Respondeo etsi mutabor:
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Linguistic Theory

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Abstract
Rosenstock-Huessy argued that language originates—always and everywhere—from the need to respond to a world that addresses us and calls us by name. Thus in his view, unlike much contemporary theory which concerns itself with an autonomous system, language is understood as a human activity, a social phenomena or power brought into existence by social forces and involving the varied capabilities of the human mind and body. In this paper Rosenstock-Huessy's philosophy of language is briefly presented and questioned from the perspective of Integrational linguistics, a recent approach to language and semiology that stresses social relations and time in the making of meaning.

0. Introduction.1

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy was neither a semiologist nor a linguist by training, by profession or by reputation. To my knowledge he has left no discernible mark whatsoever on the history of linguistics and semiology, at least as that history is to be judged from the histories so far written and the bibliographies and references that one may encounter in the literatures of linguistics and semiology of the past century. His lectures on linguistics in 1966 (published under the title *The Lingo of Linguistics*) were not well-received by the linguists in attendance who assured him that they had no interest in language as he understood it. Nevertheless his writings on language, education, poetry, singing, liturgical rites, marriage, law, treaties, royal insignia, sports, clothing and fashion constitute a way of thinking about language and semiology that is radically different from the linguistic and semiological theories current during his lifetime. In light of the integrational semiology developed by Roy Harris and his students after the death of Rosenstock-Huessy, the latter's writings on language and semiology provide an exceptionally well-grounded critique of any and all linguistic theories that assume language to be an autonomous system of signs.

One of the most important differences between Rosenstock-Huessy's philosophy of language and other theories of his time is his denial of the autonomy of the sign and indeed his refusal to develop an autonomous science of signs and language at all. This in itself makes it difficult for anyone trained in modern linguistics to grasp what he is doing in theoretical terms, and he adds to this difficulty with a writing style in which the theoretical terms of the linguistics of his time have no place at all.2 His rare references to individual linguists are usually curt dismissals with little if any discussion. Additional difficulties arise with his use of older terms, his discussions of

1 A much abridged version of this paper will be published in *Theory, Culture, and Critique* with the title "Respondeo etsi mutabor: Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy's Semiological Zweistromland."

2 It is not just the linguistic terminology of his time that he ignores, but as Jakubowski noted, the terminology of sociology as well: "Terms such as culture, citizenship, individual, society, structure, strata, groups, roles, status, actors, public life, and many others which form the core sociological concepts appear rarely, if ever, in the writings and recorded lectures of Rosenstock-Huessy." (Jakubowski 2011a: 114)

the categories of traditional grammar and a focus on names and naming. Yet by far the greatest obstacle that he throws in the way of even the most sympathetic reader is his insistence on beginning and ending with matters that other theories of language reject as political, sociological, metaphysical or religious matters which are not considered to be within the province of linguistics proper. What I have attempted to do in this paper is to set out as clearly and concisely as I can the questions that oriented and formed Rosenstock-Huessy's approach to language and how he responded to the questions that moved him. The first section will discuss the theoretical world to which he responded as a writer, and the current situation of linguistics within which we must read his works.

1. Rosenstock-Huessy's philosophy of language in light of his predecessors, contemporaries and successors

Without Engels, no Marx. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1956-1958: I, 12)

Rosenstock-Huessy's relation to linguistics is generally critical and dismissive, but not always. While he nowhere responds at length to any linguist--either in critical analysis or agreement--there are scattered references in his writings that note points of agreement as well as disagreement.3 Since most of his writings on language are sociologically and philosophically oriented, the authors to whom he responds are more often sociologists, philosophers, anthropologists and statesmen than linguists, and less frequently, psychologists, economists, theologians and biologists. He often puts himself in opposition to Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Herder and Kant while aligning himself with Heraclitus, Augustine and Hamann. Although Rosenstock-Huessy offers the biologist Adolf Portmann in defence of his claim that language is not a natural object (Rosenstock-Huessy 1962) and the biologist Jakob von Uexkuell as well as the sociologist Robert MacIver as indications that his rejection of the subject-object dualism is in agreement with the most recent biological and sociological theory (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970b: 5), he discusses none of these thinkers in any depth anywhere.

In his book *Speak that I may see thee!*—a book dedicated to Rosenstock-Huessy—Stahmer (1968: 109) suggested as Rosenstock-Huessy's intellectual precursors "St. John, Saint-Simon, Paracelsus, Hamann, Jacob Grimm, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich von Schlegel, Otto Gierke, B.G. Niebuhr and William James" as well as Feuerbach, and Stahmer's book itself includes chapters on some of Rosenstock-Huessy's contemporaries who influenced him as he influenced them, namely Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig and Ferdinand Ebner.4 These latter thinkers were the principal figures behind the journal *Die Kreatur*, to which Rosenstock-Huessy also contributed, and his statement about the journal and its contributors applies to him as well:

> *Die Kreatur* pulled together the sum of the struggles of Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and William James. They had all discovered that no one has anything to say if they are all saying the same thing. The human being does

3 The closest Rosenstock-Huessy ever comes to a sustained discussion of any one linguist is in his 1962 essay '"Es regnet" oder die Sprache steht auf dem Kopf', a response to the "blasphemy" of Alan Gardiner's (1932) claim to get at the mysteries of language through an analysis of the sentence "It rains." As it happens, Michael Toolan (1996: 148-154) has also discussed Gardiner's raining examples from an integrationist perspective which makes for an excellent comparison between Rosenstock-Huessy's "speech-thinking" and integrationist thinking.

4 Stahmer also notes that while Rosenstock-Huessy has been compared to Heidegger and vice versa, "they differ dramatically, precisely because, for example, of the asocial origin of Heideger's thought (Stahmer 1968: 118).

> not speak like God does. A man does not speak like a woman, nor a Christian like a Jew, or a child like a professor. For that reason and that reason alone are they able to and must speak to one another" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1947: 210)

At the time Rosenstock-Huessy was developing his ideas linguistics was regarded as within the province of anthropology, and his readings in anthropology were extensive, influencing not only his thinking on language but on history and society as well. In the footnotes to *The Origin of Speech* we learn that his writings on the origins of language were informed by readings of Francis La Flesche, Everard Ferdinand im Thurn, Alfred Ernest Crawley, Alfred Kroeber, Wilhelm Schmidt, Eduard Norden, Edward Sapir, Wilhelm Schulze, Lev Trachtenberg, Carl Meinhof and Clyde Kluckhohn, and many more anthropologists are cited throughout his *Soziologie* of 1956-1958. In that work he wrote of the anthropologist A.P. Elkin "I accord him an honourable place here," and quoted him: "We then realize that we are not using language as a tool--rather it is "using" us, acting upon us just as other forms of behaviour do" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1956: II, 323; Elkin's quote is from *The American Anthropologist*, N.S. 43 (1941), p. 89). In the 1945 essay "How language establishes relations" Malinowski is credited with "the discovery among the primitives that the language they speak is denotation of actions" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 122), a major point for Rosenstock-Huessy. In *The Origin of Speech* we also learn of the many European and non-European, ancient and modern languages that he studied during the development of his ideas on the subject,5 and on page 77 we read his negative appraisal of several of the 19th century's important writers on language:

> Wundt, Grimm, Bopp, Durkheim and Humboldt never completely separated names from words. Thus the dictionary, that cemetery of language, with its definitions of terms, became the normal starting point for linguistics as well as psychology. The political role of speech was treated as secondary, as built on an already existing language. But speech originates in a group through the names with which its members are addressed! Names are not words. With words we speak of things; we speak to people by names. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 77)

Aside from the anthropologist-linguists, Rosenstock-Huessy mentions a number of other more theoretical linguists, but rarely with praise.6 In the essay "In defense of the grammatical method" we read of "Magnusson's brilliant Ph.D. thesis" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 20) and in a later essay in the same collection "Articulated speech" he elaborates on Magnusson's work of 1893 as being the only grammarian who "has made grammar the philosophy of time and space which it is" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 52). Also in "Articulated speech" we read that Otto Jespersen's merit was in having re-asserted that "In articulated speech, we create a variation of the existing linguistic tradition" and that the neglect of "this feature in all speech ... has made an understanding between grammarians and thinkers impossible for thousands of years." (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 49)7 but that Josef Schaechter's *Prolegomena zu einer kritischen*

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5 On page 130 he mentions in addition to most of the European languages and Sanskrit, Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic, Egyptian, fifteen Ugro-Finnic languages and twenty African languages.

6 In some autobiographical remarks quoted in Stahmer (1968: 118-119) Rosenstock-Huessy provides a few paragraphs about his early love of philology and lists some of his reading from the period 1902-1912, during which time he had not yet suffered the crisis of the war. His criticism of 19th-early 20th century philology would be developed during the war and published afterwards.

