OUR FAITH IN SCIENCE

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1. The Academic Treatment of Faith

The academic treatment of religion is restricted by academic proprieties. No letter of real or frequent use could be printed in this "Journal" because they violate the academic proprieties. In this journal, religious documents can be quoted as source material or scientific analysis but they cannot appear here for the first time.

In times like ours, this fact itself must be clearly seen lest the gap between religion and its academic treatment reach the immensity of an unbridgeable abyss. For, the academic caricatures of scientific analysis cannot overlook the fact that sectors of acts of faith must remain our academic activity as giving a marked preference to the other expressions of religion. John Scottus Eriugena, in this Journal, has been treated with reverence. Merkau, ne is treated with respect. But General Booth is treated with neutrality or even condescension. The Salvation Army is still alive! It is impossible for an academic magazine to forego this sense of aloofness from contemporary religious life. Neutrality is a requirement of the liberal arts. For the living, it is not yet judged as to its truths. Objectively considered any living faith is a self-truth. We are now not like to seem convicted of saying a mere self-truth, cannot make a confession of faith. It is the essence of one man's faith or one generation's religion that they can only come true in
the next men's faith and the next generation's religion. Such foolish debate could be avoided if critics of religious documents could show some understanding of this simple fact that we do not reach the future by making statements which are palpably true but that we enter the kingdom of heaven by making statements which others will have to take as true. But I cannot admit that the academic profession has ever agreed on the limitations imposed on its treatment of religion by the academic proprieties.

Quite the contrary, the academic treatment declines to draw a clear line between the analysis of deed and of living religious acts. It is considered a negative quality of a religious attitude that it is a self-truth. Fortunately, I shall be able to regale the reader with a truly classical quotation of such a lack of discrimination as I myself have been its target. The issue seems to be a vital one. But first let me repeat, the academic process cannot print religious documents for the first time; they solely can analyse them much later. Nor, if they do not recognize this handicap, they, in the eyes of any active group of faith, are not neutral, but enemies. It is the persistent blind spot of academic objectivity to assume that objectivity is not partialship, that analysis is not decision. For the eyes of faith, analysis is decision. That which is analysed is treated as dead. Living processes are unverifiable by outside analysis, by establishment. To live means to be incomplete. To live, therefore, is to be in process of coming true, in process of becoming verifiable. It also means to have
the guts to be only half true and the courage to be vulnerable, on this score. The decision to impose an academic treatment on such vulnerable processes, is a cruel one, or at least torture to the group inspired by a living faith. The very requirement of academic procedure causes pain to the objects; from living brethren of the reviewer they are changed into objects of analysis. There is nothing more weakening, more destructive, to a this 'neutral' of solidarity. The broth made of man certainly tart tend to become an empty phrase when the carriage of a living faith are carried to the dissection table of scientific analysis. The polite phrases used by the academic observer during the operation may at best be compared to an anaesthesia of a surgical surgery. Whether in or no anaesthesia, the fact itself remains that surgical operations apply to sick people, and dissection applies to corpses. A Salvation Army officer to read a treatment history in the Journal could be since simply by the neutral, analytical attitude of the treatment. This attitude could prove to him the limited appeal of his own zeal; primarily, the borderline for the expansion of the movement is drawn by the fact that this academic mind manages to remain neutral. It would be easy to end this with quotations from the New Testament. But I am too serious about this enmity between academic neutrality and living processes to rest the case with an 'academic quotation.' One can quote the whole New Testament,
yet settle nothing, because no quotation is a first hand statement. Quotations themselves are second hand statements like the academic analysis. It is the misfortune of the orthodox that they combat the level of academic analysis with the Deism of orthodox quotations. And I often myself have fallen victim to the attacks of orthodox quoters of academic analysts; therefore I cannot prop up my own case by any kind of quotation.

The academic community should admit that our neutrality is particularly. Academic propriety may be very improper. To be objective does not mean to do nothing. It means definitely to do something. It carries off a living process for the purpose of dissecting it, and decided, by his attitude, but at this juncture the life or death of this process is of no importance to him. The academic world, by claiming the right to objectivity, claims the right to risk the death of social processes. Would I like to compel my colleagues to this admission? But alas I cannot use compulsion to prove my point. In the middle ages, the living faith of the Church would have used a police force against neutral, lukewarm, academic observers. In the Protestant centuries, the orthodoxy of the clergy thundered against "academic review" by quoting chapter and verse.

