On the 8th of July, 1830, a French aristocrat wearing a general's uniform and the tricolor hesitantly rode across Paris' Pont-Neuf to the Hotel de Ville. Parisians en masse tensely watched the ride, to see how it would end. Then on the balcony of the Hotel de Ville, the aged Marquis de Lafayette embraced the dismounted rider, Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans. With that ceremony, Louis Philippe became the ruler of France, some 41 years after the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789.

On the 24th of May, 1956, a Soviet commissar in a black sack suit stood up to give a secret speech before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, in Moscow. The Party Congress anxiously listened to hear what line, at a crossroads hour, he might proclaim. When he had finished excoriating the memory of Josef Stalin, the Party Congress — most with relief, many with reservations — "stormily applauded Nikita Khrushchev. With that ceremony, Khrushchev became the ruler of Russia, something under 39 years after the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution. These two tableaux, calling to each other across a century and a quarter, take on new pertinence today. They are entirely relevant to the post-Sputnik period, to the outburst of Soviet pride, to the nagging Western worries of what to do now. For the analogy between Louis Philippe and Nikita Khrushchev, when more widely explored, helps mind and action to gain time. The analogy, developed, restrains Western post-Sputnik panic without rationalizing complacency. It suggests that there is more time than we think, and also suggests how that time might best be used.
If the world today, with Khrushchev, is entering a period similar
to that inaugurated by Louis Philippe, then the U.S. should not think
only in terms of crash programs, missile or otherwise. Then the U.S.,
following the advice of history, should rather look forward to 15-odd
years of intense but supportable competition with the U.S.S.R., across
the board and across the world, without a major blow-up. Internationally,
that is the way the period of Louis Philippe went. At the same time,
domestically, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will have long-standing domestic
problems to solve. Chances are that the U.S. will cope with its domestic
problems satisfactorily, because Louis Philippe's main rival, England,
was able to do so. But the U.S.S.R. may find its troubles at home so intense
that it will likely undergo a political upheaval in the early 1970's.
For the era of Louis Philippe ended with a French rebellion and Louis'
fall in 1848, 12 years after it had begun.

These are formidable predictions and propositions. They are also
exacting ones. If they come to be believed, then much of present
Western time-sense should change. The West and the U.S. tend to think
in and plan for relatively brief time spans—annual budgets, provisional
commitments and, over and over again, sudden crises. A longer-time
sense would level out the fluctuations, in, say, aid or defense spending, it would put both on an agreed long-term basis, and it would help to anticipate and forestall crises, instead of reacting frantically
when crisis comes with surprise.

But does it make sense to plan now for fifteen years to come? What is the basis for this comparison between Khrushchev and Louis Philippe? Is it just a professor's rabbit trick, where he pulls two superficially similar historical figures out of his double-dome? Or is it a crude assertion that history daily repeats itself, a proposition that anyone who values his freedom would be unwilling to entertain? And even if Khrushchev and Louis Philippe are quite a lot alike, does it really
mean that this interesting fact should be taken seriously enough to
guide years of action?

Actually, the eras of Louis Phillippe and Nikita Khrushchev are
comparable stories in the house of modern Western history. In a
brief look at the whole structure will show where these stories fit in.

The modern history of the West is a history of revolutions. The
U.S. itself was born of a limited revolution, but the great revolutions
that have successively resaped the Western world were four - the
German Protestant, the British, the French and the Russian. Each of
them aspired to abiding new universal values: the Protestant to the
freedom of conscience, the British to freedom of property, the French
to freedom of the intellect, the Russian to the freedom of labor.
Each also asserted the rights of a specific social class against the
older orders: the Protestant the rights of the aristocracy, the
British the rights of the gentry, the French the rights of the middle
class, the Russians the rights of the working man. (In this progression,
the American Revolution lies between the British and the French. It
fused the revolution-won rights of Englishmen, hitherto denied the
colonists, with the progressive "rights of man" about to be proclaimed
with violence in France).

