Nietzsche and Jehovah's Witnesses, believed in an immediate 
end of the world, during the last sixty years.

While Schleitwe and xxxxx Dodd labored to restore 
the belief of early Christianity in an end of the world, and
called the foundation of the Church by the technical term: "Re-
chatology Realized. Nietzsche simply lived this faith in the end
of his world, and realized *rechatology. * And much as a sober
reasoning about the Church became possible only after the fall
of Jerusalem, the Crisis of the West from 1805 to our days of 1942
was needed before we can talk business on Nietzsche.

There were no adherents of Nietzsche, in the mean time,
but only preparers of his proper function. This proper function
is the establishment of distemporaneity within a society gone
and with contemporaneity. Nietzsche was the first medicine man
for the Great Society of all mankind. Since he came seventy years
before society was forced to become One, he had to prepare the
new office in an impractical , a mad, manner. However, if ever
mankind should reestablishize economize its forces for unity, it
seems obvious to me that she will need some such office, as the
tribes retained, a form of inspirer and guardian, a carrier
of all the spiritual germs as well as immunities, by which
groups can survive. The medicine man, the man who forces
distemporaneity elements into the fabric of current events, will
have an indispensable, though unlikely, function.

We are unfair to Nietzsche because of the time allowed.
We shall not commit the greater unfairness of using his

nomenclature which was wholly dependent on his environment and his

opponents. For instance, he keeps the singleness of the world,

and of nature 17 - I counted more than 370 places in which these
two terms are used, and in the singular always - although he has

no right to this inheritance from his-ism; on the other hand, he

nowhere discusses the singular MAN, in his relation to the plu-

ral MAN. His term "Life" is the go-between, so to speak, be-

tween the space singular "Nature", or World or Space itself, and

the world which he had of the MAN, through the ages. All the
times must he make use of the terminology and language of the e

centuries which he attacks. "Life was such a firm, a singular

like world, but vital like men, a very unsubstantial compromise,
For our mental health, and our power to speak, we depend on collaboration and fellowship, and Nietzsche knew it. His mind died, so to speak, from blood poisoning, having to use all the time phrases which his contemporaries would understand in their own frame of reference. As George Morgan in his careful study What N. Means, says: "Nietzsche uses "truth" like many of his terms, in two senses, an old one which he denounces, and a new one which he affirms."

Because of this constant ambiguity, probably, I never was attracted by Nietzsche's works; his trustworthiness comes from his placing himself between two eras, and allowing us today to chart our course perhaps in time to escape from the fate of the European continent, warned by dioptric.

I shall only give two examples of his predicament because they are of practical importance for our own times. The one is the choice of his title: Thus Spake Zarathustra. In one way, it was a stroke of genius. Before Plato and Socrates, here was a legislator, singer, seer, ignorant of the division we make between science, religion, law, politics, music, poetry."

The choice was the best under the circumstances.

And yet, it was a mask and led to the first threatening split of personality as described by N. himself

"Die Mitternacht, Aus Raus da warden zwei
Und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei.

Here is the mask, the mask which is followed by another and again another mask, the masks which haunt the primeval tribesmen whose dances Nietzsche invoked, the mask which makes man unable to become himself, believed and

Theism knew that unless the world is one only if God has created it. Nietzsche did not know, but he believed all his life that man is one only if God loves him. Then he destroyed his attachment to his own belief, that man becomes a person because

*) Harvard University Press 1941, p. 50
he (as loved) he came under the curse of his own time which thought of man as divine because he had a mind. His curse, born by lesser souls, killed him since he was out to prove that the mind did not make the person or the man. He shouted that mind does not make for unity. The proof offered by him did not mislead. I think he proves his point, but the many masks under which he tried to prove it, drove him into the abyss of madness. (*

The second example in his attack on Platonism. He wished to uproot the theistic aspect of God according to which he has a first cause, the prime mover, the biggest of all, and replaces it by the eternal divinity of which men are the times. He might have said—but he never did—that men are times. He did, however, once say that the human soul was a harp, with a unique melody. However this may be, he lived at a time when western Man agreeded themselves carefully tothaxmu against the unity of God.

