ECONOMICS OR POLYGLOT PEACE

OUTLINE

1. The Moral Crisis of 1944
2. America's Future
3. 1914 and 1944
4. Germany, World Power or World Organ?
5. Alternatives
6. An Economy of Economies
7. Personal Record
8. Military versus Economic Order

by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

7/29/81

TO BE RETURNED
OF COURSE, IF INCLUDED IN THE EIGHT VOLUMES

(THIS WAS CCA'S COPY RECEIVED IN BERLIN IN 1948)
1. The Moral Crisis of 1944

People are dismayed. The good people are dismayed. Aye, the better the people, the more they are dismayed. The slaughter and destruction leave little hope for a quick recovery after this war. The dissent between our perspective and the Russian and British points of view shows the uncertainty of the political outcome. People are dismayed because no pax Americana will end this war.

Pax Americana would mean something not very far from Wilson. It would mean a galaxy of small sovereign nations in Europe. But the British seem to prepare a United States of Europe and the Russians might push Bolshevism as far as the Rhine. In both cases, we would have lost the war in Europe.

The dismay of the Liberals casts a gloom over this year. My British friends write me gloomily too. The gloom is intensified by the obvious fact that the war lasts too long. Hitler always proclaimed his intention to fight on beyond the reasonable deadline. In his way of thinking, the Germans seemed to have ended the war of 1918 too early. This time, he would put down his rifle five minutes after twelve, he shouted.

The fall of Kiev, the bombing of Berlin, the surrender of Italy, would have ended the war in 1918. Then the peoples of Central Europe had the vitality to shake off their intellectual leadership in a majestic wave which reminds one of Tolstoy's picture of the "people" in War and Peace. The Allies expected the war to last into 1920. Germany saved Europe, by her capitulation.

This time, the corporal Hitler has gagged the spontaneous reaction of the plain folks. The vital impulse of 1918 of "No drop of blood shall be shed one minute longer," is deliberately reversed; the common man in Germany who has been told so often that he surrendered too early in 1918, is resigned to surrender too late this time.

This means that the power politicians and the expansionists in all countries are as dismayed as the democrats and liberals. The peace will be unsatisfactory to the nationalists, too, because the price of destruction is too high. If the French get the left bank of the Rhine, if we get Dakar, if the British get Tobruk, if the Poles get Eastern Prussia, what of it? The dislodgment and extirpation have gone too far. Churchill and Roosevelt, Imperialist and Liberal, are dismayed. Nor does the Kremlin see brighter prospects. Russia's sufferings have been too terrible. Stalin has to goad her on through famine and death and expatriation and the enslavement by the Germans and the salvos from 224 guns are needed to offset the unendurable hardships. Russia, too, is in a hurry.

I do, however, think, that the devil Hitler once more is the spirit who means evil and must achieve something good. The moral crisis of 1944 is salubrious. It is with no black joy in my heart that I welcome the universal dismay. It is my conviction that this dismay is a necessary phase in a world war. Before a world war can
end, the partial notions of a pax Americana, a pax Britannica, a pax Russica must have exploded.

That this is desirable, is demonstrated by the last world war. Each nation entered it with peculiar notions, which ranged from French Revanche for 1870 to the Crusade of the star-spangled banner. The last world war saw a violent physical crisis in the form of the Spanish flu, but the moral crisis of the peculiar war aims was not allowed to happen to each nation. In this sense, the peace came too quickly. The world war could not be transformed into a world peace because the nations had no time to shake themselves free from their preconceived ideologies.

If we wish to end a world war, we must allow a world peace to outpace the slow and lagging ideologies of the warring nations. The various nations, of course, will and shall continue to speak their peculiar political lingo. The world peace must be translatable into each of these lingos so that it may satisfy them. But the world peace must be polyglot.

The democratic peace of 1919 was not polyglot. It expected all the nations of the world to speak the one and only language of democracy. This compulsion devaluated democracy in Germany, and Russia did not understand the language of Versailles at all. Instead, the Third International undermined the democratic peace and tried to condemn us all to the language of Bolshevism.

Hitler's ten years were even less polyglot. His gang never speaks of anything but Germany. The satellites are seldom mentioned in the Nazi oratory. Hitler does not even try any longer to include other nations in his speechmaking. Germany's impotence or silence when her unhappy neighbor's inquire about their own destiny, is an extreme case of a monotonous political language.

We learn from his failure that a true peace may have to include hopes for different creeds. Therefore, it must be written for more than one political creed. We do, of course, not mean that the instrument of peace should be translated technically into many languages. We do not speak of technicalities. I mean that a world peace must be composed of various political melodies in symphonic order.

Such a world peace would have to contain the political melodies which agree with our hopes for America. But it would not stop there.

Is such a thing possible? 25 years ago, I was convinced that it was. I have learned much in the meantime. But I still hold that we will and must have world wars as long as this thing is not made possible. We easily may miss out on the polyglot peace again; then, we shall have soon a third opportunity for trying it. No war ends before its ultimate cause is settled.

Any peace will have to allow the victors to go on with their historical traditions. No victor can do anything but stick to the way of life which has enabled him to be victorious. The next peace...
may not question the sovereignty of the Great Powers nor the best
heritage of American democracy, for instance.

Therefore, we shall begin our proposal with these "sine quanons" of America, Russia, Great Britain. In omitting France and China
and the rest, we do not forget them. I think, however, that our sim-
plification, in the long run, will prove advantageous for the cause
of the other nations, including Poland and Italy and the Balkans.

The indispensable must be known first. Then we shall con-
sider the changes between 1914 and 1944. In the process, the peculiar
role of Germany among the world powers will become clearer and the
common ground on which to build the peace. Then, we shall raise the
objections to our proposal by examining the alternatives, frankly.
These alternatives are a British Empire swallowed up by the United
States as proposed, in 1930, by Bernard Shaw's witty "Apple Cart," and
later with less wit, by Lindberg, and an Austria-Hungary swallowed up
by Germany as first proposed by Friedrich Naumann in his Mitteleuropa,
and now enacted by Hitler as a compound of Frederic the Great and
Maria Theresia. Then there is Co-Prosperity, Western Hemisphere, etc.

These alternatives are of a purely political and military
character. If they must be discarded, the polyglot peace may disclose
that the time for hemispherical and geopolitical solutions, for mere
power politics, has passed. The polyglot peace may disclose its provid-
tential character of answering the real need of capital and labor. It
may free us from all economic manias, from the Brave New World, from
the tribal feeder Hitler, from Bolshevism as a world revolution.

Then, we may conclude with a restatement of the original creed
of the Americans that they came into a New World when they went west,
and that the whole world must remain new if it shall be a world in
which Americans can feel at home.

2. America's Future

America is the melting pot of many peoples. The diversity of
its inhabitants would lead to disintegration without two elementary
conditions. There must be a dynamic movement and there must be time
to unite the divers elements. Time, in human affairs, allows us to be
patient. American democracy needs patience. If we should lose pa-
tience with each other, we would lose our soul. The dynamism was fur-
nished by constant growth and expansion. The frontier made pioneers
of all regardless of race or creed or color. In the next twenty years,
the North West may double its population. We are still growing. The
equilibrium between diversity and expansion is delicate, but it is our
pride. Our North West, Texas, the Western Hemisphere, these oppor-
tunities are parts of our unwritten constitution. It is quite untrue
of our constitution as a piece of paper. It has at its base
and yet common enterprise as a map in my chapter on the Americans,
in my Autobiography of Western Man, may prove at first sight. The

* See the volume Out of Revolution, New York 1938, p. 674.
must remain big, is a wise phrase used by Charles Beard. America can remain big only by keeping all its opportunities of expansion wide open. For, bigness is not a fact; it is a feeling. Anybody who grows, may have it; anybody who shrinks will miss it. We are amiss today because our expanses is no longer unlimitable. We compare and find that 140 millions Americans are not the biggest modern industrialized Commonwealth. Hitler ruled 350 million people in 1942.

Hence, we must cultivate our feeling of common and yet personal enterprise, of free expanse. The young must rediscover America, in every generation as though they came to this Country for the first time; the old must invest in new expanse. We cannot even begin to think of a communistic America. Hence, at the Peace Conference, U. S. appears with the resolve to continue its economic traditions.

In this purpose, we need protection against a wrong peace. Our diversified structure of population, our democratic and this means our mutually patient way of life, would be and is already imperilled by any advance of totalitarianism. Totalitarians whatever they may be, are impatient with human beings. Now, a Bolshevized Germany, with Soviets in Heidelberg and Vienna and Hamburg, would for this reason be intolerable for America. The New World which we found in America must be able to recognize itself in some way in the Old World from which we all came. The morals of our political life would be destroyed if the Old World was bowlderized to the extent Russia was after 1918. For, all the minorities in U. S. which we must consider as assets for our melting pot, would then become liabilities, hostile to the Old World. America cannot sulk with the major part of Europe.

Central Europe cannot go Bolshevik. This is a condition of our survival as a democracy. American democracy is not a piece of paper with Congress written large on it. It is the slow process of unifying diversified peoples under their own steam.

This is the deepest reason for our being in this war. We are not helping England or France. We are in the war from political necessity as much as in 1917. Not our finances nor military power were threatened by Hitler, but our unwritten constitution and our political and moral structure. Hitler's Totalitarianism over Europe would be still worse than a Russian Communism over France and Germany, for our free institutions over here.

If we understand this, the disagreeable associations which many entertain when a war is called a moral issue, disappear. It is not from self-righteousness but for our survival that we must have a life in Europe in which we at least partly can recognize our cousins.

