{ } = word or expression can't be understood
{word} = hard to understand, might be this

...with a very poor word, "nature," which you should try to avoid in dealing with philosophy- -- -ical problems. It's a misleading word today. These two words -- these two worlds do not coincide. The world of the United States in which you live is much smaller than the universe of all the suns, and all the stars. And the order which the United States proclaimed to you, by its la- -- laws, and its manners, and mores, and your parents, and your teachers, and the order of the universe are absolutely contradictory. This society in which you live is a soft society, and assumes that no wrong can be done by students. They have always to be pardoned. There is an eternal mercy, called "momitis." And in nature, everything is hard, every cause has an effect; it's absolutely merciless. Now what shall we make of a nature that is merciless, gentlemen, and of a society which even calls the -- the ter- -- most terrible murderer still somebody who has to be pardoned and coddled, or at least fed for a lifetime in a prison, because you hate capital punishment? Absolutely contradictory. In the animal kingdom, obviously there is the survival of the fittest, and has been proclaimed as a tremendous truth. And you yourself behave as though you can be a misfit totally and you have a right to live.

This is the eternal contradiction of philosophy, gentlemen. And there must -- can be no day of human history where this trouble is not going to arise, because even if we have the whole -- the globe organized, there is still Mars, and there are still the suns, there is still the universe outside, the stratosphere. And never, never shall this dilemma end, gentlemen. The human mind is placed between two sources of information which mutually exclude each other and their conclusions. And as long as you do not see that physis and ethos are at opposite ends, you cannot understand logos. Because logos is an attempt to see the same meaning, the same truth, the same revelation, the same wisdom at work in the stars and in the human heart.

Now the human -- the -- the stars collide. You must not collide on the highway. So here is collision, God's law, or divine law, or natural law. Call it as you like, you see. And here in nature -- in -- in society, there is the law, no collision.

Hitler, commit -- falling under the spell of natural law, said, "Let's have all the collisions. I collect collisions, because that's natural law. Man is an animal." Concentration camps. Labor -- forced labor camps. Collision.

Give you an American example. Yesterday--who died yesterday? Saw it in the papers who died? Very interesting man. Who died? Gentlemen, that's

unethical. You are just nat- -- nature boys. Nature doesn't care for death, you see. Ethics do. I'm sorry. Mr. Weyerhauser died. Who is Mr. Weyerhauser? Who is he? Ja? What did you say? Nobody knows who Mr. Weyerhauser is?

(He was the heir to a large timber fortune, and a family out on the West coast, I think Oregon.)

Sure. He died in Tacoma -- Tacoma, Washington. Washington is even more his -- his domain, Oregon and Washington. Yes. Well, Mr. Weyerhauser, gentlemen, is of a family who plundered the wood reserves, forest reserves of the United States in the first generation so shamelessly that Congress published such a volume against them in 1913. Now they are the great philanthropists of America. And they have 9,000 tree farms and in 1941, the man who died yesterday at the age of 57, founded the first tree farm. So it took him 29 years to make amends for the shock he had -- he had given the -- the forests of this country, the resources of this country. And he today, of course, as -- as you love all these robber barons so deeply, he now to- -- today is worshiped, and revered, and of course heads the Republican Party.

And -- it's a joke, gentlemen, because for philosophers, gentlemen, the question is: Why couldn't Mr. Weyerhauser operate in the same way in 1913? This is the phil- -- eternal philosophical question with regard -- between ethics and physis, you see. In physis, no mercy. But if you have a country you live in, gentlemen, if you have "a gift outright," as Mr. Frost has put it about the American soil, and the { } -- you have heard his poem, haven't you? "A deed ou- -- gift outright." Who knows this poem? Well, that's, gentlemen, that's the Magna Carta of America. I -- you'd better go and -- and read it. I think it's -- preposterous that there is anyone in this classroom who has not read it or heard it. Be ashamed. How can you be Americans and not know this poem, gentlemen, which says everything about your relation to your own land? He should send back his two doctorates of Dartmouth. You don't deserve him as your honorary doctor.

It is not an honor to be the docto- -- honorary doctor of Dartmouth. But it is honor for Dartmouth if some people accept the degree. Because for your intellectual merits, you see, gentlemen, it is not a distinction to belong to your group.

I'm serious, gentlemen. This is incredible that -- Robert Frost can live here on this campus, and here, you are seniors and juniors and you don't know this poem, "A Gift Outright," which made him famous all over America.