In their progress, the great European revolutions have passed
through comparable stages. This is not because history repeats itself,
but because the revolutions have all been passionate, volcanic outburst
by human beings and therefore register intensely human emotional cycles.
First the great revolutions have their silent points of departure,
decades before they actually flare up, in a crisis that shows the
incipient corruption of the old order. The tension incubates for
around a century. Then comes the outburst of revolution, slashing,
brutal, fanatic, which consumes about a generation. This period has
just ended in Russia. The first post-outburst period, that of Louis
Philippe or of Narusheney, is one of compromise between the country's
past and its revolutionary elite. Thereafter, in the period foreseen
for Russia after 1970, there occurs a feeble recrudescence of the outburst
phases. Then at last the revolution settles down and passes, with its
fruitful contribution, peacefully into the human heritage.

This pattern can be readily checked out. Consider the 'European
revolution' points of departure. When John Huss was burned at the stake
in 1415, the cogensia of the Catholic hierarchy began to appear
unbearable; Huss' martyrdom provoked an eerie prophecy, "When one
hundred years have revolved, you shall answer God and me"; and in 1517
Martin Luther nailed his 95 Theses to the church door in Witteberg to
begin the Protestant Revolution. Henry VIII in 1535 beheaded his
chancellor Sir Thomas More, the keeper of the king's conscience, and
thus signalled the deterioration of royal docility; in 1649 the gentry's
ultimately

Great Demirtrance started the British Revolution which

ultimately

made the monarchy constitutional. Then France's Louis XIV in 1665 expelled
the non-conformist, middle-class Huguenots, the seeds were sown for
the intellectual-bourgeois French Revolution in 1789. Czar Alexander
I of Russia in 1825 turned his back on the Russian avant-garde that
made the Decembrist uprising and Czardom became permanently estranged,
despite such moves as the 1861 liberation of the serfs, from the
forward thinkers of Russia; the revolutionary destruction of Czardom
in 1917 was the end result.

What about the period of revolutionary outburst? A comparison
between France and Russia highlights its nature. At the onset of
outburst, the old authority withers rapidly and makes room beside it
for a more moderate, but still patriotic, conservative authority:
the Estates-General in France, the Kerensky regime in Russia. But
there comes an electric act, signalling that no compromise between
characteristic figure who hammered out the revolution's practical purpose.

Before him were burning dreams; with him are biting facts. The first
French revolutionaries foresaw "liberty, equality and fraternity" as
swEEPing all Europe; Napoleon turned France into a power that
marched for that creed. The 1917 Bolsheviks expected Communist
revolutions all over Europe; Stalin decreed "Socialism in one country" to create a
center for supporting Socialist tendencies anywhere. Napoleon organized
France rationally into a nation, a linguistic-ethnic unit; Stalin
organized the Soviet Union with central planning into an economic
entity, a multilingual and multinational combine for industrial output.
Both dictators bled their subjects white, Napoleon primarily in
foreign wars, Stalin chiefly in domestic terror. The enormous radical and
brutal strain that both men put on their peoples was bound to cause a
reaction.

The reaction to the Procrustean performance of Napoleon came in
the 1820's, some years after his fall in 1815. When the restored
bourbon king Louis XVIII returned to France, he declared, "Nothing has
happened except that there is one more good Frenchman in France"—
he provisionally accepted the remaking of France. But later on Louis
XVIII and his successor Charles X tried to nullify the revolutionary
rights that Frenchmen thought they had particularly earned by their
sacrifices under Napoleon. Charles X tried to go back to the era
before the revolution.

Stalin suffered no "Waterloo, which again shows that history does
not repeat itself. But he himself, under pragmatic duress, behaved
like Louis XVIII and his successors during World War II when he tried to
rule as simply a good Russian, letting the church's reopen and putting
old-fashioned patriotism over Communism. But when the war was won,
after the Soviet peoples had made enormous sacrifices for their
rights, Stalin suddenly attempted to turn the clock back. In his
old and new will see the storming of the Bastille, the uprising of mutinous Russian soldiers and sailors. The revolutionaries seize power, where they alone now have the real will to power, and murder those who lost it: Marie-Antoinette and the comodons. The revolutionary leaders are fanatic intellectuals: Mirabeau and Robespierre, Lenin and Trotsky. They establish their regime in blood, be it the Terror in France or the civil war in Russia. The French Revolution devours many of its protagonists almost at the outset. In Russia, the revolution eats its makers later.

When the rampant revolutionary regime is confirmed, when its initial ardor and chaos begin to cool, there emerges the single icy
declining years, Stalin reverted to uttermost Czarism — as the testimony of Mikhail Khrouchtchov himself amply proves, as S. H. has explained.