This American sine qua non is not valid for England or Russia, of course. Russia is in this war, first of all, for military reasons. Germany's army is the ghost which must be laid. The ruins of Stalingrad and all the Ukrainian cities, the dead of Leningrad, speak loudly against taking any chances with a re-arming Germany. At the peace conference, Russia will have to make sure that Chamberlain's pet idea of using Germany as Britain's sword on the continent of Europe is buried once for ever. The psychiatrist Carl Jung, by the way, a Swiss,
cherished this charitable idea with millions of others, that Hitler should devour Stalin and be satisfied in the process. It is this function of Germany as the defender against Bolshevism into which Rudolf Hess hoped to talk the British. The dream reappears invariably and we would be wise if we saw to it that it is eliminated from our own thinking. Because this would mean, indeed, war with Russia.

While the United States could not stomach a totalitarian Germany, the Union of Soviets will ask for a guarantee against a militarized Germany.

England, interestingly enough, will have a third line of approach to the peace. She is not threatened by the totalitarian menace half as much as we are. Our population problems put us into a much more delicate position than a nation in which practically everybody tries to have tea in the afternoon. And the military menace of Germany though real enough, is not the primary concern either (as it is for Belgium and Holland and France). England depends on a flourishing Central Europe for her daily bread. The British Empire cannot take the place of the Central European markets. When the City of London gave credits to the Hitler regime and favored appeasement, it did so from legitimate fear. Hitler or Bolshevism if they mean an economic well against the British Isles, would dry up the life lines of British trade. The post-war world, then, must be one which allows England to stay inside the economy of Europe, or she will be faced by famine and starvation.

The result of this survey is: England cannot be asked to commit economic suicide as little as Russia can be expected to be exposed to another invasion or as the United States is likely to undergo political Harakiri. These three great powers may or may not renounce all further ambitions; never can they admit, world powers that they are, the existence of a world in which America's free institutions, Russia's frontiers, England's trade become unworkable. U. S. must be left free to integrate a diversified people by political democracy. Russia must, on the other hand, gain time to diversify her homogeneous masses gradually into a high grade economy without a state of belligerency and an armament race. Great Britain must stay in business between the increasingly "closed shops" and hemispherical economies encroaching upon the life lines of the Empire. And I think that when these sine qua non are frankly stated, they can be applauded by all of us. For, some thinking would show us that we all need these functioning principles of all the three World Powers. Neither U. S. nor England would be well off without a diversifying Russia, and without England as the broker of a diversified world, Russia and U. S. would be in a bad way with the rest of the world.

3. 1914 versus 1944

Then, why are we so reluctant to make these distinctions? Why do we prefer to paint Russia and Great Britain as democracies in order to explain our alliance with them? Why do we insist on meeting them on our own political and constitutional plane to the exclusion of
their real life lines?

Our reluctance to make these distinctions goes back to 1918 and Wilson. And we shall lag behind the reality of today unless we formulate clearly the change in America's role in the world from 1914 to 1944. By doing so, we may cease to feel ashamed of our present day role as essentially conservative. Yes, we are the preserving and conservative pivot around which the rest of the world has swung into line. It is loathsome to see so many good people dismayed simply because they hate to be found on the purely conservative side. To be conservative need not mean to be either wicked or reactionary. To conserve may mean to preserve the liberties and the heritage of mankind.

The Badoglio government is a good case in point, of course. But the background to this and all other cases must be explored first. The individual case will then cease to surprise us.

In 1914, a draftsman whom we asked to show us graphically the advance of civilization at that moment, would have had little trouble in fulfilling our request. He would have put the United States out in front of a staggered line, and with the line falling back, France, Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy would have been marked, with Russia forming the most backward end of the wing opposite the United States.

The Great Powers and the Nations were not "in Phase" or at the same point of development, in 1914, not by a long shot, and - this is equally important - the graph would have made it clear that the ships of state of all these nations steered an independant course.

1914:

United States---------*
France-------------------*
Great Britain-----------------*
Germany---------------------*
Austria Hungary-------------------*
Italy----------------------------*
Russia-------------------

If the graph would have been refined, the lines of force emanating from each power would have been seen to intersect in many areas. France, perhaps, had fewer intersecting lines than the others. Germany's and America's competition and dynamism in the industrial field, and Russia's and the British Empire's lines of force in the territorial realm would show overlapping and expansion of great intensity.

In 1943, the graph no longer would have looked the same way. The U.S.S.R. would not be farthest behind but somehow in line with the rest. Therefore, the United States clearly had acted as the static pivot for the rest of the world to make an evolution - in the sense of evolution in military language - around them. The only similarity to the graph of 1914 would be in the sovereignty of the nations, all still being put down on the graph as though they were going to continue their own way of destiny.
The graph maker and we ourselves would have given these various powers still parallel but independent lines of destiny. This is the reason why we now have the moral crisis. Because this our mental picture of these powers does not exist in 1944 really; it only lingers on in our memories as an expectation about the future period of peace. In actual fact, the independence of the powers is greatly reduced by Lend-Lease and the common war effort. Competition is at a minimum though it still exists; division of labor is increasing because otherwise we can't win. The moral crisis consists in our confusion about the ultimate direction of these tendencies in times of peace. Must the three parallel lines, of U.S., Great Britain, U.S.S.R. of our mental picture stay parallel - then by their momentum, these powers will have to go to war against each other. Is the only way to build up a peace a complete merger of their destinies into one line?

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

Germany

Gr. Br.

We know already that such a merger is unfeasible, impossible, that it would turn our stomach and even though we might try it rationally, we would swoon like the Duchess in Henry James' novel "The American." No, the three powers cannot merge. They are united only in as far as Germany opposes them all.

Perhaps, we may take this hint. We cannot go back to 1914 when the whole world believed in one clear direction into which all powers were going. We cannot merge as though we were all cosmopolitans. Spheres of interest and balance of power won't do; Utopia won't do. But we may find that to unite and to stay united around the problem constantly posed by Germany is exactly the thing which is possible, which is necessary, and which suffices.

The peace time structure of 1914 was too anarchic; the war time order of 1943 is too uniform. The truth may be somewhere between the two extremes.

1944, then, should lead to some development beyond 1914 and 1943.

4. Germany, world power or world organ?

We now know several things for certain; the common sphere which would make sure for a reasonable length of time that we may have peace, cannot be so comprehensive as to prevent us from staying big and free, or the Russians from diversifying or England from trading on her own.
Hence, all dreams of superstates, Union Now, etc. would de-priv e us of our own destiny and history. On the other hand, the League of Nations as it actually did function by making recommendations and conducting inquiries and collecting materials. would not suffice. They discussed labor, hygiene, intellectual cooperation. This realm of pious hopes was of no influence on world politics. The Bank of International Payments in Basel is another case from which we can learn a lesson. This Bank had to do with the reparations and money transfers. and it too proved of little importance. Money was transferred, but the peoples moved in their appointed nationalistic groves. Money means as little in itself as scientific recommendations. Both do not train daily the political will power. As the Parisian paper "Temps" wrote in 1932: "Not the intellect is sick, but the will no longer is influenced by the intellect. This is the political disease of our times."

Not the transfer of money or knowledge from place to place matters, but the transfer of insight into action. And this must be practised in small areas first and extended gradually to more and more vital parts of politics if we ever shall get our political muscles trained.

This truth did strike political observers before the First World War. Walter Hines Page wrote a now forgotten memorandum in August 1913, from London. He predicted a world catastrophe within a year unless the United States proposed immediately some common project like the sanitation of the tropics. This prophetic warning of Page is still pertinent. He saw that to foresee the disaster meant nothing without some common purpose simultaneously injected into the discussion. His memorandum should rank therefore with William James' "Moral Equivalent for War," because both knew that energies are not diverted by reason but by new purposes; both tried to find them. Both, James and Page, are still ahead of us.

In the twentieth, Loucheur, the French cabinet minister, and his German friends, hoped that a French-German partnership might develop for the common exploitation of Africa. Roads were to be built on the large scale now realized in this war. In other words, Page's universal postulate was now envisaged as a limited partnership of colonial exploit. We can only hope that Africa will offer us these opportunities. However, of and on, timid souls still advance this proposition as an outrageously bold idea. It does not strike me as bold. It is to be expected that there will be many such jobs of reconstruction on a basis of partnership between several states. A world service for public works could do a lot of good. But our calamities have grown too vast. Even Africa cannot solve them. Our calamities do not arise from any arbitrary mistakes but from the existence of more Great Powers than there is room for competing military, political and economic expansion. When Europe was the undisputed leader of the world, she could afford to contain five great powers. Europe now is the victim of the advance of U. S. and Russia. Her tradition of diversity and national strife is too heavy. The oversimplification of the Russian experiment and the brutality of the Hitler experiment both tried to give Europe a status of Siberia or of Brazil which of course is impossible. The solution must be sought in Europe, not in
Africa, however. It cannot ask England and France and Poland and Germany to cooperate in the tropics. Twice, Germany has marched in exactly the opposite direction from these nations. How can this be forgotten for some sanitation problem in the tropics?

This is no mere theory of ours. Africa has been tested as a battleground and as a point of unification during a long period of time. And whenever European nations clashed in Africa, and the conflict seemed to become critical, they withdrew and settled the dispute amicably. This was the case in Tunis in 1881, at Fashoda in 1898, in Marokko in 1905 and 1907, in Libya in 1912, and last but not least in Abyssinia in 1935. Each time, other rivalries were involved. Each time, despite great excitement, the sword between the civilized nations was not unsheathed because the issue did not seem vital enough, even in an era of fierce nationalism.