The problem of American soil is a very serious one. As you know, it's shrinking. And we have not only the dust storm problem in Texas, but the

whole problem of the future of mankind -- on this little soil is -- is still unsolved. Obviously with the -- humanity increasing as it does, we probably have to go into the deep sea to be fed and -- very soon. And the Weyerhausers, gentlemen, put a philosophical problem. Why? Physis, gentlemen, if it is just an object of men's exploitation, you see, it is under mercilessness, under the law of just struggle, you see, survival of the fittest, exploitation. You carry that to the extreme, Mr. Weyerhauser is absolutely right.

But obviously, appropriation, gentlemen, that is, the appropriation of a part of the universe entails an obligation to find out the will of its creator. The destiny of this soil. And this soil has to be reproduced. It has to be -- as we call it today in this country "conserved." "Conservation." "Conservation" is a very poor word, you know. But in this country, you -- you have no better word. But you must always know the real problem is that man is the mouthpiece of all other creatures, and that he has to deal with bees, and apples, and -- in their own manner. You cannot she- -- go from Chicago to Africa and kill all the elephants and the tigers off as they do now. It should be immediately forbidden. It's just an orgy today of --. I have met these millionaires. I was in Egypt studying and there they came--I have told you, I think, this story--flying in, and just shooting, shooting, shooting. And the lady sitting in an armored car just looking at her great husband. And that's done here on our -- you do it now, because you can't do it anymore in this country, where we have killed the bull moose, and the wild pigeon, and everybody else.

I say "everybody else," gentlemen, because you see what an ethical problem it is. At what poi- -- one -- at which point, gentlemen, does the sun, and the moon, and the elephant, and the trees become our own brothers and sisters? When do you have to call them "he," and when do -- are we allowed to call them "it"? That's a great problem. Your car is "she." The ship is "she." Because you know that your life depends on them. So you couldn't say "it" of your car. And you couldn't say "it" of -- as the Britishers couldn't in the -- on their island call it "it." That's the reasons why both are "she."

Now, gentlemen, as long as in this country we cannot speak of the forests as "sh-" -- as "hes" and "shes," as we speak in poetry today of the sun and the moon. You haven't done wrong -- right by these -- by this physis, because you have not taken it across the boundary of ethics into your city of man. It hasn't become a living part of your humanity. And that's the whole trouble with this country, that the pioneering days allowed man to squeeze a farm dry like a parchment, throw it away and go to the next farm. And they said -- said so.

I knew a farmer who said, "I have squeezed 25 farms dry in my life," and he wasn't sent to prison. In any other country, the man couldn't be a citizen.

Now Mr. Weyerhauser was exactly this kind. It took him 20 year -- -9 years after the report of the Congress to recover his senses. And in 1941, he started the first tree farm. Gentlemen, what's a tree farm? Something -- it's a poor word for a good thing. It's -- we call it "forest" in Europe. It's a forest. And any forest in Europe is something that has to last a thousand years. Gentlemen, the percentage of woodland in Germany and Austria has remained the same until the French marched in, in '45, and took their revenge and killed the Black Forest. That was the most barbarous invasion of thousand years. Neither the Thirty Year War, nor the Peasant War, nor any -- or Seven-Year War, no war has ever killed the woods. Only when the French were permitted by the Americans to pose as victors did they murder the Black Forest. And they -- the -- the man in charge of the forest blew out his -- in his despair committed suicide. And the French were so -- so deeply -- felt so deeply menaced by this suicide that the man's death could not be announced in the papers in '47, that they forbade even to publicize that the man had killed himself, because it was, of course, a demonstration. They behaved like Mr. K d r behaves in Hungary, the -- because a forest is a living thing in Europe. You know, there are many songs to the forest. And very true feeling, that a tree has as much a right to -- to be -- reproduce, as a family. And in 1000 -- 1150, gentlemen, the percentage of wood land in Central Europe was 27 percent. And in 1945, it was still 7- -- 27 percent.

If you think of this, gentlemen, you know that physis and ethics are in constant cahoots, in constant conspiracy. That it is a deep problem, you see, to know that physis poses an ethical problem, just as you and I pose a physical problem. We have to eat. So we are part of physis. And the earth is to be respected, so it's part of ethics. And therefore the lines are constantly shifting between ethics and physis. And perhaps I have now made some step forward to make you understand that philosophy is not a luxury, and not an invention of a department, but that every one generation is saddled with this relationship between lo- -- ethics and physis. It has to be said what the relation is, you see. When do you call a tree "it," and when do you call it "she"? That's a problem; and every generation has to put it differently. If you have an abundance of trees and a few people, you make -- burn all the trees as a clearing, as you did in -- 200 years ago here. No -- you see, very understandable. But it can't last. Now we have, you see, many people and fewer trees, and the thing becomes quite serious.

