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"original phase" from the later ones, that is, place it before the phenomenon of the "deeply stirred," the "awakening," and attempt to comprehend it as a particular kind of human reality?

Buber: It frequently happens, indeed, that the I-Thou relation begins with an "illumination," an "awakening." But I am in no case inclined to understand this manifestation as the rule. I cannot do this because I already find this relation—as I have maintained from the beginning—in the life of the small child, as in that of the so-called primitive man, in a directly natural form; and I also understand the meaning of most spiritual forms in their connection with the natural.

I acknowledge, therefore, the significance of "being seized," but I can see in it no necessary presupposition for the origin of an I-Thou relation.

D. Time and Historicity of Man

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: The real gulf or gap between Buber's and my way of thinking is our approach to the historicity of man.

To me, any word spoken makes sense only if testifying to the spiritual coexistence of three or *more* generations of men. To speak means to live backward before one's own birth and forward beyond one's own death.

To be named establishes one into a time sequence with at least two epochal and decisive breaks: the death of the person who named me and the death of myself, the career of a name which is meant to survive any physical destruction.

Pluri-aged is my thought; single-aged is Buber's. This also happens to be the distinction between socialism (with its as yet liberal, i.e., single-aged conception of the social order) and communism (with its religion-like pluri-aged approach to the reproduction of the social order and within the social order).

Buber as well as myself is perfectly aware of this dividing line between these two approaches. To me, no individual and no individual generation seems capable of making any experience of history. *Man, the individual*, cannot do more than realize the experience of his five senses. *Sense*, common sense, is not the travesty of the democratic superstition, that is, the identity of perception for fifty or a thousand indi-

viduals at the same time. It is the power of a dynasty of generations - at least three or four - to pool their energies around one and the same experience and for making one and the same experience. For instance, the Constitution of the United States of America is that incorporating tool through which that nation is made *as all* capable of registering certain domestic experiences over one hundred and fifty years! In foreign affairs, the United States has not created any such incorporating "spine"; hence Americans are unable to develop common sense in this area: they are incapacitated for making *any* experiences in history: *vide* the ruin of World War I "experiences." These many experiences of 1918 never became an experience of the United States!

This diversity of approach lies behind all my other points against Martin Buber. For instance, *Ich* (I) and *Du* (Thou) to me are fictitious abbreviations for the real pluri-aged, named, "nationalized" and century-bound real person. To me, pronouns are *omissions*. To Buber, they suffice. If you look into my *Zurück in das Wagnis der Sprache*, you may find ample proof for my thesis that pronouns are neither here nor there. You are Mr. Friedman and Maurice Friedman long before you are I or Thou. This, today, goes unrecognized. Liberalism and humanism have perverted the relations of names, nouns, pronouns. Buber had no reason to fight this centennial⁶ tradition. Hence, his reconnoitering into the I and Thou was not felt to be ruinous for the whole humanistic and naturalistic traditions about man—as being "naturally himself." To me this is nonsense.

For me, *time* is indivisibly three in one: Future, Past, and, as their victor, Present are only *simultaneously* given. They are trinitarian, prismatic aspects of one and the same whole: Time. Time is given to real man (not to the abstraction called "physicist") as one in three: (1) the Times I enfold myself; (2) the Times which have preceded my con-

⁶In a communication to the general editors of this volume, who questioned this usage of "centennial," Rosenstock-Huussy explained that he is challenging a hundred years of academic tradition down to Hitler as naively atomistic and egocentric. "I" and "Thou" is proper for Buber, he insists, because Buber simply extends, but never changes, the views of academic agnostics who remain within the unchallenged Greek tradition. Rosenstock-Huussy declares: "My whole approach is the reverse of Buber's. I do not enlarge on the academic premises; I contradict them. Obviously, this seems preposterous." Only a hundred years hence, he adds, it might become clear why such a frontal attack could not be avoided.

sciousness; (3) the Times which follow after I am dead. Buber, on the other hand, accepts the phenomenon of time in its reduction to an inarticulate, logically indefensible, present.

Hence, our soil for speech differs fundamentally. Mine is at least three-dimensional in time; his is at best one-dimensional, but in truth *none-dimensional*.

Buber: In the central part of his formulation of his questions regarding the historicity of man and the contemporaneity of the generations, Rosenstock-Huessy gives a striking presentation of the difference between what is important to him in man and what is important to me. In the last sentences, where he speaks of the pronoun and of the "dimensions," he makes his criticism more pointed and loses thereby the ground under his feet.

