"'The Uni-versity of Logic, Language, Literature': Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy at Dartmouth College, 1935"

by Norman Fiering (April 6, 2014)

Departmentalization was an academic development in the twentieth century that Prof. Rosenstock-Huessy deplored, and in his own extensive writings he respected no disciplinary boundaries. In the late fall of 1935, only a few months after he first arrived at Dartmouth College, a recent émigré from Nazi Germany, he presented a paper to the campus Philosophy Club, nominally on the subject of the underlying unity of philosophy, linguistics, and literature. Entitled "The Uni-versity [*sic*] of Logic, Language, Literature: A Program for Collaboration," it was a topic sure to be intriguing to his new colleagues, but it may also have been a bit of misleading, for the text covers far more ground and cuts deeper than that declared theme might indicate. There is also not much mention of collaboration in any practical sense.

Because of the circumstances of its presentation—a moment when Rosenstock-Huessy was consciously introducing himself to Dartmouth, several years before the publication of his major book in English, *Out of Revolution*, in 1938—it is deserving of close attention. Many topics of passionate interest to Rosenstock-Huessy, but not normally associated with the unity of the disciplines, are touched on, and there is a formidable display of erudition. The paper is thick with ideas, to the point that any commentary must be selective. I offer here little more than an explication of salient parts of this work with some of my ruminations. [1]

Coming to the United States in the fall of 1933, Rosenstock-Huessy first spent a contentious three semesters at Harvard before moving permanently to a professorship at Dartmouth. It would appear that the distinguished 47-year-old genius from the old country, with two degrees from Heidelberg and professorial positions at Leipzig and Breslau behind him, wanted to be sure from the start that the College recognized not only his vast learning but, more than that, his penchant for radical reform. Indeed, only a few years later, Rosenstock-Huessy was leading a faculty seminar at Dartmouth on educational reform, but without lasting result, to my knowledge.

The title of the piece, as I have noted, hardly begins to capture its substance; no title could. The work has an underlying coherence, which I will try

to bring out here, but on the surface it seems to lack logical development, which could discourage some listeners or readers. As is often the case in Rosenstock's work, the text is elliptical. His mind leaped, and the poor reader can only plod on behind, looking for footing. The essay introduces fresh ideas and repeatedly challenges the accepted wisdom, which most of Rosenstock-Huessy's writing did, but in this instance there seems to be no easy surface connection among the various topics addressed. Only at the deepest level do we see the intertwining of the roots of his argument. Some of Rosenstock-Huessy's most fundamental and original ideas are evident in this rich concoction, but they are presented with only the briefest elaboration, and as the essay moves along, with mounting attacks on the philosophical establishment, it becomes more unconventional in its findings. Perhaps above all "The Uni-versity of Logic, Language, Literature" is about. about the nature of man (and, of course, woman), which is properly a precondition for any talk about the unity of the humanities. The disciplines become aspects of the whole man.

By my analysis, three central arguments are presented:

1) All people go through life both disclosing the truth they see and also much of the time hiding it. "Man is essentially concerned with disclosure and velation," he writes. What we know of reality we may reveal or declare, but at other times, for any number of reasons, we conceal or veil the truth. Dishonesty, in other words, is endemic. This is not so much a moral judgment for Rosenstock-Huessy as a fact consequent to the magnificent human capacity to speak, for that capacity allows us also the choice not to speak, or to speak falsely. The emphasis in this lecture on truth and dissemblance in human affairs, and the consequences, is one of its more striking and unexpected features.

2) Everything a person does, or says, or thinks, or creates in addressing reality is part of an ordered process involving, at the most fundamental level, only four forms or modes of expression, and throughout our existence there is a constant permutation among these four fronts, like the parts in a musical quartet or the shifting of gears in a car, each with its particular role and timing. When the natural balance or equilibrium among these fronts fails, trouble always ensues. This is clearly a startling schematization, which is at the heart of Rosenstock's work, and one that requires much explanation.

3) Central to understanding how mankind progresses in all areas—politics, arts and sciences, religion, social norms—is recognition of the role of the imperative or the vocative, the importance of which is largely missing in our

inherited, ancient Alexandrian grammar table: "I love, you love, she loves, we love, they love," etc.

These three points are not just inductive generalizations; they are embedded characteristics of humankind as a whole, for all cultures and all times. They are universals, but they also have a historical dimension, which is to say they are part of human history, including so-called pre-history, and only gradually came into being, although Prof. Rosenstock-Huessy is not hesitant to refer to them as part of a lawful process, in the sense of fixed and irreversible laws of human society, discovered and described, not enacted.

The four fronts, referred to in item number 2, above, are revealed above all in speech or language, and more specifically in descriptive grammar. If that sounds simplistic, the reader should not be deceived. The phenomenon that Rosenstock-Huessy delineates is complex and does dynamically and comprehensively illuminate the human condition. Although these four modes of confronting and describing reality—whether it be to disclose or dissemble—have a number of names, each of these elements has a discrete core identity that underlies the various names. Once one is alerted to this finding, one sees the process everywhere, at all levels in different guises. Whether it is an entire nation-state, society at large, or an individual, this grammatical quadrilateral still applies.

Along the way, we must be disabused of certain fantasies that cloud the picture, the most important being, perhaps, the notion that thought is independent of language, indeed superior to language, and that the brilliance of the thinker is allegedly limited by the inadequacy of language to reflect his supposed depth of insight. According to this assumption, first we think and then we speak, as though the thought is independent of language. But for Rosenstock-Huessy, there is no human faculty superior to speech. Speech, not reason or the mind , Wayne Cristaudo has written in his work on Rosenstock-Huessy, "is the real basis of thinking." "Speech," for Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig, "was primarily a creative, revelatory, and redemptive power, and not merely or essentially a descriptive one."[2]

It is necessary, too, to let go of the dualisms that have dominated Western philosophy since the time of Plato, or at least since Descartes in the seventeenth century: subject and object, mind and matter, idea and reality, and so forth. We may indeed be sometimes a subject and sometimes an object, but human experience is hardly exhausted by that duality. It is not only incomplete, it is a

false limitation that has done untold damage. We can never get rid of the subject/object split, Rosenstock-Huessy concedes, but by enlarging the picture we can put it in balance and perspective.

Each of the terms in the title of this talk—logic, language, literature—Rosenstock-Huessy makes clear, has common synonyms. So he also speaks of unifying into a single cosmos "thought, speech, and literature," and he refers as well to "thought, language, literature," and "logic, linguistics, literary criticism." The terms "thought," "logic," and "philosophy" are more or less interchangeable here, as are "language," "speech," and "linguistics," although *speech* for Rosenstock-Huessy most often refers to that most basic and defining capacity of human beings, not simply to a branch of learning. "Literature" is ambiguous because it is not always evident when by "literature" Rosenstock-Huessy means poesis, i. e., creative writing, whether it be a lengthy novel or a sonnet, and when he means the academic study of literature. There is, in any case, considerable overlap in the finest cases of literary criticism and literature.