The logos then, gentlemen, is the apportionment, the apportioning of ethics, and ethos, and physis to reality. And to prove to you, gentlemen, that this is something you yourself are immersed in, let me now give you an example of the moment, of the present day.

A naturalist, gentlemen, deals with -- let's take a simple example: bulges,

curves, waves; and he describes them so that anybody can see them. Now the historian, or the ethicist deals with the Battle of the Bulge. Has anybody -- heard of the Battle of the Bulge? Who has? Only a fraction. Well, gentlemen, when I and you deal with the Battle of the Bulge, which was fought in the -- at Christmas time 1944 and into the -- January, which was the battle -- the last stand Hitler took against the Americans, where the famous "Nuts" were said of -- at -- where?

(Bastogne.)

Bastogne, sure. Now we have here a very interesting problem. The high point was probably the resistance of the general in Bastogne. But the battle is rightly called the Battle of the Bulge. What's the difference, gentlemen, between bulges in physics and the Battle of the Bulge? Can anybody tell me the -- the situation of the logos, with regard to a physical event, that something bulges, like a dress, and the historical event that something is called "the Battle of the Bulge"? What's the difference? If you approach it in a -- spirit of investigation, what do you -- what is proposed to you, what do you have in front of you when you look at a bulge, and when you hear of the Battle of the Bulge? What's the difference?

If you can understand this, you come nearer to understanding another aspect of this eternal battle between ethics and physis. And I -- it must be my attempt to make you see that the -- all history of philosophy today, all the books, the popular books on philosophy are so nonsensical, so valueless -- they give you anecdotes. But they do not tell you that there is in every year of the Lord the same question necessarily asked, you see. Always the same. Philosophy has one theme and nothing else. And you don't believe this. You think philosophers are brown-study men who think of something. They don't think of something. They think of the one dilemma, in which ever son and daughter of man is immersed. That it -- you have to distribute your loyalties between bulges, gentlemen, and battles of bulges. Why?

I -- I'll give it to you, because you won't find it, gentlemen. If you speak of the Battle of Waterloo, the historian, the philosopher, the thinker, the man who comes later, it already has a name. And as this name shook the roof- -- -afters. The Battle of Waterloo makes the fortune of the Rothschild bank. It made the English put the monument of Wellington in front of their stock exchange. It brought about the restoration of the Bourbons. And therefore every Frenchman to this day who is a leftist trembles in re- -- with respect to the name of the Battle of Waterloo.

That is, gentlemen, historical, ethical, political events, events in the socie-

ty of men, express their reality, their significance by names, which meet with mixed feelings, which create tremendous emotions and tremendous actions. If you name Kossuth, the name of Kossuth in Hungary at this moment, it inflames the workers' council against the Russians. And it therefore is a reality in society which, when you talk to the Niagara Falls about Kossuth, has no corresponding response. Nature, gentlemen, cannot be spoken to. Human beings, however, are ruled by words, by names. I can arouse your feelings by any wicked name I give you, or give something you love. I cannot call your father "SOB" without your coming out and say, "Take this back. I'll hit you hard." Right you are.

Names, gentlemen are that what moves human beings. Nothing else. Nothing else, gentlemen. You cannot get any soldier to go to war if you cannot say to him, "Go to war." That's why you are so silly when you say, "War is murder." I hear people often confuse these things. Or when the Puritans -- not the Puritans, but the diseased Puritans thought that marriage was obscene, because you had to get children. Gentlemen, what you call a thing, that's what it is. Love and marriage are angelic, are heavenly powers. Prostitution is something quite different. It has a different meaning, and rightly so, because it is something different. It swings in a different context. I know that many marriages today are not better than prostitution. And there are very -- many honorable harlots. But the main thing is that even though -- the -- the names themselves, gentlemen, carry weight. Perhaps you take this down, gentlemen. The Battle of the Bulge carries weight with you and me. It moves us to action, because the name itself is a part of the event. An event has only happened after it has been called -- has received its name. The Battle of Waterloo was only the Battle of Waterloo after the English had decided to call it that way. Blcher tried to call it Belle Alliance, the good alliance, and it was -- didn't work. And there was another name proposed, you see. It didn't enter history. The French and the English have decided to call it the Battle of Waterloo. In German textbooks, you still fi- -- read the name "Belle Alliance." And for the -- for the Prussians who didn't enter the spirit of the French Revolution at all, it made no -- not much difference; the downfall of Napoleon had no immediately political, you see, democratic repercussions.