I can't mobilize the secular branch to behead the academic critic of my living faith. I can't hope to make a dent by quoting the New Testament. There is a good reason why neither...
neither method will work. We must take seriously one innocent phrase of our sentence about academic propriety: "...religious documents...cannot appear here for the first time." (cf. p. 1)

For what do we contend by this little phrase "for the first time"?

If it is not right for this Journal of Religion to preach a living faith for the first time, we may rightly conclude that it can reprint the same phrase, and quote the same words, a second or a third or a fourth time!

This, however, is an intense revelation. There is then a **first time** which differs in quality from the second time. That which has to be said for the first time is for this very reason in a different place of life from that which is said for the second time or quoted for the nth time. In other words, these are qualities. In matters of faith to say something for the first time, for the second time, for the third time, for the nth time, is in itself a change in quality. Nothing which is said for the first time is of the same rank as that which is said for the nth time! The academic treatment of it will kill an utterance as though it had never been uttered before. It treats all utterance as invulnerable. The inspired attitude is to the utterance as though it had never been uttered before.

It knows it as invulnerable, as mortal. For this is the difference between saying, "I am saying for the first time" and saying, "I am saying for the nth time", that for the first time was not born until it is in great danger of being superseded and when said for the nth time this danger is present. The academic mentality does not dare any
distinction between yet another one already secure truth.
but if this is so the revival realistic execution of the
under and until, in this modern construction by the orthodox
thesis not in the only more. I offer the suggestion that
the academic profession will have to be in any man of faith
and historic their claim of being. Instead I put that the man of
science will have to learn that there is a time for everything
and that the ethical process is injected into our every political
as to whether life one of the spirit consistent.

We cannot now as well as soul of an "object" as objects
have come to have souls. And this destroys our materialism.
Objects are not material by God. The academic critics are
untrue, if they continue to deny change. But eternal in the soul
are meant to be opened to further the destruction but they never
rise from the rest. The faithful are unable to deny this part
of the truth. The academic world is "the world" in the sense of
Christian tradition. The it also in the sense of the Christian
tradition the our faith cannot rise from "this world" but but
have to live even for sceptic neutrality. We are asked to stay in
this world, to be analysed by it, and to survive the dissection.

I could now quote a whole list of academic attacks on my
confessions of faith which show that actually the academic world
decides over life and death of living processes without ever
being conscious of its dangerous powers. They pose as not
doing, anyth into, to the objects of their criticism. But it is not
by far one to look back on. I wish, on the contrary, to prove
my point about the interaction of life, death, the resurrection
of our faith, by an analysis of our universal faith in science.
I shall proceed in the scientific manner. I wish to take the
report of the Journal of Religion to the physics laboratory in
which I worked for a number of years as a poor assistant. I shall
analyse the faith of the academic analyst for excellence; the
physicist's faith, the physicist's religion, my own faith in the
physicist's right to analyse, the public's right in science all
echo the marks of genuine enthusiasm. I shall analyse, that
is to say, dissect them, although I am the right to kill their
enthusiasm. But at the end we shall see their faith rise beyond
my objections in a startling resurgence of my own faith in
more or rather science.

It will then become clear by practical example that the
synchronization of the enthusiastic life and the numerous
dissection of our faith is legitimate. Not move to coexist or
to be able to coexist. Analysis is not neutral. It is not
objective. Analysis objectifies and neutralizes and that means
it kills. But without such murder in the euthanasia of our faith
no needs of our faith could be weeded out. That which is killed
by an analysis deserve to die. The reader who is patient enough
to read on from here may easily find at the end that my dissection
of physics has created more room, more seriousness, for new
sciences of the future than has been before thought possible. My
dissection of physics. Any dissection of physics, any
objectification of a living force, reduces its size in the
real world. It thereby creates a vacuum which attracts new life.
The horror vacui sanctified analysis as we gain room for new
life. Physics is a most appropriate theme for dissection.
It has been the one and only science, the cornerstone of
progress. Faith in science and faith in its first layer,
physics, have been identified. This essay disentangles our faith
in physics from our faith in science. Its analysis of the
science of physics treats physics as the core in the living
process of scientific upheaval, through the ages. The rise of
physics must be analyzed as a religious movement. But no phy-
sicists believe everyone else; they have always trusted their faith
as negligible if compared to their reason. But the faith in
physics is the one good idea which drove the scholemah
into theology, which is driven, as today into the social sciences.
An analysis of our faith in physics has the practical effect of
severing our faith in science from an ideology of physics. The
physicists have usurped an exclusive role on the scientific process.
Analytic physics is exclusiveness. The exclusiveness of or-
mode character of physics as our master science is untenable.
By the acceptance of physics as the "normal" science, we block
the birth of new science. The future of science depends on our
hope and faith in science. Even accept the fact that science is incomplete and unfinished and hope expects that the road to new sciences is not blocked by the action of physics. Theories or philosophies cannot cope with science as far as it is of the future!

