The role of negation in the structuration of language has grown from small beginnings. Jespersen says about these beginnings: "Not means less than! or in other words: not between the term qualified and nothing! This is especially obvious when we consider the ordinary meaning of negative numerals: 'He does not read these books in a year' means 'less than three'. (Jespersen, Philosophy of Language, pp. 375 ff.) The role of negation does not end when something has been negated. From these modest beginnings, negation has developed into a lever which has lifted up the whole human speech to a higher level, twice. First, the naive language of the child or the primitive, of singing, narrating, talking, calling, has been civilized, by its vaccination with negatives into a state which for the sake of clarity we shall call sermo secundus. It is the equivalent to reflective, rational, philosophical language. And whereas the philosophers oppose it to language as something absolutely different, we cannot agree to their breaking up the relation of speech and reflection. We do, however, admit the new qualities incorporated into language by negation, a process that we are going to study in the next pages.

Thought is speech inside ourselves. This sermo secundus is the great experience of the adolescent. When we enter puberty and begin to fall in love with the other sex, we match this external 'singing half' by our internal 'going double'. Man, at puberty, splits, acquires a conscience, and that is, begins to converse with himself in a dialogue of reasoning and justification. Most people remain eternal adolescents, and remain enamoured with their dialectical power. The adult, however, gets fed up with reasoning. The adult, as in every thing else, wants to see results of reasoning. A third level of speech becomes desirable, sermo tertius, belonging to manhood and parenthood. This sermo tertius or parental speech is neither naive speech within the group nor expert reflection of individuals, but is the application of expert reflection for the remaking or refounding of groups.

The degree to which a person has incorporated negatives, determines their rank. The child, the adolescent, the adult should handle language on different levels. We shall analyze the sermo secundus (philosophy) first, and this will help the reader to take the more difficult step of reaching the third level that has been sometimes called the second philosophy but which it is more coherent to term sermo tertius.

The negation is preparing a better and truer affirmation. Negations are enhancing the value of our positive statements. In St. Augustine's Psalm (see text) out of five hundred sentences, not less than ninety contain a negation. Alive French thinker has pointed out that in our prose language it is difficult to formulate realities and certitudes because prose reduces (as we know already; see our chapters on reduction and plenitude). But for a person's vital experience and his lucid conviction of a long range view one rendering never seems exhaustive. To him, prose offers a means of suggesting success-
fully that fulness or plenitude which ligatures our faculties of expression, instead of listing one point after another in mere succession, he will describe the new and unifying spirit that animates him, with the help on negations.

Take, for instance, a scientific definition of "the state"; "state" is the sovereign government over one particular territory. This is a definition which is rather dry as long as the author is unable to familiarize his readers with just what "sovereign, government, and particular territory" mean. Of course, he could let us hear the patriotic songs, the history, the budget, the orders of the head of the executive power. Then we would see clearly that the state although a sovereign yet was not a deity like Athene or Moloch. In other words that sovereign was a very relative term. We would see that to govern was restricted to the correction of abuses and dangers, etc., and did not preach love or fashions, also that the State was uninterested in the future of mankind as a unity, or in the internal relations, and internal relationships of all its members. It would become clear that the state was not the Church, nor the tribe, nor a free association. But the writer on the state usually does not write politics or history, or become a political scientist, albeit a political scientist. Thus, instead of introducing the other styles of speech (imperative and narrative and songs), he infuses into his scientific treatment itself the necessary clarifications by saying what the state is not.

A definition is arbitrary when it is not elucidated by negations or limitations. Mistrust any definition that is purely in the affirmative. It is mere verbiage. And the simple word "state" mostly is preferable to such stuffed circumlocutions. This type of definition is not better than the answer given by the young communist to the question: But what do you mean by capitalism? he replied: "Capitalism is everything which I dislike." The purely affirmative definitions of scientists very often deceive. The simple statement that they simply are wishful thinking and that they put into their topic everything that they dislike. For example, most politicians mix some religion, some humanitarianism, some imperialism, and some homespun sentimentality in their talk about taxes or states' rights, and yet, they will not mention these elements when you ask them for their definitions of them state. It is only when negations are added that the definition amounts to something tangible and responsible.