The Battle of the Bulge, gentlemen, cost me some American friends. We were seated at -- at -- at New Year's party together while these news came -- -ing in, and this was the one time that the Americans really trembled. There was a shock. It was unexpected. It was a setback, after they already had felt that everything was -- was over. We all were of course terribly grieved. But my friends, who were dear friends for -- by that time 10 years, broke with me inside, because they said, "This is a German. Well, who knows? He's one of these wicked peoples." They ascribed to me, so to speak, the Battle of the Bulge. Anything could happen with me, because I came from this cursed country which offered a

defeat to the victorious American armies. It was quite a shock to me, I can assure you. There we were, good friends, you see, in a close company, in a private home. And you just felt that they -- they had to take it out on somebody. So it was me.

That's what a Battle of the Bulge does. In -- in the world of eth- -- ethos, gentlemen, we are ruled by names. You know very well the difference between "Negro," "colored people," and "nigger." It's a difference. And it has different consequences -- which word you use. Very great dif- -- distinctions as a matter of fact. So it is with "WASP," and it is with "Christ-killer," and it -- with all these nice words which the American language harbors.

And it can't be helped, gentlemen, because we know each other by names. You give me the name "Professor." I give you the name "student," you see, and that gives us -- each other status. And we cannot be natural to -- with each other, you see. We have to be ethical. And it is Rousseau's and Thoreau's error that he thought men can be natural.

I tri- -- have tried to tell you that ethos is always older than nature. Nature is the common impression of second thought, on all of us. But society is my role with regard to other people's roles. It's reciprocal. Nature is a secondrate experience. Nobody can experience the space except with others together. All nature, that is, all mere space outside, can only be observed if you are firmly grafted in the common sense, in the common life of a society. No individual, no baby can observe nature, because it is fearful until his mother has said, "You can look out of the window. I'm with you. I'm protecting you." Any physicist, you see, has a fire department, and has you and me, the taxpayer, supporting him before he can be delegated to the front of nature looking out for us into space.

If you can once see this, gentlemen, space we all have in common, but your lifetime you have for yourself. And therefore, your lifetime has to be reaffirmed by the name given you. The president of the United States is now president for four years. He is it only because we say so, you see. The man in -- in Haiti today, as you know, resigned as president of Haiti on December 6th, and now he -- he calls himself just nothing. Therefore there is -- the law has been broken. Have you seen it in the paper? A funny man. He -- he resigned as president because his term was up. He didn't allow a re-electio- -- a second election. He took command of the armed forces. And now he is a nameless somebody, and everybody has the right to declare that there is no law in Haiti. And he didn't know this, this idiot. He lives in a -- probably went to an American prep school, where nature and ethos are confused.

All of you, gentlemen, are sick because you don't know this distinction.

All of you think that life is experienced as -- in the same way in society and in nature. In soc- -- nature, you never experience life. You only experience death. You only experience things. What you call experience, gentlemen, is not what you think it is. In society, we experience how people call us. That's what you experience, you see, and how you -- they expect you to call them. That's a real experience in society.

For example, if you have the experience of your first love, you understand that your -- girl expects to be called by a name she has never heard before. If you can't invent a name for this girl, she'll never love you right. Any -- young love can demand that the persons involved are called with a name never used before on them. That's what makes a poet. That's why poetry is necessary in love, because you go to the poet and borrow some of his epithets so that your girl may give you a date. Better be poetical, you see. But this, gentlemen, is experience, is an experience which you cannot make in nature. You cannot make an experience in nature because you can -- of this kind, because you cannot speak to nature. Nature can operate on your five senses, but it doesn't make sense. But if your girl suddenly calls you "Johnny," and -- and is reconciled to your advances, you have made a tremen- -- have a tremendous experience. Somebody spoke to you who did not speak to you before. That's the difference. And that is experience.

All the words you use, "life," and "experience," you abuse, gentlemen, because you have lost the wall between nature and society. And that is the deepest reason, gentlemen, why Marx came into being against the liberals. In this country, as you know, liberals today are Communists. But gentlemen, there is a wall between liberal thinking and Communist thinking. And what is the wall? The wall is that Marx said, "It's all society, it's how we call each other, how we speak to each other, how we treat each other, reciprocity." And all the liberals, every American philosopher, statesman, and thinker tries to deny that we are anything but natural beings. And there is no understanding, therefore, on the real Marxian issue today in this country, gentlemen. Marx has nothing to do with what the Russians do. That's politics. Marx was a very profound thinker who saw that Rousseau, and Thoreau, and Franklin had abolished the wall of the eternal dilemma, of the double household in which we live. You live in a family of human beings who call each other by names, by the right or the wrong names. And you live in a natural, you see, world outside, but only if you huddle together, if the auth- -- -olidarity -- solidarity. Society is ruled, gentlemen, by solidarity, despite every man's own time. Nature is ruled by distinction, despite the unity of space. Will you take this down? Society is ruled by solidarity, despite the distinction of -- every member's time, or lifetime, you can say, or time span or -- ja, time. And nature is ruled by the distinction of every thing, by the distinction of everything, despite the unity of space.