To the eye which has the obedience of realism, this goes to show that the solution cannot be expected from Africa since the knot was not tied in Africa. The questions of Africa are many and important but they cannot answer the question put to us by the two world wars. When the world wars were imminent, the questions of Africa were explicitly and definitely found wanting and were discounted. African collaboration may well result from world peace; it will not produce it.

When a war breaks out twice within one generation at one definite center, we must make bold to reorganize that center. This center is Germany. And this is not an accident of poor policy in 1914. Not only did W. Page foresee the catastrophe a year before the archduke was assassinated, in 1889, von Holtke and Nietzsche, certainly the two most diverse characters which one can find, predicted a universal attack on Germany. Henry Adams hinted at it in 1905 when he said that Germany was groping to find a possible place in the new alignment of World Powers. By 1918, literally the whole world was fighting Germany. This time, Japan has deserted the universal cause; nevertheless, Germany's isolation again is the outstanding factor. The riddle of Germany's proper role in a world which has become One, must be solved.

That this is true, is borne out by the Nazis themselves. They never tire to tell the German people that they speak as Germans to Germans only, that they have no salvation to offer for anybody except a Nazi or a Nordic. In vain, shall we hearken for a word of promise or understanding in their speeches by which Switzerland, Holland, France, Denmark might be comforted with regard to their own destiny. Even though the Nazis have satellites, they do not include them into their thinking or their mental picture of the future world any longer. The slogans of a New Order or a New Europe have completely disappeared from their official and journalistic output. It is Germany and Germany alone of which they speak.

In the face of this self-characterization, the schoolboy in Colliers who proposed a partition of Switzerland between Italy, France and Germany is a valuable example of a Pax Americana-thinking. This country is so imbued with racial and clannish practices of its minorities that Colliers article simply asked for a Latin, a Germanic etc. "block." But Europe is a pattern in which every single country
is composed of various races which were and are fused by a common his-
tory into a commonwealth of nationalities. It is quite untrue to think
of the British Empire as the only Commonwealth of Nations. For, be­
tween New Zealanders and English and Welsh people is no "national"
difference. But between Flemings and Wallons in Belgium, there is.
Alsace is a part of La France une et indivisible although the Alsatians
are in no way related, neither in creed nor in race, to the Basques.

The Reich, then, must receive a different treatment from all
other parts of Europe. A geopolitics even though advised by Professor
Bowman, if it tries to build United States of Europe or decree border
corrections and merges, thereby, Germany with her smaller neighbors
one way or the other, will lead to political "blood poisoning." Give
the neighbors a slice of Germany, and they will choke from Nazi doc­
trines. Give Germany slices of her neighbors and they will be sacri­
ficed to the next holocaust of war. All this is appeasement in the
worst sense; it is caused by the dogmatic unwillingness to take people
up on what they themselves do and say and think and practise. Would
anybody in his personal life ever insist that a man who shouts, "Treat
me differently," must be forced together with people who shout, "Don't
 treat us differently from yourself"? Germany has asked, time and
again, to be treated differently from all her neighbors. I propose
that her wish should be fulfilled, and the wish of her neighbors not
to be chained together with Germany in some "United States of Europe"
should be fulfilled too.

Germany's neighbors and Germany cannot receive the same treat­
ment. Ever since the Seven Years War did the Reich strive towards a
peculiar destination. And it is destiny, not geography, which decides
over a nation's fate; I know that all present day thinking runs in the
opposite direction. They say that it is environment and not freedom
which makes a man's fate. These doctrines of geopolitics and of indi­
 vidual environment are one and the same doctrine which beleagures the
American soul at this moment out of our college textbooks on sociology,
psychology, geography, economy. But it runs counter to the Constitu­
tion of the United States, and it is good Nazi doctrine. We cannot
support Latin or German Blocks if we believe in the future. Any solu­
tion which does not differentiate between Germany and her neighbors,
is a fatalistic, behavioristic, racial solution and incompatible with
the history of free men.

Since man breaks all such chains of fatalism in the end, any
such solution would end in disaster. But unfortunately, nearly all
the solutions proposed by Anglo-Saxons before the present Moral Crisis
have this funny mechanical and antihistorical character. For this
reason, I feel that the present crisis of dismay is a blessing in dis­
guise. It should enable us to see what Germany has been asking for,
and to give her this very thing.

These considerations lead up to the proposal which I made in
1918 and 1919 and 1920 and which I now repeat: Germany demands to be
treated as more than a small nation somewhere in Europe and this is
not unreasonable. Germany is too big for playing the role of Belgium
or Sweden. On the other hand, Germany is unable to develop into a
world power without behaving like the elephant in the china shop. Her
treatment of the Poles proves this.

Therefore, Germany deserves to be treated as a global institution because of her importance, but not as a political world power because of her handicaps. Germany may be considered the first part of the globe which is too big for its own continent, and which therefore should be treated as "the globe's country," the first tentative organ of the Great Society. All the economic transactions of Germany should be cleared through a World Board of Production. Germany's neighbors should not have to fear unlimited dumping on Germany's side. Private capital of the victor nations should not be invested in Germany as it was between 1923 and 1929 to the detriment of her neighbors because in consequence of these investments, appeasement became the policy towards Germany. All credits given to Germany must be world credits, agreed upon by the World Production Board. On this Board, the great and the small powers should be represented. But it should not act like the League of Nations, with unanimity, but like a regular business administration, with the power of decision and leadership.

Germany would be completely demilitarized. On the other hand, she would and should not be put under the educational pressures of Teacher's College, Columbia, or any other well meaning but non-German organization. Cultural autonomy, in other words, would be the price to be paid for the complete military and political elimination of German power Politics. The economic treatment should save Great Britain; therefore, it can be expected that the treatment would be based on fair and reasonable principles of perpetual economic subsistence of Germany and adequate standard of living. The demilitarization should protect Russia; therefore it should be easy to satisfy the German needs for adequate protection against her adjacent border states. Because such protection would not threaten Russia; and it is needed because these small neighbors should have no right to tease the bigger body politic of Germany wantonly.

It is the cultural autonomy which will displease our American Liberals and the refugees more than anything else. Fewer refugees might be able to return in this case, and the racial orgies of the Nazis seem to make us all recoil in violent reaction against their educational practices.

Since the moral and spiritual aspect of the German solution is the main concern of American democracy, this cultural autonomy will seem to be a contradiction to this concern. But is there any other solution? I do not think so. The Germans asked for worldwide solution; they now shall get it in a sense in which most of them (not all) did not expect it. This in itself will deflate the racial doctrines more than anything else. There should be less antisemitism in Germany after this war than in any other country of the world. But this will only be true if the freedom is left to them to make this discovery themselves. If anybody else tried to tell them, he simply would retard the date of the discovery. First of all, do not allow a legend to develop as in 1918. The Nazis must be compelled to sign the armistice themselves, this time. The loss of sovereignty should not be hidden behind any vague and sentimental ideology of "Limited sovereignty" or of a probation period and some prospects of later
admission to the councils of independent nations for good behavior. This was the scorn which embittered all German foreign relations that ideologically Germany was treated as a nation just like Czechoslovakia, and practically of course, she was not. Call a spade a spade. Sanctionimonious phrases are more horrible than the courage to admit a differentiating treatment; without meting out any slimy judgments on morale the victors owe it to the world and to Germany to say what they do and to do what they say. It is to the advantage of the Western Powers that the Russians let their German Committee use so much political oratory. We may be matter of fact this time, all the more easily.

The cultural autonomy when seen against this clearly stated new political reality would not be poisoned by any illusions of nationalististic grandeur or vendetta or resurrection. This fact should reconcile the liberals to the cultural autonomy. Certain propaganda lies of Goebbels would expire in the light of the naked truth: "This is what the Nazis have done to Germany." In this sense, the harsh political conditions and the cultural autonomy are corollaries of each other. If the peace is clearly articulated, then, and then only, the teaching in the German schools will have its corrective in reality. I repeat that this mutual interplay between political reality and teaching and press did not exist between 1919 and 1939 because the Treaty of Versailles and the even more unreal Treaty between America and Germany of 1920, concealed the true treatment of Germany behind stock phrases in the lingo of the League of Nations. The world war ended in an orgy of national democracies covering up the stark reality of world economics.

The punishment of the Nazis is connected with the cultural autonomy. I have little imagination in this ghastly matter. The boys who were brought up in the Nazi Ordensburgen, probably will all have to be shot. Youth is no extenuating circumstance in their case: it is aggravating. The prevalent American mood seems to be to give the young another chance and to execute the old sinners. I am not very excited over this matter. But with my experience of the German youth movement, I hold that a certain Nazi youth is incurable, and will not be changed where and when the member has been corrupted as totally as in the special brooding places called Ordensburgen. The older Nazis would render us their greatest service if they could be held up to universal contempt. A negro said when asked about Hitler, that it should be brought to this country and made to wear a black skin for the rest of his life. A Jew said that he wished to come into a restaurant and see a poor man hanging around; then he would say to his friend, the Jew said: "Really, there is Hitler." Both stories point, I think, in the right direction. We must not make martyrs of the Nazis; they must be made contemptible. They are cowards and should be treated as such. Perhaps, a formidable Hitler speech should be listened to by all Germans once a year, a speech of 1933 or 1940.