From 1100 to 1900, from the Crusades to Einstein, by playing up the Reception of Plato as the origin of modern science, our mental home is papered with Aristotle when we should say Thomas, and with Plato when we should say Descartes or Cusanus or Kant. Nietzsche had to kill the Platonist aspect of Christi-anity, in its second millennium (*). West of the time, (* "Résolu à défricher le sol à jamais de tout poisonnement de Platonism, il en extréme notamment la souche la plus souterraines et résistantes, la croyance Chrétiennne.

And he talked of Socrates with such violence when in fact he wished to lead the road from 1900 to 2100. Seemingly pushing us backward from Socrates to Dionysos, he actually longed for a door which would lead from the desolation of Grover Whalen's World's Fair to a newly inspired, a fairer mankind.
there are some other moments— he is convinced that the God of Christianity was the Platonic God. He never realized that the whole trinity Munemusa campaign was a victory over Plato and Aristotle, and that Christianity can survive in a complete divorce from Hellenism, that this indeed is the only hope of survival.


But since the Occident had discovered the world of space with the help of Porphyrus, Menaech Seneca, Cicero, Aristotle, Plato, in this order (which means in an order opposite to historical sequence), Nietzsche leaned over the raft of Christianity into the flood of time and saw the pre-platonic world of Dionysus—well equipped to analyze and illuminate the life of man—introduced to the sphere of a man who knew only Porphyrus. He found nothing in the latter except a sort of pre-platonic world if such a world could exist. He did not feel that man wished to see an end of history. Nietzsche became the Deification of Man and the Church.

In the Church attacked when man is justified. The deification of a man was the explicit purpose of the Church of the Saints.*)


With the historic reality of this Church of the Redeemed, Nietzsche nowhere comes to grips. Those plants and gods of God are simply unknown to him; how unknown, shows his attitude towards Paul. Here is trapped by the indefinable stupidity of his contemporaries, especially Overbeck. He never asked himself the simple question how it came that he, Nietzsche, was able to rival Jesus, to destroy Plato, to enthroned Dionysus. All three acts, he owned to Plato, and one might almost feel tempted *)"The Godhead, the principle of deification by which those who shall become gods, do become Gods... " (Munemusa-Dionysus, the Areopagite, Menaech Seneca, Tertullian, De Ecclesiastica Hierarchy, Cap. 1, #4, Migne Patrologia Graeca, III, 375.)
to say, to Paul alone. Where Nietzsche is at grips with reality, it is in his fight against Scholasticism and Protestantism, against Aristotle and Plato, inside Christendom. These influence in Church and College is still unbroken. Nietzsche rightly then called "Christendom" the one thing which Protestantism and Romanism do share, their Greek theism, unbiblical as it is. Both, he rightly accuses us, have been equivocal about the reality of God's world against the world of space and silence. They did give over this world to science, and retreated into another world which either was proclaimed to be "another" world or an"interior"World, and by doing so, they abandoned their bold belief in incarnation, that this was the one and only world which God ever created and ever will create, that the kingdom of God is in our hearts, that God is allowing the risen Christ to stand on his right now, for the last two thousand years, and that heaven is open now and not then.

Ezra, Prince of Humanism, had turned Christ to Socrates, and he knew how to make the conversion of Socrates fit Jesus, in an interior world and eternity.

Nietzsche's era, the era in which Gurdjieff could give in to the temptation to equate Paul and Socrates, and Jesus and to pray with Socrates, in his Colloquium: Sancta Socrates, ora pro nobis.

Against this identification, Nietzsche places the equation—and with him, it was a real equation—Dionysus/the Crucified.

The ora pro nobis, of course, had to go, as well as the Socrates, and was replaced by an "enliven us", "fill us", "support". The very marvellous identity of Erasmus, the prince of Humanism, to Nietzsche's cross to suggest that Nietzsche did put an end to this whole era of Christianity, called Humanism.