Pure affirmations are worthless except when all four forms of speech (imperative, optative, narrative, besides the indicative) are used. In a drama, for instance, do not need definitions. In the family, people don't need definitions. Here we are at grips with the full cross of reality, and are living together at all four fronts of life, we do not need to define what we say. It is only in the school that we must define and analyse our tools of speech; the fellowship is one of common thought, and here, the absent three fronts or reality are represented by the addition of negations. Thought must include negation before it can become scientific. He who has not doubted, has no judgment. In court, the judge must lean to the plaintiff's side for a while, and for a while to the side of the defendant. Or he is prejudiced. To judge means to be first moved this way, then the other, and finally reach a decision. His judgement is always a qualified affirmation, qualified by having tasted the possibility of an opposite decision. We call the dialectical method that method
that moves from plain Yes through No to a higher affirmation. To think, then, is to include the phase of saying No in your final affirmation. And this will lead us to a definition that excludes certain elements of which one might think when one heard the simple first one. Parmenides the Greek, has been the first man who saw this process clearly. He became the first philosopher, in a scientific sense, The Chinese never got that far. They have wisdom, great teachers, traditions, but not a philosophy. The accidental philosophers have been so proud of this technique that they have excelled it into something quite apart from speech. They insist that a concept is not a word, and that it does not belong to the world of human speech but to that quite separate world of thought. Now, the vitriolic contempt of philosophers for people who think that they talk when they think, is a thousand fathoms deep, "Woe, We would get drowned if we risked a cruise on this Dead Sea."

For the book of human speech, it is, however, sufficient to remember that the process of meditation, defining, conceiving, is consecutive to that of recording, naming, telling. We use our brain in both cases. I cannot perceive the beauty of a landscape if I am not trained mentally. And I cannot conceive of the state if I cannot speak. The first philosophy, to us, is a second "sermo", it is analytic speech, cautioned by the use of negations.

Pure affirmations being worthless in any debate on a doubtful question (since affirmations rely on unanimity like the command and obedience of master and disciple, captain and soldier), negations must clear the road for a new unanimity to be created out of nothing. We can agree again after having drifted apart when we have understood what is keeping us apart and excluded this or negated that it should enter in the argument and perpetuate our understanding. In a unanimous group, no arguments are needed and therefore no philosophy. The first case of philosophical argumentation is in court. Because the parties must quarrel and are no longer unanimous, the judge defines the concept of "theft." The parties say, one it is theft, the other it is not. The judge must talk it over himself and whatever else the logicions may call what he does, to us it is enough to conceive of concepts as a second layer of speech.

We may easily draw the line between unanimous language and defining language. In the first, it matters little who does the talking. Everybody feels to give expression to the whole group. He is a mouthpiece of the life of this group to which he seems to talk. But a man who defines and uses concepts, stands alone, like a judge. He becomes a person. A man who has the courage to say that he denies before he says what he accepts, always will make himself heard and leave an impression. This personal contribution is quite rare. But he may, indeed, be sure that he will force people to become aware of the fact that he tried to say something definitely his own. Examples of definitions:

"Il est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu nisi ipsa intellectus. (Leibniz)"

"Adjutrix at liberalis philosophia; sed non adjutrix nisi libera, ine non liberalis nisi adjutrix. (St. Bernard)"
That the language of definitions which is spoken in courts and textbooks and classrooms (mark! it actually is written and spoken daily to millions of people, and therefore it is by no means just "thought"), has become necessary when people who did not live together in unanimity, had come to agreements, is a phase of language which the Romans (and the Greeks) found in the ancient days of their linguistic development, from 500 B.C. to 500 A.D. We find Latin equipped with it fully from the times of Cicero. There is, however, a third and still higher type of speech, a sermo tertius, or a second philosophy that heals the folly of mere definitions and abstract concepts. And we can see this rise, within Latin, before our own eyes. The daily life of Latin teaching adopted this manner, "the philosophy of the paradox," not more than 900 years ago. "That is a paradox! It is the fact that A is also not A. In logic this can't be true; for a higher science, it is the daily fact of our own life. I am what I have been, and I am not; and I am what I shall finally be, in a certain sense now already while in another sense I am not all that I hope to be. In space, A must equal A. But through time it may not. All first-sense philosophy has analyzed indicatives only, prepositional like: "he is coming" (and not "she"). The first philosophy is a logic of concepts in space, and in space, the part A always keeps its identity with itself. The second philosophy, the philosophy of paradox is conscious of the fact that we also talk at the time fronts. And here, nothing keeps its identity!

The first scholastic sentences of this third type of language, the sermo tertius, I can find are the two following:

"Paulus apostolus Romanus est non Romanus est." That means the apostle belongs to Rome, is buried in Rome's suburb, is the patron of this city. And yet he is not. He belongs to the whole Church, and not to the Roman Church. He actually has no specific Church, any more than his master. (The point was of considerable practical political importance at that time). The sentence was written about 1085 by Pope Victor III.

The second sentence deals with the question of bread and wine on the communion table. And the solution of a long quarrel said: "Fidelis in communion et ipsum corpus quod de virgine sumptum fuit, sumitur et tenum non ipsum corpus sumit." This sentence is from the pen of Lanfranc, Anselm's predecessor in Canterbury, etc. 1078.

He is and he is not. He eats and he doesn't eat. These are typical sentences of the third speech. The paradox (which means "praeter opiniorem") frees the speaker from the slavery to his own terms or words. Only in about 1070, 1080, 1090, has this kind of thinking become established in the Occident, and has remained our distinction till today. It would have been impossible except for the consciousness of Latin, to put it so neatly.