"Thought, language, literature" would be the most correct as a title, Rosenstock-Huessy reflected, but alas, "the alliteration of the three 'L's proved too strong an enticement. Thus," he writes, "my mind fell into the trap of language at the very beginning, and I am giving myself away as a pointed example of language's power over a man's logic". (68-69)

Properly understood, the thousands of languages of mankind, Rosenstock-Huessy remarks, are "one great and marvellous [*sic*] disclosure of the human mind". He credits the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt as an inspiration for this realization. With Humboldt, Rosenstock-Huessy believed that to understand human speech we must study it as a "finished product," not as a process in formation. Hence, to look to the children's nursery for an understanding of speech, to study how the child gradually masters his mother tongue, is a kind of reductionism and is completely misleading. "It is in the highest reaches of our own intellectual life that we must look for analogies when we try to discover the energies which created speech". (68). This point is brilliantly elaborated in Rosenstock-Huessy's *The Origin of Speech*. Here it is a passing comment.

Philosophy

Philosophy cannot be successful without philology, Rosenstock-Huessy asserts, and vice versa. That is, there can be no separation between logic and

language, or thought and speech. Language, logic, literature are merely "various forms of crystallization" in a single process. Such an argument, he recognizes, is heretical in philosophy (or it was in 1935 when Rosenstock-Huessy wrote this paper), but he cites as predecessors Thomas Carlyle; John the Disciple "in his character as the author of the Gospel of St. John"; Friedrich Schlegel; J. G. Hamann; and in the twenty years preceding 1935, "Majewski, Ebner, Buber, Cuny, Royen," who have all developed "forms of thinking" that may enable us to describe the underlying unity of thought, speech, and literature.[3]

It has been the foolish pride of philosophy that it was "beyond speech and not at all at the same level". Language, it has been claimed, is merely material; thought is in the realm of the ideal, in the Platonic sense. Philosophy or logic may aspire to be the science of truth, Rosenstock-Huessy writes, yet those truths, nonetheless, must be expressed in language, in books and articles subject to critical examination. Despite that fact, whenever a critic, such as Carlyle, called the supposed elevated thinker "a mere myth-weaver or a sartor resartus like any poet," philosophy paid no attention. "The logician, proud of his scientific character, prefers symbolical logic to the modest confession that he is a writer of books and a speaker of words". (68-69)

It is relevant to note here that the subordination of philosophy to language was a twentieth-century phenomenon, occurring in different guises, such as the analytical school in Britain and the structuralists on the Continent. So much of this work, however, sometimes referred to as "the linguistic turn," dissolved into cynicism, relativism, or even nihilism, lacking in moral content. Rosenstock-Huessy's aims were far different. Twenty-seven years later, in 1962, he wrote about Ludwig Wittgenstein:

> "Wittgenstein's approach . . . excludes from consideration the actual truth or falsity of any statement" aside from formal matters. "Further, the things that are likely to be of greatest interest to living human beings in time—those that require decisions and action—are outside the scope of logic and linguistic analysis. . . . [For Wittgenstein] what a living person does or should do about any statement is not the province of philosophy. . . . The idea that words and other symbols have a reality of their own, or that they are, or can be, active and actuating powers that derive from, preserve, foster, and even make human history—that may bring

> people together or plunge them into war—is not acceptable to Wittgenstein" .[4]

The thinker can never invent a wholly new language to serve his purposes. However original a philosophy, it must deploy existing language. On the other hand, the philosopher, like the poet, may give existing words new meanings, although the old meanings cling, and sometimes the intended new meaning is stillborn. The mind of the philosopher can be a "seedbed" of new languages, in the sense that new meaning is created. In fact, Rosenstock-Huessy writes, "to think means to translate from one language into another better language". (71) It must be accepted, too, that "thought" does something to language. It may kill words, for example. If this is true, it should be one of the tasks of philology to inquire what logic does to language.

> "Logic can no longer remain indifferent to the fact that it has duties toward language. That is why we wish to speak here of thought, speech, and literature as one united effort of mankind to disclose or to conceal the truth. . . . They are rays of one fire burning in man to communicate to or to hide from his fellow man his share of truth. And we throw out [*i.e., put forth*] the hypothesis that thought, language, and literature, insofar as they are means of concealing or revealing truth to ourselves, to a partner, or to all men, are ruled by the same laws". (71)

More than two thousand years of philosophic disdain for rhetoric or oratory, since Plato, has led us to believe that thought and literature are separate activities. We exercise our reason by reading or writing articles and books, but the "intermedium stage of *speaking our mind* is rarely inserted." (*Italics added)*. Hence, the illusion is born that somehow we can think outside of the realm of speech. "The modern thinker conceals from himself the fact that no thought can come to the ken of the majority of men except in listening". We partake of the reasoning process by listening and answering. It is the "electric induction of the dialogue" that makes us partners in the search for truth. But once this *social* situation is over, "we are empty again". (73) The reciprocity of listening and speaking was a central theme in Rosenstock-Huessy's thought, best exemplified in his 1944 essay, "The Listener's Tract". [5]

Language

The philologists and linguists, those specializing in language, as distinct from the philosophers, have their own problems, which is revealed by the

organization of the field of languages in higher education. Typically, one can study a language and never be offered any "linguistic principle".

> "Modern linguists do not think that the power of language is intimately connected with the power of truth. They do not assume that, as Aristotle said, truth is the obvious aim in speech, and lying only secondary. The whole idea of levels in speech depending on its nearness to truth is unheard of. The science of truth and the sciences of languages are separated. Language is thought of as being a tool, a gadget at man's ready disposal to serve him whenever he wishes to put up [*i.e., put on*] this or that air". (69-70)

Literature

With regard to the third group of activities, literary criticism and comparative literature, and also creative writing, Rosenstock-Huessy reinforces the notion that often the most profound remarks relating to language and philosophy are made by those specializing in literature, "which fatally remain unheeded by logicians and linguists". The philosopher has traditionally shown "utter contempt for oratory," because he dismisses it as merely language, and not logic. Yet, consider, Rosenstock-Huessy writes, the philosopher or

> "any speaker on the platform tries to speak his mind in a lasting way, and . . . therewith, he is struggling with the living word in a unified effort. He has to think in the monologue we call thought, he has to speak to an audience by which he gets involved into a dialogue, and he is hoping for a lasting effect by which his words shall become detached from the moment and take on the power of outlasting more than one occasion". (72)

We see in this example the three-fold character of words: "in the monologue the man is thinking aloud; in the dialogue, he is speaking to his hearers[;] and in the pleologue . . . he speaks for future recollection." Pleologue, Rosenstock-Huessy explains, is a kind of speech that can be presented to more than one audience. In time, the monologue branched off into the supposed separate realm of thought; the pleologue gave birth to literature. Monologue, dialogue, and pleologue are separable only superficially, since all three are present at the same moment when a speaker stands at a podium. [6] (72) In other words, the unity of these disciplines

is derived from the primordial act of speaking. Philosophy is a form of literature and literature a form of philosophy.

The image of the philosopher thinking inwardly and supposedly always aiming at the truth is fallacious. First of all, "we discover as many new things about ourselves or about the world or about our beliefs through speaking out and writing down as by thinking inwardly," and inward thought is as susceptible to deceit as any other human process. The philosopher or logician is as eager to deceive himself as the orator and the novelist are, and he "uses as many tricks to cheat his own conscience" as the other two do. Detached inward thought is, in itself, "no more proof against the fallacies of passion, prejudice, and interest than speech or writing. Thinking can be myth-weaving exactly as fiction is. And literature struggles for truth just as desperately as thought". (73)

To summarize Rosenstock-Huessy's 1935 indictment of the isolation of the academic disciplines: The thinkers, the philosophers, deceive themselves by the idealistic notion that thought is superior to, perhaps purer than, speech or language; the specialists in language, the linguists and philologists, divorce language from its essential function of conveying truth between men, and treat it as a detached, natural mechanism existing merely for "communication" and subject to analysis on that basis; meanwhile, those specializing in literature, so-called, appear to accept their separation from the philosopher's search for truth, with the result that the study of literature can descend into mere aestheticism or into academic word-play.

