As you know, the next meeting of the American Philosophers will be in December and will deal with 'Philosophy and the Social Sciences'. Now I could not tell of any other topic more central to all my work. So the announcement wrought on my mind naturally. It was not so much a series of new ideas but a simplification of my method of thinking which was the result. The idea of dealing with so comprehensive a subject in one or two papers seemed little apposite. I thought of it as a hopeless beginning. But like a puzzle or any logical difficulty just the hopeless ingenuity of the program tickled me. I felt that what was needed was a demonstration of not more than one or two principles if the task should be soluble at all.

That was how this paper came into being. It is an attempt less of developing my ideas in full than of boiling them down into a nutshell.

The recipe for such a problem is complicated by the fact that the social sciences are not a reality in the same sense as the natural sciences are. Nobody can doubt the results of the natural sciences. A Ford Car, the Zeppelin, Poison gas are making it impossible to forget their reality, their success.

The social sciences are a bundle of disparate departments of knowsledges which try to 'behave'. Some are under the spell of the natural sciences, some are despised and doubted like economics, some are old-times, without much caring for first principles like some parts of history and philology. In as far as they deserve to be called a unit, they can fairly be taken as a promise, as a task of the future, as a new army waiting for its declaration of independence. For if it was true that they had to take their orders from the natural sciences, we need not talk about them at all. They could fall under the general title 'Philosophy and science.' The title 'Philosophy and the Social Sciences' contains in itself the suggestion that a special and immediate relation exists between Philosophy and the truth about social facts which is well distinguished from our knowledge about nature. That social science be distinguishable from natural science, then, is the working hypothesis underlying the topic of the meeting next winter. But mark well: this is not a conceptual problem or a question of defining 'nature' and 'society' themselves. We are not dealing with nature and society but with the sciences about them; Philosophy is challenged to criticizing mental processes, scientific processes. The instauration of natural sciences by verifying hypothesis in the way of experiment, by reducing many different observations into emanations of general laws, can obviously be employed for many problems concerning man. Eugenics, Statistics, Psychology are largely trying to expand the methods of natural sciences to new fields of application. As far as reduction of an infinite multitude of experiences and observations to general rules is intended we remain disciples of the Novum Organon or of Descartes. Now the fact that social facts are treated and investigated with those methods, will always lead to a natural science of Society but not at all to a new start of a philosophical organon which calls for a method causing social sciences to spring up.

Either the social sciences altogether represent a special method abhorred, despised and obstructed by any natural scientist or they are natural sciences about society. Sciences are methods of mental operations. If the method is the same in principle, it would be sheer self betrayal to call for two different names.
To illustrate this point it may help us to look backward as well as forward. The Social Sciences being at best a promise and a believed future may not have a method of their own. But that the problem of method is all important, can be shown from a comparison of the philosophy inspiring all natural science since the 16th century with the philosophy which built up the medieval civilization. A closer inspection of their values will be given in the appendix. At this point, let us take for granted what is proved in the appendix that both a philosophy of values and one of natural sciences are two perpetual elements of our modern thought. Both are stretching out into the field of sociology.

Moralizing and rationalizing of the social processes is going on all the time and will always go on. There is theology and there is natural science concerned with Society. But society itself cannot give birth to these two sciences for one simple reason. No A B C or D can claim of being an external observer or of experimenting in society really. Neither is society transcending us like the idea and God. The own experiment and the own ideas of the social scientists change the propositions and qualities of society itself. They can, furthermore, not claim to deal with a body of universally established truth. For society contains believers and unbelievers, good and bad, historical men and unhistorical children. He can impose no revealed truth on society or he becomes naivett a dogmatic naturalist or theologian.

In this impasse a way out is furnished by one very simple observation. Whereas God does not speak in human language and nature does not speak, all social facts are accompanied by the words of those who are producing these facts or are registering, attacking or defending these same facts. No social fact is without the accompaniment of names labelling them, human utterances concomitant to these facts. A family is not a fact like a mountain, because the members of the family call themselves the Rosenstock- Huessys or the Joneses. The father of that family is called a father, the child his son and so forth. When the sociologist begins to describe a nation in rapid decay he may have to register as one of the clearest symptoms of its decay the boastfulness of its members. Their bragging of climbing up olympic heights may become an argument in his essay to prove their incontrovertible doom.