Well, Sir, I wish you would write this down, too. Why do you refute -- refuse? I shall treat you as a piece of nature from now on.

({ }.)

Society lives by solidarity, despite the distinction of every man's own time. And space lives by the distinction of everything despite the unity of its space. If I speak to you, gentlemen, I have declared my solidarity. Can -- I can only speak to people whom I grant life, and who grant me life. Whenever you speak to a person, he is pardoned. There was a great law in the kingdom of Spain, when the king -- or the Roman Emperor, too -- when a man would -- with a judge, or the king, or the emperor, or the dictator speaks to a man who is condemned to die, the man is pardoned, because the sanctity of the society demands that when the living word reaches one of the members, you see, the -- the highest power, the supreme power, he thereby has received it.

In the old times, gentlemen, in any tribe, in any Indian tribe, when the father of the family receives the child and gave it his name, the child could no longer be exposed, and life -- his life couldn't be destroyed. By the acceptance of this per- -- of the personality of this child, by giving it his own -- its own name, the child only made the threshold between nature and society.

That is, the ancients, gentlemen, knew very well that it is only the word spoken to somebody who takes him across from physis to ethos. We do this. Gentlemen, we no -- don't have to do it. Hitler snuffed out, as you know, all these -- 6 million Jews by giving him a -- them a number. And at the end, they had not even their own name. And at that very moment, he felt strong enough to -- to find -- helpers to -- to extinguish them. As long as they had had their name, I think many of his hangmen would have shuddered by his lawlessness, you see. But first, he flipped them outside society on the dungheap of nature. And once you deprive a person of his name, and you don't even know that he has a name, he's just a number, you can easily reconcile your conscience, you see, and say, "Oh, it's for the good of their -- of a," you see, "of the country, that these people are wiped out like lice." And that's what he actually did. He said in the beginning, "I shall weed them out like grass -- like weeds. And I shall teach people to look tha- -- in that," you see, "into them, the character of weeds."

So gentlemen, ethics and physis are political problems. Philosophers are always in politics. Always in politics. At this moment, gentlemen, this country is without any thought, without any mind, I mean -- I -- I think the all-time low, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., a man panic-stricken, with shit in his pants. And that's a -- representing us to the outside world. I mean, it's the all-time low in foreign politics -- has been reached in this country. Fortunately the man is dismissed.

Even they find out in Washington.

And it's a great scandal, gentlemen. -- But foreign policy now, we -- we cater to Mr. Nehru's policy. Because policy has to be -- Mr. Nehru has now to tell the American public what's ethics and what's physis. If you read carefully how we cling to this Asian-African bloc -- why? Because everybody has now -- European thought? Can't be listened to. Europeans in America, like myself, can't be listened to. But we can listen to this idiot Mr. Nehru. If you read his Universal History, it's the stupidest book that has ever been written. But we -- it is. It is available in {Talplit's} for 80 cents. There has never been anything so miraculously stupid. But he's a "great, wise man." Because this country has no philosophy. It has declined to listen to philosopher, so it must listen to any witch -- sorcerer from the outside. Once it was the Chinese who was beloved. Now Mrs. -- Mrs. -- Mrs. -- what was her name? Mrs. Chiang Kai-Shek, yes. You have a hard -- hard time to remember that. But I can assure you, in my time, even my horse got her -- his name from her, because my -- a young friend of our house was such an enthusiast, you see. And her family gave Mrs. -- Mrs. Chiang KaiShek a million dollars. And so she got the right also to name my horse; now it has a Chinese name.

Only to show you that every 10 years, some other influence in this country, of some philosophical -- allegedly philosophical nature is at work. And I -- I just come from Boston, and I have a dear friend there. She was always progressive. She even voted for Wallace. And -- and now she's so progressive that Mr. Nehru is her idol. And I said to her, "Do you always have to have an idol?"

She said, "Yes." She has to have an idol, because she has no philosophy.