Truth and Dissemblance

In all three forms of the word—thought, language, and literature—man is "essentially concerned with disclosure and velation," as noted earlier, or we might say, concerned with openness and concealment, in relation to himself, to others, and to humans in general. Human beings are distinguished from the animals

> "by the one fact that any group, nation, tribe, member, human individual, wherever we find him is occupied in justifying himself to himself, to others, and to the kind. This explains why he is wearing clothes, why he is making speeches, why he is reasoning and why he is writing books. . . . Man is at every moment bound up with his kind in a way no animal is. At any given moment man

> answers for his attitude by true or false statements. He is perpetually active in disclosure and velation, perpetually passive in enclosure and reception". (74)

In a memorable affirmation of humankind's fundamental sense of accountability, Rosenstock-Huessy writes: "Mankind is present where[*ever*] a man exists." A person may address himself inwardly, may speak to the ears of another, or may write for the eyes of a million readers, or do all three, but we are conscious that in all three forms of discourse we are answerable, in the end, to the judgment of mankind as a whole. From one source or another, we crave affirmation. In a sense, we feel we are always being addressed: Who are you? what are you? What is the truth?

Given this understanding, Rosenstock-Huessy argued, "a uniform structure may permeate the mental, linguistic and literary processes by which man answers for his behaviour." (75) At every moment every human being is inescapably answering to God, another person, or mankind as a whole, either by thought, speech, or writing. Rosenstock-Huessy calls this process "answerableness," which is the consequence of the polarity of disclosure and dissemblance, unveiling and veiling. Often "a group acts on behalf of its members, declaring to other groups what it stands for. . . . The calls, expressed in these declarations, may reflect intentions, or memories, complaints or war-cries, doubts, or certainties, desires or fears. It is always an apologia pro vita sua, whether a nation, a great poet or a burdened conscience explain[ing] to Geneva [i. e., to the League of Nations] or to posterity or to God what they are actually compelled to become." "Compelled to become" Rosenstock-Huessy insisted, repeating the phrase, "because the alleged activity of man is greatly exaggerated by all those thinkers who forget man's answerableness." He placed little stock in man's alleged agency when in fact our freedom is "pretty much limited to the choice to conceal or to disclose the truth" of what is happening to us as we are carried along in life. As he would inform his young students in the Dartmouth classroom: "Your aims are not your destiny". The most a man can say of himself is that although he did not really "make himself or his so-called actions . . . he was indeed able to decide about his amount of hypocrisy about his actions".(75) "Our contribution to our biography is essentially our decision how far we can go with the truth. We all cannot go very far".

We are shaped by life and by nature, and our only truly free action is contained in "the myth-weaving or truth-disclosing business". As an answerable

creature, thought, language, and literature are our greatest actions, and it is these actions also that bring about change and transformations in society. What happens in the world is constantly determined by a man's choice to succumb to fear and thus dissemble, or by his courage to tell himself or others the truth of what he sees.

It takes real physical energy to tell the truth in the face of the prevailing conventions, Rosenstock-Huessy emphasized. Much lying is just weakness because we lack the nerve to come out with the truth. Thus, the balance between honest reportage and the security of self-justification or rationalization is weighted in the direction of the latter. Lying, concealment, or reticence is usually easier than truth telling. Weakness makes us obdurate at a moment when if we only felt strong or healthy enough we would actively listen and be open to change. The saving "spark" which we are capable of sending into "the network of electric current in the community" tragically does not come because we feel too weak and too weary. Thus we sink back into the safety of compromising. (76)

On the other hand, dissemblance is only possible because society is in fact based on truth. The liar depends upon the social solidity established by those who have told the truth in the past. "Like cold as compared to warm, or ill as compared to healthy, lying is nothing in itself, but a possibility furnished by the existing precedents of truth." The hypocrite plays safe and survives by quoting *old truths* said by others at critical times; the energizing truth of the moment that he might reveal he keeps safely hidden. (76)

What a challenge to humankind Rosenstock-Huessy presented! We must all be as fearless and forthright as biblical prophets. Is this cause for hope or despair?

The Four-Fold Reality

In a person's encounter with the world or with reality, four modes of behavior are possible, Rosenstock-Huessy argued, two spatially (the inner and the outer) and two temporally (the future and the past). These also fall into grammatical forms, the imperative, the indicative, the subjunctive, and the perfect. A person can:

- hear a command, i.e., listen to an imperative calling for new action in the future. Oriented in time, he is acting, in Rosenstock-Huessy's terminology, *prejectively.*

- intend to make a move, i.e., to take action in the world in accordance with a description outlined in the indicative mood. Oriented in space, he is acting *objectively*.
- announce or express an emotion, i.e., delve into his interior life, in the subjunctive or optative mood. Oriented in space, he is acting *subjectively*.
- remember or recall an experience, i.e., carry forward an aspect of the past in formulas and ritual or in accordance with tradition. Oriented in time, he is acting *trajectively*.

These four modes or moods, each with a particular characteristic on the coordinates of space and time, in any healthy person may recur in sequence or be held in relative equilibrium and harmony. Together they reveal a universal structure basic to humanity.

> "To point forward and backward in time and to look inward and outward . . . in space are four perpetual situations of man. In any given moment, a living being is exposed to the possibility of repeating the past or cutting him[self] off from his past, and [he] is given the choice to withdraw into [his] inner self or to look and lose himself in his environment". (78)

What fascinated Rosenstock-Huessy, and what he wrote about again and again, is how these four most fundamental fronts in life—future and past as aspects of time, inner and outer as aspects of space—are constantly revealed in speech. By looking deeply into the forms of grammar, he believed, we have a means of arriving at a more complete and accurate understanding of the human situation than is typically offered by the social sciences as presently organized. The study of the forms of speech and language brings us insights into the deepest layers of existence. These four stances—prejective, objective, subjective, and trajective—are also a key to grasping the fundamental unity of philosophy, philology, and literature, as we will see.

With regard to literature, it is significant that the traditional division of poetry into epic, lyric, and dramatic, is paralleled as well in the grammatical forms of indicative, optative (or subjunctive), and imperative. Lyrical poetry, for example, is close to the subjunctive, and distant from the indicative; whereas epic poetry with its narrative form is presented more or less in the declarative sentences of the indicative mood. Finally, the "march of dramatic action fits well into the scheme of a grammatical imperative." What drama and the imperative

have in common, Rosenstock-Huessy writes, drawing examples from ancient Greek drama, is that both "are pointing forward to an unsettled future". (77)

With reference to any moment of speech, or any word, we can ask: "How far it is concerned with the description of an outward process, or wishes to reflect an inner movement or pushes forward to a solution in the future or is reproducing the past". (79) These vectors of time and space, which are integral to life, are, of course, normally intermixed, exactly as we switch in speech or writing from past perfect to imperative, from indicative to optative. Most important, there is "an identity," Rosenstock-Huessy claimed, between "the grammar of society" and "the grammar of language". (79) In other words, a full understanding of human speech provides us with a general means of interpreting the processes of human affairs, a means of roughly diagnosing social sickness and health. It is an identity that is repeated, Rosenstock says, "on higher and higher levels of life".