Grammatik (1935) is "a little masterpiece of this dissecting and reducing method which just because it is perfect makes one feel that we are all going to give up the spirit soon because language is illogical, stupid and always wrong against logic" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 57). In the 1935 essay "Uni-versity of logic, language, literature" we read of Karl Buehler that his "investigations fit into our own discoveries. However, it cannot be the purpose of this paper to deal with his studies in detail since he separates thought and language throughout" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 96). While W. von Humboldt was castigated in the quotation above, we find Rosenstock-Huessy also writing that an "attempt like the present to unify the cosmos of thought, literature, speech, can find no better patronage than the name of Wilhelm von Humboldt. ... he believed that the structure of language contained the secrets of national individuality, of history, of man's creative destiny. He treated languages ... not for their own sake but for a complete picture of the possibilities of the human mind" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 67).

In the 1945 essay "How language establishes relations" Joseph Vendryes is credited with recognizing the error of "using the term "Copula" for the word "is," which is one of the most inveterate signs of the fact that grammar has not been treated as a science of society" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 119) but a few pages later in the same volume, in an earlier 1944 essay "The listener's tract" Vendryes is castigated for publishing a treatise on language in which "the words that signify the acts of hearing, listening, obeying, understanding are not to be found, even the word "oreille," the ear, is missing" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 135). A few years later in volume I of his 1956 *Soziologie* Rosenstock-Huessy repeated these remarks on Vendryes, with additional remarks on Brice Parain's 1942 PhD thesis *Recherches sur la nature et les fonctions du langage*, a thesis directed by Vendryes. Of these two works Rosenstock-Huessy remarked:

> Philology structured itself on the processes of phonetics and, from that vantage point, around saying, speaking, writing. But neither "calling," nor "calling on the phone," "calling into office," "calling into being," nor "calling into life" have any place in the textbooks. For those expressions make it almost impossible to overlook the intimate connection between a call and its aural perception on the part of a hearer. Acts of hearing are reserved for other disciplines of study or perhaps left to chance. In academic military training, questions of obedience, the psychology of comprehension, the acoustic nature of hearing, and learning and teaching are treated. But these departments remain silent about linguistics. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1956-1958: I, 141)

Rosenstock-Huessy's thinking on language was already fully developed in his 1925 *Soziologie* with his later writings largely working out and elaborating the themes set out therein.8 The major

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7 The variation of which Rosenstock-Huessy speaks is not what is commonly meant by the term in e.g. sociolinguistics. He is referring to the situation in which a speaker and interlocutor speak about something, each in their own way. Thus "When we answer, we neither repeat merely what the first speaker has said nor do we start in our own language. ... The language, the linguistic materials which are to be used, is prescribed by the first speaker. It makes no sense to answer a man in a language in which he does not want to talk, but inside this framework I am free to introduce variations, to enrich, to specify, in short to articulate" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 48). The following passage is indicative of what impressed Rosenstock-Huessy in Jespersen's writing: "The essence of language is human activity—activity on the part of one individual to make himself understood by another, activity on the part of that other to understand what was in the mind of the first…" (Jespersen 1992: 17)

movements of 20th century linguistics, philosophy of language and semiotics after the publication of Pierce, Saussure and Wittgenstein had hardly any echo at all in his writing: in his entire published writings Saussure is mentioned only once ("The most recent language scrutineers--Revesz, Louis H. Gray, Meillet, Saussure, Sapir, Alan Gardiner--all dilate on the origins of language. But the index entry, name, does not occur in any of their works." Rosenstock-Huessy 1956-1958: I, 178).9 While Wittgenstein gets an entire encyclopedia entry, Pierce and Whorf fare even worse: Rosenstock-Huessy never mentions them.10 Yet that he continued to read linguistics is evident in his remarks on publications by Meillet, Schaechter, Gebser and Parain during the 1930-1940s, numerous works on classical and Biblical languages published in the 1940-1960s, and Gardiner's works from 1932 through 1961 as well as a wide range of publications on ancient Egyptian language, texts and archaeology of the same period. It is also clear that he was reading Jakobson in 1962 for there is a footnote to Jakobson's paper "Why 'Mama' and 'Papa'"? that was added to "Im Prägstock eines Menschenschlags oder der tägliche Ursprung der Sprache ," the revised German version of a work from the 1940's prepared later in the same year as the work cited—1962—and published in 1964 (Rosenstock-Huessy 1964; the citation to Jakobson's paper is to the version published in the latter's 1962 *Selected Works* and appears in footnote 2 on p. 453).

That Rosenstock-Huessy never tackled Saussure (or Whorf) is puzzling to say the least, given both the apparent similarities and sharp contrasts between those theorists' interest in speakers and society. One of Saussure's translators—Roy Harris—noted in his introduction to his translation of the *Cours de linguistique générale* that "*Langue* and *parole* are thus both defined by reference to the mental faculty involved (*le langage*), and *not* by reference to the community or to the community's speech practices (which differ from one country to another)" (Saussure 2013: xxxi). For Saussure, *langue* is a structure, its properties structural properties (Harris and Taylor 1997: 209), but the question of how that structure exists in and among human beings is not so straightforwardly indicated. Harpham notes that

> Saussure is relentless in attacking those who regard language as natural or organic, but is for some reason unable to weed out all references to nature from his own discourse, ... Indeed, the entire fifth chapter of the Introduction is conducted in the key of biology, with references to "*l'organisme intérieur de l'idiome*," "*la vie des langues*," "*l'organisme grammatical*" (compared to "the inner organism of a plant"), "*le développement naturel, organique d'un idiome*," "*l'organisme linguistique interne*," and so forth. ... And throughout, the social

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8 While the 1925 *Soziologie* presents the range of his ideas together for the first time, the main reorienting ideas had already been the subject of conversations between Rosenstock-Huessy and Rosenzweig prior to their July 1913 encounter that led to Rosenzweig's conversion to Judaism. D'Antuono (1999: 189) describes Rosenstock-Huessy's philosophy of that early date as a "philosophy of revelation" arising from his reflection on language, "the *organon* of the disolution of ontology" in which revelation is understood to involve "an adherance to the point of view of the interlocutor."

9 There is probably an oblique reference to Saussure in his brief remarks against the arbitrariness of names in Rosenstock-Huessy (1946: 8-9): "Every American college student feels safe, as far as I can see, behind the barbed wire of this argument: words and names both are 'arbitrary.' They have confused 'transient' and 'arbitrary.'"

10 Cristaudo (2012: 66-71) devotes several pages to Rosenstock-Huessy's comments on Wittgenstein, while Meredith Cargill claims in an unpublished conference paper from 2006 that Rosenstock-Huessy was definitely an adherent of the Sapir-Whorf view of language but cites no references to Whorf in Rosenstock-Huessy's writings or lectures (notes on the paper are available at http://www.erhsociety.org/links/).

> product of language, the invention of the collective mind, is, for reasons never articulated, described in biological and merely organic terms. (Harpham 2013: 29)

Harpham goes on to note that Saussure's science of language offers language as a kind of system in which "despite a general sense of individual freedom (in the production of speech), each element is subject to the rule of the system, or langue, from which it derives its identity; and that the names of politics and history must not be spoken" (Harpham 2013: 31). Saussure himself plainly stated (in the Harris translation) "the rules a community accepts are imposed upon it, and not freely agreed to" (Saussure 2013: 82) The contrast with Rosenstock-Huessy in this matter could hardly be overstated.

While the various schools of thought drawing upon Saussure each dealt differently with the biological and social aspects of language, all have had in common the notion of language as an autonomous system operating in some connection with the brain, the social aspects of language arising as a result of using that system. A description of this system is the primary object of linguistic theory; what happens after the system generates language is a topic for another discipline.

Nearly all of Rosenstock-Huessy's publications were written prior to Chomsky's *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965) and he nowhere gives Chomsky or any of his followers any attention, but the chief theoretical issues that Rosenstock-Huessy rejects in the theorizing of his predecessors and his contemporaries appear unaltered in most linguistic theory that has appeared since his death in 1973. Language for the nineteenth century linguists as for Chomsky and today's cognitive linguists is and always has been a natural phenomenon, a matter of biological structures, physiological functions and physical evolution. The rules of a linguistic community are imposed upon it by this genetic/neurological/biological inheritance. In Chomsky's famous statement from 1965

> Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance. (Chomsky 1965: 3)

Chomsky later defined his research more and more narrowly as a biological science. In a 2009 lecture he remarked that "the physical sciences are not studies of phenomena. Rather they are studies of the principles and processes that underlie phenomena" and with this move he supposes that he has freed himself from the necessity of dealing with any actual linguistic—much less social—phenomena. In his attempt to develop linguistics from a behavioral science into a physical science, "to integrate the study of language and cognitive processes generally, human thought and understanding," Chomsky inaugurated biolinguistics, "the study of language as a biological capacity, pursued much as we study, for example, the nature of the human visual system or the insect visual system or other capacities of organisms.... The only way known to study the capacity is to develop computational theories that attribute the computations to the mind of the insect and ask the question of what these capacities are in the insect, how do they

develop, and how they are used" (Chomsky 2009: 6-7). In a paper with Berwick published two years later the authors were more blunt in their definition of language: "human language, a particular object of the biological world" (Berwick and Chomsky 2011: 19).

Language is a natural system to be studied as an object of natural science: that was the assumption that oriented linguistics in the 19th century as it did during the 20th century and continues to do so today. Ironically Chomsky's desire to develop a "hard science" of linguistics has been strenuously defended in a recent textbook which declares grammar to be "magic": "syntax has a biological base, and that human beings, from whatever language community, sociocultural background, or millennium, are all bound together by the same basic grammatical magic" (Hall 2005: 197).