Mr. Nehru today in this country is such a joke, because there is nobody who hates America more than his delegate here, Mr. Mennon. He is a great -- yes, he is a great hater of this country. And he tries to de- -- degrade us. And we listen to his -- because we need something new, something, you see --. The only philosophy in this country is fashion, -- the latest mental fashion. Because you evade the issue, gentlemen, you have to have a philosophy, because if not, you have another man's philosophy. Because at any moment, you must know whether the trees in Oregon can be cut down or not. As you know, the people in Oregon, Idaho, and -- and -- and Washington have to have very appropriate ideas about Hell Canyon, and conservation. They are -- very much harder hit than we. They have a philosophy of government there. I have a friend there who worked in the -- in the Columbia River power development, and he is -- in politics, and I know how deeply the people there have for this limited area, at least, a definite philosophy. Very strongly developed, and that's how they defeated Mr. {McKay}, and Mr. {Welker}.

It's a partial philosophy, but it's something to know that people know the difference, gentlemen, between a forest that is alive and between a forest that is a thing. That's ethos, gentlemen. -- Take it now down. Ethos is the treatment of the universe as much as -- as much alive at least as myself or more. And physis is the treatment of the universe as less alive than myself, or dead.

You have a hell of a time to -- to appreciate The Tempest by Shakespeare, because the world there is eth- -- ethically treated by Ariel, and spirits, and Caliban, and the -- they -- they -- the whole -- Island, as you know, is alive. And that's for you is a joke, gentlemen. I doubt that it is a joke.

I have in my long life, coming from a big city with too much -- too much blacktop in the streets, I had to recover my senses. And I think I have. I now fully understand the necessity of speaking in gender, of the "la forˆt," as the French do. It isn't a thing for a Frenchman to call it "la forˆt," you see. It is alive.

And the -- the sea, the same. Isn't the s- -- what is the sea in English? Which is "she" and which is "it"? Wie? How about the sea? Isn't there in English a distinction? Wie? Which sea is feminine? No. S-e-a. Sea.

({ } the Atlantic Ocean is maybe compared to a "she," but "ocean" in general is "it.")

Ja. Because that's -- that's -- that's why I mentioned it to you, gentlemen. Where there is a complete name, there is personality, you see. Atlantic Ocean, she, you see, can be she. And thereby -- it moves up to the grade, you see, of -- of life. It's -- it's your equal. The great -- that's the great story. The -- the abstract sea, you see, thing, neuter. It, you see. The -- the named thing alive.

St. Augustine's -- I told you about this incest { } and my famous example, gentlemen. In the old Roman law, and in -- and in St. Augustine, there is found the explanation why we can't marry our mother and our sister. You think that's something natural. Nothing in nature, gentlemen, that would forbid you to marry your --. The -- the animals -- do forget who's their mother and who's their sister. And they do mate. So it is per- -- perfectly natural. It has nothing to do with unnatural, incest, gentlemen. It has only to do with ethos. And St. Augustine has put it in a nutshell when he said, "I cannot make love to my mother and sister, because I already at first have received them by another name of love. And therefore I -- the new power of naming would be impoverished. I could never supplant"--you see, how do you say -- supplant? ja--"supplant, substitute, replace one name of love, the first name, mother, you see, by the new name of love, which would ring absolutely unheard-of," you see. The essence of love is the new name.

It's a very profound, and I think the only profound explanation of incest. It doesn't belong to the biologist. It doesn't belong to the geneticist. It belongs to the ethicist. Ethos is hurt if what you have re- -- received in a tepid mood, or a lukewarm mood, or warm mood, mother or sister, you see, suddenly is obliterated by the explosive force, you see, of sweetheart and love. We must not -- you -- you -- evade all these serious issues by putting them, like genetics and eugenics, into the department of zoology. But gentlemen, you and I will never be a zoological being. It is hopeless for you and me, because we are shocked by wrong names. If somebody calls you a liar, you can say a thousand times it's just a word. It burns you up.

Yesterday, Mr. Booth read the -- Othello. Who -- who went there? Oh, you are not freshmen any longer, so you are through with Shakespeare. Well, there -- there Cassio, you see, is dismissed from his office by Othello, and he -- he runs around and says, "I have lost my reputation, reputation, reputation." It's a very wonderful scene, because the -- the grasping Iago is already the naturalist and says, "Oh, the body. If you were wounded, I would pity you. But reputation? It's nothing. Reputation? Reputation? After all, everybody who landed in these -- on these shores usually had already lost his reputation in Europe. So what's the difference? Reputation, you see. It makes no difference." But it does, gentlemen. Unfortunately Mr. Cassio is moved through the whole play through his loss of reputation. And he -- and Desdemona perishes, because she tries to restore his reputation.