The self-consciousness of each part of society is one of the elements of social reality. There are Germans, Americans, Workers and Capitalists, Colleges and Legions not only as denominations and matters of fact. But they all are matters of names giving process in society, as well. The descriptive or the evaluating work of the social scientist may add a new label to Methodism or Bolshevism or Idealism. But one of his observations is that some people praise Bolshevism as a messianic hope and others curse it as the end of civilisation.

All social facts have this quality in common that they have been named, labelled, and termed before science can observe or organise them. This is not an empirical fact but a principle derived from the concept of society itself. Society means collaboration of social forces, of parts of a whole. All these social forces are represented by human beings who talk and who are named according to their social functions and offices. Man is a dignitary holding office in society. Child, slave, private, woman are as official names as Jews Christians, heroes and veterans are. All names are inherent to the social order because they assign places to members of societies or to enemies of society. Society being interaction of human beings, it is impossible that any part can be played in this society without a certain degree of self-consciousness on all sides involved in the interplay. Now social self-consciousness is expressed in words. Words and ideologies, then, are one inescapable element of every subject matter of the social sciences. The social sciences can never get hold of naked facts. They always find facts disguised and wrapped up into language, because society can not exist without a minimum of self-consciousness...
and ideology of its members about their functions.

In this analysis words are shown to be an element of the objective world which the social sciences wishes to discover or to organise mentally. Names, values, words, are here not found on the side of the thinker but on the side of his subject matter. Society's own elements are not only money, human bodies, politics etc; philosophical criticisms, theological wreeds, scientific slogans are social facts of greatest importance. The name of Einstein is a social phenomenon for the social scientist precisely as Hitler.

What can the philosopher offer to enlighten the sociologist in a situation where every word and name has at least a twofold meaning, one in his own scientific work and another among the parts of the society of which he tries to build up a science. A third era of philosophical epistemology is needed because neither dialectics nor logic admit the law of the plurality of subjective world-languages.

And yet the case is not hopeless. For dialectics and logic are not the only elements on which to build a critical philosophy. The third branch of the trivium, grammar, was always a slave of dialectics or logic. For example medieval grammar is wholly dependent on dialectics. Modern philology on the prevailing theory of logic. But as soon as we face social facts grammar suddenly gains an importance unheard of before.

The grammatical structure of any social phenomenon can not be neglected once we admit that in each social fact some self-conscious functioning of human beings is involved and that self-consciousness is expressed by words and names.

The simplest fact may illustrate this. When a police cop summons a mob to disperse, he will shout Go! In general after a minute the mob will have made its decision whether to go or not to go. In both cases three remarks: the cop on duty, the members of the crowd and the reporter will state the same event in three different sentences: the crowd says: we go; the cop: you go? the reporter: they go.

Any social fact, then, can be described in at least three ways:
1. The acting part of society gives a name to what it is driving: I do this.
2. Its antagonist, who is effected by his action says: you do this.
3. The observer who is registering the action says: He does this or he did this or he always does this.

The list I do you do he does seems pretty abstract. And as the skeleton of an epistemology it cannot be too abstract.

It is the minimum of pluralistic judgment which exists in any social phenomenon; those who do, those who are concerned, and the disinterested scientific mind cannot help expressing themselves in three different grammatical forms. A further reduction into the one statement: he goes for example is impossible. If a scientist thinks that the description 'he goes' suffices and does not mention the words concomitant to the event in the mouth of the doer and the sufferers, he degrades his social fact into a fact of nature. He gives up his claim of believing in a special social science. Most modern sociologists, in fact, are natural scientists in their method, even against their intention. Because they think they can describe social reality without explaining why the man who does an act in society calls it 'I go', whereas the scientist, says: 'He runs'. The grammatical interaction between the 'I' the 'you' and the 'he' is by no means arbitrary.

A Republican says: 'I deliver Rome from despotism.' Cesar says: 'Et tu, Brute, art murdering me?' The historian has not only to report both conceptions; he must as well use in his sentence a third verb, neither 'deliver' nor 'murder', I suppose. But whatever he chooses, his description of how Brutus 'killed' Cesar, is based on the two ways of thought and speech prevailing in the partners to the event themselves.
I deliver
You murder
He killed

are three links in the grammatical structure of social thought precisely as lawful as Major Minor and Conclusion in a logical syllogism.