In literature we see the division of "inward lyric, outward epics, backward-looking formula and forward-pushing drama". (79) By "formula," or better, the *formulaic*, Rosenstock-Huessy refers to the elements in poetry that are frequently repeated to evoke the past, such as memories and implicit quotations, the "unavoidable elements in any poetry" that turn the audience to the past.

A surprising comparison may be made, too, between literature and the procedures in a courtroom, where all of the same elements of our relation to time and space can be found, although divided into an ensemble of separate parts. The formulaic in a legal battle, for example, consists of the wearying repetition of "whereas" and "whereas" and "furthermore as regards to," on and on for pages citing prior law and prior facts that have the same effect on the reader or listener as the famous recurrent formulaic phrases in Homer. A "quieting influence is secured," Rosenstock-Huessy notes, "because the past is fully represented and resumed, the known precedes the unknown, and before our speech turns to the future, we dwell in the past". (78)

Whether it is poetry or prose, the same quadrilateral of elements will always be present: "Indeed, nobody can speak one language only. Man's reality is at least fourfold". (80) Even lying or concealment is so divided into time and space elements:

> "The four forms of lying tell the same story. Fiction, lying, hypocrisy and cant are four styles of concealing our truth. The imperative is the form which abhors lying most. For to use 'cant'

> means only to repeat participles and formulas, to lie means to conceal external facts, fiction is the arbitrary invention of inner sentiments, but a hypocrite dissembles the imperatives of his actions". (80)

Cant, then, insincerely repeats formulas from the past; lying rearranges exterior space; fiction invents from interior space; hypocrisy falsifies the motives that are leading a person to act in the future.

Turning now to the prose of academic disciplines, at the other extreme from poetry, there are as many forms of language as there are in poetry. Poetry, Rosenstock-Huessy argues, is divided into narrative, formulaic, lyric, and dramatic elements, with affinities respectively to the indicative, the participles of the past perfect, the optative or subjunctive, and the imperative. These same grammatical forms of imperative, indicative, optative, and participle are found also in the four types of prose, as distinguished from the poetic: namely, human expression in oratory, science , philosophy, and history, each with their alignments in space or time. (80)

Oratory, or political speech, is the "articulation of an imperative" pointing to the future, and puts us in the prejective mode. "Mathematics [*i.e., scientific statement*] analyzes relations in [*exterior*] space and accomplishes the creation of a language perfectly objective". "Philosophy reflects on our inner [*interior*] thought," and is thus typically subjective. History, as a division of prose, is a special case, and its classification can be confusing. History obviously looks backwards in time and tries to conjure up the past and quote the utterances of the past as faithfully as possible, but as a scholarly discipline in the modern era history must be sharply distinguished from the mere carrying forward of the past by ritual, formula, and tradition, as in a chronicle. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, history is characteristically written in the indicative, upholds objectivity as a standard, and tends to see itself as a branch of "science" in the broad sense. (80) Hence, it does not purely represent the trajective mode, a complication that we will come back to.[7]

Be that as it may, it is vital to reiterate here that these two major realms of discourse, scientific prose, on the one side, and poesis or the creative arts, on the other, although encompassing much of modern human culture, do not exhaust the functions of speech in society. Clearly, non-fictional "scientific" prose, as a whole, is the home of external observations, and not an expression of our wishes and desires, or of our inner emotions. For the latter, we look to poetry or poesis,

i.e., to creative writing, to be the guardian of our inner processes. Yet, however grand in what they achieve, however vast the territory they cover, poetry and scientific prose are "in charge" of only two of the four modes of our conscious life, namely "the elating optative of our inner self and the analytic indicative of the external world". (80) Both, it will be noted, including even historical writing, are grounded in our inveterate division of space into inner and outer, interior and exterior. But humankind also lives in time; indeed for Rosenstock-Huessy, we live predominantly in time, not space, and he explicitly identified himself as a "time thinker". Prose and poetry, absorbed in the spatial order, are thus but half of the totality of human experience and expression. [8]

Ritual as Past, Imperative as Future

Where, then, in the grammar of human society is time represented? Past and future appear in two other types of speech that are *no less important* than scientific description and creative writing, but little recognized: "the past by ritual, the future by all the imperatives mastering our life, beginning at the bottom with [*a mere traffic direction*] 'keep right,' and ending at the peak with 'do right'". (81) The bookish tradition of 2,000 years has misled us because we do not encounter ritual and the imperative in the classroom, the lecture hall, the library, or the laboratory. One can read a whole book or listen to a long lecture and hardly notice an imperative. Can ritual and the imperative really be equal on the scales of life to art and science, to mathematics, literature, and philosophy? Indeed, for sanity, balance, and health, it is essential that they be, whether we are focused on the individual or on whole nations. But these relatively invisible forms must first be made visible.

The imperative is not found so much in books as it is in everyday spoken language, in the give and take of simple human interchange. Similarly, ritual, "the powerful realization of the past," persists in countless ceremonies, observances, re-enactments, monuments, and traditions, spoken and performed, which are not always recognized as such. The occurrence of the formulaic, the function of which is "to guard against the inroad of an uncertain future," is found not only in obvious liturgical forms but in all forms of legal practice, and this is true in the United States above all, where tradition may appear to be most eroded. The lawyers, Rosenstock-Huessy pointed out about his adopted country, are the "priesthood" of the formulaic.

> "In fact, modern democracies find their most sacred ritual in parliamentary speech and procedure. At all occasions, whether suitable or not, the '[*will]* anybody second?', 'the motion is carried,' and so on and so forth, show the tremendous power of the formula for binding society together. It is this binding power which alone deserves to be termed religion". (81)

Citing the linguistics scholar Antoine Meillet, Rosenstock-Huessy notes that religious ceremonies practically always use a language that differs from that which we employ in the ordinary course of life. But "it is a logical mistake to seek the ritual outside the speech and to ascribe a special speech to the ritual. *The special speech is the ritual*". (82, *ital. added*). You can almost measure a person's religiosity by all of the occasions when he recurs to the solemn language of ritual.

This is not the place to elaborate further on the supreme importance of the imperative in Rosenstock-Huessy's work, beyond its brief delineation in this 1935 address to Dartmouth College colleagues. Suffice it to say that he has written hundreds of page on the imperative and the vocative, i.e., the address in the second person, including his work on human development. Child rearing, for example, begins always with imperatives, that is, the injunctions delivered by all parents to their children from the moment of birth: "Johnny, go to sleep, eat your porridge, love your sister and brother, tell the truth, obey your elders." As adults, too, we are constantly waiting to be summoned by those whom we feel have the knowledge and authority to tell us what it is necessary to do, including among the summoners our own conscience. Otto Kroesen has shown how the function of the imperative in Rosenstock-Huessy's thought is comparable to the theological notion of revelation (a form of divine address) and analogous to the experience of falling in love or of being moved by love. The common thread is that meaningful action begins with our being spoken to, or addressed in some fashion.[8a]

To recapitulate, from the standpoint of human experience all reality is situated either in the past or the future, and is deemed to be either inside or outside of a framework that we establish or acknowledge. (The present for Rosenstock-Huessy is an artificial human construct). "This means four original approaches to reality, and four different aggregate states for the speaker". (82) Such is true of nations, as well, which if they are healthy have their legislation (future imperatives), their sciences (outward, objective studies), their arts (inward turning, subjective literature or painting, sculpture, music, etc.), and

their anchors in the past manifest in rituals, holidays, monuments, observances, and the like.