Why do I mention the cultural autonomy at all? Because it alone will allow the Germans to settle into their own new form of existence as a world organ but not a world power. It is hard for Americans to understand how the history of Germany for the last 200 years
is bound up with this distinction. This, however, is the stubborn fact. There always was the polarity between a Germany partitioned and overrun by Frenchmen, Swedes, Spaniards, Croats, Turks - in the Thirty Years War for instance and again in Napoleon's days - and a Germany belonging into the world in the true sense of this word. The guarantees of Germany must not come from bilateral treaties drawn up with Mr. Benesch or with Mr. Herriot. It should rest on a due respect for the universal interest of the whole world. This is the Weltgel-tungs-traum of Germany's inner territories since the Reformation. They wished to belong into the world at large with the great contribution they had to make and found themselves like Paraguay or Bolivia cut off from the oceans.

From war, Germany did not expect mere victory. The German myth is frankly melancholic. Siegfried is murdered and the vengeance of his wife Kriemhild ends in utter disaster. But they do dream of some mystical Twilight of the Gods during which the world of constant strife will be purified and disappear in fire. Hence, I feel sure that Germany is the only great nation in the world today who is able to digest the blow which the peace will deal to her sovereignty. But she will only be able to rediscover the best dreams and visions of her past in this strange denouement if nobody forces her mind.

It should be obvious that Germany with nearly one hundred million people must be faced with a solution which she can understand and live down. As a world organ, Germany could teach her children that the two world wars were not fought in vain. That Germany's virility compelled the rest of the world to shake off their laziness and indifference and to take one great step out of the anarchy of the 19th century. By reducing the number of Great powers and by organizing them around the Heart of Europe, these powers had to pay tribute to Germany's claim that she could ask to be part of world order instead of a European anarchy. Unless we allow some such German aspect of the last Thirty years to develop no solution will be successful in the long run. Perhaps, this is asking too much from the dogmatism of our democrats and Liberals. They may prefer a third religious war for their doctrines and may wish to make every German repeat their explanation of these wars. I have advocated the solution of Germany as a world organ and not a world power at a time when upon Germany the role of a political and economic parasite was imposed. I am a conservative who has the illusion that he knows when a thing is dead although he has loved this thing. To me Germany's sovereignty died in 1918 and ever since I am looking for a world ready to acknowledge this tremendous historical fact and to build upon it a partial order of a New World. A great power who loses her sovereignty does not become thereby a small nation; she may be used as the cornerstone of a vaster building.

If Germany becomes a global land, Bolshevism will not reach the Rhine; the economic system of the Reich will be a mixture of private property and public administration as it always has been since the railroads were nationalized. Russia will not be imperilled by war. The many races and creeds of America will not be asphyxiated by the Nazi stench. The great economic machinery of Europe can be salvaged, for the salvation of England, France, and all the other neighbors of Germany who all would starve if Germany resembled forever the rubble
in the streets of Cassino.

Negatively then our proposal fulfills the requirements discussed by us before.

5. Do we have any alternatives?

The democratic tradition all over the world cannot admit of operational and functional division of labor between various bodies of men. The latest appeal of the Pacifists asks for a peace between "equals." Nobody believes more fervently in the ultimate equality of man than I do. But I do not at all believe that this equality can be extended to nations big and small, or to railroads and farms. A railroad must run because it has a franchise. A farmer may go to Florida for the winter. Some nations can go to war, Switzerland cannot. To inject the notion of equality into the discussion of a good peace is an empty phrase. The victors of a war should look ahead and imagine a solution which will encompass the future of the vanquished in a positive manner. But this has nothing to do with any operational equality between victor and vanquished nation. I am glad that the many Maharanjas of India were never treated as equals by the British. I have never heard that any American soldier treated an Indian tribe as equal. But undoubtedly, the individuals who composed these tribes, were not worse than the individuals who used to come to the colonies in the 18th century.

The democratic alternative of complete equality simply puts its head into the sand and says: there are no functional distinctions between nations. In consequence of this, there is eternal war between them.

A more advanced school of thought, after the last war, and today more emphatically, asked for economies of continental size. Geographers and Socialists around the Sozialistische Monatshefte-foresew a Russian, a British Empire, an American and a European and a Far East economy, all more or less independent and all more or less complete in themselves. We need not go into the geographical fictions of this multiple of economies. They had to assume that one could create five globes instead of one. Hitler did take the proposition seriously and his European economy was planned with the support of the brightest minds. The Empire builders tried the Ottawa Conference but that did not make the Empire self-supporting. The Japanese tried the co-prosperity idea but that did not arouse our particular enthusiasm. It must be admitted that many people still think of such economy by continents as ahead of us. "Hemispherical Solidarity" has some associations of this type. It does not look as though Argentine will share in such a plan for America, and the U. S. do not seem to cherish such an idea with regard to oil in Arabia. Although easily understood as a compromise, a halfway house between small national economies and world revolution a la Trotsky, these ideas are antiquated. Their practical application by Germany and by the Japanese is in process of being destroyed by us. And at the same time, our own steps which nearly led us in the same direction (Ottawa, Good Neighbor Policy, Russia's complete isolation) are refuted by this war. The moderates who thought up
these continent wide solutions, represent the pre-war thinking of 1932. They are still very well entrenched because of their decency and fairness. But they deny that the world wars made or will make any sense. They do not admit that wars produce the evidence of the next order.

This is a question of faith. To me, the emancipation of the black men by means of a war measure in 1864 is highly instructive. The only part of the emancipation which made history and became a living part of the American Constitution was this step which Lincoln took as commander-in-chief and which the war tested. Ever since, Negroes have been soldiers. They have not been allowed to be much more. The 14th amendment benefited corporations, not negroes. But the war measure remained in full force. May this not be an example of a more universal rule?

But I do not expect that the peace-time and civilian thinker will see the creative role of a war effort for the re-orientation of society. Hence, I wish to argue on another plane with him. This other plane is economy. I challenge him that the idea of six parallel and uncoordinated economies is incompatible with the very essence of economic thinking. We may conceive of sixty governments, of 48 states, of political alliances and wars between equals. But I do not think that any economic theory can admit any order in which the division of labor is not made the ultimate test of soundness of theory and practice of economics. The division of labor in the material world implies diversity of function. No economy is in equilibrium or in health in which the tendency of expanding the division of labor is artificially stopped. Division of labor is a process which cannot be halted by frontiers of states. In England, Germans were waiters and tailors, in Russia they were officers and scholars. But each time the German element played a specific role in the division of labor. Jews, Italians, Czechs, Frenchmen, Irishmen, are predisposed in certain ways for certain jobs. The nationalism of this world cannot be decreed away but it can be mitigated if we allow these economic roles of various nationalities to be recognized as facts. It is only one higher dimension if we think of whole economies in a similar manner. There is on the highest plane a division of labor between divisions of labor, between economies as organized forms of society. If we have to have five or six important economies side by side as the pre-war co-prosperity advocates thought, these economies must be conceived not as all identical repetitions of one pattern, but as the necessary variations in one whole. My proposal then is not so totally different from these projects of five or six economic regions but it attacks the notion that such a division of the world into regions satisfies the fundamental need of all economic life to look at every act of man as an act in the Great Division of Labor. Regionalism without division of labor is without future. Whether we look at a meadow's ecology or a town's residential suburbs, or a country's dialects, life goes on at the growing point where a larger division of labor is tried. General Smuts' Holism is the only possible approach to the future of economy.

Some vitality, some life should result from the night of Europe. And I can see nothing but cemeteries and despair if no new division of labor is allowed to develop out of this catastrophe.
An abstract regionalism would introduce a static division of the globe instead of a division of labor. Hence we are forced to take one conscious step and to concede the minimum of deliberate organization, a German Production Board organized by the Great Powers around a Buffer Economy for Germany. Conservatives should take this step as the minimum which buys us independence and freedom for the other parts of our social life.

6. An Economy of Economies

What, then, would the world gain or lose? In 1914 the nations marched into the future in a certain alignment, with the U. S. emotionally and actually, far out in front. Today, the emotions may have changed here and elsewhere, but no doubt, there still is going this independent marching towards the future and this is as true of the small as of the big nations. A highly official Dutch personality told me some months ago that Holland had not any wishes to change radically. They wished to go back to their queen and they wished to see as little as possible of Germany. The good backwood people of this country who speak of future revolutions in Europe, are thirty years behind the times. These nations wish to restore everything that reminds them of peace and order, from kings to witamots, from Scotch bagpipers to Tirolese Dirndls. And they wish to be able to forget revolution.

This is especially true of Russia which prefers at this moment the memory of Suvorov to the memory of Trotsky, and the memory of Peter the Great to the memory of Suvorov, and the memory of Alexander Nevsky to the memory of Peter the Great.

The acceptance of Germany as the object of cooperation would give the deep feeling of rest to her neighbors for which they crave. I am not discussing here changes in boundaries which some of these neighbors of course will demand. I think that such changes in many instances are reasonable. But I do think their importance should not be exaggerated. I mentioned before that blood poisoning may be the result of such re-annexations. Of course, the Alsace would return to France and other changes may be advisable.

Our solution is based on the principle that the U. S. will remain a country of free enterprise for the next generation at least, and that the U.S.S.R. will not discard their form of capitalism either. Russia will begin to produce consumers' goods on a colossal scale, and we shall build power projects, Pan American Highways, and bases on a colossal scale, and on an even larger scale we shall reforest and rehabilitate our soil.

What does this mean for the world? The nightmare of a "one-way-only" economy, of one single economic system for the whole world, would explode. And I would dance and shout: thank God.