The historical nature of man is the aspect of reality about which we have been basically and emphatically instructed in the epoch of thought beginning with Hegel and ending with Heidegger. I account it a great merit on the part of Rosenstock-Huessy that he has concretized this teaching in so living a way, as no other thinker before him has done: in his pointing to the generations living in contemporaneity with one another—a pointing out which I was especially happy to invite him to make in print when, more than three decades ago, I began to edit the periodical *Die Kreatur*. As a focusing of attention to the one side, just in its concreteness, it was and is welcome to me; but if he exhibits it as the most important and decisive reality in man, then I am compelled to hold him to be not less misleading than that whole teaching of our epoch—an epoch that has presented to us the cup that we have sipped until we have now reached the dregs.

Certainly, man is an "historical" being, which, to be sure, means for the description of a Patagonian something other than for that of a Chinese or even of an American. Certainly memory and promise are mingled in language, and both extend immeasurably beyond the birth and death of the speaker. But even here, in the realm of language, we can remark that with this perception of the "historical" we are still far from having come sufficiently close to the reality of man, indeed, that thereby we have not at all obtained a glimpse of the most characteristic fact, the open mystery of the person. In the actually spoken word the

eternally new event is not the said but the saying; and the saying stands in the present, the personal present that must at times let itself be represented in the said through the purely evocative word.

When I say "person," I point to the underivable. Were we endowed with a perfect historical knowledge, nonetheless we could not explain the essential constitution of a single person. I may not conceal the fact that by the words "essential constitution" I point to this person's having been created, to the fact of facts that, in the Jewish tradition, has been clothed in the saying that three work on the origin of every human child: father, mother, and God; this same fact that is proclaimed to me by each newborn child to whose cradle I step, through his traits, gestures, sounds that never yet have been. And, God be thanked, I too am there, as the father, the grandfather, the great-grandfather, or perhaps only as a guest, gazing ever more deeply into the mystery. Human existence, even the most silent, is speech; and speech, whether intentionally or unintentionally, directly or indirectly, along with gaining ground and forcibly penetrating, along with sucking and tasting, along with advancing over untried ways, is always address. What addresses you, not in the said but in the saying, is the underivable person, the now living new creature. The person becomes known in the I-Thou relation.

Of course, the personal pronouns are also neither here nor there; they stand only for the relation that cannot be expressed in any other way. Rosenstock-Huessy's opinion, influenced by grammatical teaching, that they stand for a name or even for a proper name, appears to me an error having serious consequences. Whether I say, "Eugen has written a 'sociology' in which such-and-such things are spoken about," or, "You Eugen, what were you calling to mind when you wrote so-and-so in your 'sociology'?"—that is the vital distinction. The pronoun "He" does, indeed, stand for a name, but the pronoun "Thou" only in the case of the first "You" in the latter sentence.

And to go back to the theme of the generations, but still only incidentally: Out of his valuation of the proper name—which I regard simply as an indispensable and unsatisfactory symbol of personal uniqueness—there follows for Rosenstock-Huessy the so-to-speak biographical equation of two deaths: the death of him who named me, and my own. That is an Old Testament manner of thinking to which I

cannot adhere; it is, at any rate, already relinquished by the Gospels, where the giving of the name is no longer an important biographical act and changes of name are no longer undertaken by God or the people, but by the person. Since then much else has changed. But I myself am deeply opposed to him who, in such a manner, sets as legitimate, next to one's own death, the remembered death of the man who has given him his name (who could, e.g., have been the superintendent of an orphanage); next to my death there is place for no other aside from that of the man with whom I have exchanged the most genuine Thou of my life.

My thought is not "single-aged." But my faith is. I believe in the hour, in the life of individuals, and in the life of the human race, where the historical bursts open and the present reveals itself. I believe in this hour because I know it. I know that it opens men to each other and establishes community between them. This, my faith, hence this experience of faith, this knowledge of faith, and this hope of faith you call a "single-aged socialism" and select as its opposite a communism whose approach is not only pluri-aged, but even religionlike. Are you thinking of the historical manifestation of our time on the banner of which, the most massive of all times, that term is written, that movement which has been frequently described by objective observers as religionlike? In any case, let one last thing be said: My innermost heart is indeed with those (in the near or remote future) who, driven into high despair by the pseudo realization of this religionlike world program, by this planetary centralism of power that will quite possibly invert everything, will summon with their last strength the single-aged and all-aged present, the presence between men.

E. Philosophical Anthropology

Walter Blumenfeld: 1. Is "the" human being of Buber the real human being or a rare, if ever realized, ideal, the "authentic" and especially the mature, normal person? Buber's teaching can hardly be applied to the mentally ill, to small children, and to idiots. Is not his "man" only a potentially and in no case a universally prevalent being?

2. Is there a dialogue with things and with God in the same sense as with persons? Surely there can be no discussions with them, even if one grants that one can be "addressed" by God and by things. Furthermore,