Faith is the key of future responses and processes answering our demands. The certainty of faith, given in the letter to the hearers of faith as the hope in the hope to come is unsatisfactory. Faith is the certainty that our home as it stretches our in the future will be changed by a yet unknown but living mind, maybe centuries later. Faith is the certainty that we are about to be incomplete, half true, unfinished, so that others may complete and verify and finish. Therefore faith in new science is not a leisurely hope for things to come but an active making room for scientists to move in.

Our analysis of physics is an act of faith in the coming of a new and better science of peace and war, of men and civilizations.

Technically the approach of the following pages on our faith in physics uses fresh materials, both as to present day acts of faith as to their ancient predecessors. I have made ample use of my own experiences in the physics laboratory between 1942 and 1945, of a complete analysis of Michael Faraday's Diaries, made with my students in 1956, one of my research in the beginnings of natural science as one of the co-founders of the Paracelsus Society in Germany. For the antecedents of our sciences in ancient religion I had to renew the
religion I had to renew the classical and mythological studies of my youth under Wilamowitz, Diels, Ventzen, Brauer, Meyer and Bismarck. In this connection Eduard Knoeven's contribution to the Harvard Tercentenary prove me a most fortunate opportunity.

2. Science Corrects Grammar

One result of my observations in the laboratory of physics and in the examination of Michael Faraday's Diaries is that science summed up in advance so that the reader may know what he might expect to find and what not.

As the results are numerous and divers most of them grow gradually from our investigation. The following statement does not cover the whole paper. However it puts the emphasis on the one point which is unexpected in articles or books on the history and function and the philosophy of science. The last thinker who came near to our point of view was Herschel in his Novus Organum and in his history of the inductive; his books were written a century ago. After Herschel nobody thought that science should or could be treated upon except by philosophy and history. We have treated science here as a process of creative language and religious transformation. Neither a philosophical nor a historical Journal could be found which would deal with our topic. A combination of linguistic, sociological and liturgical considerations form the specific method of this search. The conditions under which science originate and progress
and are real or are investigated.

The one notable difference that is not absent in other
treatises is that, for that reason, is a sentence, is the
fact that science made creative changes greater. The Western
world, regardless of the national language French or Italian
or Spanish or American, etc., at a while, developed its practical
structure to harmonize under the impact of science. Unrecognized
allegro, but clearly identifiable, a new category of grammar
has been created by science. This category is the tense of nouns.

The verb "go", "I went," "we walk," "let there be light,"
"there shall be science," all have in their form a tense aspect.
They belong: first to the present or to the past, to the
completion of the incomplete future. The many variations of tense
in French or German.

That is, the verb "nature" or "world" or "essence" should have a
"tense" character in unchangeable. Nouns in the present which we
have inherited from the Alexanian, are thought of as
unchangeable or "unchangeable."

It is the discovery of this that. Let this Alexanian
sequence which our schools uphold, is obsolete. Science has
organized the human heritage of noun to that they have ceased to
be "blocks" of eternal entities or objects or things. Hours have
been placed in process by science. In the scientific process
however it becomes a new field, consists in the temporalization
of the frozen and tenseless nouns of unscientific speech or
language. Even nouns are not "ideas" or "essences" or substantial.
They are relative as past, present and future aggregates of reality. Science re-arranges the old name of our dictionaries and moves in the traditional nouns into a new relationship of permanent interplay and process.

This process is opposed to the usual pre-scientific attitude of thoughtless talk. But it is equally alien to the logical and semantic approach. For the logician, words are a close of which he tries to strip clear thinking. He knows how arbitrary words are used. The least thing we should assume according to logic is that specific words are categorical and incomparable. Neither an absolute nor a relative truth is describable to new words. Thought, are taught, in the eye of logic, nearly always is confusing and polluted by the use of words and all their associations.