If you find the Dionysus an outcry exaggerated—Heiderix—used the equation first—be careful that you do not miss the one aspect under which the Crucified and the Cross can make process at all in a repaganized world.

Humanism is, certainly at the last years, the foremost, the greatest, the greatest, against all, the Humanism, against the society of the Dionysian, the tragic character of life again, the lack of precalculability.
In a society where most people lead meaningless lives, the outcrop: "This is true Divinity that there are Gods but not a God" is not devoid of meaning as it first sounds. Platonism, and 95% of our college teachers are Platonists, and Aristotelism —and 95% of our Catholic Priests are Aristotelians—has degraded God into an idea, (the Platonists) or a first cause, (The Aristotelians) of the abuse of by Humanism.

Look into the old Testament where the very name of Yahweh in Exodus 3, is translated by a philosophical formula."I am who I am" (against even Thomas Aquinas had certain doubts) whereas it actually means: "I am with you," "I am present." Against a God-prime mover and against a God-Idea, nothing can help but: He,-those old people seem to have conceived that this is fully covered by the conceptual.

Certainly, Nietzsche is outside the Church and outside Christianity, with this shout, but he is not outside humanity.

I often think that he simply picks up a strand left untied by Augustine and late Nicolaus Cusanus. When Cusanus speaks of the vision of God, he stresses "the succession without succession" in God's eternity. "Timelessness and succession may well coexist once the human reasoning is out of the way," says Nietzsche. 1) Over and the same problem.

"Compare the other: "Thou art a God, and never did I hear things more divine" in Föhrliche Wissenschaft (1882), #244.
2) Nicholas of-Cusa, The Vision of God, J. M. Dent 1928, p. 2
3) Werke XI, 186
1) Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, quaestio 13 Art. XI.
We Christians should have given more thought to this before. But the resurrection of the writings of the Fathers can only bring life. So much about the Church of Man Deified, of the Redeemed.

VI Theology and Philosophy and Natural Or Strange Words.

Obviously, Nietzsche is completely irreconcilable with standardized theology and philosophy. "Theology has choked God," he exclaims. And philosophy has evaporated the world. To both, something irrecoverable has happened which divides their existence into pre-Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean.

(Technology today is the science of somebody else's God. It is Philosophy and History and Psychology of Religion. In the Divinity School at which I taught, there was one single man who did not prefer his standing in the Department of either History or Philosophy or Literature, to his rank in Divinity. Those who wished to be scholars, and you can't be a scholar with an ordered route. The topic of the modern scholar may be circumscribed as New or Old Testament or Church History. But not his judgment anticipated.

Practically, this is what has happened. Theology is the logic of some "objective" concept of God, as found in Church or Bible or all the World Religions. Which means that God is absent, and the one quality of God which made theology in the last thousand years possible, his omnipresence, is incompatible with the new critical attitude. Anselm of Canterbury knew that his theistic speculation was a makeshift for the time in which God forsaketh him; his dialectics were based on a theory of God's absence; this means, it presupposed fuller moments in the life of the theologian where he was full to the brim of the Divine Life. *) This emptiness of the theological state is forgotten; Prof. Bixler thinks the when he speculates, he is nearer to God than in any other state.

(Readers' Special Pass)
God now belongs to the world which can be discussed. Reasonably, we may speak of God as long his name remains a power in our personal survival, and not one minute longer. The rest is philosophy.

The theologians belong today to Philosophy, and its departments, with the special connotation that there worldly material is Bible, Creed, Church etc. of the so-called Christians and Jews. Christianity is the subject matter of theology, nothing more.

Now, in a parallel movement, philosophy has outgrown the condition of its existence. Which is this condition? That the philosopher, being faced by Chaos, suffered from the irrational character of the universe, and in this suffering, he emerged with the pearl from the bottom of the sea which inversed most minds, and put sense into this Chaos. The philosopher was important for the world. He was a special case of mind, unnaturally troubled with by Chaos.