The secret of grammar consists in that it places all the members of society in their proper place. He who acts represents the seat of self-consciousness. So he is condemned to say 'I did it'. They who suffer from his action represent the seat of the natural repercussion and so they shout: 'you do that?' He who meditates or contemplates can pacify the vibrations of his excitement which thrilled the doer and permeated the sufferers. In his third sentence 'he did it', the social process reaches its end. It is no longer dangerous, unlimited. The social scientist, by his discussion, tries to put an end to the violent repercussions and the vibrations which pervade society ever since this particular action broke into the previous framework of society.

Perhaps the social-scientist is less a peacemaker than the dove which is proving that dry land is in the sight after passion has flooded the parties to the social struggle. But peacemaker or dove, always is the social-scientist the lateborn brother of the man who cried out 'I!' and the reacting neighbours who cried 'You'. He is distinguished from them by his grammatical position or situation which allows him to call the I and You a He. But that only means that his mind is towering over the struggle. It does not mean that he is not or should not be a partner to the struggle for the other parts of his being. You can be a Pacifist in Social Science and yet come to bear arms against Japan as an American. Nobody can boast of being a He-speaker in Social Science who does not admit that he was and is in many respects an 'I' and a 'you' in society as well.

The grammatical aspect of society makes the impartiality of the scientist dependent on his capacity for being partial as a natural man. The scientific judgement in the Social Sciences has not the same meaning as it has in the natural sciences. The chemist must have no predelection for hydrogen or oxygen, when he is going to study the mixture of those elements. He begins with a mind passionately devoted to truth but not to hydrogen. The sociologist begins with a natural soul passionately devoted to those he loves and passionately averse to everything that might harm those whom he loves. He who does not love his hero at the beginning will never prove a good biographer. He may cool off, he may listen to all sides, indeed he must, but he must keep aware of the great fact that he could never have written the biography if he had been so cold and indifferent about his hero before he began his work. The part played by benighted enthusiasm and naive faith in creative work must be frankly admitted by the social scientist. They have always played their part. But they never got their proper place in scientific theory.

The grammatical theory allows us to say that social facts in order that they might happen at all must and shall never be called in the same language by those who create them, by those who oppose them, and by those who relate them. It is neither possible or desirable that a boy who marries terms his sex relations with the words apposite for the doctor. The scientific reason for this is that each function in society is slated for extinction if it is not allowed to produce its own self-consciousness. He who is not allowed to say that he marries the best, and most beautiful girl should not marry and need not marry at all. The social sciences have to admit allegedly "wrong" expressions and unscientific language not only as admissible but as necessary for the bringing about of all important social events.

The ambition of a physicist is to make all people know how to reduce albumine to protein, or the air into its elements, or molecules to their atoms. The ambition of the social scientist is the opposite. He must study that amount of unscientific language which is the intrinsic requirement of social life.
Each function in society requires terms, names, evaluation in the mind of the man who represents this function. Thus the grammatical epistemology emancipates the social scientist from the domination of physics in which every function is explained by one formula. The social scientist asks what is the minimum of different evaluations and different self-consciousnesses for preserving the antagonistic functions in society. Take our own symposium, How far must a logician, a grammarian, a philosopher of religion, an estheticist preserve a different terminology in order to survive and to fulfill his function in the department successfully? Dialectics asks: How many opinions can be tolerated about the same values? Logic asks: How many facts can be explained by the same reason? Grammar asks: How many faiths are necessary for preserving the many functions of society?