There is, however, one important school of linguistics that flourishes as an exception, a group of dissenting voices against theorizing language as a natural biological system. In his theoretical writings since 1973 Roy Harris has elaborated an approach to language—called variously Integrationism, Integrational Linguistics or Integrational Semiology—that constitutes a sustained critique of language as a system and adherents to this school of thought insist that language can only be understood within a broader theory of human communication and social relations. In the discussion that follows Rosenstock-Huessy's writings will be poked, prodded and investigated in light of Integrationist theory.11

2. Language and social relations.

In his 1945 essay "How language establishes relations" Rosenstock-Huessy began by warning the reader that he does not plan to discuss language through the study of the history of language, of phonetics or semantics but instead will "try to explain speech as a function of the various elementary social relations, just as breathing is a function of respiration" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 117). He followed this introduction by offering the reader four types of social relations established in the act of speaking:

> 1. The speaker and the listeners are unanimous, of one spirit. They agree.
> 2. The speaker and the listener are "dubious," split, and of two spirits. They are strangers.
> 3. The speaker depends on the listener, whom the speaker expects to act on what he has to say.
> 4. The listener depends on the speaker because the speaker has acted already. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 117)

That language establishes relationships is not an idea unique to Rosenstock-Huessy, but the latter's emphasis on social relationships as indicated in the passage just quoted is something quite different from other well-known discussions. We may, for example, contrast Rosenstock-Huessy's approach with Rorty's comment in the latter's essay "Pragmatism and romanticism":

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11 The reader unfamiliar with the work of Roy Harris and others inspired by his writing will find a bibliography and a few short pieces by Harris introducing Integrationism on his website, http://www.royharrisonline.com/index.html as well as a database of integrationist oriented publications at http://www.integrationistsrepository.com/

> When Nietzsche says that a thing conceived apart from its relationships would not be a thing, he should be read as saying that since all language is a matter of relating some things to other things, what is not so related cannot be talked of. Language establishes relationships by, for example, tying blood in with sunsets and full moons with tree trunks. Lack of describability means lack of relations, so our only access to the indescribable must be the sort of direct awareness that the empiricist has of redness and that the mystic has of God. Much of the history of Western philosophy, from Plotinus and Meister Eckhart down to Husserl and Russell, is the history of the quest for such direct awareness. (Rorty 2007: 118)

In Rorty's examples the "relationships" established are between two "things" that are themselves "words that are no more than the creation of finite human creatures in response to finite human needs" (Rorty 2007: 119). Rorty's relationships are relationships between words, not social relationships. Rosenstock-Huessy on the other hand insists that not only do "The fundamental classifications of grammar and the fundamental classifications of social relations coincide" but that "Grammatical classifications in themselves would remain arbitrary without such empirical backing by social reality" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 117). The full measure of how far Rorty is from Rosenstock-Huessy on the matter of language establishing relationships is made clear in a comment in the last paragraph of Rorty's essay: "a pragmatist outlook ... would complete the process of secularization by letting us think of the desire for non-linguistic access to the real as as hopeless as that for redemption through a beatific vision" (Rorty 2007: 119). For Rosenstock-Huessy, it is Rorty's "real" that moves us to speak—love, hatred, desire, need, war and revolution—and in his view a beatific vision may indeed lead to redemption. We speak of the real because our first-order experience of the real is what moves us, and our vision of the future may lead us to our redemption through speaking new social relationships into existence.

For Rosenstock-Huessy, first-order experience of language begins when we are spoken to: the proper order of the pronouns is not 1st person *I*, 2nd person *you* and 3rd person *he*/*she*/*it*, but rather our linguistic experience begins not with our *I* speaking at all but with hearing ourselves addressed by name, as someone else's *you*.

> Out of a thousand cares, impressions, and influences which surround, flow around, and beset it, a child gradually stakes out its borders as an independent entity. Its first discovery on its own, therefore, is that it is neither world, nor mother or father, nor God, but *something else*. The first thing that happens to the child--to every person--is that it is spoken to. It is smiled at, entreated, rocked, comforted, punished, given presents, or nourished. *It is first a "you"* to a powerful being outside itself--above all to its parents. ...
> Hearing others say that we exist and mean something to them, and that they want something from us, precedes our articulating that we ourselves exist and our articulating what we ourselves are. We develop self-consciousness by receiving commands and by being judged from outside. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1988: 16)

It is this address from without, not our biological inheritance, that brings us into language. Here Rosenstock-Huessy departs from modern linguistics entirely: language is not the product of an internal organ or cognitive mechanism, but comes from without as a gift. Yet not as a gift

produced elsewhere by others and handed to us ready made, but a gift such as friendship which establishes the conditions for its own existence through an act of friendship. *Respondeo etsi mutabor*: speaking changes both the speaker and the one spoken to; through the act of speaking both interlocutors make themselves into human beings.12 "Man's language aims at something not aimed at by apes or nightingales: it intends to form the listener into a being which did not exist before he was spoken to" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 4. The German edition of this book was interestingly entitled *Im Prägstock eines Menschenschlags oder der tägliche Ursprung der Sprache*). Man is not human, he wrote later on in this same essay (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 80), unless he manages to integrate into a unity his determined material body and his "undetermined social organ" (his temporal character), an integration that is effected through ritual language. He contrasts this becoming human through language with the situation of an animal:

> Nobody tells the animal of its origin. But we, the churches and the tribes of time immemorial, have lifted all human beings from their dependence on mere birth. We have opened their eyes to their origins, to their predecessors. We have transformed their mere births so that they became a succession of precedents well-known and well-established. And we have transformed their mere deaths into a precedent leading to an emancipation of their successors. We have made men know their origins by originating one tongue for them. The origin of human speaking is the speaking of human origin! Speaking one tongue, men have become and can continue to become Man. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 21)

Adherents of the view that language is an autonomous system of signs—biological or otherwise—will immediately object that in order "to speak of origins" language would already have to exist, so Rosenstock-Huessy has explained nothing about the origin of language. This is a crucial point, the foundation of Rosenstock-Huessy's understanding of language. How does he deal with this question?

He never addresses that question directly, but argues that the social conditions that give rise to speech--and the origin of speech is a social event, not a biological evolution--are the same now as in the first speech event in human history. He proceeds with his argument by making a distinction between pre-formal, formal and informal speech. Pre-formal speech is

> A method of showing a man the direction to the next farm on the road or a way of stopping a child from crying. Then it comes in with gestures, smiles, and tears, and then the apes and the nightingales are our masters. There is no doubt in my mind that, in our daily chatter and prattle, our speech serves the same purposes as animal sounds. ... There are areas in our life where we share the conditions under which animals emit sounds of courtship, warning, etc. When we use sounds in these same areas they bear some resemblance to the languages sounded by animals. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 1)

Formal speech on the other hand signifies

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12 On this Stahmer remarks "With Kierkegaard, Rosenstock-Huessy would insist that humanity is a task and not a fact." (Stahmer 1968: 132).

> the power to sing a chorale, to stage tragedy, to enact laws, to compose verse, to say grace, to take an oath, to confess one's sins, to file a complaint, to write a biography, to make a report, so solve an algebraic problem, to baptize a child, to sign a marriage contract, to bury one's father. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 1-2)

After making this distinction he introduces informal speech and relates the latter to pre-formal and formal speech:

> Informality is a rebellion against formality. Never can "informal" be called pre-formal. ... After forms have been created and perhaps grown stale, we may become informal. To be informal means to neglect forms which exist. ... Logically and historically, the formal precedes the informal, and it succeeds animal speech. In anticipation of our result, we may say 1. pre-formal animal speech, 2. formal human speech, 3. informal, low brow speech. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 2-3)

He insists that the study of informal speech—lullabies, nursery rhymes, neighborly advice, a pointing towards the next house, gossiping neighbors—does not lead us towards the origin of language but to a late state, possible only after the accomplishment of formal speech. "The nursery and the parlor presuppose the meeting house and the court and the formal languages spoken there" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 7). Pre-formal speech on the other hand, may be explained as a variety of animal expression, a matter of natural history, biology and physiology. In a grammar of Latin written with his friend Ford Lewis Battles he provided an illustration of animal (pre-formal) and formal speech as they might occur in our everyday interaction:

> When you yell “iiiiiiiih” and your chum yells back “iiiiiiiih,” you are two little animals making inarticulate noise. When you, however, say to him: “Now listen, Johnnie,” and he says, “I listen, Billy,” you are two people speaking to each other in articulated speech. What is the difference between the two cases? In articulated speech, the process of listening is clearly defined between another person and yourself. You summon him to act as a listener. The roles are distributed between you two, because one in the same act first is suggested as an order on your side; then, the same act is acknowledged as a voluntary reaction on his side. You and he enter in this specific relation. In answering you, “I listen,” he partly identifies himself with you since he admits that he knows exactly what you mean. Furthermore he preserves his personality by adding “I.” Speech is both identity with, and distinction between, people. It is like weaving a pattern out of several fibers. For his “I listen” is not the same sound as your “listen.” It has passed through his conscience and consciousness and he had to reshape it before he passed it back to you. Now the sentence “I listen” carried back to you something quite different from the noise “iiiiiiiih.” It was now a declaration of cooperation, of acknowledgement of his having heard you. A sentence is a personal relation between answerable people. Articulated speech is communication between responsible people. (Rosenstock-Huessy and Battles 1975: 14-15)

As human beings we speak sometimes as animals—and such language can be explained in the same manner as we explain the grunts, growls and songs of animals—sometimes informally (when we speak inconsequentially), and sometimes we speak formally. In light of the absence of names in pre-formal animal speech and the prevalence of pronouns in informal speech, he renames these three varieties of language prenominal, nominal and pronominal, declaring that if we wish "to understand the origin of formal speech it must be from a man's work or an old man's deed" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 4). With these matters taken care of, he then declares that "we may well inquire when and where formal language is called forth, and what constitutes the contribution of language in a hitherto speechless community. The authentic place and the legitimate moment for the birth of language can now be explored" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 7).