The simple quadrilateral of future (imperative), outward (indicative), inward (optative), past (participles and formulas), Rosenstock-Huessy concedes, may appear to lack subtlety. Turning, then, to a different approach, he drew a parallel with four basic human attitudes: "plasticity, conventionality, aggressiveness, and elation. A man is plastic under the impact of an imperative[;] he is aggressive where he dissects the world by figures, forms, and the calculus[;] he is elated where he trusts his inner revelations[;]and he is conventional or repetitive where he reduplicates the past." (82) These are the potentialities of man whether he is revealing or concealing truth. And whether it is language, thought, or literature, as described earlier, the same "forming principles" will apply, providing the unity asserted in this lecture. Man realizes his ends by a plurality of moods, and in the study of man it is essential, among other things, to listen to his own remarks about himself. "He knows more than the indifferent scientist about the tragedy in and around him". (83)

Rosenstock-Huessy spoke of the foregoing as "discoveries," and he believed these findings can have far-reaching results as a method for studying history, psychology, sociology, and more. In his 1946 work, *The Christian Future*, he said of this cross of reality: "This is not symbolistic fantasy or arbitrary schematizing, but something that has grown through two thousand years". (166n)

The discovery is illuminating about man and the world, a new way of seeing ourselves, but perhaps of limited application as, let's say, the basis of policy or therapy. We have learned, basically, that human beings must continually and always deal with choices of past and future, to be, for example, in specific instances conservative or progressive, or in times of crisis even reactionary or revolutionary; and in space, we must choose to be inside or outside of innumerable social and political configurations, or in different words, to choose between "them" and "us," the difference between who is inside and who is outside. These are *conflicts* more or less imposed on us as part of the human condition.

Our modes of personal existence, too, less in conflict, may be reduced to the spatial and temporal forms described in the terms subjective, objective, trajective, and prejective, all functioning harmoniously. This is a somewhat different quadrilateral. We muse inwardly and attack problems outwardly,

engage in rituals and observances carried forward from the past and respond to charges handed to us for bettering the future. In this 1935 lecture, Rosenstock-Huessy does not take up the problem of the variable meanings of the cross of reality, the difference between, let's say, a driver's uneventful shifting gears in a car for a smooth ride, on the one hand, and on the other being unjustly ticketed in a speed trap and forced to act.

No person escapes these directional stresses and choices, although there are plenty of systems, especially Asian, such as Buddhist practices, that advise men and women to find quiet in the still present, shutting out the worries of where and when. These various methods from several traditions for finding inner peace and equanimity (at least momentarily), a state that G. K. Chesterton referred to as the "ecstasy of indifference," only prove the rule, that to be human is to be sometimes uncomfortably stretched on the vectors of forward and backward, inward and outward, an excruciation from which some yearn to escape, at the risk of figuratively leaving this world. Equally vain over the long term are therapeutic goals of social or psychological "adjustment," which means somehow removing the tension of conflicting directions. "Realization," Rosenstock-Huessy writes, "is approached not in one way but by a plurality of moods, "(83) an assertion that suggests, perhaps, less torment from this situation and more joyful opportunity for choice.

Three Applications

Rosenstock-Huessy was convinced that the discovery of the four-fold nature of our relation to reality will have "far-reaching results for history, for psychology and sociology". He referred to it as "a sure method" for tackling problems, yet he feared that without any examples of practical application the new categories may appear to be too abstract. (83) In response to this awareness, he offered three quick examples that aim to make the method tangible: one from language, one from philosophy, and one from literature.

With regard to the first, the usual scheme for teaching a language divides the tenses, the moods, the pronouns, and the declension: I love, thou loveth, he/she/it loves, we love, you love, they love. For presenting a foreign language, this practice may be permissible, Rosenstock-Huessy allowed, but it is a terrible model for understanding our relation to our mother tongue, for which we ought to know "the deeper coordination of modes and tenses and pronouns". (83) A

"thoughtful grammar, a philosophical grammar," would stress that three forms of the verb are related to three states of personality. The synopsis, reflecting a universal sequence, should run: "ama, amem, amat [*i.e., love! or love me! in the imperative; I would love or do I love? in the subjunctive; he loves, in the indicative, reflecting a new reality*]. Here we have genuine and direct forms". Our own language, according to Rosenstock-Huessy, "should be disclosed to be our living self, not a pedantic bed of Procrustes". (84) The implication is that the teaching of English, for example, to native-born American children should shun the mechanical detachment of the ancient Alexandrian grammar table—I love, you love, he loves, etc.—and turn instead to life as it is actually experienced: we are told to love, we fall in love with all of its turmoil, and we do love. Rosenstock-Huessy deplored "the disguise of truth by our grammar books". Our mother tongue, he writes, "should be presented to us as the introduction into the secrets of personality". (96) "Of all the dogmas of antiquity," he wrote in another paper, dating from 1945, "the grammatical dogma is the last to persist. The schools have shelved Euclidean geometry, Ptolemaic astronomy, Galenian medicine, Roman law and Christian dogma most radically. Ancient grammatical dogma still dominates". [9]

Turning from language to literature, as a second example of what his discoveries might yield, Rosenstock-Huessy asks that we examine a nation's mental health, so to speak, by the quality of the "equilibrium" between the four tendencies of

> "describing, and thereby dissecting[;] of singing and thereby elating[;] of listening to orders and thereby changing[;] and of thanksgiving and thereby perpetuating reality". (84)

Any special literature, Rosenstock-Huessy proposes, can be characterized by "the proportions that are shown between its four central moods". (84) Onesidedness in a nation's literature is no small matter, of concern only to specialized critics; it can result in "fatal suppressions of reality" and cause social, political, and economic disaster. (96) This is one of the themes, of course, of *Out of Revolution*.

In the nineteenth century, there was a blossoming of novels, science, and historical research. At the same time, however, liturgy, prayer, and rituals were practically dying out. This disequilibrium was filled by looking to the writing of history as an evocation of the past, which is not the same, obviously, as a vital or lived continuation of the past into the present. Rosenstock-Huessy did not use

the word "tradition" or "heritage" in this 1935 lecture, but their decline is implied.