But our investigation leads to a very different result. True enough the nouns like "truth," "science," "physics," "economics," "nature," are very often used meaninglessly by laymen and scientists alike. But our discovery -- surprising as it is to ourselves -- consists in the proof that it is not the semanticist or the logician but the scientist himself, in his actual research, who cures the ills of empty talk. Nature, science, truth are categorical terms! They are not "words."

The static picture of a modern language might be compared to the geological strata of the earth; science then is the volcanic force which cuts across the horizontal layers and compels these static strata to enter into communication with each other. This
Communication is the scientific process. Science by encompassing the layer in which the terms "mind" and "body" and "world" were coined, and the layer during which "nature" and "universe", "science" and "rational" were employed; creates an interplay of which its own "technical" "mathematical" language is the third partner.

The more clearly are unfrozen and thaws open and proceed in the art of living processes. Through science man is able to claim upon the core substance: the sources of his mental history, to call on them and to dismiss them at will. Relativity is not solely a mathematical argument. It is also a social one. Physicist are oft amazed by the cosmic or an unfolding under the aspects of relativity. But the union stands between science, folklore, philosophy, poetry, is equally imperative. Our principle of relativity makes science the partner in a social coset in which the scientist has to be his brother's poet, his brother's "jesuit," his brother's "philosopher," "keeper," if there is to be any science.

No science without poetry. No science without the common language of the people, no science without philosophy, no science without politics.

The very nature of science is to organize the interplay of the language use in the home, of families, the capitals of states, the sanctuaries of the church... if science refuses to act as the interpolator of dynamic processes betwen these separate
layers, it is not science, it is not the science in which people have believed for the last eight hundred years with religious faith.

The moral conscience of science is imperiled today because of the frequent denial of an individual scientist that he be his brother's priest, his brother's poet, his brother's political keeper. They will part company from him if their keeping him and his keeping them is not uppermost in his mind.

This itself is not a topic for pius mores out of scientific demonstrability. The "tense-making" quality of science has always been the keeper of the people's consciences. The denial of the linguistic function is not older than 1670. Then in self defence, scientific positivism broke off the bridge which connect the innermost science with the immediate books of real life. The scientific positivist took language wherever he found it — without ever saying thank you; he delivered all scientific discoveries to the multitude without caring what became of his terms. When they became slogans on the market place.

All words of science travel the road from metaphor to scientific formula to slogan. This process of all scientific terms has become a commonplace and the mystics are the first who have woken up to the impure phases for all scientific terms among the common people.

It is the comfort of this investigation that the pre- and post-scientific phases become apparent as more than deformities or pollutions of "pure" science; they are as vital as science itself.
or solutions of 'pure' science; they are a vital part of science itself. Only science can intervene. But the interpretation of the scientific process, the slopes and the metaphors may be purified and made to live again. But the idea can never be to live without slopes or metaphors in scientific unity all the time.

By the temporal, the different character of all forms, this perpetual life process is insured. It is rank superstition that science should ever seem to have existence outside a context of procedure, of history, of 'practical use.' Therefore our discovery of the traces of our mind created by science belongs to the utilization of religion. Science becomes, then, to our conscience the universe, the scenes that are summed up in the term 'religion.' A live in science is a necessary part in this process that regulates our movement through the cosmos.

Science is an element in the allegory of religion, in one aspect of our discovery; the other aspect is that science creates new categories and places these categories on the same fact viewed from a different angle. But that tells in one and the same fact has not been forgotten. That is the way on which our faith in allegory, in science and another equation of some solution of our own will. Science is necessary for solving religion, it must be called to the absurdity that

slopes solutions or do it as in conflict with religion. The
The Nature of the Physical World

"The Nature of the Physical World" is the title of a well-known volume of Gifford Lectures by the physicist Laddering. It is an elegant title. For in it the social, religious, political, and mental issues straddled by science are reflected as by a prism. Innocent and scientific is this sound; in fact it is just innocence and this slice of science. To determine its place in our society is the aim of this essay.

We shall see that the religion of the physicist stands revealed and not only of the physicist. The religion behind all science stories revealed in the religion which these scientists share with the nations of the world. Nor on the basis of this religion the nations allow the truth that universal science will operate right across all their political barriers. From 1440 to 1946, that is until physical research came under government control, science was international.