And where does Rosenstock-Huessy look for this "authentic place" and " legitimate moment" for the origin of language?

> Until we have faced the situations of a human society when and where speech is lacking we cannot even understand the second question of why the instruments of language were cast in grammatical forms. The question of the origin of language makes sense as a sequence of two questions. First, when, in our own experience, is new speech indispensable? Second, when, then, did speech become indispensable? Without any present day experience of speech as originating anew under our noses, from necessity, we shall have no yardstick for the past. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 7-8)

Rosenstock-Huessy proposed that we look at our own experience of language in order to discover the origin of speech, and to look precisely at those situations in which we are unable or unwilling to say what we must say, prohibited from speaking or simply not listened to when we do speak. In this "hell of non-speech" we discover the social forces that provoke human beings to speak to each other and establish relationships of peace instead of isolation, war, tyranny and the anarchy of all against all.

> In plunging into the darkness in which man cannot yet speak or no longer does speak to his brother man today, we shall prepare ourselves best for the answer to the questions: what is speech?, how does it originate?, why do we speak?, which, of course, are one and the same question in its divers aspects.
>
> We are, then, going to inquire under what conditions modern man is not on speaking terms with his brother. This obviously is not a purely linguistic or philological question. If members of a family are not on speaking terms, something is wrong with the family. A moral question is implied. When nations are not on speaking terms, they are at war. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 9)

With this move, all questions regarding language and its origin, beginning with What is language? have been torn out of the linguist's familiar territorial grasp, and Rosenstock-Huessy is well aware of this:

> Our way of putting the question for the origin of language shifts the field of the question into the realm of politics and history. The question "when must man come to speak?" is disclosed as a question which must have been answered by other authorities than the teachers of English or Arabic or Sanscrit. They deal with languages as facts. Our question deals with languages as question marks of political history. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 9)

Because Rosenstock-Huessy chose to approach the origin of language as "our problem of understanding what happens when a language is not functioning," he offers us not a componential analysis of phonology, syntax or semantics, but a semiology of making meanings with others, a tentative, risky, dangerous and failure prone activity not produced like sweat or piss by bodily organs but produced moment by moment—if at all—by human beings who make each other into human beings through this semiosis.13

This point of departure for investigating the origin of language was neither arbitrary nor a purely theoretical necessity: his orientation arose out of his personal experience as a soldier in the First World War, and in his work with factory workers and industrial arbitration in Germany immediately after that war. His basic insights were first written down in the trenches as letters to Franz Rosenzweig in 1916, and can be clearly seen in his works on industrial law from the post-war period, such as this 1926 remark in *Vom Industrierecht*: "before two individuals may talk to each other in words about things they must be mutually responsive, they must recognize each other as persons" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1926: 86).

Finding ourselves in a social disaster, we are compelled to establish relationships with others because the relationships are not given to us; if we wish to recognize and be recognized as a brother, sister, friend or coworker in situations of social disorder, we must establish those relationships with our own acts. "Speech is the political constitution of a group beyond the life time and living space of any individual, beyond common sense and physical sense" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 31). In an essay first written in 1939 and revised in 1955 ("In defense of the grammatical method"), Rosenstock-Huessy argued that this is what his method of research reveals: social disorder is the condition in which language originates.14

> What is wrong with society? That there is war, revolution, crisis, and decadence in it. Without these evils, we should live in the Garden of Eden, and that means, without self-conscious reflection on our social situation. Social disintegration is a

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13 The important difference between language produced by natural processes and language as human activity was discussed briefly by Thomas Duncanson. He noted the "drastic, unfamiliar *naturalism* in his thinking about speech" but argued that "Rosenstock-Huessy saw speech as natural, not in some uninteresting biological or even psychological sense, but in the grand phylogenic sense that in speaking human beings realize their deepest and most complete well-being and advance their humanity" (Duncanson 2001: 14).

14 Much later Baudrillard would make a remarkably similar suggestion: "John grows up normally, but doesn't talk, and this drives his parents to distraction. When he is about 16, at last, one teatime, he says: 'I'd like a little sugar.' His mother is staggered and asks, 'But John, why have you never said anything up to now?" 'Up to now, everything was perfect.'

If everything is perfect, language is useless. This is true for animals. If animals don't speak, it's because everything's perfect for them. If one day they start to speak, it will be because the world has lost a certain sort of perfection."(Baudrillard 1990: 83-84)

> blessing in disguise since it compels us to wake up. The grammatical method insists that the negative aspects of society compel us to think, to speak, to write, to study, and nothing else makes us think really. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 11-12)

The four evils that are the primary focus of Rosenstock-Huessy's sociological and historical writings are presented in that same essay in terms of social relations across times and spaces:

> "*anarchy* prevents translocal units from cooperating" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 12)
>
> "'Decadence' means to be unable to reach the future" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 12)
>
> "In *revolutions*, the new men, the future generation does violence to the existing order and to the people formed in and by the past" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 13)
>
> "Wars disregard *extraterritoriality*." (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 13)

All four evils Rosenstock-Huessy diagnoses as diseases of speech for they each emphasize one aspect of social life while neglecting or suppressing another. In respect of the aspects of social life that each evil neglects, we could say that each evil is a speech defect since it prevents the expression of a necessary aspect of social life. In the face of these four evils language appears not as a fact of nature but as a social miracle.

> The cry for peace and order is a desperate cry. Shouting for freedom and for regeneration of the good old days is of the utmost violence. The lullabies and sugar coating of common sense are not acceptable to crying, weeping, shouting, raging people. They must experience the miracle of seeing the dead come to life again, and foes become friends, and dissent become agreement, and shouts become new words. ... Formal speech produces exactly these miracles. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 31)

That speech is a social miracle occurring in the face of these four evils points to the fragility and temporal nature of language, new speech being "created under the pressure from graves in back of us and cradles ahead of us, from foes in front of us and dissension within our own ranks" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 30). The failures of speech to set the world aright indicate that language is not a perfect machine for the production of social order any more than it is a mere reflection of an existing order.

> If it had not failed time and again, we might think speech to be infallible. As a natural process, speech would be infallible. Most anthropologists are convinced of the natural character of speech. They never ask under what conditions it must function. In all their research, they naively presuppose that man first can speak and then goes into politics and "organizes" society. The opposite is true. Man must speak if he wishes to have a society; but very often he cannot speak and then

> his society breaks down. ... Shall we be able to articulate our chaos into order once more? There is no guarantee for success since at no time has every tongue or every speaking group succeeded in provoking men to trust and freedom -- some have, some have not. All speech must take the risk of being misunderstood by common sense. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 31-32)

The four evils that Rosenstock-Huessy identifies are related to our basic orientations in life, "the two axes of time and space, with their fronts backward, forward, inward, outward," these being not arbitrary "verbal definitions of the social order" but rather "open to a unanimous experience and an identical consciousness of all human beings" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 13-14). The task of speech is "the perpetual conquest" of the four diseases of speech.

> To the four diseases, four different styles of speech bring relief. Men reason, men pass laws, men tell stories, men sing. The external world is reasoned out, the future is ruled, the past is told, the unanimity of the inner circle is expressed in song. People speak together in articulated language because they fear decay, anarchy, war, and revolution. The energies of social life are compressed into words. The circulation of articulated speech is the lifeblood of society. Through speech, society sustains its time and space axes. These time and space axes give direction and orientation to all members of society. Without articulated speech, man has neither direction nor orientation in time or space. Without the signposts of speech, the social beehive would disintegrate immediately." (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 16)

We speak in order "to unify, to simplify, to integrate life" across these four fronts in time and space. "Without this effort, we would go to pieces by either too much inner, unuttered desire, or too many impressions made upon us by our environment, too many petrified formulas fettering us from the past, or too much restless curiosity for the future." (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 18). Every living being as well as every social group "has to defend a present under the simultaneous stress from past and future. To live means to look backward as well as forward, and to decide, in every moment, between continuity and change" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 17-18). The struggle for existence "is implied by every word we speak" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 10).