Turning to historical writing as the remedy for the decline of tradition was a goal of the so-called Romantic historians of the nineteenth century—such as Bancroft in the United States, Macaulay in England, and Guizot in France—but ultimately, as historians defined themselves as practitioners of a kind of objective "science," the reliance on historiography had exactly the opposite effect of what was intended. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the writing of history accompanied the "triumphal march of the natural sciences, those clearest outposts of our outward tendencies". It could not hope to keep the full balance, because it remained enclosed in the general field of prose. Historiography in our time is a "subspecies in the sphere of prose," and prose is "always analytic, dissecting, aggressive". In another paper, written at almost the same time as the "Uni-versity of Logic, Language, Literature," entitled "The Predicament of History," which Rosenstock-Huessy presented at the meeting of the American Historical Association in December 1934, his thoughts on history are more fully developed.[10]

> "It is no mere guess when we assume that the health of an individual and the wealth of nations may depend on a balance between prose, poetry, ritual, and imperative. This can be expressed grammatically by saying that any individual or group must remain capable of shifting freely and at the becks of fate from the subjective "I" to the objective "it", and further to the listening "thou" and to the remembering "we". (85)

It is arguable that in the United States today, we are strikingly untethered from the past of only a little more than a half-century ago, which results in an anxiety that accounts for some of our most reactionary politics

Finally, an example of the application of the grammatical method to philosophy. Nothing is "so well safeguarded by philosophers as the naïve arrogance of the school that [*holds that*] reality can and has to be divided into objects and subjects. This division is taken to be the division of the world. Alas, the world would not survive this division if it were to be taken seriously". (85) In truth, the attitude in which we face the outward world as a subject is merely "one perfunctory and transient function or mood among other functions and moods". A person looking forward, for example, cannot know of any such division of the world. "He acts . . . under the compulsion of an imperative. He is

initiated into the future because he is still plastic. He hears a command. The great fact of any ethical imperative, whether coming from above or below, from out or inside, is that I am not the subject [*i. e., the speaker*] of the imperative which I hear". (85)

Descartes's famous axiom, *Cogito, ergo sum*, has the "innocent form of a scientific and prosaic statement" because the philosopher wished to express all the truth about himself in the style of the indicative. But when Descartes resolved at the age of twenty-four to devote his life to philosophy, he surely was not taking this step in the descriptive attitude of the *cogito, ergo sum*. Descartes, in fact, listened first to an imperative, "the old imperative of the serpent: *Cogita* and *eritis*, [*Think and you will be.*]" Clearly this first "*Cogita*" was not spoken by Descartes himself. It was spoken *to* him, not *by* him. "And when he listened to this call he was in that moment neither an 'I ' nor an 'it,' neither a subject nor an object." Subjects and objects cannot "*obey* to human speech". (86, *italics added*). The "I" differs fundamentally from the "thou" that receives the command; the "I" is the source of the command to act, the speaking subject. The hearer of the command is neither subject nor object. "The things which the philosopher is *called forth* to think about are his objects. He himself is something which is neither subject nor object" at that moment of decisive change. (86, *italics added*). He is a preject.

It is a good thing, Rosenstock-Huessy emphasizes, that man can "never dream of becoming a subject *pur sang* or an object cog in the machine. It is always a degradation when a human person is treated as an object. And it is always an impermissible deification when he thinks of himself as a prima causa, as a real subject. Did he make himself?" Even before we can introduce the division into subject and object we must first be the recipient of a command, that is, we must be listening to a "you" or a "thou" that flies towards us "like a projectile from another, stronger arm's bow. Under the spell of being addressed I find myself in the plastic attitude which allows a man to be transformed into something different from what he was before". (86) One of the great values of Rosenstock-Huessy's cross of reality is that by transcending the simplistic subject/object distinction, we are obliged "to limit scientific thought to its proper field and time," an urgent necessity in 1935 and a necessity still today. "Nobody can use his mental powers in one 'style' only". (96)

The universal acceptance of an experiential reality beyond subject and object, Rosenstock-Huessy believed, can only be achieved by offering new terms

that have a chance of becoming just as embedded as subject and object. Hence, his coining of "prejects" for persons in the position of "you-s" or "thou-s" responding to an imperative, and "trajects" for those who see themselves as participants with others in a common past, and who are unified in the "we-participle".

The concept of prejectivity, Rosenstock-Huessy acknowledged, bears a resemblance to the concept of "*Geworfenheit*" found in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, but he had no desire to align himself with either of those thinkers.[11] His main concern was to insist that we are far more often governed by prejectivity, as, for example, in a positive response to a call for change or a revelation, and by trajectivity in our conservatism, than we ever are by either scientific objectivity or mystic subjectivism. (87)

Bounded or Liberated by the Cross

What must be granted is that there is no standpoint outside of the cross of reality from which we can view it, a transcendental language that somehow has escaped these four fundamentals of reality. There is no Archimedean point beyond or outside of this nexus. Rosenstock-Huessy would be the first to acknowledge that he is himself in the middle of it, and you, the Reader, are similarly entangled, as am I. Rosenstock-Huessy never pretended to look down from another galaxy.

Whenever we begin "to listen or to think from one of these four angles of [our] real life," we become a different person, and all four angles are perpetually needed. In my case, for example, I have been inspired by Rosenstock-Huessy's lecture and wish to act on its message in some fashion, prejectively; I am moved by it emotionally, weighing its conclusions, and my imagination stimulated, subjectively; I am also analyzing the lecture in a detached, scientific fashion, to some degree objectively; I regard the lecture as worthy of preservation and want to ensure its continued study, as I am trying to do by reporting on it here, trajectively.

"Any one phase of speech or style does not suffice to express our full experience of the life within and outside, before and behind us." Indeed, the deepest errors are the result of the belief that we can rely on only one, as the rationalist trusts only objectivity or the mystic only subjectivity. Even marriage, or at least a real marriage, Rosenstock writes, depends upon these four styles:

> "(1) the divine command 'love me'; (2) the elation of the honeymoon; (3) the hard reckoning of household economy; and (4) the security of the evening chatter and the common holidays." (88)

Turning reflexive now, near the end of his presentation, Rosenstock-Huessy admitted that the process of making known his discovery is not itself immune from the four-sided structure of "Plasticity, Reduplication, Aggressiveness, and Elation." The new terminology of "prejective" and "trajective" must become more than his "subjective" theory. It has to "enter the field of merciless competition and selection in the schools" and survive. Thus we have to ask, are these terms indispensable for our understanding of the world, or is this an abstract theoretical exercise? His new method, Rosenstock-Huessy claimed, will at least have to run through all the different styles of self-expression until it can "feel its way back into the Great Tradition," which has unfortunately enshrined the duality of subject and object as though they were exclusive. (89)

Rosenstock-Huessy insisted that "thinking takes time." Truth emerges as part of a process. Yet this fact is largely ignored because in the schools truths all appear to be pre-existent and everlasting. But, he asks, what is the process of how they came to be? How does the truth grow? "Nobody can, shall or may think all the time! And we incorporate truth not without re-thinking the same problems". "Thinking takes time" refers to all of the possible qualities that color time, and in particular to the stages, which for Rosenstock-Huessy have the status of a law of life, from "impression to obsession to expression to definition," which is equivalent to the movement from imperative, to the subjective uncertainty of the subjunctive, to the participles of the epic or narrative recounting, to the detached, objective indicative—a procession through Thou, I, We, It. Thought, Rosenstock writes, is "a sociological and biological process. . . . It can only be realized by circulating through a number of phases or stations. Thought, speech, writing are creatures and behave like all other creatures". (90) A lecture course that Rosenstock-Huessy taught at Dartmouth was exactly on this subject, which he called "The Circulation of Thought". One version of it was recorded on tape in 1954, consisting of about 40 hours over 29 sessions.[12]

As we alluded to earlier, the proceedings in a courtroom drama exemplify perfectly for Rosenstock-Huessy the elements of the cross of reality formed by the medium of space and time in which we live, although in a trial the four parts are temporarily separated.

> "The plaintiff argues on the objective break of the law; the defendant urges his subjective right to act as he did; the precedents bring up the past in order to enable the present court to form an opinion how far the case is the reduplication of former events. Finally the decision comes down upon the unsettled new and shapeless prejacent case and presses it into a legal form". (91)

Thus, Rosenstock-Huessy concludes, the due process of the law contains all the elements of the mental process he has hitherto described, with the difference only that in the courtroom the phases are filled by different persons, rather than being the expression of a single individual. "It is a complete misinterpretation of the process," he asserts, "to take these people as speaking the same language". Each is singing a different tune.