Economics can achieve their ends in various ways. The ideal economy is a multiformal economy. And the co-existence of England, Russia, U. S., Germany, and all the other countries, should be sufficient evidence that economy may have to function diversified.
Ingredients of capitalistic, socialistic, feudal, communistic, monastic, paternal, mercantilistic procedures enter into a sound economy as well as features of a family economy, a type very much by itself. A navy, a family, a convent, a hospital, an artist, a factory, represent this variety of economies conspicuously enough. A country which would live by factories and schools only, without family monastery, studio, hermit, camp, port, would be a monstrosity. Children in a home live in an economy of growth: receiving more than they are giving, but giving just the same to a considerable extent. In a factory, we may perhaps be expected to give more than we receive but it usually does not work out that way. In any case, it is an economy of output, not of growth. A monastery is a household of intensification. An artistic genius needs a patron, at all times, id est, he is and remains an economic outcast. If his work pays, he probably is no genius. At least, in science this is true. (When the discoverer of the wave theory, Heinrich Hertz, was called to a big university, he shook his head in sadness: Now they call me and pay me a big salary and now I am an extinguished volcano.) A navy is the pet child of a whole nation. Now nations specialize in some particular economic feature, and should continue to do so.

That anybody should try to reduce these contradictory economies of our various stages and phases and occupations into the straightjacket of pure capitalism or pure communism or anything pure, has mystified me all my life. Obviously, the earthly existence of man is not pure but impure, economics are impure, races are impure, society is impure; and they are the better the more they are mixed. I admit that certain mixtures fail. But those are done without fervor and enthusiasm, from mere whim of the moment. I have no axe to grind as to the degree of mixture or admixture in economics. But the admission of it as the very principle of our material existence - and what else is economics? - is the sine qua non of a world peace. This, then, is one important discovery; a World Peace has one minimum condition, too.

The sine qua non, the indispensable conditions of the great powers are not the only ones. The world at large has been sick with monomanias of chambers of commerce, labor unions, Bolsheviks, Fascists, Socialists, gold standard fanatics, Social Credit people, etc., etc. The peace can only be based on the decision to abstain from economic monomanias. Not only that there is not one economic system for all and everybody (The manufacturer whose daughter becomes a nurse or a secretary, may convince himself of this fact quite easily.) It also is not in the least desirable that there ever should be attempted such a unification. It is a bad dream. Our souls need unity, for we must be able to be one heart and one soul. But our bodies most certainly must not get mixed up with every other body. Marxism is an attempt to found a church on bread alone. The wars of the world were fought against this heresy always. The Thirty Years War was fought for the same mistake in the opposite direction, of one church-bread so to speak. It won't work.

The two world wars, I actually believe, had to be fought for the extirpation of the one-economy-only dogma. Capitalism and communism and corporationism and Hitler's New Order, all had to be defeated before the war aim could be proclaimed: free choice in
economics. Man is free to choose any old or new way in economics. Matter is undogmatic. You may have to have a dogma about God because otherwise Hitler may be enthroned as Christ as this literally was done in Germany by the German Christians, people with a soft brain. But under no circumstances can you have a dogma about money or wheat or the optimum size of a factory; if you try to have such a dogma, the people may have neither work nor bread.

The reader need hardly be told that the situation thirty years ago was topsy-turvy. Dogmas about God were pooh-poohed, but dogmas about economics were taken to be infallible. When people put a wrong emphasis on the static and the dynamic elements of their judgment, they lose their judgment. The misplaced dogmatism led to the world wars. If we wish to conclude peace, the dogmas must be placed outside this material world of ours. An economic dogma is impossible because in economics, we consume every product of time. Everything may be right at one moment and wrong at another. If we try to handle economics dogmatically, the world falls on evil days.

Hence, the constitutional admission of a whole arboretum of economies is a sound response to these wars. The operational unit Germany would be a new variety in economics which by its very existence would force men to bury the hatchet of economic dogmatism. The ideological conflict between Russia and the West would be refuted by the existence of such a Buffer Economy. And the world of the mind would become as big as it must become if it shall run parallel to the size of the real world. As long as any one ideology on material questions may consider itself to be the only one worthy to exist, world wars will break out. It is necessary to fight for a multiform world economy because otherwise constant rebellions will break the prison bars of such a misplaced dogma. The special and new organization of Germany might be called a Buffer Economy not only in a geographical but also in a moral sense. It expresses the very best traditions of Germany's administrative genius. This Buffer Economy would allow the other nations to keep their sovereignty in every other respect except in rebus Germanics.

Probably, a truce of ten years, and an allied High Command would be the simplest way of setting up the desaltable machinery outside the purely national administration of each member of the World Production Board.

And if Germany's economy could be a topic of the Grand Strategy, we could hope for peace. Lobbies in Congress and parties in France, and Tories or Labor in England will hardly have the necessary imagination. For the German economy will have to be conducted in the grand manner, as a strategical undertaking of the next century. It should excite the imagination of the best people all over the world. Around it, the reconstruction of the rest of Europe, of Russia, etc., would easily group itself.

Between 1789 and 1918, the interplay between war and economics was understood by the profiteers only. Economic theory dealt with peace time conditions and ignored that war conditions decided the peace economy of every country. One example may, at the end, illustrate
In 1936, a French economist now a minister in de Gaulle's cabinet, visited America. He complained to me one day bitterly. This is what he said: "Here I am trying to negotiate a treaty of commerce with the States. But whenever we consider an important item, I am told that, of course, when war comes, the neutrality legislation may intervene with our receiving this product. How then can we treat with U. S.? Since we are not sure that we shall get these things at the time at which we need them most, we shall build up these industries by subsidies in our own country. We shall hate to do this. It is foolish. But the big line which divides American thinking for 'normal' economic conditions from all realism, compels us to do a thing which will isolate us from U. S. more and more. The economics of war are decisive for the economics of peace. A ship must carry life boats and carry on life boat drill always although she may not be on fire ever. Economics are built around the worst that can happen, not around a lucky interlude of peace." Let us think through this little Philippica of Mr. Andre Philippe; then, we shall be on the highway to a strategic economy and an economic strategy.

War and peace, as everybody knows, are met with two different types of economic rules. The existence of one economy for the duration, and another in days of peace, would suffice to prove that the laws of material things, that economics, are multiform. If we wish to avoid the wholesale slaughter and destruction of our own historical world by bombs, we shall have to give to all sorts of economies a place in our world, without war, even to a typical war time economy. And it is here where Germany comes in. Germany's economy may be called the economy most efficient in war. Take away the use of violence and her economy will eminently deserve conservation. Germany's economy is not the best economy. There is no best economy. But it is a specimen in the arboretum of economies which deserves to be preserved. This is not a plea for a museum of economies. Economy has to do with real life. Germany's economy is a real achievement. And the respect for a functioning economy is the due respect for the tested life of the creature man.

As the shock absorber and buffer economy, Germany would help us to escape from the childish dogmas of the 19th century. We would learn to be polyglot on the material world and its changes. We would speak the many languages which go with the many forms of work and production. A peace that is frankly polyglot in economics, could become a real world peace. It would prove that man is free to master his environment. A polyglot peace would deal the greatest possible blow to all doctrines about wars of the future and inescapable fate.

6. Personal Record

Friends have advised me to mention my record of former publications in which the ideas of this essay were evolved. I do not see that this background makes the ideas any better. And nothing is more irritating to the reader than the man "I-told-you-so." If the things
which I say are true then they are true regardless of the fact that I fought for them in Germany from 1918 to 1932 without political success, it is true, not however without leaving a seed behind me.

Just the same, I shall now give chapter and verse of some earlier statements. I am moved by two considerations. One is that my American friends may wonder why I kept my mouth shut for the last decade, and did not even say all this in my Autobiography of Western Man, called "Out of Revolution" (New York, 1938). Yes, I consciously acted the man Who-did-not-tell-you-so, in this country. Not that I ever concealed my thoughts on the subject. There is a whole chapter in "Out" on our Economic Future, in which the lack of an economic staff of world wide insight, is made responsible for our chaos. Also by a world wide moral equivalent for war, I tried to hasten the day on which the truth could be told. But before this last winter of dismay, it may have been silly to expect a real hearing for my expectations. From 1933 to 1939, as everybody knows, people were incredulous of anything. And from then on we had to live through all the obsolete fashions of the past once more, from Spyckman to Bowman, from Lindberg to Hartmann, from the fourteen points of Wilson to the seventeen points of Mr. Hull. In a remarkable regurgitation, everything ever tried before was once more without any intention to "obey." By obedience, I mean the necessity to bring sense into immense sacrifices with due respect for the sacrifices. And a due respect is shown when we listen to the moaning and groaning of the nations, and do not repeat our preconceived national aims.

My second reason for this epilogue is my respect for many of my German compatriots who have come to this country. Whereas I have tried to forget Europe and been more interested in the rehabilitation of American agriculture and man power than in world politics, they believe fervently in some restoration of the Weimar republic as one of the sixty odd nations on the world's map. They think that a man who does not believe in this solution for the countries between the Rhine and Danube, must be very wicked or very foolish. To them the Nibelungen which predict that Hitler-Kriemhild must be tamed by a world order coming from the outside over these parts of the earth and ending the gruesome strife, are an absurd fairy tale, and not the forebodings of the future world order. I prefer to face the attack of these friends openly by repeating the record of my constant resistance against their illusions. They are of course highly honorable men but they would have to explain why the German people deserted them in the decisive hour and how, after such desertion, they can have any chance. I hold that the German people had cause to reject the Weimar Republic not because it was bad but because it was impotent.