The minimum of contradictions and the maximum of contradictions which might be consistent with the vitality of society, are the grammatical problem of society. The number of tolerable contradictions is not innumerable but can never become one. A young man, a child and a hoary head will never call a new event either a war or the zeppelin arrival with the same names. And they shall not. Class-war is only one out of thousand examples where the application of the natural scientist's logic led people astray: the Class-war is eternal in as far as it is functional; it is temporary in so far as it is not functional. Employer and employee will always exist albeit that the Government becomes the only employer. But in that case the function of an employee has not disappeared and his interest in immediate higher wages will still try to frustrate the interest of the Government in higher output. In this sense, the fate of marxism is significant of our situation between two eras of different scientific logic. To Marx as a disciple of d'Alembert and Diderot and Hegel, it was impossible to look at social processes with unscientific eyes and scientific eyes both. He believed that social action did not necessarily need a variety of social vocabularies. He believed that his one social vocabulary could replace all unscientific and emotional vocabularies. Meanwhile the culte of Lenin and many other emotions had to be exploited in Russia again and again. The idea of building society on logic was given up when Russia allied herself with France and joined the League. Society is accessible for scientific consciousness only when the many functions of society have conquered their place by a series of unscientific processes of self-consciousnesses which are equally true and legitimate as science because they are equally vital.

An independent body of social sciences can not be based on dialectics or logic because it can never intend to abolish the minimum of necessary contradictions among all the speaking functionaries of society. But the grammatical method can explain to all the relative character of their contradictions.

Thus the problem of a grammatical epistemology may be approached from the side of concomitant self-consciousnesses of the different persons in society: I, you and he or it. In this case we find the scientist in a function which differs in person from the functions officiated by the humans he is observing. It is his function to observe and to report his findings about the 'hes' and 'shes' who live socially. But it is not their business to look at their own actions in the same impersonal or third-person-fashion. On the contrary he must expect them to look at their social duties in the light of an I who feels responsible and a you who feels critical about these actions. Differentiation of a plurality of intellectual processes, mental processes, reasonable functions, and a sociology of knowledge and science itself is a premise for the eventual future of a real science of society.

But there is not only the necessary pluralism of reasonable persons gradually leading up from the passionate doers, actors and partners to social actions to the pacifying sociologist, all using reason for a different purpose and
therefore bound to use different language and terminology. The social scientist can find his own position in the history of philosophy itself only if he discovers that theology and natural philosophy speak and are compelled to speak of man in a way forbidden to him. The grammatical conception of the first principles for an independent social science will not be stabilized before it can be proved that logic and dialectics never wanted to deal with a pluralism of intellectual consciousnesses, antagonistic to each other and still desirable and why they did not want to do so.

Neither a theory of values nor a theory of nature is compelled or allowed to dissolve 'man' into the plural 'men' on principle. Dialectics of medieval theology and the logic of modern science and mathematics know of man in the singular only. Jesus, the measuring rod of medieval dialectics, of Aristotle and the observer of Einstein are all singular concepts. Sinners, idiots, and unscientific minds had to be admitted by dialecticians and logicians. But the sinners, the idiots and the unscientific minds did not count scientifically. But they count in the social sciences: The proper function of the social scientist would become meaningless without an opposite function of the sinner, the criminal, the idiot and the naive child. The child plays as realistic a part in society as the scientist himself. The latter does depend on the existence of a child's, a layman's, a criminal's, a poet's diverse ideologies. In the moment in which these people would think the ideology and would speak the language of sociology only, their functions would evaporate. They would all have become sociologists and be paralyzed in the faithful fulfilment of their daily duties. For it is impossible to serve, to love and to sacrifice, to forget, to reform and to build up a new world without that division of interest, that exaggeration of importance which puts the love to our neighbour who fell among the thieves far beyond our general "Weltanschauung" and far closer to our eyes than all encyclopedic scientific knowledge.

Philosophy can teach the social sciences that the knowledge produced by them has to be forgotten as well as it ought to be established. A rotation of different horizons of consciousness, from the prejudiced to the scientific and back again is the condition under which the social scientist is allowed to function. Without this rotation between knowing and forgetting again he would destroy the society of which his sciences are telling from origin and destiny.

It is at this point that the grammatical method most clearly is sheering off from the dialectics of scholastic dispute and the logic of academic discussion. When we compare how a chemist is handling his general laws and how a sociologist must wish to apply them, the difference will become obvious. A chemist who knows that H₂O is a special molecule, must keep in mind this knowledge when he wishes to apply this law for chemical purposes. He will experiment with multiples of this molecule, will rearrange and substitute till all the combinations derived from his premise that H₂O is an especially important formula are tried out. At the end of his thousands of tests scientific truth will be ascertained for this limited field.