Theis effort has spent itself. The philosophy of common sense has seen to this. The world is seen by everybody alike. The Pragmatists tell us that the mind is a tool, an instrument to satisfy the common man. Everybody can understand the world, nobody is driven crazy by its abnormality. The World is just followed beforehand. It is believed in, as divine and orderly. Philosophy has become a theology of the good, true, beautiful world. Common sense philosophy is theology. Theologists ceased to follow the rules of their game when they began to speak of other people's God. Philosophers ceased to function when they began to speak of everybody's world. Without the "God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me", over the theologian's desk, and without the parallel inscription: The World is out of joint, over the philosophers headquarters, the two sciences as we have known them, disappear. "As if some lesser God had made the world and had not force to shape it as he would, now becomes the watchword for the theologian; and for the world, we get the delusive blasphemy of Browning: God's in his heaven- All's right with the world!" Is it not strange that Tennyson and Robert Browning should have written the epitaphs for this pair of twins?

VII

There can be no theology without the risk of blasphemy and there can be no philosophy without the risk of madness.
Dewey and Bixler, the latter for philosophy, the former for theology, would not see this connection. Nietzsche saw it.

Jonathan Edwards remains a great theologian because in his revival, he hit very hard at the neighborhood of blasphemy. William James remains a great philosopher because insanity, madness tempted him time and again. In our days when people discuss a finite God, and a finite world, they still resent blasphemy. When somebody doubts the virtues of your college team, he still can commit a desecration. Without desecration, no consecration, without the fear of the unholy, no belief in Holiness. Find out were a man sees red— and you know his God. It's usually he himself.

When the mayor of Miletus had to govern a handful of Greek, in the face of the Nile cult of Egypt, he shouted: Everything is water. The waves of the Mediterranean and the waters of the Nile, became one. Their separation would have made any understanding of the world impossible; Thales of Miletus would have gone mad. When Johannes of Damascus, 1500 years later, can say: The trinity may be compared to water: the father is the source, the son the river, the spirit the ocean.* It is as though he quoted Thales who had reconciled fresh and salt water, first, and in this, the whole world.

Blasphemy because God is treated as absent, and madness because the world is a labyrinth without orientation, are the reasons for the existence of philosophy and theology. In his time, Nietzsche was the only man who knew both these truths, and he suspended them over his life as well as his thought, as their guiding stars, and as his judges. If you wish to judge him, judge him in their light.
Philosophers and theologians will not see this connection. Nietzsche took its burden upon himself. Nothing great is to be expected from a philosopher or theologian whose thought does not originate within this danger zone.

Think of the two greatest American thinkers, Jonathan Edwards and William James. Edwards knew of blasphemy because he had come near it in connection with the revivals in Northampton. His foremost witness of the revival later killed himself. And William James? All his life, insanity and madness tempted him and out of the pit his courage was begotten.

They were not so sure as the modern thinkers who speculate on a religion for freethinkers, and on the finite character of God or God's beginning after the glacier period.

Without danger of desecration, how can there be consecration? The special activities called theology and philosophy exist because men wish to safeguard themselves against blasphemy and madness. And we blaspheme when we treat God as absent, we go mad when the world has lost direction, for us. Nietzsche cried for a revelation which would orientate him in the world and fill him with divinity. This is the power of transvaluating values, in us.

Now, Nietzsche was the only man in his time who knew the two reasons for the existence of theology and philosophy, the two dangers of blasphemy and madness and he suspended them over his life as well as over his thought, as stars and judges.

If you wish to judge him, judge him in their light...
"God is not sent from my speech; and the world has no orientation without my thought", he tried to say at a moment when the people only talked about God and about the world as though God were the experience of a third party, and his own thought the world contained any signposts of his own.

In the face of these human beings without the power of being the dators legis, in case if their stammering: I am just a human being he reminded them of the fact that God was on their lips and the world in their thoughts whether they liked it or not.

At the same time, seeing them desert God and World in favor of just being "human beings", he rightly exclaimed: "Not only the wisdom of many millennia, their madness, too, comes to ahead in us."