The comparative chronology in France and Russia sets the scene for Khrouchtchov and Louis Philippe. The outburst period in both great revolutions has come to a close, with attempts at reaction and reversion to the pre-revolutionary order colliding with the revolutionary momentum. Everybody is tired of the purely revolutionary fervor and pain. Its cost has been too much. Reaction to the old order has reared its head. But it is not going to be allowed to win. The revolution has cost too much for that. Such a progressive reconciliation between the new and the old is going to be reached. Khrouchtchov is an uprooted reactionary; the progressive reconciliation between the new and the old is going to be reached. Khrouchtchov is an uprooted reactionary.

Both Louis Philippe and Khrouchtchov have conciliatory personal backgrounds. Louis Philippe was a French aristocrat of the ancien régime, not a Corsican adventurer like Napoleon. Khrouchtchov comes from a traditional Russian peasant stock and is not an uprooted transmigrant like Stalin. Louis Philippe originally sided with the French Revolution, despite his background, but deserted it in 1793 for extended exile in England and in the U.S. Khrouchtchov gave his adult life to the Soviet Revolution, but he had the shrewd insight to repudiate and desert from its Stalinist excesses. In their personal histories, these men spell compromise.

To do they in their personal behavior. Louis Philippe was known as the "bourgeois king". He disdain the august trappings of royal power and made his palace as accessible, in his time, as the White House in Washington and Andrew Jackson. But Khrouchtchov in his time, compared to Stalin, has certainly been Mr. Accessibility, whether it be to foreign visitors, newsmen and diplomats or to whole foreign peoples in his wanderings abroad. And Khrouchtchov has not been a bad barnstormer in the Soviet Union either.
As the two men are comparable, so are their regimes. The chief feature of both their regimes is that the revolutionary class, the French bourgeoisie on the one hand, the Soviet Communist elite on the other, have abandoned their ideological preoccupations. They now want a respite from revolutionary struggle. They want to live it up. Louis Philippe cheerfully told the bourgeoisie, "Enrichissez-vous" (Get rich !) Khrushchev is promising the Russians more food. He is easing up on police terror; he is letting them think, talk and travel a little more. But he is especially favoring the party elite, the new class.

Living it up brings corruption with it. Balzac has left scathing literary accounts of the corruption of the rampant French bourgeoisie in the 1830's and 1840's. The criticisms of Soviet writers of the Soviet elite have just begun, with novels like Letin'sa Not By Bread Alone and Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago. Beyond that, the "golden youth" of the USSR, the spoiled children of Communist functionaries, is already an established social phenomenon. And the material acquisitiveness of the Communist elite, its preoccupation with conspicuous consumption, is becoming increasingly evident.

The period of living it up is also a period of national pride. Some of the things that the revolution set out to do are actually, visibly being achieved. The French set out to dazzle the world with intellect and literary genius. In the proximities of Louis Philippe were scholars and thinkers like Thiers and Guizot, who figured powerfully in politics, and writers like Balzac and the then up-and-coming Flaubert. The Soviets set out in 1917 to create a first-class technological society. Under Khrushchev, they amazed the world with their Sputniks. As a faithful student of history, the launching of the Sputniks, or of some comparable technological achievement, should not have been a surprise.

Instead, Western analysts were amazed that Khrushchev quoted
Like wise, Western experts should not have been surprised by the downfall of Marshal Zhukov. In the post-outburst phase, the thinking political, civil elite irst of the revolution means to taste the fruits of triumph. They are not about to let the military take over. Louis Philippe, Thiers and Guizot, the thinking leaders of the bourgeoisie, were as little disposed to bow to the soldiers as Khrushchev, the chief of the Communist Party, was to yield to Marshal Zhukov. How can the politicians swing it, when the soldiers seemingly have the physical power in the country? The politicians can swing it because they have the power of ideas within the army, which has been infiltrated from top to bottom with revolutionary ideology. As Zhukov fell, they Soviet marshals publicly swore their subservience to the Communist Party.