But reverse is the method of the social scientist who transcends from theory to practice, for example from ethics to education:

Let him state the golden rule or let him say: Love your neighbour like yourself first. How is he going to apply this rule? Our times, in their bowing before the altar of natural science, think that one can love one's neighbour and be conscious of the general law simultaneously. Yet the Ethicist who thinks that he can love whilst he is conscious of applying the general rule by his action is not loving. The simple fact that he believes to apply a rule perverts his action from an act of love into an act of duty. For any human action based on a principle is lawful action and an act of love in order to betray its origin from love must keep clean from any logical subsumption.
under a rational principle. The estheticist who asks from you to keep in mind
his law when acting changes the currency from the gold of love to the paper
money of duty. He who knows the rule and is rich of knowledge has more trou-
ble to love than the child because he must have forgotten the general rule
again before he can really love again. It is impossible to apply a general
sociological law consciously. It must be rediscovered not as the result of
a syllogism. The syllogism would run: Major: I shall love my neighbour
Minor: this is my neighbour
Conclusion: that is why I love him.
The object of his love is the Major of his syllogism. He is in love not with
the predication of the Minor: my neighbour but with the law expressed by the
Major. He loves his ideal, not his neighbour.
The wise man who cannot help knowing and approving of the rule must keep apart
his intellectual love of wisdom and his spontaneous disposition to love this
man Brown whom he meets on the road. Consciousness of the abstract meaning of
an act transforms its concrete character and value.
Here an example. When the first Baronet Rothschild tried to fulfill the law
of giving alms to the poor he used to go out in the dark and to fill with
coins the pockets of the poor who passed him within the gates of the ghetto
of Frankfurt, by pacing up and down and never stoppez or looking at those
he surprised by his spending. To him the anonymity of the gift was the essen-
tial element of his charity. The same gift of 10 Dollars ceased to be charity,
by getting connected with their author. The right hand shall not know what the
left hand is doing because the classification of an act by its author or by
its receiver both is two third of any social act.
Spontaneous Love, faith, hope cannot be provoked to be realized in the friendly
light of their abstract and rational formulation. They spring up in the
darkness of despair, weakness and hatred.
The social processes and the science of society are blocking each other whenever
the consciousness needed for one is encroaching on the situation of the
other.
The outburst 'I love' never is the application of a Major to a Minor, but the
rediscovery of a perpetual potentiality as a present actuality. Now this poten-
tiality of love in general and the actuality of my love in particular must
be separated by a more or less long timespan during which our consciousness
is blighted or at least uncertain of the situation. Nobody can say or think
'I love you' for the first time without becoming conscious of it in this mo-
ment for the first time.
And he cannot become conscious of his love for the first time without having
been ignorant of it before. He who does not discover that he loves with sur-
prise and even with a kind of panic does not love at all. He who does not discover
that he loves with surprise and even with a kind of panic does not love at all. It is, then, right
to pretend that ignorance and unconsciousness must precede this surprise and
this discovery. And the greater the surprise, the purer, the deeper and the
more complete the love can be rooted in the subconscious depth of the lover's
personality.
This circumstance frustrates the attempt made by modern moralists frequent-
ly to identify the ideas of the good, the true, and the beautiful with the
vital processes of love hope and faith. The good is a regulative abstract
idea which wishes to be applied to concrete situations. Goodness is loved
when it is applied by the idealist, not he whom he benefits.
Love does not ask to be loved as an idea. Jesus did not wish to be worshipped
as the idea of goodness. Though idealists humiliated him into an ideal ever
since. He explicitly said that he who loved one of the poor, did preferably
to all idealists clinging consciously to their rule. In fact when requiring
the love to the one God he opposed the love of the many greek values as much
as the love of material goods. To love God with all your faculties certainly
does not mean to love goodness or beauty or truth. It is a fallacy to change
subject and predicate in the sentence that God is truth; though God is truth,
truth is not God. God is many other powerful things besides that he is truth. He is life, eternal life; He is the way, he is love, he is spirit. But not one of these his divine emanations or qualifications are God themselves. They are predicates and adjectives, not persons. God is good. Godness is not good. The idealistic advice to love goodness differs widely from the simple statement that it is good to love. In the first case the lover loves his own idea, his principle. In the second he obeys the law of creation that it is not good for man to be lonely; in the first case he is alone with his abstract principle he does precisely what he is dissuaded to do by the second rule. To love means to transcend the boundaries of one own self-made gods and to live the living God. But the living God is unable to speak to us through man-made ideas. We can only speak to us by god-made creatures. What he asks us to love is his creation, not ours.