Drawing on his early scholarship in the history of law, Rosenstock-Huessy painted in this lecture a vivid picture of a generic murder case in a Medieval court room, full of drama, which I can only refer to here. The due process of law, in Rosenstock-Huessy's argument, comprehends the different styles of the human disclosure of reality "because it is one of the models of complete human speech." It condenses into the proceedings of one day "facts and feelings, memories and plans which stretch out over indefinitely more space and time," and the definition or decision that results "is the quintessence of this condensed process". It comes at the end, as it ought to.

The philosopher similarly, like a courtroom judge, has no authority to speak the last word first. Of course, as a teacher he can dictate to students, but that is not the practice of philosophy, which occurs when one is not sure of his community. Persuasion is the proper process of research in the social sciences.

> "He who begins with a definition tries to escape from the rules of this process. He can be a mislocated legislator whose will for power seeks an outlet in writing and teaching. But he is no social scientist. For he declines to think loudly and to make thereby acceptable to his collaborators his process of reasoning". (94)

Seventy-five years ago, Rosenstock-Huessy hoped that the new names "preject" and "traject" would be widely adopted. When he died in 1973, however, this terminology was as alien or invisible as it was in the 1930s. In 1935 he accepted that these new names were still at the "frontier between studio and museum" in man's art of thinking, en route from the moment of inspiration to the ultimate institutionalization. He said, hopefully, "Once there is a word,

everybody will begin to believe in the existence of the essence behind it. . . . A name wrested from our lips in honest struggle for truth is in fact in most cases the standard bearer of a part of reality. By its name, a thing is called forth into life and put under the protectorate of the whole of human society". (87) Regrettably, to date, most of his ideas have not succeeded in crossing the border from inspiration to the commonplace, as he described the process. (94-95)

A critique of faculty psychology, too, is brought in to support not only the unity of the humanistic disciplines but of our mental personhood as a whole . Reasoning, Rosenstock-Huessy held, is not distinct from will, emotion, and memory. "The standing belief that a person has the three departments of reason, will, and feeling is completely wrong. Emotion, will, and memory are loaded with reasoning processes precisely as objective contemplation is. We are using our mental power equally in art and science, in education and in religion. The picture of a man shifting between will and contemplation," as proposed by Schopenhauer, "or between irrational mysticism and cold rationalism is a caricature of the nineteenth century. The human cosmos is represented to completeness in every microcosmic act of inspiration". Logic, language, and literature are fundamentally unified because we are exposed to the four directions of time and space "in every actual process of thought or speech". The difference between our emotional, our inspirational and our rational state "is one of arrangement, not of complete separatedness". (95) Indeed,

> "Man is unable to think or to speak without using all four elements simultaneously. It is not the elements that differ in poetry, science, politics or religion. It is their arrangement". (95)

At any given moment, we are engaged on all the four fronts of life, employing or undergoing inspiration (the imperative), imagination (the subjunctive), analysis (the indicative), and faith (ritual and formula).

A Pause at the" Law" of Four

Without doubt, some of Rosenstock-Huessy's faculty audience in 1935 would have reacted as did Bruce Boston in his 1973 Princeton dissertation: The cross of reality is "too pat, too contrived, to systematized".[13] The listener's or the reader's instinctive response is that the world is messier than the cross of reality reflects and that Rosenstock-Huessy is building a castle in the air. From another perspective, what he has framed seems too loose or too general to be useful as

anything other than an academic exercise. Such criticisms are particularly painful and paradoxical, because if there are two things that Rosenstock-Huessy prided himself on, they were that his thought was always grounded in flesh and blood reality, and that he was not given to metaphysical system building.

The cross of reality may be elusive, but it is not meant to be rigid. Rosenstock-Huessy hated abstract systems and saw man as essentially defiant in the face of any attempt to characterize him in any one way. Predictions based on statistics and polls, he felt, were usually wrong because as soon as a person learns that he (or she) is expected to continue along some established course, he rebels against the prescribed path. Human beings make a point of showing that we are not predictable. The world will not come to an end precisely because the prediction that it will end tomorrow catalyzes us into preventive action today. That is one of the meanings of the motto he proposed for the third millennium, respondeo etsi mutabor, I respond even though I will be changed.

What saves the cross of reality from typical characterizations about the nature of man is that it is not, in fact , a law or a categorization. It should be seen as an avenue of freedom from social, political, psychological, historical, economic, cultural, religious restraints. "Cross" may be the wrong metaphor if it is associated with the horror of impalement, as opposed to, for example, "crossroads". It is true that the connection to the suffering Jesus was not one that Rosenstock-Huessy entirely avoided. In *The Christian Future* (1946), for example, he used strong physical words: "Reality itself—not the abstract reality of physics, but the full-bodied reality of human life—is cruciform. Our existence is a perpetual suffering and wrestling with conflicting forces, paradoxes, contradictions within and without. By them we are stretched and torn in opposite directions, but through them comes renewal. And these opposing directions are summed up by four which define the great space and time axes of all men's life on earth, forming a Cross of Reality." (166) Yet even this statement is not altogether existentially gloomy because he it ends with "renewal".

Rather than "cross of reality," it would be a fairer description to speak of, let's say, "vectors of choice," "arrows of freedom," "options of opportunity". Humankind is trapped only in that we have no hope of escaping the mortal template of space and time, which is the way Rosenstock-Huessy would have it. There can be no metaphysical relief, no talk of transcendence, no talk of redemption outside of this "lovable" world. But we are not unfree.

Several applications of the cross of reality, or the vectors of choice, have been given. Rosenstock-Huessy also applies it to the question of what constitutes our moral duties, in which freedom is central. Whenever we lecture or teach or write books, we naively extend to all men the general commandment, "Hark, Hear, Listen." The insight that these imperatives are at the core of any realistic ethics is the "finest fruit of the new method," Rosenstock-Huessy believed. For the only possible content of any human ethics, an ethics that does not completely overlook man's most human capacity, that is, speaking and listening, is revealed by attention to the foremost role of the imperative: the call to action. Any set of Pelagian rules for good behavior will always end in utter failure if it aspires to go anywhere beyond pure convention and utilitarianism, because it will necessarily deny "man's freedom and our life's incalculability".

> "The quiver of true ethics holds no other arrows but the imperatives derived from man's talk with the universe. They run all like the first commandment: Hark, give ear! It is man's duty to hear and to listen to the voices of love and wisdom and the law. For the rest he is free".

The fact is, no specified ethical code can hold up under the pressure of an inbreaking new command. For might not a person at any time "hear a voice louder and more true" than all of the earlier injunctions? "The only ethical command which church and society can impose on man is: Give ear, think it over. The first thing society must guarantee to its members is time for recollection and reconsideration". (96-97) One thinks here, of course, of the famous moral teaching of one of Rosenstock-Huessy's heroes, St. Augustine: "Love God and do what you will".