That a book title is so pregnant with meaning is rare. But the book title in itself is symptomatic of the faith in the
community in which it is published is to be expected. Books hold the creation of children of their authors. In making our children we cannot help declaring our faith or unfaith. August, Amos, Baktur, heroic speech on the monument level of life-long names. Our words may be of the moment. If I call my child Trifles, I certainly betray some cynicism about the value of the human soul. Because our name ride on the onewhite on which more than one generation overlap. The name failure I gave the be void in the spirit of my child's line and in the spirit of the child's lifetime, we finally, in this child's children's lifetime. Whenever we declare ourselves in the the face of more than our own generation we are committed to declare our religion. In our own time we may not our light under the bushel and may conform. Between the spirits of our generations we must become enigmatic and are found it with regard to the thing in which a really glory. Any may occur in his faith or in his cynicism, in his personal or in his conventional faith. A glory so does when he must represent his whole age and its spirit in the tests of other than own generations.

Hence, names are the declarations of our faith, whether we like it or not. This being so, The Nature of the Physical World declares the faith in which science and the notions of the Renaissance world glory. The average academic reader already at this point may rebel. He knows how book titles are fabricated by publishers.
The irreverence of the commercial book market now fills the academic spectator with irreverence for all book titles.

May I suggest that this, though clever, does not seem clever enough? The objective observer of the wiles and tides of book titles should combine complete contempt for mere salesmanship with the utmost reverence for the stream of speech which the publishing craze pollutes. It is the academic mind's curse that it will not revere names. And yet it must use names in order that society may respect it. "Socrates," "science," "Plato," "truth," "happiness," "greatest number," -- all these names are indispensable. Scientists are only tolerated because great names protect them against the suspicion of being drones or nihilists or rebels. What's in a name? The usual answer is: nothing. Let us repeat the famous question in this form: What is in names? And the answer must be: The present day value of our past history lives in names. To them we bow, in them we unite, through them we know our way in the dark.* And scientific reflection has always known this except for the last seventy years. The impenitence of "positivism" and "departmentalism" after 1880 began to dispense with values. The special sciences denied the dignity of names like Plato, Aristotle, Paul, Thomas, Kant, Hegel. It became the fashion to forget the philosophies which must christen the special science before it has any meaning. But even the specialists bowed to three names: Science, Progress of Science, Nature. During the last decades, the appeal for funds to the

* Beza
public was largely based on the use of these three sacred names. What is in names? Ask any scientist who had to raise funds for his research. If he is capable of self-observation —most scientists are incapable of it — he will find that he invokes names whenever he needs help and support. Names differ from words in that names can be invoked for help, defense, and attack. Words are coin. But names are the gold standard, the frame of reference to which all words refer back. Names are the building, the structure; words are the bricks. Invoking the names, the scientists makes the people bring him the bricks.

All this should be commonplace. But it is not. Several physicists of international reputation remarked of Baddington's book title, "The Nature of the Physical World": Well, he just as well could have given it another name! Such is the degradation of the special science by 1946 that grown-up men have become sheep. For he is degraded to a sheep which bleats who is unaware of the dominions, powers, principalities which govern his steps by the compelling influence of their names. These gentlemen collect money for their scientific research, write textbooks on physics, run a society of American physicists, tour the country for a World Government, bestow a Lorenz medal or a Nobel prize, and then they shrug their shoulders and say: we could invoke, by our book titles, the public in any case. The history and background, the real drama of their science as expressed in names as Nature, Physics, World, has become opaque.
and meaningless to these slaves of routine. They are the last scientists in the sense of Nietzsche's "ultimate man." They themselves believe in science, Physics, World Peace. But they no longer can evoke and arouse faith in the people. For, the names consecrated by the sacrifices of centuries, to those specialists mean nothing.