The origin of the first word and the origin of the next word is the same in kind, for language is always a new origin. Grammar arises with our decisions as to how to order our world, how to integrate ourselves into it. The language maker is placed at the center and at the origin:

> [W]e sustain the time and space axes of our civilization by speaking, because we take our place in the center of this civilization, confronted as we are with its four aspects: its future, its past, its inner solidarity, its external struggle. And in this delicate and dangerous exposure to the four fronts of life, to the inner, the outer, the backward, and the forward front, our words must strike a balance; language distributes and organizes the universe, in every moment, anew. It is we who decide what belongs to the past and what shall be part of the future. ... Whether I say, in our days "Europe was a great civilization," or "Europe is a great civilization," passes judgment on the life and death of Europe. I either relegate it

> to the past or I credit it with a future. And whether I say: we all should have peace on earth, or: these dictators should keep quiet, proves where I draw the line of inclusiveness or exclusivity, respectively, between myself and the people whom I consider "we," on one side and some unspeakable people, somewhere in the outside world. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 19-20)

Yet this speaking I is, for Rosenstock-Huessy, not an autonomous ego bursting forth in speech: we all speak first in response to having been spoken to and in expectation of being heard and responded to in turn.

> We speak in our anguish or in our curiosity to minds whom we try to make into our listeners, readers, students. This is the intellectual responsibility shouldered by the most skeptical and most uncommunicative thinker. Even Sorel, who shouts for violence, in his doctrine, actually, and first of all, shouts for readers for his treatise. The first outcry of human self-consciousness about society is the word: Listen! (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 23)

With "the 'you' that is expected to listen ... the dualistic concept of a world of subjects and objects is abandoned" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 24) and language is seen to be necessarily and always a Zweistromland in time rather than a cognitive system in no need of a respondent. However, having posited a language which is always "originating anew under our noses" yet which is always in the first instance a gift from without and entails the articulation and transmission of grammatical forms to our neighbors and descendants, we are faced with the objection noted at the beginning of this paper: both the use of language that one finds (or is given) and the transmission of forms certainly seems to imply the preexistence of a language ready-made rather than the origin of language in every speech act. The objection registered by Roy Harris seems appropriate:

> Language-use is presented as a matter of stringing units together, the allowable units and their combinations as being already available in advance for that operation, the combined whole then being slotted into some external environment or situation. This…is language 'as we know it'. *But it isn't*. It is an analysis imposed on language by adopting one narrow and rather questionable perspective. (Roy Harris 1998: 6)

Can this apparent contradiction in Rosenstock-Huessy's understanding of language be comprehended? How might Rosenstock-Huessy have responded to Roy Harris in the above quotation or to the axioms of Integrational linguistics?

3. Space, Time and Grammar: The Logics of Experience and of Writing

> No child founds communities properly speaking. It learns languages which exist and operate. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 9-10).

This statement taken by itself seems to contradict the basic ideas of Integrational linguistics. It would be easy to interpret this as a blunt statement of what Harris calls "The Language Myth",

i.e. that language is an autonomous system not made by human beings and that language is what makes communication possible.15 We may juxtapose to this a statement written in 1912 about the role of language in the making of law in medieval Germany which Rosenstock-Huessy reaffirmed decades later as the key to his thinking:

> The intellectual conduct of the age was maintained only by the unifying influence of the Latin hieratic language, because the living vernacular always overpowers the thinking of individual man who assumes that he could master it; it is wiser than the thinker who assumes that he thinks, whereas he only speaks and in so doing faithfully trusts the material of language; it guides his concepts unconsciously, towards an unknown future. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1912: 144)

Here again language seems to be some *thing* acting on us, a thing which we must "faithfully trust". These statements—and many like them throughout Rosenstock-Huessy's writings—present the reader with the most significant difficulty in understanding his thought, for in his writing Sprache (German works), speech and language (English works and translations) appear to refer in one sentence to the act of people speaking to one another and in the next to what Harris would refer to as the products of communicative activity. The principal theoretical question for the integrationist is how Rosenstock-Huessy understood the relationship between language as action and language as something which exists and operates "out there" in our world. If he ever saw a theoretical difficulty in writing Sprache-speech-language and meaning sometimes action, sometimes object in the world, it is not something he ever addressed directly.

If these same statements are read in light of Rosenstock-Huessy's insistance that language is in its origin and always the call of one to another, then rather than referring to language as a thing out there he is always referring to a community of speakers teaching us their language that we might make it our own, voices not within our brain but from the world around us who guide us into the world we make together "towards an unknown future."16 It is the speaking community, not a linguistic system, that teaches us and guides us. This reading of Rosenstock-Huessy reveals a marked contrast with Saussure:

> The first thing which strikes one on studying linguistic facts is that the language user is unaware of their succession in time: he is dealing with a state. Hence the linguist who wishes to understand this state must rule out of consideration everything which brought that state about, and pay no attention to diachrony. Only by suppressing the past can he enter into the state of mind of the language user. (Saussure 1922: 117; quoted in Harris 2005: 90)

For Rosenstock-Huessy, our language is always a response to a prior call from another: we listen to the past and speak now towards the future. His understanding is also in marked contrast with the "scientific" linguistics of Max Müller who argued that "Languages can be analysed and classified on their own evidence ... without any refernce to the individuals, families, clans, tribes,

15 See especially Harris's 1981 book *The Language Myth*.

16 Bernard Charbonneau would later cry "No, I am not alone, I speak, I write the same language as generations of men. ... The meaning of my words goes beyond my individual self." (Charbonneau 2013: 359).

nations or races by whom they are or have been spoken" (Müller 1861: 76; quoted in Harris 2005: 86). Harris notes that this assumption leads Müller

> to treat the viewpoint of the language user as totally irrelevant to the scientific investigation of language. The language user knows little or nothing of the past history of the linguistic forms currently in use, noor of their relationships to forms in other languages; and moreover does not need to possess any such knowledge for everyday communicational purposes. ... The scientific method that Müller espouses requires the linguist to abstract from the speakers altogether, to ignore the communicational activity of the language community and to treat 'the language' simply as a set of forms and combinations of forms. (Harris 2005: 88)

The integrationist insists that the products of communicative activity become meaningful signs *only* when they are *made* signs in communicative activity by the speaker/writer and the hearer/reader, but Rosenstock-Huessy saw our entire experience of the world as constituted by meaning making together with others, an orientation of thought that makes his ideas difficult for anyone accustomed to ignoring the role of the speaker/writer/listener/reader in the spoken/written.17 This is not the same as saying that the not-I or the world is a linguistic fiction of the I, but rather an acknowledgment that the only world we know is one which is already saturated with language when we encounter it. This holds not only for the human community of speakers and hearers, writers and readers, but of our entire physical and social environment. Whereas for Saussure "the physical world lies outside the language system as such" (Harris 2005: 93) Rosenstock-Huessy argued on the contrary that

> "Nature" is an abstraction from the saturated-with-language-world, the world minus speech. "Nature" is the result of a subtraction. It is a misleading word, because it seems innocent, a primordial sound, an "a priori." Yet this is to get everything upside-down for in our actual experience voices call us into life first of all, and water, earth, and wind may concern us only after membership in society and participation in language securely lash us above the abyss of nature. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1962: 43-44)18

We are born into a world that precedes us and continues on after us. In that world are innumerable objects and events that we may perceive as meaningful or meaningless, related or unrelated to us or to anyone else, and language is a part of that experience from the womb. We may theoretically understand our interaction with the world in what is often called "objective" fashion, seeing and hearing only isolated objects, movements and sounds; in this manner of interacting with the world, nothing can mean anything for meanings are not perceptible things: there can be no signs.19 Nor is there space and time, nor even nature, since these are also not

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17 Hahn (2011) notes that Rosenstock-Huessy's remarks on law as a world born of language (see the quote above, Rosenstock-Huessy 1912: 144) marked him as an "academic eccentric" among the legal scholars of the time.

18 Rosenstock-Huessy is here following Max Scheler. See the latter's review of Fritz Mauthner's *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache. 3. Band. Zur Grammatik und Logik* where he reproaches Mauthner for his nihilism: "Hier ist überall purer Nihilismus, dem Sprache allmächtig ist und der sie zugleich verachtet, das letzte Wort—und ein "artikuliertes Lachen" über das große "Nichts", das bei der Subtraktion Welt minus Sprache—gemäß dieser Lehre—übrig bleibt, die letzte Geste. [etc.]" (Scheler 1914: 119).

19 Perhaps this way of experiencing the world as not addressed *to me* lies at the origin of autism?

perceptible things but abstractions, interpretations of the world of experience. However if we abandon the need to insist upon this (impossibly) objective relationship to a world which is not altered by our own existence, our interest in it, and our naming it, we may consider our relationship to the world around us as we indeed experience it: a world in which we and all those around us interact motivated according to our needs, desires, discomforts, fears, loves and hatreds. To be born into a human world is to be born into a world with language. To join the human race is not merely a consequence of our biological birth; to become human is to answer, to become a language-maker ourselves, an activity that presupposes an interlocutor.