But regardless of your preferences, American or German reader, will you please note one central fact: at one time the later Weimar republicans and the former Potsdam Monarchists of Germany, both shared my opinion. There was one moment in the world's history, when the impulse which I here have articulated, was the universal impulse of all the people of feeling, in Germany. This strange moment of German unanimity on Germany's loss of sovereignty was November 9, 1918.

"Every German, including the German Kronprinz, knew on
November 9, 1918, that the Reich was gone and that Germany from now on had no other central problem but the reconstruction of an economic discipline." This I was able to print as late as 1932, in the "Hochland" of Munich, in an essay "Judas Ischarioth und die preussischen Konservativen." Lest my opponents over here think that I turn against them only, I quote this essay; it branded as traitors the conservatives of 1932 who tried to wipe out the fact that in 1918 they had buried the monarchy with great conviction.

The sacrifices of the nations all of them are waiting to be used for a symphonic composition. The peace of a durable type were not mechanical reconstructions but harmonious compositions. The "era of reconstruction" had not too good a reputation, in American history, because of its purely mechanical character in which the proud melody of the old South was simply omitted. Hence this melody stayed outside the living growth of the States ever after the era of reconstruction. But the Boer War was ended by a melodious peace. There was no reconstruction in South Africa, but a new Round Table was built by Lionel Curtis and others, and a new affability was allowed to spring up.

During the period in which the most radical term for a world peace was "reconstruction," I kept my mouth shut on world affairs, and became a citizen of this country, and fought my battles inside the New England tradition of scholarship and inside the boundaries of the State of Vermont. There was plenty to learn and plenty to resist, too.

Now, while I turn to the problems of a world of which New England and even the U. S. form a very small part, I cannot say to my American friends: "I told you so." And I am happy because of this. But we together, may now have to explore a way of extricating ourselves from the war which started in 1914, went underground in 1918 and flared up again in 1931 (Manchuko) but of which we never did extricate ourselves, despite Harding's "return to normalcy." I dabble with a polyglot peace, then, in this essay, because reconstruction is doomed to failure, and we all will have to go beyond such laziness of heart and mind.

If the reader will remember that on November 9, 1918, neither monarchists nor democrats of Germany cared for their hereditary ideals but were wide open for a completely unforeseen much more profound solution, then the difference between them and myself boils down to this: The Nationalist or Rightists, and the Leftists and democrats, gradually repressed and tried to forget the universal shock of that day. The democrats hoped that if they had the forms of a sovereign republic, the size of the true catastrophe might be made smaller and smaller. The conservatives could not forgive themselves their own despair - as little as the conservatives in U. S. can forgive anybody that they had the jitters in 1932. AND BECAUSE OF THIS COWARDICE, they were irresistibly hypnotized by the beast from the abyss, by Hitler.

Both Left and Right hoped to make the catastrophe of world proportions undone, hoped to make it into just an unlucky episode. The scope and depth of the world war was the more deliberately
minimized the farther people drifted away from the actual date on which their eyes had been open to the full meaning of a world war, from November 9, 1918. Their attitude posed a similar problem to that of the business men who did know about 1930 that a whole era had ended with the crash of 1929; today, however, they admit nothing of the kind, although they still well know it in their subconsciousness, that the world war and the business cycle are two sides of the same story, and that the astrology of a ruthless cycle is unworthy of man. So, I am just slow-witted. I had not invented this depth and comprehensiveness of the catastrophe; only it is true that I could not forget it.

I had to live and to make a living among people who seemed to me faithless to our most telling experience, and who on their part, thought that I was a great nuisance. Between telling the truth and making a living, it was a tight rope walk. But there has not been a year between 1918 and 1932, in which I did not have an opportunity of publicly testifying to my conviction, in books, speeches, magazine articles, lectures, courses, work camps, academies for teachers in adult education, academies for trade union leaders, factory workers, people's high schools, churches, universities, and among engineers as well as employers.

Today, I am very critical of my own ideas. My long silence in this country was useful because it showed me that it may be too early still for Americans to face the Oneness of the world in a deeper sense than in that of a geographical map. Also, Hitler's atrocities had not yet happened when I advocated Germany's organization as a Buffer Economy in an economy of economies.* In this sense, it may be too late.

Besides, the benign experts of 1918, on the American side, will be replaced by this time by hard headed experts on oil, and water power and geology and bases and airports. The negligible facts of human destiny and human imagination will be brushed aside. That 100 million people represent a volcano of politics and poetry and imagination and desires, that this volcano must be harnessed to the great palace of the god Vulcanus, i.e. the world's industry, is an unpleasant truth and although peace cannot be successful without including the horsepower unit MAN; and this peace cannot be successful without being imaginable by the peoples of Europe, such a peace may be missed. The line of least resistance may well be taken by all the parties concerned. We shall know this immediately when we read the terms. If they are blunt and straightforward, we will have won. If they are sanctimonious, sanctuous, in the lingo of 1860, the absence of any faith will be obvious.

But whatever now will be done, I do know for certain that in 1918 Germany was ready for a new order, for an economy of economies. And that if they had been understood in their blind and inevitable groping for their final place in the world, the Germans on their part would have understood that they too had to sacrifice and contribute to the Oneness of the World.

And it seems to me necessary to hammer this unbelievable

* See especially Die Europäischen Revolutionen, Jena 1931 pages 521ff.
statement into the record until it is believed and acted upon.

Anybody who studies the history of Germany from Hus and Mathias Grünewald to Albert Schweitzer and Albert Einstein, will know innumerable facts which explain Germany's whole part in the light of this world-wide solution which today is asked for. The "world view" (Weltanschauung) world literature (Goethe's vision) "Weltsendung des deutschen Geistes" (Herder) are anticipations of Germany definitely making her entrance into the One World of the Future. But I shall not continue.

If, after all this, the reader has the patience to listen to the way of thinking on which I arrived at my conclusions and by which I tried to make these conclusions palatable to my German countrymen, he kindly is requested to glance through some brief excerpts from my writings. (The texts would fill several hundred pages.)

1) From "Europa und die Christenheit," three essays first published in the "Hochland" of Munich, beginning November 1918, and later printed as a pamphlet, Kempten 1919:

"The Death of Siegfried:"

"The German Reich has been." We should not cowardly conceal this fact to us. The Twilight of the Gods has taken place. As the Middle Ages have ended, so ends today the day of the modern nations of Europe.

The work of Richard Wagner is not by accident the Ring of the Nibelungen, the song of the will to victory and of the defeat of this will.

Our faith in an emperor protected the Reich. Neither the impersonal "State," nor a reasonable democracy nor scientific socialism are able to protect the Germans or to unite them. The Germans were united by the leader only. To have a leader, has been from the beginning the only instrument of political unity in Germany. The German Reich depended on an emperor and for that reason, it now falls with him. No makeshift may take its place, in our loyalty. Such a profound wound does not heal under some cheap bandage. We must find a life, now without the poison of some pus produced by shortlived quackeries.

2) "In the next decades, despair will drive the Germans to plans of revanche, to attempts of a restoration, to violent outbreaks. We shall see the experiment of a pseudoemperor who will make use of these elements of unrest. They will turn the compressed area of Germany into a hell. In this confusion, both the neopagans in their nationalism and the well meaning "little Germans" will curse us. Because we now go beyond the purely national role of our country. From the whole world as a unity, Germany must receive her destiny in the future.

"The nationalist feels that his honor is lost and tries to reconquer it; by arming the country again as though it still were his
own, like private property. The democrat realizes that his country is economically already sequestrated; but politically, he talks as though he still was the member of a sovereign nation. They hate each other, because the nationalist only sees that which we have lost; the democrat tries to gain something which has not roots in our history or our real situation. We ourselves, between the two, can only hope to constitute a kind of faithful cable between real past and real future because without some such faith in continuity, the life of the Germans would lose all meaning and destiny.

"Look upon the map. Find Germany in the middle of the continent, without certain frontiers. Everywhere are the forests cut through by frontiers; everywhere are the boundaries uncertain. Nowhere is anything definite or absolute. The innumerable little states no longer are safe homesteads for us. In the center of the world, we stand exiled so to speak by the world into our own country, which they have mortgaged with a mortgage held by the whole world. The same territory which we considered our own, now must be considered as an operational part of the whole globe, and order must come to us from some universal economic pacification of the whole."

From "Die Hochzeit des Kriegs und der Revolution," Wuerzburg 1920:

3) "To give us an encouragement so that we might obey the reality in which we move, everything is written which I have written for the last years. I cannot abandon this way of courage against ourselves. For only at the end of this road do I see a life worthy to be lived, which will regenerate our thinking and regenerate the people.... The churches and the nations or states, now must allow a place for a new unit, a nation at work. We no longer should dream of victories but care for the survival of our people as a cooperative fellowship. Into this process, we should give ourselves, lose ourselves so as to gain our soul again. Our nation was led into the only genuine depth which exists, the depth of misfortune and necessity. In this depth, we may learn to distinguish between the trimmings and the real conditions of our organic place in the order of mankind. The world of the Teutonic tribes was followed by the medieval church. The world of the church was followed by the world of national states. The world of European nations now will be followed by an equally varied world of economic units, in which the many groups of the Human Race will cooperate in a division of labor. Only those peoples will be blessed who take this step with bold decision. He who puts his hand to the plough and looks backward, is not fit for the kingdom of God."

7. Military, versus economic, Order

An Economy of Economies undertakes to separate the military power of a State or Nation from the working capacity of a cooperative social order.