Returning now, at the end, to the original theme of his lecture, Rosenstock-Huessy called for a new and better collaboration among the "disintegrated body" of the human sciences. Language, literature, and thought should aim at nothing less than the "everlasting man who lives under the three commands Audi! Lege! Medita! (Listen! Read! Think!)." These three commands, equivalent to language, literature, and philosophy, are "our human dowry. They are our only moral prescriptions of general character. They make human society the delicate, frail, loveable creature it is. And they are only three forms of one command". (97)

What then unifies languages, literature, and philosophy? They all begin with the imperative, which is fundamentally a call to action. Each must follow the same path to truth every time a word is spoken, from the inspiration that comes to us as a command; to the internal struggle as we find our way, a mixture of elation and doubt; to the shared achievement as we find collaborators and supporters, and speak as "we" in a new narrative; to the final stage of scientific, objective description, and definitions.

Here, then, we have a new picture of human progress, far from the Cartesian view that locks us into objective description as the only source of truth, and which necessarily divides observation between the subjective and the objective. But man is unified in his quest when it becomes apparent that there are four sources of truth, each necessary and equally valid, and each an element in the structure of grammar. The novelist and the philosopher, the philologist and the poet, the historian and the artist, the priest and the logician—none is superior to the other, despite the pretensions and claims of each. Society cannot afford to lose any of the four angles on reality, lest it perish. And no individual can be whole if he or she attempts to suppress or eradicate openness to the future, harking to the past, the poetry of internal life, or the scientific precision of our relation to the external world of nature.

NOTES TO "UNI-VERSITY"

1. "The Uni-versity of Logic, Language, Literature: A Program for Collaboration" is reprinted in *Speech and Reality* (Argo Books, 1970), pp. 67-97. A typewritten version, perhaps properly designated the "original," was included in the microfilm of ERH's works, Reel 6, item 306, and is included in the *Collected Works on DVD* . At the end of the original, in Rosenstock's hand, is written: "address to the Philosophy Club late fall 1935." The membership of the Club, or who might have attended this lecture, is not known to me. I am assuming that ERH saw himself as speaking primarily to faculty, not to undergraduates. Dartmouth had no graduate students in the humanities. It is possible that information could be found about the context of this lecture in the archives of Dartmouth. The 1970 reprint varies very slightly here and there from the original, but there are no substantive differences. The numbers in parentheses in my explication refer to the page numbers of the reprint.

A German version of this paper is included also in Rosenstock-Huessy's *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts* (Heidelberg, 1963), I, 525-567, under the title: "Die Einsinnigkeit von Logik, Linguistk und Literatur: Zum Andenken an Wilhelm von Humboldt." I have made no effort to track the differences between the English and the German versions, and I do not know which was actually composed first. But a comparison of the 1935 lecture in English with the 1963 German publication might reveal something of the evolution of the author's thought over that thirty-year period.

Born in 1888, ERH retired from teaching at Dartmouth in 1957 and died in 1973 in Norwich, Vermont.

2. Wayne Cristaudo, *Religion, Redemption, and Revolution: The New Speech Thinking of Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), xi, also p. 55: "The idea that language is an obstacle to reality is for [Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy] but a vestige of naturalism's blindness to the way in which we make and respond to our world."

3. Probably a reference to Erazm Majewski, *La science de la civilisation. Prolgomnes et bases pour la philosophie de l'histoire et la sociologie* (Paris, 1910) and to Ferdinand Ebner, *Das Wort und die Geistigen realitäten; pneumatologische fragmente* (Innsbruck, 1921). Martin Buber is a well known author on speech philosophy and was a major contributor to the journal *Die Kreatur*, along with his friend Rosenstock-Huessy. Probably a reference to Albert Cuny, *Études prégrammaticales sur le domaine des langues indo-européennes et chamito-sémitiques* (Paris, 1924) and possibly to Gerlach Royen, a Dutch scholar, *Die nominalen Klassifikations-systeme in den Sprachen der Erde. Historisch-kritische Studie, mit besonderer berücksichtigung des Indogermansichen* (1929).

4. The comment on Wittgenstein is from an entry that Rosenstock-Huessy wrote for the *American People's Encyclopedia* (Chicago, 1962), (Reel 11, 545, 107 , accessible on ERH, *Collected Works on DVD*), one of about 70 brief essays he wrote for that work. For more on ERH's writing for the *Encyclopedia*, see Norman Fiering, "Jelly Roll Morton Meets Prof. Rosenstock-Huessy," available on request.

5. "The Listener's Tract," which survives in a typescript from 1944, was published for the first time in *Speech and Reality* (Argo, 1970). Online at <erhsociety.org/contributions/> Eckart Wilkins has re-structured the original text, without altering a word, in order to bring out better the import of ERH's close and profound thinking on this subject.

6. According to Meredith A. Cargill, The concept of "'pleologue' resembles Chaim Perelman's idea of the 'universal audience' (*The Realm of Rhetoric*) and also Michel Foucault's idea of originary texts ('Discourse' 220), which are texts that become the objects of commentary". "The Communication Theory of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: Speech Pragmatics," (Draft version 9, June 6, 2006), unpublished. It can be found online at http://erhpaperdownloads.blogspot.com/

7. I discuss Rosenstock-Huessy's analysis of the role of historical writing in: "'The Physician of Memory': Heritage vs. History," available upon request.

8. ERH wrote extensively on the nature of time in a number of different contexts. See, e.g., *Christian Future*, 167-174; "Teaching Too Late, Learning to Early," (May, 1940), in *I Am an Impure Thinker* (Argo, 1970): "Man is peculiarly a temporal being, ever but an exile and pilgrim in the world of space, " 91- 92; and "Time-Bettering Days" in *Rosenstock-Huessy Papers*, vol. I (Argo Books, 1954) . For commentary, see Peter Leithart, "The Social Articulation of Time in Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy," *Modern Theology*, XXVI, 2 (April 2010), 197-219.

8a. Otto Kroesen, "Toward Planetary Society: Revelation and Redemption in the Work of Rosenstock-Huessy, Rosenzweig, and Levinas," unpublished. The meaning of revelation and love in the work of Franz Rosenzweig (and implicitly for ERH) is expertly delineated in Samuel Moyn, *Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas Between Revelation and Ethics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), chap. 4.

9. "Grammar as Social Science," in *Speech and Reality* (Argo, 1969), 98.

10. Cf. "The Predicament of History," a paper that ERH presented at the meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, D. C., in December 1934, which was published a few months later in *The Journal of Philosophy* , XXXII (Feb. 14, 1935).

11. "*Geworfenheit*" usually translated "thrownness" was used by Martin Heidegger to describe the accidental nature of the infant's arrival in the world, without choice over timing or circumstances. This is a rare instance of Rosenstock-Huessy, in his English writings, referring to Heidegger. Speaking to his new colleagues at Dartmouth College

in 1935, he may have felt that he could not simply by-pass this philosophical luminary. The two men were nearly exact contemporaries. Heidegger notoriously was an active Nazi sympathizer, a position that Rosenstock-Huessy despised. According to Wayne Cristaudo, *Religion, Redemption, and Revolution*, 287, Rosenstock-Huessy denounced Heidegger as "Nazi scum".

12. On the progression from impression, to obsession, to expression, to definition, see also Norman Fiering, "Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy on the Structure of Significant Lives," available on request.

13. Boston's critique, from his dissertation "'I Respond Although I Will Be Changed': The Life and Historical Thought of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1973), is cited by Darrol Bryant in "The Grammar of the Spirit: Time, Speech, Society," in *Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: Studies in His Life and Thought*, ed. by M. Darrol Bryant and Hans R. Huessy (1986).