(Well, Sir. Iago equivocates though, because later on he says, "He who steals my purse steals trash.")

Pardon me?

(Well, later on, Iago says, "He who steals my -- my purse, steals trash, but he who fil- -- filches my good name is taking something.)

Well, Iago of course is the devil. The devil is the man who knows the importance of ethics, but refuses to believe it, you see? You see.

The -- the -- you see, the real problem of faith, which I have already tried to tell you I think in other classes, is that people who know something won't believe it. You always think that on the one side of the ledger is faith. And on the other is belief. And so you divide science and religion and you say, "Religion is -- belief that which cannot be known, or which is stupid, or which is the opposite of -- of science. And science is the facts." Gentlemen, that's not the story. The problem of knowing and believing is quite different. Iago says, "I know," you see, but he doesn't act on it. And therefore he doesn't believe in it.

That's the devil. Believing -- it means action, to act on something.

I told you the story of Mr. -- of here, Mr. Steffansson, the Arctic explorer, who went to Washington in 1942 and said -- after Pearl Harbor, and said, "You know for 400 years that the earth is round, don't you?"

And they said, "Yes."

"But you have not believed in it. And you don't believe in it, and why don't you?"

They were very much surprised. You know the story? And what was his answer?

(I believe that he meant { } Iceland.)

In which { }.

(Pardon?)

Yes, in which context was this important for our war effort?

(Flying.)

In flying over the {Kuriles}, yes, and the Aleutians, instead of over -- via Hawaii. If -- you see, the -- the road on the Equator, obviously, you see, is twice as long as if you -- go take the shortcut, as the -- as the periphery of the -- of the ball, the globe. And they -- they had known, but they hadn't believed it. The same true is of Iago, gentle- -- Sir, you see. And the same is true of you, gentlemen. You know that men should have solidarity. But you don't act it out in Clinton, Tennessee.

So my -- this was my duty for your paper. First to state once more that logos, physis, and ethos, gentlemen, are realities, because the city of man speaks to us, but is small. The universe doesn't speak to us, but is big. You can also take down this as another sidelight: we always experience space as a whole, and then subdivide it into things, into smaller things. First, you wake up and there is this whole space, until you come to an hindrance. And then you can subdivide it into seats in this room, and places, inside. The experience of space is first, as one. And every division of Egypt, and Arab countries, and Africa, and Europe is belated, is second. Time is experienced the other way around. You experience first the o- -- one moment of your own life, and then perhaps the -- your own life. That all time is one -- has to be created. Has to be believed. It is not natural.

It's nonsense to tell you that all time is one. Not an experience. It's a thought. It's just a -- a creation of the mind, an act of will. Most people never realize it. Most people live as though they -- they were the only people in the world, and their own time was the only time that existed.

Now most people don't know this. You always speak so glibly of space and time. Take it down, gentlemen: space and -- to put space and time together in this manner is a mere superstition. It doesn't exist, because all space is first experienced as singular, as one space; and all spaces are fragments and fractions of this one big space, the universe. But your lifetime, gentlemen, is first experienced as this time to yourself. You cannot share it with anybody. It's the existential problem. You only have your own time, you see. And you have nothing else, at first. Given: your own time; given: the universal space. They are the only -- they are two facts, you see.

If you can say, however, that your little home is not for sale, because it is yours in this universe, and if you can say that all men of all times, the ages, belong to you and you belong to the ages, then you have done something that is not natural. That's purely ethical. That's a creation of the logos.

The unity of time, gentlemen, and the division of space is the achievement of the logos, arbitrating between the space of physis and the time of society. The unity of time, gentlemen, and the divisions of space are the achievements of the logos, of the words spoken to these times, and to these -- this space. To space, we say, "Make room for a nation," for a little nation, too, you see. To time, we say, "Be one, from the beginning to the end," because it isn't by nature.

We have no experience of any time before my -- your birth and before -- after your death. Can't be experienced. Purely fiction. But a fiction you can believe in. It's -- it's -- that's the dream castle which we build.

Let's have a break here.

[tape interruption]

...gives us a good Anglo-Saxon term for "society."

(It's not Anglo-Saxon. It's Assyrian. I looked it up, too. It comes from {kenon}.)

(I got mine from Webster's Unabridged.)

(I got mine from Webster's Academic. 18- -- 1850.)

Well, I -- I --.

(But there is -- there is an Anglo-Saxon word however, which we thought of the other day, "burgh" -- b-u-r-g-h.)

Wie?

(And I'm fairly certain it's Germanic in origin, "burgh.")