And yet, a hundred years ago James Frank of Chicago and Otto Oldenberg of Harvard -- the two physicists whom I approached -- could not have blasphemed against the created names of the scientific edifice. In 1847 the year of the Communist Manifesto, the Western world still knew what it meant to speak. It knew that in science, an arbitrary game is not played with paper clips, where any word could substitute for any other. They knew that there are no substitutes, no synonyms for Nature, Physics, World, because the invocation of these names has consequences absolutely distinct from the invocation of other names. Other people rally to my support when I appeal to them for the blind, the destitute, the lame as when I appeal to the public for the scientists, the intellectuals, the research workers. Do Messrs. James Frank and Otto Oldenberg expect to collect the contributions for the blind, the destitute and the lame? Unfortunately, against the modern specialist I cannot invoke common sense. Because the modern mind has lost common sense when it comes to semantics. My friends think that everybody can define his terms as he pleases. They have never given a thought to the distinction between definition and articulation.
The distinction is this: when I am inarticulate, I try to articulate. This involves risk. I may fail. Therefore he who articulates any experience for the first time must speak as the words come to him and he must evoke names as they might appeal to his listeners and he must call things as they are called. To articulate anything for the first time means to dive into the ocean of speech for the sentence that will give me peace of mind, for the names that will induce my interlocutor to listen and for the words that will make sense between my mind and the interlocutor's mind.

To say something for the first time is so difficult that there is at best one way of saying it and very often there is no way of saying it. Much remains inarticulate. In the process of articulation the question which matters is: Can it be articulated already? Between speaker and listener and things can the necessary articulation be achieved or not? To articulate is always a new step in the history of mankind's becoming conscious of itself in conversation. But to define is a taking stock of old articulations. We define what has been said or thought or expressed or labelled before. Definitions undermine previous times and try to understand them. Definitions classify. Articulation originates. The physicist of today has forgotten that his science had to be articulated as the science of the natural world before he could proceed with his definitions as a physicist.

A century ago all this was well understood. Then William
Whewell published the many editions of his "Novum Organum Renovatum", his "Philosophy of the Deductive Sciences." And here, in book IV, Whewell says of the language of science: "The language of science is not arbitrary. The language of science does not consist of words or definitions or terms used at random for reasons of expediency. While Frank and Oldenberg hold that any words will do for any book title or any belief, Whewell crisply says: (I am quoting from the 3rd edition, London 1858) p. 355 "The history of science is the history of its language." Every step in the progress of science is marked by the formation or appropriation of a technical term. (257) "In learning the meaning of scientific terms, the history of science is our dictionary." (368) "It is usual for unscientific readers to complain that the technical terms which they meet with in books of science are not accompanied by plain definitions such as they can understand. But " -- Whewell now continues with a pivotal truth known of course to all men of faith and stated in John I,1, but expressed by Whewell as the faith of the scientist, in a classical manner -- "but such definitions (as the laymen desire) cannot be given. For definitions must consist of words. And in the case of scientific terms, must consist of words which require again to be defined and so on without limit. In entering upon each science we come upon a new set of words. And now are we to learn the meaning of this collection of words? In what other language shall it be explained? In what terms shall we define
these new expressions? To this we are compelled to reply that we cannot translate these terms into any ordinary or familiar language. Here as in all other branches of knowledge the meaning of words is to be sought in the progress of thought, ... in the minas of the authors of our discoveries. In their discoveries these men articulate. We improve on their articulation by defining their (not "our") terms. But the action is theirs. Our definitions are but our reaction to their advancement of our science. Any definition, Whewell says elsewhere, receives its meaning from the proposition inside of which the terms are clarified by the definition. When I say "let us take the North Pole", "us take" and "North Pole" must be defined. But no definition which forgets the proposition for which the terms require definition will be of any use. Definition which forgets the sentence, the articulation, the proposition which it serves, serves nothing. Whewell is quite caustic on this point: If we forget that definitions are secondary to the primary task of proposing, in the historical birth of articulation, a new truth, we sharpen a knife with which we have nothing to cut; we take exact aim, while we load our artillery with a blank cartridge; we apply strict rules of grammar to sentences which have no meaning. (p. 37)

The book title "The Nature of the Physical World" is a proposition. It proposes to the public that they buy the book. It invokes their reverence or curiosity for Nature, Physics, World. If the author has anything genuine to say the book title also
must leave him satisfied as giving him the peace of mind which we seek by articulating a necessary and vital thought. We must speak, we feel, and if the book title were untrue to fact, insincere and catering to the wrong people, we have not spoken as we should have. The difference between our obligation to speak and its wrong expression in a fishy title will haunt us and haunt others until it is remedied, either by redresting the book's second edition or by adding another book or by having commentators enlarge on the proposition.

The title of a book is not a question of definition but of articulation. Articulating is the process of binding together the speaker, new insight with the listener's old prejudices on a common topic in a common moment. For any such task, the problem is not HOW to define one's terms but to articulate, to bind AT ALL.