Only by paradoxes is it possible for human man to study evolution, progress, conversions, and any dynamic process. In any dynamic process the same thing ceases to be and yet, it remains. Hence it is, and it is not.

The Paradox then is the new application of the word "no." In a definition, a concept is reproduced by negating other things, in the paradox, the same thing itself is shown in its ambivalence, as really having two meanings at the same time. "Sumus id quod sumus, non sumus id quod sumus." It is the eternal truth about all living beings, and especially about man with his never satisfied longing for change and improvement and self-fulfillment. But these sent-
ences must be kept in mind at the same time; or we shall misjudge
men. Thus the third speech, the second philosophy has been achieved by a new linguistic equipment, by applying the negation once more, but for healing the lack of completeness in any merely indicative statement, not for the purpose of excluding the negated part only.

Anglicus est, mericamus est. Yes, they are; but how wrong to call them thus and thereby keep them apart for ever. His nega Anglicus neque Americanus sum omnem unum.

This famous word of the first writer of the sermo tertius, of Paul the Apostle, is based on the paradoxes of his master. Here are some of them: Et de vestimento quid solliciti estis? Considerate lilia agrī QUOMODO CRESCUNT: non laborant neque nemī. Dico autem vos omnium nec Salomon in omnī gloria suis coopertas est sicut unum ex ists.

Scitis quīs principalis gentium dominantur eorum qui majores sunt postestatem exercēnt in eos. Non ita ert iterum vos: sed quicumque voluerit inter vos major fiērī, sit vester minister, et qui voluerit inter vos primus esse, ert vester servus.

The sharp division between the sermo secundus philosophorum that only corrects indicative, and the sermo tertius that corrects the philosophers themselves for their shortcomings by omitting the other moods of speech from their argument, may be studied in the first sermon of the sermo tertius which was put down in writing by the author himself. This text, then, befittingly, concludes the glorious story of negation as a vehicle to higher language. This story is a parallel to the march of zero in mathematics and 0 calculus.

"Vide de quo ver descripti per philosophiam et ἀνανεμεῖς αὐτοῖς μέλῳ propriam traditionem hominum. e Excellentio autem vām vobis demonstrāt. Sī lingūā hominum loquar et angelōrum, ertatem autem non habāmus. Sue sum valēs esse sonās aut syllābolum tinniāntem. Æt si habāmus philosophiām et 0000m mysteriām omnī, et 0000m scientificum, et si habuero omnem fidem ita ut montēs trāferam, ertatem autem non habāmus, nihil sum. Et si distribuero in obis pauerum omnes facultātes mens, et si tradidero corpus saum ut erēdem, haertatem autem non habāmus, nihil prodest.

Charitas patiens est, benigna est; charitas non semulātor, non agit perperum, non inflātur, non eō ambitiosæ, non querit quae sus sunt, non irritātur, non cogitāt malum, non gradēt super iniquitāte, congradēt autem veritātem. Omnia credit, omnia sperat, omnia sustinēt. Charitas unquam excititātis prophētiae evocōbuntur, sive linguae cessabunt, sive scientiā estrāctur.

Ex parte enim cognoscimus, et ex parte prophētēmus. Omnis autem vēnerit quod perfectum est, evocābuntur quod ex parte est. Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate, tunc autem faciam ad faciēm. Nunc cogēnosco ex parte tunc autem cognoscīmus sicut et cognitūs-sum. Nunc autem unam fidem, spēs, charitātēs tria haec major autem horum est charitas. (1 Cor. 13).

The question of peace as a question of unanimity. As long as we speak in the name of our group, we do not endanger the unanimity and that is the peace of the group. Any No, however, that we have to say, breaks up the unanimity of our society, hence, engenders its peace. Man found that No must be spoken, and yet, the peace must be kept. So, the court came into being, with their decisions
based on defined concepts, on negation, and yet peaceful.

The quarrels between whole groups could not be ended by judges. A new power anticipated unanimity till it could be reached in real common language again. The whole description given by Paul of this new power, is, in the last analysis, nothing but a means to cover the hiatus between the unanimity lost and the unanimity to be restored finally. Charitas operatur quando lingua communis secundum traditionem hominum perit. Charitas spernit se ipsam inter gentes separatas, inter inimicos non habentes pacem mutuum, usque ad redemptam linguam communem. Unanimitates petitur cum sermone utamur. Sed quia unanimitas saeppe in verbis non iam est, per interlocutores supplenda est. Non possimus loqui hodie in arxbiore tantopere diviso nisi supplendo patientia nostra se cum secumam illam quam sermo deficiens non supplet. Id enim fit ut sermo temporis aequum creditur quo durante nova lingua communis crescat et cresceret possit. Ad producendam hanc creationem nova m, omnis homo suam linguam r-linuere, et linguae communis sique efficacior patere debet.


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