The language that is given to us, the language that we find in the world around us, is a language, a world of signs—books, newspapers, sound recordings, road signs, price tags, gestures, handshakes—made by others to mean something to others in their world. That it means something to the original makers is a result of their making it mean something in a particular situation at a particular time; that it should mean something to us or to anyone else requires our making it mean something to ourselves in our situation and in our time.20

> When we answer, we neither repeat merely what the first speaker has said nor do we start in our own language. ... To articulate, then, is a highly complicated act that implies both: identity and variation. Without identifying ourselves with the language as it stands, and as we find it, we cannot say our word, and without varying and deflecting this material in a specific direction that is constituting a new situation created by our own choosing, our entering the ring of the speaking folks would be useless. ... the irresponsible way of using ready-made slogans and judgments in mere repetition without making them ourselves here and now, under our own name, is a vilification of language. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 49)

Repetition as a vilification of language in Rosenstock-Huessy's understanding contrasts sharply with contemporary semiotic theory from Pierce's types and tokens to Derrida's iteration.21 While Rosenstock-Huessy insists that articulation is an *act* that implies identity and variation, Derrida insists that the sign/mark contains in itself both identity and difference apart from any relation to iterator, reiterator, hearers/readers and contexts:

> This iterability, as Sari concedes, is indispensable to the functioning of all language, written or spoken (in the standard sense), and I would add, to that of every mark. Iterability supposes a minimal remainder (as well as a minimum of idealization) in order that the identity of the selfsame be repeatable and identifiable in, through, and even in view of its alteration. For the structure of iteration—and this is another of its decisive traits—implies both identity and difference. (Derrida 1988: 53)

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20 This responding act of sign- and meaning-making is never guaranteed: "If no one understands me, at least, beyond myself, these signs are there, black on white. Perhaps... No, I have not been dreaming, I have spoken, I have written; the work of an entire life is there, abandoned, like a fruit fallen from the tree. I had to speak, but for that reason, in the absence of a yes I have received this no that no one even spoke. I remain alone, rendered mute by my speech, for no neighbor, no public recognizes it." (Charbonneau 2012: 359).

21 Although Rosenstock-Huessy never responded to either Pierce or Derrida, Harris and other integrationists have. See especially Hutton (1990) on Pierce and Harris (2003) on Derrida.

The integrationist would object that one can only regard these as repetitions/reiterations if one ignores (as Derrida does) the listener/reader, the difference that time makes and the situation of the "repetition", an objection that Rosenstock-Huessy would no doubt have appreciated. Whether Barthes considered "official institutions of language" as vilifications of or typical of language is not as clear: “All official institutions of language are repeating machines: school, sports, advertising, popular songs, news, all continually repeat the same structure, the same meaning, often the same words: the stereotype is a political fact, the major figure of ideology.” (Barthes 1975: 40). Barthes, Harris and Rosenstock-Huessy might all have agreed that the unsponsored language of slogans was politically irresponsible and destructive of human relationships, but . Rosenstock-Huessy went so far as to insist that in authentic speech there are not only no repetitions but "Es gibt keine Synonyme. [There are no synonyms.]" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1956-1958: II, 77).

For Rosenstock-Huessy, we orient ourselves in that world into which we are born through naming the elements in our inner experience, external encounters, past experience and desired future worlds. What does it mean to name?

> The name is the right address of a person under which he or she will respond. ... Names give orientation. ... All superstitions arose because religions wanted eternal recipes for giving names. The true life of human speech defies all recipes. The names under which the parts of the world must be made to move change with the times. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970b: 42-43)

Time and space are not themselves objective material realities but linguistic creations of everyday experience, and upon these the scientific notions of space and time are dependent:

> To speak has to do with time and space. Without speech, the phenomena of time and space cannot be interpreted. Only when we speak to others (or, for that matter, to ourselves), do we delineate an inner space or circle in which we speak, from the outer world about which we speak. ... But the truly human phenomenon of space is found in the astounding fact that grammar unites people within one common inner space. Wherever people articulate and vary one theme, they move in an inner room or community as against the world outside.
>
> And the same is true about the phenomenon of time. Only because we speak, are we able to establish a present moment between past and future. Because I am telling you all this here and am waiting for your answer, is it possible for you and me to forget past and future, and to call this hour an hour, this paper a unity, this time one moment, one time span. By human speech, space and time are created. The scientific notions of time and space are secondary abstractions of the reality of grammatical time and space. Grammatical time and space precede the scientific notions of an outer space or of a directed time. For they presuppose an inner space between the scientists and some contemporaneity between them, too. Without the pre-establishment of one inner space of "science," no scientific analysis of time and space holds water, or even can take place at all. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 20-21)

Here Rosenstock-Huessy is making an argument similar to those put forth by Roy Harris in *The Semantics of Science* and elsewhere. Harris criticized Holt-Jensen's account of the language of science with the remark that it offers us "the comforting reassurance that the language of the natural sciences is scientific because it is the only language in which scientists can get answers to scientific questions" (Harris 2005: 160). Harris himself insisted that the language of science projects

> back upon Nature the assumptions built into an ancient philosophy of language, ... Those tacit linguistic assumptions were responsible for building up the traditional picture of a universe filled with discrete objects of various sizes, each equipped with its own battery of properties and having its own unique position in space and time. Similarly, the binary distinctions between possibility and impossibility, truth and falsehood, observer and observed, were anchored in the linguistic operations of verbal description, not in the structure of the universe allegedly described. The discoveries of science are reflections in a linguistic mirror. With the assistance of language, scientists extrapolate from their instruments to the universe, from the part to the whole. Without that help, they would be stranded in a linguistic no'man's-land. (Harris 2005: 187-188)

Neither for Harris nor for Rosenstock-Huessy does this recognition invalidate or diminish the accomplishments of science. What it does do is force us to notice and account for both the social and the linguistic dimensions of science and our claims to knowledge, for once we have named our experiences, speaking puts us into a second order of experience: "never does a listener, a jury or a judge hear reality itself; they always hear people telling them about reality. And the reflecting mind is in no better position than the judge" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 44). Following this recognition, it is but one short step for Rosenstock-Huessy to see in the verb forms of human speech the social markers of time which will vary from one community's form of social organization of time to another's, and thus from one formal grammar to another.

In *Magna Carta Latina*, written after he learned that his son was failing Latin in school, Rosenstock-Huessy complained that "Latin is taught after the Alexandrian method, as though sounds make a word, and words a sentence" (Rosenstock-Huessy and Battles 1975: ii). In writing a new grammar as a response to his son's failure, he wanted to write a textbook that offered not a dead language made of sounds, words and sentences, but the language he knew and loved, hence the title *Magna Carta Latina: the privilege of singing, articulating and reading a language and of keeping it alive*. The Latin declensions remained the same as in any Latin textbook, but the manner and order of presentation were intended to correct a failure of speaking across the generations.

> "His Father's Latin" would not be true to the father's faith if it treated language as a mere tool or, as people are impudent enough to style it, as a means to an end. ... We would, then, commit the sin of sins, the sin against vivification, if we treated language as material, as a mere vehicle for ideas. (Rosenstock-Huessy and Battles 1975: vii)

Since language for Rosenstock-Huessy was not the concatenation of sounds and sentences nor simply a vehicle for the transportation of ideas and information but the making of social relations, the grammatical forms labeled and tabled by grammarians--indicative, imperative, subjunctive, nominative, accusative, dative etc.--all exist as the results of processes of forming and reforming, creating and recreating relationships across times and spaces, and thus they take on a wholly different character in his thinking about language than one finds in traditional grammars and modern linguistics. Under Rosenstock-Huessy's examination all of the formal distinctions found in traditional grammars, the mental structures that linguists "find" in the language organ and trace out in theoretical notations reveal their political origins:

> We draw the conclusion that language serves the purposes of peace, order, representation and credit. The eternal origin of new speech is based on man's mortal danger from war, crisis, decay and revolution. ... If our diagnosis is correct, the structure of language should bear witness to its political purposes" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 17).