To dismiss our general principle from our consciousness is the only way of testing its transpersonal truth. If it comes back to us in practice, its rediscovery means that the experiment proves the hypothesis. In society the experiment is a genuine experiment only when the partners to the experiment are sincerely unaware of the principle which they are expected to prove by their behaviour! After all this is the same in nature and in society. Atomes do not know how they are expected to behave when put on trial. They simply follow their spontaneous drift. Men cannot live without consciousness. Still it is an intermittent consciousness which is inherent to their being alive. In order to build up that very society which is rationalized by the sociologists, they themselves and all their fellow men must be allowed to act spontaneously and to follow their inborn drift and flair and disposition.

We are finding ourselves at a point from which we can sum up the discussion. The social sciences, indeed, differ from the natural sciences in that they ask for three levels of consciousness where the natural scientist is satisfied with two. The natural scientist is placing his objects on one side, his scientific consciousness on the other. Any object of the natural sciences is not expected to change its behaviour simply by the fact that a scientific theory of their behaviour exists. Any object of the social sciences is bound to change its behaviour by the simple expression of any scientific theory about it. This is a serious check on the sociologist method. He must safeguard both: the freedom of his investigations and the very existence of the society in which he is carrying on his research. He cannot overlook the fact that most social processes must go on regularly because they are vital for the very existence of the society in which the social Scientist himself exists and functions. Let him commit suicide he himself must provide means of protecting the social processes against their being weakened from being spotted steadily by his scientific consciousness. He must pay reverence to the law of spontaneous rediscovery which prevails for every act of faith, love or hope and that is to say for any vital act of social life. He is not allowed to ask from the members of society to love his rule but he must be willing to admit and to teach that it is better to ignore the scientific rule than to become incapacitated for its spontaneous realisation. Between the potentialities of science and its realisations in society no object line can be drawn whereas our knowledge about nature of things can be applied consciously. For the natural sciences, then, it suffices to know of two levels of consciousness: one is the level preceding our scientific research; the other is the level represented by science itself.

For the social sciences two levels of consciousness do not suffice. Beyond the scientific level a third level is needed without which science would destroy society. On this third level the fair proportions between scientific consciousness and spontaneous consciousness are the real problem. Scientific consciousness being only one form of social consciousness among others looses its absolute right of sovereignty on this level. Though being free in its sphere it is not freer than the other types of consciousness. The wisdom of this third level differs from science in that it knows when to forget and
when to know scientific knowledge. In the process of man versus nature man is allowed to be like God, omniscient, conscious, ubiquitous, not sleeping, not forgetting, watching and mindful for ever. In the process of man versus society man is not allowed to be the same at all the time. Society's transformations, its vital processes depend on a perpetual change of consciousness and a variety of self-consciousnesses. The sociologist must point the way to this rotation and law of transformation by heeding the phases preceding and following his own action as much as the phase conceded to him. In the relation between Society and the Social Sciences, the Scientist is responsible for more than his science. He is responsible for a second thing too, namely the word 'and' in the phrase Society and the Social Sciences. A method of the Social Sciences is not a method of economics or history or law only, it is the method how sciences can become and remain aware of their functions in society which are expressed in the unconscious word 'and'.

This, then, is the philosophy of the Social Sciences that they recognize an attitude of the scientist transcending his rational pride and uniting him, on the third level, to all men who have acquired the knowledge when to know and when to forget, when to love and when to legislate, when to trust and when to investigate, when to teach and when to educate, when to rest peacefully in the autumnal starlight of generalities and when to burn ardently from the fire of sudden spring-fever. The syllogism of logic gives man power over nature. The seasons of grammar make man a member of society. The social sciences are discovering the potentialities of man and the conditions for their realisation. Their philosophy teaches that and how the discovery of these potentialities must not interfere with their realisation. For there is a time for every purpose and for every work.