And so, you look into a new kind of hell which he opened and willingly entered, a hell in which he was in many times of man at the same time. And in opening this hell, he gave an unholy picture of our nature. Man is times. Nietzsche, seemingly lived an active life from 1809 to 1889. Here, he shared the decadence of his era, its deification of art and criticism, its blindness towards the Church etc. as an obedient and loyal contemporary.

Secondly, this same Nietzsche withered in agony expecting the witches sabbath of all free thinking, the victory of anarchy, and again he identified himself with the despair and anarchy and courage of the masses whom we see at war today because he could see that war would be their only way of self assertion.

Thirdly, however, he left the contemporary of 1880 and the prophet of the rebellion of two world wars behind himself and lived the Zarathustra discipline that would have to follow in the wake of these catastrophes. Then, when a united mankind would need the martial virtues for its simple survival, Zarathustra would come into his own, and implant those virtues which formerly were begotten by external wars into the fiber of a now pacified mankind which still and not more than ever had to sublimate these same virtues.

Nietzsche is all these three times before the wars, in the wars, after the wars. And certainly the man who saw madness breaking out, is more than a man who goes mad. By saying it, he became the reconvalvescent of his own madness, and can vaccinate others who have to live through the same three phases, now.

Nietzsche is polychronous. And this "torn-to-pieces-hood", he revealed as man's true nature his being crucified between the times, over an abyss. Not as an act of Roman justice, but as the indecipherable watermark of every human heart, the Cross become legible now. It is engraved in all of us because man is crucified by time. The cross is at first a historical fact but after Nietzsche, it is made into a secular and scientific fact, too. The cross is the truth about man's nature. When a man has to carry this torn-to-pieces-hood all alone, he must go mad. We must carry it together.
However, this now has become from a revealed dogma inaccessible to human reason, an experimental fact, through Nietzsche. Man has indeed one feature which sets him apart from the world of space as much as from God's eternity, the Cross in his heart which sends the sword right through his heart and makes him into a distemporal.

The World is space, God is eternal, Man is polychron, Nobody is obliged to believe this. But he can know it, from now on, as the scientific truth about human nature.

Knowledge and faith have changed places. Knowledge of man now states the truth formerly guarded by faith alone. The of

The carrier of a life time philosophy does not exist. Nietzsche shed his philosophies like animals their fur. Man has one nature, to be torn, to be suspended between past and future, and belong to at least three times, Heaven, Earth, Hell.

Maddened by the world and blaspheming the name of God, Nietzsche transformed belief into fact, secularized the teachings of revealed religion about man's nature and gave them the value of facticity.

Providentially, this happened at a moment when the written sources of our belief, Bible and calendar of the Church, lost their grip over Western Man. Our children, in their majority, are ignorant of the Bible, and the Calendar of holidays. But, I do think that they are imbued with a clear notion of man's torn nature, which the Christian idealists never dared to have.

 groundbreaking turning point marked off by Nietzsche, is the transfer from the ecclesiastical reservation of Christian souls to the free hunting grounds of secular minds. He said there shall.

Theology may now well be unbelieving; philosophers must make man the believer the starting point of philosophy. Man's nature is not in his reason, but in the Cross of distemporal, in the fact that he ends and opens times.

Now, the more thoroughly our space may become organized in a well functioning economy, the more shall we become confronted with the task of making men of all times, from the stone age to the age of Greenwich village, live together. The more all men may be equal as to food, housing, clothing, the more radical will appear
"God is not absent from my speech; and I am not unimportant for the orientation of the world", he tried to say at a moment when people loved to assert: I am just a human being, that is when they withdrew from God and World, by this very expression, when they gave up to be the dater legis.

"Nicht nur die Vernunft von Jahrtausenden, auch ihr "Jahrhundert bricht an uns aus". Not only the wisdom of millenniums, their madness, too, bursts forth, in us [*] In the face of these "human beings", without Gods or Worlds, he spoke the truth, and identifying himself with these dying souls, he brought their madness out into the open, himself.

Again, let it be said that he had to live in a number of ages, simultaneously, if he should find a new time-continuum. He was the victim of the conquest of space, and he called himself the decadent of this era, his own time.