This is the secret goal of all the endeavors of the last decades: to disentangle the economic or social from the military or political power.

Germany found after 1929 that she was left with an opportunity for curing the economic disaster of the crisis by rearming. She used military means for economic purposes.

Russia had done the opposite in 1918. Then, Lenin consciously and deliberately sacrificed military power and territorial possessions to the opportunity of making his economic experiment.

For us onlookers, Germany and Russia are twins, one of them being a total state running after a reasonable economy, the other being a total economy chasing after a reasonable state after having concentrated on economy for two decades. Both are totalitarians since politics and economics, war and business, are insolvably intertwined.

If Hitler wins, then all the nations of Europe will remain chained to the chariot of his master economy. And the suppression of Europe by Philip II of Spain will be mild compared to the new yoke which results from this slave economy based on political power. We cannot accept this solution which would require that we could do no business with any part of Europe without the gracious permit of Berchtesgaden. But simple as our No is, it is not so simple to frame our affirmation. Europe is in the center of the Western World and although the airplane could link Russia and U. S. via the Northern Pole to the exclusion of Europe, we still have a long way to go before the Northern Pole has replaced the sea-lanes and the railroads which cross through Europe.

Keeping our goal clearly in mind: the separation of military and economic power, we now must turn to the imagination of the nations which live in Europe. For whether we impose this peace or whether the war simply peters out without a signed peace, the imagination of these nations constitutes millions of horsepowers of energy. And this imagination must be harnessed to any dynamic economy if it is to function at all.

Now, I feel that it is possible to draw a hopeful picture in which this imagination gets its adequate function. I base this hope on the fact that once before, the heart of Europe had little military ambitions. Prussian Militarism as it worked from 1700 to 1944 was owed to very specific conditions. Before 1700, the heart of Europe was enormously peaceful, even to the detriment of order. And if we analyze these original conditions carefully, we may have reasonable hopes that a new economy may create non-military ambitions.

The reader may shrink from the following array of dates.
Nevertheless, he should be able to survey them easily. They mean to give the mutations of the German character through which it passed since the Reformation. Maps and material are collected more amply in "Out of Revolution."

From 1700 to 1944, the political order of Central Europe was continuously more militarized. Before 1700, however, the 350 courts and free cities in this same area indulged in the luxury of having very little of an army or of a foreign policy at all. Both these worries they left to the Holy Roman Emperor whose Sacred Empire surrounded their lands like a protecting mantle. If you look upon the map, from Brussels in the Northwest through Strassburg in the Southeast to Tirol, Crain, Istria, Hungary, Bohemia, Silesia, and Schwiebus, the Emperor's hereditary lands surrounded the 350 courts of inner Germany. For this reason, before 1700, these inner regions could afford to concentrate their efforts on religious administration; each prince or magistrate considered himself sovereign in matters of religion. Weimar or Dresden or Munich owed their glory to a peculiar division of labor between the Sacred Order of the Empire and the inner peaceful territories of the innumerable petty princes who reformed the church.

Here, then, do we have a foretaste of future possibilities. There was once in the past a situation, in the forests of Germany, where the Teutonic tribes had disarmed. There can be no question of restoring this specific time. However, we learn from it that a change in character can be expected when the function of a region changes. There is no more permanency in Prussian militarism than in any other allegedly eternal feature of man, if we are bold enough to inquire into the facts.

Before 1700, then, let us say in 1600, the town of Berlin was the residence of a prince, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, who reformed the religion of his lands but was militarily impotent. Berlin where this prince resided essentially expected its military protection from the Holy Roman Empire, which was considered a sacred order of the Church. And the only date of historical interest in Berlin's history up to that time, was the day on which its prince had reformed its religion, in 1539.

1740, 1840, 1940, 1944, show a very different picture. Berlin no longer was residence of a German prince, in 1740, but the capital of a Christian State whose head the king of Prussia was, who claimed sovereignty like a rocher de bronze among all the other states of Christendom.

By 1840, Berlin had changed again from the capital of a kingdom to the center of a so-called Great Power. Successfully, Prussia plays a role in the Balance of Power. Whereas in 1600, on a scale of values, Vienna would have pulled down the scale deeply if Berlin had been placed on the other scale. By 1840, the two cities began to acquire equal weight.

By 1870, Berlin boasted of being the center of the German nation. Germany's Reich claimed to be a nation among the nations of the
civilized world. This was not true because of the fact that the Austrian Germans were left outside, and Poznan inside. But it was effective enough, for coloring the whole German thinking as though "national" was the whole content of political action.

By 1940, the Holy Roman Empire, even in its disguise as Austria-Hungary, had disappeared. The Germans treated Berlin the capital not of a nation but of a dynamic economy, and embarked on a shooting expedition into the economic reservations of all other nations and great powers, hunting for their own economy. In 1944, Berlin itself has ceased to function as the center of this goosechase. Berlin now is out of commission as much as Vienna. The Ukraine is lost and therewith, the war is lost economically already. Since the war was a shooting expedition for the golden fleece of economy, the war was lost with the loss of the Ukraine. On the other hand, let us not forget the unpleasant fact that the small nations of Europe are in this quandary: On the one side, they desperately look for some safeguard to escape the Purge of the Fuehrer. As nations all the Europeans hate Hitler. Economically, however, they do not know what to do or to hope.

The terms, under which this German kaleidoscope has shifted from century, deserve our attention. Princes reforming the Churches inside the Sacred Empire. States within Christendom. Powers within the Balance of Power. Nations, within the civilized nations. "Hitler," poaching in the world's economies, from Argentine to the Caucasus. Future: The military and the economic power disentangled, as the religious and the military powers were separated before 1600.

Please weigh the fact that the princes of Central Europe before the mantle of the Sacred Empire was rent, were princes in matters of religion, id est inside the church not inside the world. Then, our program becomes clear. The German leadership however it shall function, must become a leadership not in the world, but in society, id est, not in power politics but in economics.

This to be sure, is exactly the opposite from the Weimar Republic solution. And all leftist Germans will oppose me because they have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. They wish to give Germany some though little slice of political power but no recognition as a peculiar Buffer Economy, for the benefit of a symphony of economies. In short, they wish to return to their places of influence and power in Germany, but leave the Germans at home without anything to be proud of. Does anybody believe for a moment that 80 million Germans will be happy to imitate Nicaragua?

The adequate function of the heart of the Western World must be a specific function. Any imitation of other nations is disastrous. Hitler's totalitarianism cannot be replaced by the same state of affairs from which the peoples of Central Europe turned away, to Hitler, because even the devil seemed better than the state in which affairs were right then.

Either Germany's economy is taken up as a world problem, and made into a Buffer Economy, or the present Moloch System of a Berlin-
Vienna Unity, comprising the German Nation, the Prussian and the Austria-Hungary inheritance, is going to delete all historical forms of Europe, and force its place between the American and the Russian Wing of the Western World, as a military and economic center. A national democracy for Germany does not solve anything and would lead to war again.

If we do not divide the economy and the political order, the chaos of vision or the vision of chaos will continue. The decisive thing, it seems to me, is the fact that we are, to a certain extent, back to the days of the "Great Elector de Brandeoburg." Then, the Holy Roman Empire surrounded these inner territories and permitted them to experiment in Protestantism without much danger.

Today, the capers of the Nazis take place in the midst of a world which is contracting by the increasing division of labor, by the raw materials, transport, science and techniques which unify the whole globe more radically than the Holy Roman Empire ever was able to unify. The "insideness" of the Nazi stronghold, then, is the practical problem. They say that they are so central to all economic life of the rest of the world that they can dictate their terms. We must show that the factual insideness of Central Europe within the world's economy need not drive them mad. We must replace this madness by some economy of economics. A mad economy, this is the chaos which the Germans see around them. They will not become normal before this vision of Chaos changes.

But what do we hear on the Allied side? The terms which are used in the debate, smell of the seventeenth and the nineteenth century, and are both without any roots in American experience. One is "Great Power" which smacks of the balance of power and of imperialism, the other is "nation" which does not explain the economic plight of all nations since 1929, whether a Hoover or a Hitler was in power. The talk of nations incarcerates the economic life of the world within national boundaries and degrades the political leaders into rain sorcerers who are held responsible for the depression or who boast of prosperity as though it were of their making.

Is it necessary for the United States to indulge in the vocabularies of Mr. Anthony Eden or of Mr. Benesh or Count Sforza? And to exclude its own native tradition? Of course, the United States are Great Power and Nation. What of it?

What is the genuine American tradition? Certainly not the talk of power politics or of nationalism. When the word "nation" was first used by Continental Congress, a dead silence reigned; it was felt to be a tragedy. Everybody knew that the term did not cover the real hopes of America. America was slated to become more than a great power or a "nation." And the intellectuals who handle these words lag behind the real people of America, in their thinking and writing. We have a war between the articulate press and literature imitating the European slogans and the business and work of this New World which is pressing into quite different channels. Many people feel this our torn-to-pieces-hood. One of my friends, a typical Yankee, for this reason, accuses the country of Insincerity. But it
is not insincerity but the use of a false amalgamated nature, in all political debate which creates the terrifying vagueness in Wilson and Roosevelt. The people of this country are committed to a New World and a better order, but to neither imperialism nor nationalism.

In the last paragraph, we used two expressions which to the best of our knowledge represent the genuine American faith. After we have talked of Germany's "insideness" within the Roman Empire, "within" a balance of power, "within" Europe, it is only fair to compare now America's "insideness." America, too, has a vision of the universe surrounding her.