His discussion of the imperative in *The Origin of Speech* will suffice as an example of how he treats these traditional categories:

> The logic of an imperative and its corresponding report demands that a supertime be established which neglects the separation of two bodies and their biological times. The order given by one person and the other's reporting back correspond so much to each other that they beget one common time. ... What we find between people who trust one another in commands given and fulfilled is not a frame of reference but a field of correspondence. The distinction is fundamental. A "frame" seems to exist outside our sayings or acts. This field of correspondence, however, comes into being by sayings and by acts, and does not exist outside of them. ... After this [the order fulfilled], the field collapses and disappears. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 47)

Continuing his discussion of the imperative as the establishment and acting out of a time-bound social relation he argues that what all linguists and formal logicians have assumed — "that sentences are the independent elements of speech" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 48) — is untenable. He does so on the basis that in social life, the command "March into Germany" makes no sense without a response (such as "We have marched into Germany") for the logic of speech demands that the imperative sentence "does not end until he [the original speaker] hears that it is fulfilled" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 48). Our "stubborn forgetfulness of the obvious ... that the logic of the sentences of language is based on responses between people" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 62) leads linguists to base their analysis on an inadequate appreciation of the temporal and social dimensions of language, a theoretical blindness that he attributes to literacy: "The abstract sentence, we may venture to suggest, is conditioned by its literary character. Speech, in its origins, was unwilling and incapable of formulating sentences into which speaker and listener did not enter" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 42). The trouble with linguists, he complains, is that

> they always stopped at the analysis of the "completed" sentence. In so doing, the reason for grammar remains invisible. "March" and "we have marched" are not

> two different tools such as a hammer and a wrench I may have in my tool chest. "March" and "we have marched," correspond to each other as aspects of one process... (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 48)

Rosenstock-Huessy then describes the three features that distinguish authentic speech "from all texts analyzed by the tradition of linguistics":

> First, speaker and listener exchange places. The speaker becomes listener; the listener becomes speaker. Second, this changes the style of the sentences spoken. In advance, the imperative puts a burden on the listener. Afterwards the narrative unburdens this listener who reports back and quite literally carries back the burden put on him before the act. Third, sentences are the beginnings and endings of actual changes in the physical world. They are not "mental" or "intellectual." (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981a: 49)

The constant references to language throughout Rosenstock-Huessy's writings are characterized by an insistence upon the material consequences of language: language is the human-creating, time-creating, space-creating, world-creating, world-altering and self-changing action of one who cannot refrain from speaking, which is to say, from responding. Language is not an abstract system in the brain or in the heavens but a maker and changer of brains and heavens as well as futures and pasts, self and other:

> All speech rides the future of a new heaven and a new earth. All speech draws out the speaker from behind his isolation into a realm of communality with the person or persons who listen. This realm is not a mere fantasy; some material partition in space and some historical bridge through time must result from speech when it is in full force. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970b: 60)

4. The power that makes us speak: gods and the politics of language

At this point we may touch upon the central and most difficult point in Rosenstock-Huessy's theory of language as maker of social relations. We have already seen that in his view it is language that makes us human beings above and beyond our animal existence by integrating our determined bodily nature with our undetermined temporal nature. And we do this in large part by creating times and spaces though our linguistic activity. Language comes to us from outside—father, mother, neighbor—through our experiences of being spoken to, being named and placed in life through ritual, incorporated into the social life of family, neighborhood, church, school, work and play, and called to political speech in times of social crisis. It comes to us not as a biological inheritance (although of course our anatomical and physiological capacities for speaking or writing are biologically determined and inherited), nor as a socially imprinted system (a "prison-house of language") over which we have no control. The nature of language is that it comes to us as a call from a world woven entirely of language, and we make it "our" language with our response; yet it is our response alone that makes language possible: without it there is no language, only a solitary cry in the wilderness of nature.

What is language, that it creates times, spaces, men and women, and the relationships amongst all these? First of all it is not an autonomous system but the establishment of and invitation to a relationship into which we may enter, and with our entry we cooperate in the making, maintaining and changing of that relationship. The speaker's proposed reality is answered through affirmation, negation, counterproposal or silence, and in the latter case language and social life remain unfinished and in expectation of response or fear of social disintegration. The voice that gives us our name articulates an entire world of relationships and invites our participation. This leads Rosenstock-Huessy to describe the driving force in the creation of language thus: "The power who puts questions into our mouth and makes us answer them, is our God. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1993: 725). He elaborates this point a bit in a 1954 lecture: "God is the power that makes us speak things for the first time in our life. Therefore the parents are gods for the child inasfar as they enable the child for the first time to speak" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1992/1997: 8, lecture 3 (September 30 1954), 16). The college boy abandons the god of his fathers — "parents, teachers, dear God with his white beard" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1988: 26) — and begins to listen to the voices of other gods:

> the voices of politics (i.e., of the times), of the people, of faith, of philosophy, of love, as invisible voices within him. By making demands, they begin to urge him toward a new self-chosen position in life, toward his vocation. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1988: 26)

Here we find gods, creatures rarely encountered in twentieth century linguistics treatises, but in Rosenstock-Huessy's thought we are not dealing with the orthodox gods of theology for in his understanding "gods are not primarily metaphysical powers divorced from life, but first and foremost experiential powers with names" (Wayne Cristaudo, forthcoming). However we name them—if we are aware enough of them to do so—our gods are our "highest sources of appeal," the desires, loves, hatreds, or other "real powers we serve through our daily choices" (Cristaudo, forthcoming). It is these gods—social forces, drives, demands—that push us towards each other and language. Language is neither instrument nor a means for transmission, but a power that transforms us and our social realities.22 When our gods die, our language changes: "Catastrophes are the collapse of worlds and the language that has woven them—the sources of appeal and authority" (Cristaudo 2012:73). Which of these commands from without we respond to, which commands orient us towards the world beyond ourselves, this is what determines the world in which we live, the nature of our social relations, and the forms of our languages.

Thus it is our hearing ourselves addressed by name and called out by a name and as "you" that introduces us to a world that desires our participation, and as Rosentock-Huessy's friend Franz Rosenzweig noted "Only an "I," not a "he," can pronounce the imperative of love" (Rosenzweig 1972: 178). This is the world of the lover and the beloved, the world of proper names, the "individual without category ... it carries its here and now with it" (Rosenzweig 1972: 186-187). Fear and the desire for power reduce the world to an "it," a world that can neither call to us nor respond. The demand for a third person objective language in which world and others all become '*it*'s reveals a political orientation of an I, solitary, unnamed and hidden from itself, dominating

22 On this see Hasselaar (1973: 237 and following) and especially Cristaudo (2012: 78-80) where Rosenstock-Huessy and Rosenzweig's conception of language as a power is contrasted with Saussure's understanding as indicated in the famous diagramm in the *Cours de linguistique générale*.

and controlling a world of objects, a world of exploitation, slavery, and rape, a language in which both You and I are prohibited, each for different reasons.23 In a world of "it"s there can be no language and there can be no meaning for there is no one to make anything mean anything to anyone else; to speak presupposes the recognition of you and I as persons (Rosenstock-Huessy 1926: 86). For Rosenstock-Huessy, a language limited to the third person (e.g. the language of science) reveals a political crisis, a disease of language, for authentic speech requires the full range of persons, and not only You and I and It, but of singulars, duals and plurals as well, and the continual circulation of all of these voices through call and response, name and answer. Without that integration of a multiplicity of voices establishing themselves in a variety of relations with each other and those relations changing according to times and places, we slip back into the "hell of non-speech," a condition of inhumanity in which there is no peace for no one makes peace in word and deed.

Rosenstock-Huessy's references to God and gods making us speak may lead (and often has lead) his readers to interpret the political dimensions of his thought in terms of religious conservatism or even fascism, and a reading which understands his "Sprache" as a system that controls us without our free participation only strengthens that political interpretation. Yet in order to interpret him in this way it is necessary to ignore not only everything he wrote about the role of the respondent in making and fulfilling his relationships with the past and future, but everything he wrote about the political origins of speech and the role of time in the making of all social relationships.

Voorsluis (1984: 311) noted that in Rosenstock-Huessy's understanding of freedom, it is the freedom to *say* 'yes' or 'no' that forms the very basis of our freedom, and this is only possible as a response to words addressed to us by another. As for time, the role of time in political life is evident in the very language in which politics is discussed—conservative, progressive, revolutionary, reactionary—but Rosenstock-Huessy's thinking on time and the making of times cannot be grasped at all in these terms. Rather he viewed political life as connecting past and future as well as here and there through speaking new conditions of peace into existence. His insistence upon the impossibility of repetition is rooted in this understanding of time, as is his insistence that the future determines the past: we understand our past and the past of others in terms of the future we hope and strive for. Instead of pitting past against future as conservative and revolutionary theories do, Rosenstock-Huessy speaks of teachers and students and "the creation of a body of time":

> The pupil, then, is not compelled to go beyond his death but he wants to get before his birth. ... a young man who learns, penetrates into the before-himself time, by backwardizing. He holds out a feeler into the past. ... Before him, men lived already. Whether he likes them or disapproves of them, they have formed all the matters and objects and words and laws and habits and rituals which he may conform with or reform. His freedom depends on his getting back of these forms into the time when they were still in process. To learn means to go before the forms into their formative moment. Because then, the past and my background cease to be rigid determinants of my own form and habit. In backwardizing, we

23 For more on this in relation to Rosenstock-Huessy's "dative thinking," Bakhtin's "absolute need of love" and Fromm's analysis of the necrophilia of western culture, see Pigalev (1997).

> re-enter the ranks of those who determined the past. The parallel to the teacher, then, is quite literal. The man who teaches determines the future by his experiences. The man who learns determines the past instead of being merely determined by it. ...
> Now, how to get teacher and student together? One holds out his feeler into and "after-me" time; the other feels his way into a "before-me time. In the hour in which they communicate, they build out of these two elements a common present. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1981b: 31-32)

The present is that "body of time" that young and old create together out of their experiences (pasts), hopes (futures) and love—or hatred—for each other.24 "Without Engels, no Marx" (Rosenstock-Huessy 1956-1958: I, 12) is a splendidly succinct expression of Rosenstock-Huessy's theory of language as arising out of social crisis and creating new social relations. When language is understood to be the co-creation of social relationships by persons all of whom are freely engaged in that creation and responding to each other, the traditional labels of conservative and progressive, revolutionary and reactionary simply do not apply. For Rosenstock-Huessy, political life is a new creation with every act, and each act may lead us towards heaven or it may plunge us all into hell.