In the time of Louis Philippe, the Marshal Soult played a role curiously like that of Zhukov. He had been a brilliant campaigner under Napoleon. He was also a political opportunist, which Zhukov too must have been to gain the high position that he held under Stalin. Soult was in exile after Napoleon's fall; Zhukov slipped to an obscure command in Stalin's Czarist period. Soult was restored to grace earlier than but the power he held as Louis Philippe's Minister of War, as nominal as the remaining as nominal as the Soviet marshal's. Soult came back into prominence six years later, again with nominal powers. Is there another "up" ahead in Zhukov's up-and-down career? And the opportunistic Soult allied himself with the enemies of Louis Philippe in 1846. Would it be surprising if Zhukov, if he is still alive then, would side with the rising against the Khrushchev regime that may be expected around 1970?

Enough has been said to demonstrate the rather striking correspondence between two periods in modern history. The differences remain: the French and the Russian revolutions take place in different nations,
they are made by different types of men, they have different objectives. They affect the balance of global power differently. But the Russian revolution, seen in this light, becomes a humanly comprehensible, universally digestible affair, not a wild and dark mystery played out within the battlements of the Kremlin.

II

If this interpretation is accepted, a series of consequences flow from it.

It should provide a measure of calm comfort on the prospects of peace. There was no major war from 1830 to 1846, nor for that matter for another 66 years beyond that. Granted that historical evidence cannot be utterly conclusive. Still, it can be a legitimate source of hope. The statesmen and the citizens of today need only show the sense and wisdom of those a century and a quarter ago. The great going fear, of course, is that Khrushchev will not manage to do so. But if French leaders, emerging from a revolution as ghastly in its way as the Russian one, succeeded in simmering down, there is ground to think that Khrushchev may be more settled than some of his bibulous and truculent utterances indicate.

The period 1830-1846 should be thoroughly studied anew, with a searching scholarly eye out for the forces, principles and events that seem relevant to the present. The detached, telescopic view of events in Russia today might provide useful supplements and corrections to the little that can be seen in the Soviet Union with the naked newspaper-reading eye. Historical study would provide a frame of reference for interpreting in depth the surface currents that over Soviet Communism. And in the career of a statesman like Palmerston, who conducted foreign policy for England against Louis Philippe, present American diplomats might find many clues for their own policy planning.
For the US appears as the successor to Britain not only in terms of power or in terms of leadership of a free world coalition. Britain fulfilled a specific conservative mission against the French Revolution. It contained the revolutionary forces, so to speak, and it upheld the validity of the pre-revolutionary traditions and principles against radical, all-consuming innovation. It put the external check on the excesses of the French Revolution until France's unique contribution to Western civilization could become useful to everyone. This, it seems, is the nature of the U.S. role toward Russia.

In the footsteps of England from 1630 to 1815, the U.S. today appears to face three broad missions: limited struggle, expanding peace and deepening interpenetration between it and the USSR.

The outlines of the US-USSR struggle are plain enough to need little elaboration. The technological battle is joined, the contest for the Middle East smolders. A Soviet-inspired Communist bid for power in Indonesia waits in the wings. India looms as a major field of East-West struggle as its economy flounders and the Communists tighten their grip on the Indian state of Kerala. In Africa as it arises, the figures schooled in Leninism will be bidding for the allegiance of the ex-colonial peoples.

The French under Louis Philippe were expansionist too. But they pursued their aims in a more conventional power-politics fashion, not in the revolutionary manner. There is reason to think that the Soviets may fall into this pattern. Not only has Soviet ideological fervor ebbed; the foreign Communist parties have been badly hurt by first de-Stalinization and then Hungary. Also, the Soviets seek the respectability that comes with diplomacy and hope to shake off some of the odium that attaches to conspiracy. Now they try to win chiefs of state without exactions of red oaths of allegiance; they use aid as much as a power lever as the creation of chaos. It is Soviet
Diplomacy, rough and tough, rather than Communist fanaticism, reckless and incendiary, that the U.S. faces today. The U.S. ought to be able to cope better with the more "respectable" USSR.

Amid struggles, areas of peace are likely to expand. It is now possible to travel in Russia. It is even possible to talk to Khrushchev, although such conversations rapidly turn into monologues on his part.

Russian scientists turn up at foreign conventions and Russian bigwigs turn out in foreign capitals. Cultural and educational exchanges are growing. Unquestionably, these developments are part of a new Soviet public relations campaign. They also appear to reflect a Soviet desire to put certain fields of activity and behavior "off limits" for political struggle. This de-politicizing deserves cautious, judicious U.S. cooperation.