He foresaw that others would rebel not in words as he, but in terrible convulsions, and he identified himself with the peoples now at war. Finally he threw his soul far ahead over the abyss of these wars, when a united mankind could implant the virtues of war into its unity, Zarathustra. The man who said that madness broke out, is not simply the man who went mad. By seeing it, he survives his and its time's lunacy, a reconvalescent.

By this poly[verse] character of Nietzsche's thought, his "torn-to-pieceshood", the nature of man is revealed as crucified. In our old papermaker's product, the foolscap, you could see a fool's cap and bells engraved as watermark. And for our pre-nietzschean eyes, we wore the fool's cap and bells. But for those who knew what Eschatology Realized meant; in reality, behind the foolscap and bells, another watermark, indelibly engraved in the human heart, becomes legible: the cross. The Cross is not only a historical, it also is a world[ly] fact, it is the truth about man's nature.
From a revealed dogma which seemed inaccessible to natural reason, the Cross has become, through Nietzsche, a fact of nature and of the new science of time and man. Man has one feature which sets him apart from World or Nature as much as from God, the Cross in his heart which makes him into a distemporary.

The World is space; and if you object that after all time is mentioned in science, Nietzsche and all the modern time-thinkers will reply: No, not the genuine time; science sees time as a poor fourth dimension, as an afterthought, and in a curtailed perspective as seen from the viewpoint of space.

God is eternal.

Man is polychron. Men are times when they are blind and cowards. They are polychron, divine, if they are willing to pay the price, to suffer the Cross of being and of not being a member of their own time. Nobody can be forced to do this. Nobody is obliged to believe this. But the new situation is that from now on, everybody may know it as the simple truth about human nature.

All ideas about a human mind superior to the human body about a timeless reason in man, about an unshakable self-reliance in man’s character, our natural reason, have come to nought.

The carrier of philosophy whom we presupposed following the Greek standards of the sober man, is a fiction. Man has one nature, to be incalculable, to be unstable, to be torn, to be suspended between past and future. His greatest triumph of integration is not to become whole like a little globe or monad but to get himself so much together, as to avoid a complete disintegration, a mere confusion and split personality inside; the perfect man and most normal reason would still have to be a cross between a crucial reason simply because we are times and suspended between past and future, between the beginning of the stone man and the end of all times.

Thus maddened by the world, and blaspheming, Nietzsche transformed belief into fact, secularized the teachings of revealed religion about man’s nature into universal facticity.

*) This is the important result of the three volumes of
von Balthasar, S. J., Die Apokalyse der Deutschen Seele, 1934
and this he did at a moment when the sources of revealed religion lost their hold over Western Man, by the critical approach. Our children, in their majority, do not read the Bible. But I do think that they are imbued with a new notion of human nature.

The historical turning point marked off by Nietzsche, is this inexhaustible transfer from the ecclesiastic: the reservation to the free hunting grounds of any human mind.

Doing this, he wrote a new lease on life since theology and philosophy, both, can now develop new standards, an unbelieving theology, so to speak, and a believing philosophy.

Beyond the changes in these two fields, the function of Nietzsche stands out clearly: He has opened a new era in which the atmosphere is purified from two heresies of the last thousand years: one that nature is divine, and the other that man is natural.

Man has his own nature, the cross which he shares with neither God nor World. The reciprocal life of the three individualities, Man, God, World, enters then, into a new phase of "perichoresis," of "circumincassion" as the old doctrines call it. And the Morris dance of these three elements which are the reciprocal components of reality, God, Man, World, marks for the full orchestral sense, for the conquest of time, all the more urgently the more thoroughly the conquest of space may come to its orderly solution, in some form of economical organisation of the globe.

It is very difficult to conceive of a state of man in which wars and frontiers have disappeared. It is only for this very day that Nietzsche prepared, the lose usage of man and man, singular and plural, in arbitrary alternation, will have to cease. We will have to become much more precise in our handling of the delicate question when Man and when and their element is time, when they are at the right moment and at the right time.

Whatever we think of Nietzsche, we may admit that he came at the right moment and at the right time.