APPENDIX

In comparing the philosophy of academic science from 1600 till today and of scholastic philosophy from Abelardus to Scotus with our present day grammatical problem of Society we may test our division of the sciences into the social, the natural, and the theological. For if it can be proved that the two methods never intended to deal with society it becomes probable that we have rightly stated the gap left by the two older sisters of grammatical philosophy, by dialectics and logic. We shall investigate the scientific aim of medieval dialectics and the scientific logic of modern times in order to answer the question: are these two methods the complete set of possible methods? If not, why not?

My thesis is that medieval theology and modern natural sciences are intimately independent and that their scientific reciprocity and dialectical polarity is expressed by their two main concepts: God and nature. Men in the plural are no elementary concept neither of medieval nor of modern philosophy. Both, then, have treated society by external methods quite inevitableness.

The medieval philosopher was a believer seeking instruction: Pides quaerens intellectum. He began by accepting a vast amount of dogmatic truth, credebatur intellegat, and then different interpretations and opinions of the doctors were branching off from a central stem of faith. The farer of from the dogma, the more arbitrary could reason argue. A mouse, gold, salt, an earthquake, would receive the most ridiculous interpretations because these everyday empirical things were farthest off from the bundle of universal princ-
pies essential to man's heart everywhere in the world. But the divine dignity of each human soul, the authenticity of scriptures and traditions, the ethical standards of the golden rule could not be explained away by sceptical hypotheses of the intellect. Scholasticism has some central facts and **axiomatic observations**, life and death of Jesus, Resurrection and miracles, from which a tremendous science of deductive truth is derived.

The method is: Believe in these facts and search how far reason can organise its opinions so that they harmonize with these facts. New observations through happening all the times through the Middle ages are exceptional. The real curiosity and scientific work goes in for the discovery of new principles. Scholastic Science has discovered great things. But its discoveries are in the field of opinions, mental visions of harmony and concordance, of hierarchy of values. The whole pride these men took in the historic character of their religion meant that the important facts were all recorded in the testimonies of the faith and handed down from generation to generation as the minimum of observed facts on which discussion, interpretation, science could be based without becoming meaningless. The Sic et Non of AbaIard and the application of the word Theologia unknown in the old church, for the new science meant Dialectics and Rhetorics taught the doctors of the middle ages how to dispute and how to hold different opinions on the same facts. That is why any training in scholasticism is so wholesome for the theoretician. All the snares for reason, all possible corollaries were thought out between Anselmus and Cusanus. Words like additas and ubiquitas, sameness, transubstantiation were real discoveries.

The service rendered by philosophy, then, was consciousness of dialectic and analytic problems in the interpretation of a relatively few generally accepted facts.

The shortcomings of this method in facing new facts are obvious. But it had its great merits too. Greek philosophers could not compel their students or their colleagues to discuss the same problems. Each school looked into a different direction, one of matter, the other of ideas, the **kinesis** of action, the fourth of dialectics, another of beauty and so on. The schools of Greek philosophy do not really concentrate on one single set of facts. Each school begins at the beginning and finds the beginning somewhere else. Scholasticism is Aristotelian in method but by its Christian limitation it was able to work with one method through four hundred years on the same facts. That made the achievements of medieval philosophy more fruitful. The disagreements of opinion were not allowed to change into complete diversity of recognised facts.

But it is more important to state its lasting accomplishment. It is a mistake to think that we got rid of scholasticism. It is still and will be in use for any discussion of values. The new interest in it opened our eyes for the amount of scholastic method surviving in Kant or Heidegger or Nioüel Hartmann. Much more than Aristotle it is the scholastic adoption and transformation of Aristotelian and Platonic dialectics which is handled in any process of evaluation between two or more values. This remark is necessary to destroy the prejudice that scholasticism be a historical conception merely. Something timeless and eternal is at our disposal through the work of medieval science. It is perhaps not unimportant to stress this point. For the new methods of academic thinking in modern times seemed so radically new that it was for a long time impossible to recognize our perpetually using of scholastic ways of thinking. Aristotle himself is employed by us in his scholastic garb and with the regiments added to his terms by Thomas and the other masters of the Middle ages since we speak English or German when we dispute today and these languages are derived from the scholastic Latinity.