Vigorous competition with Russia and careful pacification of whatever fields can be pacified are essential to the main need of the next decade and a half: the interpenetration of Russia and America. The heritage of the West that America holds in trust — values like the German-won freedom of conscience, the British-won freedom of property, the French-won freedom of thought — must more and more work their way into the USSR. However, it must also be expected that some of the values proclaimed by the Russian revolution, even if they have to date been grievously distorted in Russia (as revolutionary France distorted freedom of thought), will permanently work their way into the Western way of life.

In fact, Communism has probably already won as much of an ideological victory as it is ever going to. It purports to stand for the rights of the working class. It also claims that those rights cannot be fully attained unless the state runs the economy. Is it not very likely that American labor owes something of its prodigious progress to the Soviet Union, which by its emergence declared that
the heyday of old-fashioned capitalism was over? And is there not a connection between the New Deal, where the U.S. government took over a measure of responsibility for the U.S. economy, and Soviet state planning of economics? Needless to say, this has nothing to do with the vulgar assertions that labor unions and government regulation of business are "pink". It is only a reminder that no nation is immune to the tremendous forces of a world-wide revolution being mainly enacted in another nation.

The U.S. is still in the process of meeting another domestic problem inseparable from the Communist ideological challenge: the problem of integration. The Communists have noisily trumpeted the equal rights of the proletariat. And the Negroes, in terms of social and economic status, have been the proletariat of the U.S. Again, it is hardly a coincidence that American Negroes should be making their greatest strides forward during the period of the Soviet revolution. The Soviet regime did nothing directly for the American Negro; rather, Communism has only tried to exploit the grievances of the Negro. But the U.S. as a whole responded to the ideal egalitarian creed of the Soviet revolution and began to give Negroes equal rights.

Nor is it an accident that the integration problem has come to the fore in the US at precisely this time. The British in 1832 passed the Reform Act, the most decisive extension of the franchise in British history. Parliamentary reform, the elimination of the rotten boroughs, came first. Elimination of the rotten boroughs in the cities followed. In the US, the Supreme Court first ruled nationally on integration. Now the states are painfully, piecemeal implementing the court order. It would seem that there is an intimate connection between liberalisation in the anti-revolutionary nations and the Louis-Philippe-Khrushchev kind of let up in the revolutionary nations.
The US has kept the domestic peace by bringing revolutionary principles into harmony with its own traditions. For Russia's domestic peace, she must integrate Western traditions into her revolutionary heritage. This, far more than foreign adventure, is the essence of Khrushchev's problem. His liberalization program suggests that he either knows it or is unconsciously attending to it. The Soviet Union, in its surge to world power, has trained up an influential intelligentsia and a strong managerial, functionary class. That class now wants some traditional Western rights, and the rights must be granted because the regime depends on the ruling class. Significantly, some Soviet scientists have already gained the freedom of conscience that they could refuse to work on the hydrogen bomb, without being punished for it. Soviet students and writers are cautiously pressing for the right to think. All of them are pressing for more material benefits, property rights. The Westernization of Russia, in those senses, is under way. Anything the US can do to assist it will contribute to Russia's tranquillity at home, and thusly to her re-integration into Western civilization.

How far will Khrushchev get with Westernization? The evidence from Louis Philippe's day indicates that Khrushchev will be able to take care of the wants of the Russian elite. Louis Philippe did manage to please the bourgeoisie. But Khrushchev or someone like him will probably not satisfy the Russian people as a whole. They are likely to rise against his rule, as suggested, about 1970.

That period may well be more dangerous than the one today. The Russian masses then may fasten their hopes on a tin-pot Stalin, the way the French after 1848 chose Napoleon III. But if the US wisely and tenaciously follows its historic mandate for the next 15 years,
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That period may well be more dangerous than the one today. The Russian masses then may fasten their hopes on a tin-pot Stalin, the way the French after 1848 chose Napoleon III. But if the US wisely and tenaciously follows its historic mandate for the next 15 years,
it should also be able to fend off the fresh peril of the 1970's, and remembering Napoleon III's ill-fated hour in the sun, genuine peace within the Western world may be looked for around 1985.

It will be high time, too. Then, very likely, the U.S. and Russia will need to combine against the growing peril of Red China. For China may be the revolutionary Russia of the 21st century. Not that history guarantees these things. But it points to them, and its hints should not be ignored.