5. Conclusion: The Language Maker as Peace Maker

In 1973 Roy Harris published his first book *Synonymy and Linguistic Analysis*. In his concluding remarks he wrote

> Within the context of any inquiry which treats linguistic knowledge only in terms of complex pairings of 'forms' with 'meanings', the problem of validating synonymity statements is—and must remain—insoluble. But on the basis of a more detailed analysis of communicational relevance it will become possible to state more accurately the conditions of communicational equivalence with respect to which natural languages are structured. Discussion of the kind which has been presented in the preceding chapters may be regarded as merely preliminary to an investigation which opens up the possibility of replacing 'synonymy' by a more precisely defined set of equivalences, and thus providing a more adequate conceptual framework for the analysis of natural languages (Harris 1973: 159).

Harris's criticism of any approach to language which isolated *forms* and *meanings* from the situations of their actual occurrence in communicational exchanges led him to a critique of the foundations of linguistic theory (including his own reference above to "natural languages") and philosophy of language that he has been elaborating for the past forty years. His understanding of signs as things made within a social situation of communication between interlocutors and sign

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24 Kroesen discusses the implications of this particular aspect of Rosenstock-Huessy's theory of language in relation to technology and the language of socio-technical relations. He remarks that "If our language no longer brings us into a common understanding, it entails also a loss of historical memory" (Kroesen 1995: 59). On this topic readers may also be interested in a blog post by Nicholas Carr "Conversation points" (http://www.roughtype.com/?p=3110) and the a remark made by Ta-Nehisi Coates in his article about cell phone use on public transportation: "I think what we have here is a working definition of an asshole -- a person who demands that all social interaction happen on their terms." http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/how-the-quiet-car-explains-the-world/273885/

makers/interpreters of all sorts has focused on the signs made and the theoretical issues that arise when taking time and circumstance into account. Rosenstock-Huessy died in 1973 after spending the last 70 years of his life developing a theory of social relations based upon linguistic interactions. Both Harris and Rosenstock-Huessy rejected the study of language as a natural object and both insisted that language only exists as social activity: when we wait for the last living speaker to study a language, Harris insisted, it is already too late, for it takes at least two to make language. The phenomena which Harris and Rosenstock-Huessy investigated and discussed overlapped in many ways: gesture and action as responses to speech, the importance of writing for linguistic theory, the marriage ceremony, the lay perspective, and most of all their insistance on the temporal and political dimensions of language.

By insisting that the study of language must be pursued within its natural setting of human communication, Harris approached language in the same context within which Rosenstock-Huessy had studied law and revolution, church and state, command and obedience, slavery and freedom, calendars and religions, art and song, marriage and meals, history and prophecy, creation and revelation: the social life of speaking human beings. While Harris focused on analyzing what he called the "products of communication", Rosenstock-Huessy focused on the social forces that compell us to communicate with each other. The difference in their respective approaches invites an attempt to put them together, as does the refusal of both of them to enclose their thinking within a disciplinary boundary.

Some of those who have written about Rosenstock-Huessy have interpreted his ideas about language as closely to the idea of language as a pre-existing system or ready-made tool as they can,25 and Rosenstock-Huessy has given them plenty of reasons to do so: his language often appears to contradict what he is at other times stating clearly. If one reads "Language establishes relationships" according to traditional, structural, Chomskyan or cognitive theories of language as "Language as a system (whether a gift of god or product of biological evolution) establishes relationships" then it is inevitable that language will be understood as something preexisting and external to those relationships. It is, as Harris remarked of Chomsky's theories, "a fascist concept of language if ever there was one" (Harris 1983: 119). Reading Rosenstock-Huessy as if he were reproducing Harris's "Language Myth" renders his works incomprehensible, incoherent, a mass of contradictions while at the same time forcing a radically conservative or even fascist political interpretation of his remarks on the relation between individual and society, individual and state. Should that same statement (and many other statements of his) be read according to an integrationist understanding of language, understanding it as something like "The language we make together establishes us in our relationships" we have not an external system forcibly and inexorably shaping human lives in accordance with its structures and strictures, but human beings making our worlds together through speaking (writing, signing) to each other, through making language together.

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25 For a particularly clear example see Maurin (2003), where Rosenstock-Huessy's remarks on nominating (as well as remarks by Otto Bollnow, Martin Heidegger, Carl Jung, F. Nietzsche, Walter Otto, Karl Rahner, Max Scheler and Benjamin Lee Whorf) are offered in support of the mathemetician Erich Kähler's views on language and reality. In Maurin's argument "Language is not only an organ (for cognition) available to be used or not: *language is control over man*." (Maurin 2003: 961). Rohrbach (1973), Hasselaar (1973), Kroesen (1995), Jakubowski (2011b) and Cristaudo (2012) do make the case for a social understanding of language but none of them discuss Rosenstock-Huessy from the perspective of linguistic theory, and apart from a brief note on Saussure in Cristaudo's book, there are no references to the literature of linguistics in any of their works.

To the reader not blinded by the "language myth" it is overwhelmingly obvious throughout Rosenstock-Huessy's work that his "grammatical method" is not an attempt to analyze autonomous linguistic structures but an attempt to indicate the social function of grammatical forms in organizing the world and allowing us to integrate our life with past generations and future generations, both here and across the border, by attending to those socially created and maintained forms from the past and teaching them to the following generation. The grammar of creation is the grammar of language makers and not at all a grammar of "natural language." Grammatical forms follow from and are determined by the situation in which the need to communicate arises, and those situations are embedded in our experiences with others and the times and spaces we create together.

Although reading Rosenstock-Huessy in light of integrationist theory reveals a coherent and comprehensive theory of language as a social activity, any semiology that one might hope to derive from his writings will be sketchy at best. He was interested in language as a social activity, but appears to have had no interest in a theory of signs and sign making of any kind. Aside from a few profound but scattered remarks, writing is always assumed under the larger concept of Sprache/speech/language or simply ignored. In like manner his numerous discussions of marriage ceremonies, law, eating and drinking customs, games, clothing and dress, liturgical objects and rites are all pursued as though these are matters of speech without any attempt to indicate why he regarded these as part of the world of speech, nor what theoretical implications might arise if these varied phenomena are regarded as varieties of speech. Using his own terms, we can say that in spite of the many pages he devoted to arguing against that view of language which he rejected, he did not name it. Roy Harris did. While Rosenstock-Huessy named his own approach *Sprachdenken*, throughout his writings Sprache is Sprache on all sides. Against what Harris named *The Language Myth*, Integrationist semiology took up many of the questions that occupied Rosenstock-Huessy and takes up many more that he did not ask.

While Rosenstock-Huessy did not work out a semiology, he did what Roy Harris as a linguist did not do: he worked out a sociology appropriate for a world experienced as saturated with language, a theory of the establishment of social relations through linguistic activity, of the articulation of perceived social evils and the means for correcting and improving them. It is a social science of the making of peace, of integrating then and there with here and now for you and I through grammatical agreement, a peace and an agreement that is either made anew with every act of authentic speech or else it collapses in silence or scream.

In keeping with his understanding of the origin of language as arising out of political crisis, he described his politics in terms of translation in one of his early works—*Angewandte Seelenkunde* (1924; English translation: *Practical Knowledge of the Soul* (1988))—and of border-defying piracy in his last, *Dienst auf dem Planeten* (1965; English abridgement: *Planetary Service* (1978)):

> *Crossing over to another shore: that is the risk of politics*. People have to change into new people, their sentences into new sentences. So the study of any grammatical method can't itself be a logical or mathematical theory. It has to be a

> courageous translation, a venture and an advance into unseen territory. (Rosenstock Huessy 1988: 6)
>
> Peace is always something explicit. It has to be concluded in an area where no common language existed before. So this last chapter is going to concern itself with the coming language of the pirate's peaceful country. Our Esperanto won't be seeking words for bread and wine and money. It must proclaim a calendar of our tears and laughter common to all of us. People who keep peace among themselves share joy and sorrow. If they don't weep and joke together they certainly aren't at peace with one another. Pirates' Esperanto must fill the gaps left by the silencing of each group destroyed by technological progress. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1978: 97)

He imagined or perhaps hoped that one day his thinking would be understood not as linguistic science, but as a search for peace. And for Rosenstock-Huessy, the path of the peace maker was the path of the language maker, even though not every language maker sets out to be a peace maker.

> And my own direction of thought, probably, will have to be listed as the meta-ethical search for a synchronization of mutually exclusive social patterns of behaviour, as "the metanomics of the great society" which must contain contradictory ways of life. My grammar of assent, my grammatical organon, is devoted to the task of supplementing the statute law of any given society with the metanomics that explain and satisfy our enthusiasm for the synchronization of the distemporary, of old and young, black, brown and white, government and anarchy, primitive and refined, highbrow and lowbrow, innocence and sophistication, all at peace, in one human society." (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970a: 41)

This is certainly not the linguistics you studied in school, and in light of his self-perception it is small wonder that linguists have ignored him.

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