The shortest formula for expressing the scholastic method is the pro and contra dispute. 5 reasons are pro, 6 con. They are weighed, the terms are investigated whether there is a quaternio terminorum, the final decision almost always builds in some of both sides. Thus the answer becomes not a simple deletion or annihilation of the values of one side but a hierarchy of values.
in which the lower values are made into elements of the bigger solution. Both sides are relatively right when they are able to show evidence that they represent a reasonable interest in one side of the question.

Now let us turn to the scientific method of the natural sciences and begin with an example. A. observes two processes in Europe x and w, and formulates a common rule or system explaining both. B. in Africa observes z and v. C. reports from Mexico three more observations o, p, and r contradict the rule derived from x and w in Europe. Research man D. proposes an experiment which we may call T. Testing the European, African and American observations. How is he going to do it? He must add to the empirical observations already made some more which are not empirical. The experimental observation transcends the empirical because in it as many elements of the observed facts as possible are taken up separately.

The crucial test of the experiments adds to a series of casual observations one or more observations of a different nature because they are produced on principle in a relative vacuum. The method of the natural sciences adds to the observations which happen to be made macroscopically as many observations as possible which we can only make under the microscope, i.e. under exceptional conditions. What, then, is the essence of the experimental method? Its essential feature is addition of observation. The principle of the natural sciences is to increase the mass of observed facts. Scholastic evaluation increases artificially the number of possible opinions on a limited set of facts. Naturalists increase artificially the number of observed facts to be interpreted by a limited number of Theories.

All natural or cosmological philosophy after Descartes is willing to doubt all observations and to rely exclusively on the self-evidence of logic. The law of the excluded middle for example is one of its central principles. It is the opposite of dialectics which held Jesus to be God and man as well. But to the modern "Weltbild" a thing is either a or b. Dialectical philosophy erects on a limited number of common facts about human heart's destiny and character an endless superstructure (as complicated as gothic ogives). Logical epistemology and scientific logic plunges into an endless ocean of facts which is enlarged day after day but which is to yield a few general laws set up by reason.

In the philosophy of values and the natural sciences our relation to facts and theory is precisely reversed. In a science of nature we expand the mass of facts but keep down the numbers of interpreting theories.

1) The progress of dialectics beyond the simple juridical decision: Black and White, Godd and Bad, Yes or No, Guilty - Not guilty are well expressed by Gilbert de la Poiré, one of the earlier scholastics in his commentary on Boethius (Migne 64, 1256 AB): Non omnis contradictio est interrogatio, Una aut altera pars contradicetis nulla prorsus habere argumenta veritatis videtur... aut cum neutra pars veritatis et falsitatis argumenta potest habere, tunc contradicet non est. Cuius vero utraque pars argumant a veritatis habere videtur, quod sed est.

Not every contradiction is a dialectical problem. For when one part of the contradiction seems to have no arguments of truth or when neither part can offer proofs for true or false, the contradiction is no question. Whereas when both sides seem to have arguments of truth, a dialectical problem exists.
Now we are prepared to approach the sciences about social processes. We can see immediately that the situation which we find here, really cannot be treated by either method, because we find that the problem of society or of mankind is not exhausted when we have asked for values, for the good tone and beautiful or when we ask for the first thermodynamic law. It begins only when theology and natural sciences, with the most efficient dialectics and the most symbolic logic, have done their work. And it begins with the grammar of society which enables men, peculiar men to operate on ideas and things in the funny way philosophers do.

The old trivium of the liberal arts: dialectics, rhetorics, grammar proved more complete than its medieval and modern forms. 'Philosophy', as a term, changed its content twice already. Its contribution to the era of the social sciences will be a theory of Minima and Maxima of Contradictions. It will never allow for one language only, (the Marxian and Fascist heresy). On the other hand it will check the meaningless atomization of the scattered score of Sciences around men which revel in disorganised statistics and footnotes on footnotes to facts.

The grammatical method is not monistic. But it is a scientific method which is able to control the consciousness of the sociologist, historian, political scientist and to bring them back from their casual and empirical contradictions to the building up of necessary and functionary contradictions.

Typed out from the manuscript, 68 + 2 pp., by Lise van der Molen, Winsum 25 - 27th of October 198?.

The manuscript was written, I guess, in 1942. Check the mentioning of the war with Japan, which broke out in December 1941. The conference referred to was in December too. Check the topic