While the Great Elector of Brandenburg was a Prince of the Sacred Roman Empire, this country was settled as "God's country." While the Old World restored its antiquity, by Olympic Games and the Celtic Language and the Roman Empire and the Teutonic Tribes, these United States proclaimed a New World and a New Order and while the Europeans looked backwards, the people here looked forward towards the destiny of man.

Destiny and New World are the prominent American terms which promise a future.

When Bill 1776, Lend Lease, was passed by Congress in 1941, the wrong slogans of mere power on the one hand, and of mere nationalism, on the other, gave way to reality. We got in touch again with the great tradition as in vigor in 1776, when a whole New World opened before the enchanted view of Americans. Not only that in "God's country" they were far away from the Old World. The whole world looked from these shores. We must insist that we are, by coming to America, in a New World, and that the whole of the world looks differently from here, including the so-called Old World."

Madness will hang over the center of Europe as long as they are talked to in terms of nations and of powers only. Let us speak of the economy of a New World and of the destiny of mankind, let us make use of General Smuts' wise Holism, the philosophy of the whole, inside of which we all function, then our "inside" and Germany's "inside," I mean the two worlds inside of which we and they assume to move, will for the first time begin to look compatible.

A friend of mine who agreed that the intellectuals from Bowman to Hartman moved on Unamerican lines, sighed, The true American goes Chamber of Commerce, in the midst of this desperate struggle. I told him to take heart. And the same day I read a heartening story. Here it is:

Eric Johnson, President of the American Chamber of Commerce when he accepted Stalin's invitation to Russia, said: "The United States and the Soviets are the two extremes today." That's a good saying. Extremes lie inside some providential or at least potential order. They are "extremes" with regard to some standard of common

*See the documentary evidence in my chapter "The Americans" in Out of Revolution, Autobiography of Western Man, New York, 1938.
decency.

Russia and U. S., the Chamber of Commerce and the planners, may see that the Buffer Economy of Central Europe will remain in the hands of madmen unless we act symphonically. If we move on into a new world, the mutation of Central Europe from a nation into an economy would appear in its true light, as a violent jump into a new dimension, as a catastrophe in the literal sense. The "catastrophe" in Greek is the point at which the course of events suddenly takes a new direction. The naive faith of mechanical straight lined advance in one logical and calculated direction is not the way of history. Because human beings must enter a crucible by which their lagging thoughts are weeded out and their ideas can be brought up-to-date. We must think up to our real situation within the New World which surrounds us. So far, I have only seen idealistic thinkers offering us their nice plans for general happiness such as they figured them out in their armchairs. They dream that the world will live up to the idealists' wishes. The naive blueprints of my liberal friends show a wonderful indifference to reality and history.

The world never will go their way. The world expects us to think up to its wonderful created unity and diversity. The earth is the Lord's and not Wall Street's or the planner's. The New Direction is not entered upon by wishful thinking. But by the sacrifice of our prejudices; the kingdom of heaven comes down to earth. The prejudices which we are asked to sacrifice today are the term "nation" and the term "power." Alas, people prefer to sacrifice their sons in war to the sacrifice of their pet prejudices. Hence, the Germans live in a Mumbo-Jumbo of "Nation as Economy," and of the old Teutonic Tribes as the new Superstate with Lebensraum. As long as the United States consider themselves to be situated in a chaotic world of nations, we too are guilty of this Mumbo-Jumbo, of a reactionary cultivation of the Old World's standards.

If the peoples of the New World would return to their own language, the fever which always is produced by the use of stale political terms, will rapidly recede.

 Didn't we speak of a New World once? Why not try it?

Catastrophes like this war force us to abandon pseudo-directions. They call us back into our original direction. They go to prove that any truly New Direction is a new form of the original direction of man's destiny.

And man's destiny certainly is not to go to war for the restoration of Gaelic or a Roman Empire or Ethiopia or the teutonic tribes, or a League of Nations, but to create a New World in which to rival and to compete in an ever expanding division of labor.

In these days of dismay, I was fortified by the following letter from Colorado. Despite its casual character, it seems to illuminate the American basis of the social order.

"And then in a clearing, the trail forked. The Bear Mountain
Trail plunged in the sun-and-shade-dappled woods. The sky was the deepest royal blue. And then, on a ridge to the left of the trail, a ridge which slumped eventually down into the plain, we saw six deer silhouetted against the depth of the sky. They had spotted us long before we had seen them. They seemed to realize that we would bring them no harm. They were too far away to distinguish anything but the outline. They did not want to run away but they seemed to be afraid to know that they should be afraid. And so they disappeared. On the way down to the plain, we began to talk of Oklahoma. Her father had been in the great rush the day the territory was opened. The family had come out by wagon from Indiana. They had arrived at the line a week beforehand. And had done some scouting to pick out their location beforehand. The mad gallop for hours. And then the site by the winding river in a grove of trees. And how the people of that site always stuck together no matter how far apart they were. Her father went to school there. He and his brother would run off with the Indians whenever their father's discipline seemed too strict. And they would return. And one day the father went to California. But always he wanted to go back and one of her father's schoolmates has written her to come to see them on week-ends. They still stick together.

"Her father went to California. This classmate later moved to Colorado. They never saw each other again. Yet the grove of trees by a river in Oklahoma holds the sympathies of people forever. This may sound naive but here was a link in the chain of American history."

The letter proclaims in which manner the Americans became one people. They became one people by common free and risky enterprise. The American people did not find a great power or a nation or even a state. They formed states, became a great power and were considered a new nation, but first of all, they crossed the Atlantic and they went out west and found their household gods in a grove of trees by the winding river. In this act of faith, they became united and only in such acts of faith, will they remain united.

This, then, is the nature of the New World which surrounds the soul of the people, in this country. They only have to understand that the Old World cannot remain in its militarised and nationalistic mood either. That which is required from the Americans at this juncture is that this time, the Europeans are heading for economics. Europe is adopting belatedly the lessons taught by America. America, at the same time, is taking over part of the political functions of Europe. The confusion arises from this process of equalization that America becomes more European, with regard to power, and Europe goes American with regard to economics.

Once, this equalization of functions is seen as a mutual adaptation, we can free Central Europe from its totalitarianism by undertaking part of the policing task as one of the guarantors of the "Western World," and we may allow the Europeans to turn to joint enterprises in economics, as an area of open frontiers in matters of business.

Then, we all shall live in the New World which was recognized as our manifest destiny, 150 years ago.
Summary

People are sick at heart; no pax Americana is in sight. Too many different interests are jeopardized by this war: military-geographical, political-moral, economic-social. However, these interests are not jeopardized to the same degree of vehemence for the various belligerents. And therein lies the key of solution.

For Germany, all three interests are in the crucible. For Russia, the military geographical threat is paramount. England writhes as an economic and social body. America's free institutions are in mortal danger.

Hence, the basic demands of Russia start with geography of England with economics, of America with moral and political order. Russia must not be invaded, America must not be asphyxiated, England must not be ruined economically.

These three aims should be distinguished. They have compelled the three Great Powers to wage this war. They are therefore the minimum program of their peace. This minimum guaranteed, they will have averted their mortal dangers.

America must insist that Germany go neither Nazi nor Bolshevik in the future; America must live in a pluralistic universe. England cannot survive if Germany becomes an economic desert. Russia must insist that Germany be demilitarized.

Solution: Military and economic power must be separated. Germany is to be constituted as a Buffer Economy, and dealt with by a globe production board for the protection of her smaller neighbors. She must receive specific treatment, in a pluralistic economy of economies.

Germany, by history and thought, is prepared for accepting a solution which denies her world power status, under the condition that her claim to be a world organ is recognized.

The author's record after 1918 is traced.

The period 1914-1944 fights the monomaniacs of economy who believe in one single dogma. The American Chamber of Commerce as well as the spirit of the pioneers, farmers and bankers of America, are not going to sacrifice an economy of free enterprise and experimentation to any universal political or economic quackery. Economy is not a matter of dogma and requires the multiform solution of experiment. Hence the demand for polyglot peace.
(I think you will like to see this list of books. — R.C.C.)

Books by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

Protection of Peace and Ducal Power from the 8-12th Century...1910
Ostfalens Legal Literature under Frederick II.
Texts and Investigations .........................1912
Niebuhr's posthumous Letters..................1911
Royal Family and Lineage in Germany .........1914
Out of the Calendar of Church Holidays .......1910
Roland and Townhall ...............................1912
The Eternal Law-Suit of Law against the State....1919
The Marriage of War and Revolution ............1920
Europe and Christianity ..........................1919
Colonization of Factory Workers. Investigations of the
Living-Conditions of Factory Workers........1922
Applied Psychology ..................................1924
Sociology I. The Forces of Community .........1924
The Struggle for Adult Education. 1910-1926 ..........1926
Industrial Law. Questions of Legal System ........1927
Life's Work in Industry and the Problems of a European
Workers' Front ........................................1926
The Age of the Church, Chapters and Acts. 3 vols ....1927-28
Henrick Steffens, a biography ....................1931
Our Folkname "German" and the Dissolution of the Bavarian
Duchy Labor ...........................................1928
The Work Camp ........................................1931
Labor Service - Military Service .................1931
War Army and Legal Community ..................1932
The European Revolutions, Founding of States and National
Characters ............................................1931
The Abandonment (breaking down) of the Political Lie ....1923
The Quartette of State, Society, Church and Folk ....
Protestantism and Spiritual Guidance ............
Symbol and Custom .................................