Oh yes, it's burgh, there's Newburgh, and what you have -- what have you -- burger, the word "burger" you see comes from it. You see, the citizen. Of course, that's in German, too, I mean, the same, Brger. And "bourgeois" is the same. La -- the French "bour," from which "bourgeois" comes. That's exactly the same word, "burg," "burger." It's Dutch, too.

And -- but that's not the story. The burgh is after all the fortified place. But the minimum for a settlement in the old days, was a hedge. And -- in German, this -- this -- and this is pronounced like "town," so it could also be spelled this way. And in English "t" in German is always "z." You have English "two," and we have in German "zwei." You have English "ten," and you have German "zehn." And you have English "town," and you have German "Zaun." And the Zaun is today -- nothing but a fence.

Now the important thing is, gentlemen, that our anci- -- ancestors were good philosophers. You have lost their insight that men can only exist behind a fence. "The fence of the law," the Jews called it. The fence of the law. That is, human society is only able, by some distinction from nature, you see, to begin to exist, to live. And therefore the word "town" and the word "Zaun" in English -- in German, or the word "fence" today, the fence of the law, means that people among themselves accredit each other with life, and personality, and grant each other the right to live.

The Human Rights Day was yesterday, and you know, the president had to say that it was very poor at this moment, how it was handled. But what you call "human rights" is this living behind a fence where we cannot be treated like nature. You cannot treat a man inside your Zaun, inside your town, you see. Inside Our Town, we have to treat each other as -- as alive as we ourselves, or as I said to you in the definition, more alive. You look up to a judge, and a minister, or priest, or a good mother as more alive than yourself, I hope, or to the poet. And therefore receiving dignity, authority. What is authority? Dignity? Recognition that they have more life than we have. We grant them therefore recognition as a -- of a higher life.

It's all very simple, gentlemen. The whole gradation is constantly made by every one of us. I have seen young children snub an old man of 85, and I have seen them revere him. And that's then a decision they constantly make, you see. If they treat him as nature-boys, then they think because a man has no teeth and no hair left, he is just dead; and they treat him in nature as less alive than they are. If they live in a good society, with the fence of the law around them, they'll get up when an old man enters the room, or an old lady, and will show their reverence. And that's the difference between the fence -- outside the fence, and inside the fence. And today the -- assumption of the young brat is that there is no such pale. "Outside the pale," no meaning for you. The juvenile delinquent has totally conquered society. The juvenile delinquent thinks that he is outside the fence, that everything is nature. He can shoot anybody in Central Park.

That's nature, you see. This -- this business of town, then, and township, is something rather -- very simple. -- Really, the recognition that the whole difference between ethos and -- and nature, and physis is in the fence.

Everybody inside the fence has a right to live. Nothing outside the fence has this right, you see, can claim it, because it doesn't speak to us. We -- manipulate it, we treat it, we make war against it. We exploit it. We make it as a garden into the city, and plant the flowers there, and treat them, you see, as domesticated animals, or domesticated plants, then they come to life with us.

Now let's turn to the -- this is the last day today on Plato. Will you kindly look up The Symposion? I said to you that the greatness of Plato is -- in The Republic is that he identifies the individual and the republic. That all the powers of the republic as a whole, the organization of mind, heart, and belly, is found as well as--in any city--as in the individual. That's, as I said, we should use the word "micro-" -- "micropolis" for man in Plato. Man in Plato is a little city. And the other is a macropolis. And you see, therefore, that's an ethical concept.

Plato has for men and society nothing physical. But to him it's ethos. You speak of microcosmos, and macrocosmos, and think that's Greek philosophy. You are mistaken. In Plato and Aristotle, man is the city written small. This is very important, because I said to you, Plato and all philosophers ever since, gentlemen, are a community inside themselves. Any philosopher must be able to voice inside himself the voices of the whole community. He is not a philosopher who cannot speak the jargon of a king, of a mother, of a worker, of a slave, of a technician, of an inventor inside himself and make the -- all harmonize. The philosopher is a small city inside himself, gentlemen. That is since -- Plato, the solution, it may not be true that you and you are little cities. You may just be individuals. But a philosopher, you see, one man in the city must be like the city.

A little ahor- -- acorn, so to speak, you see, the egg, the seed of the whole city.

({ } that Democritus, according to Aristotle { } said that a -- a man is a small world.)

Well, there you have a kind of derailment. I mean, he should have said he's a small city, I'm sure. That's -- is the break in the tradition. Today we all say "small world." That is microcosm. Micro- -cosm, small world.

Gentlemen, I warn you. I give you an example of how I experienced this very practically. It's -- 40 years ago I was a soldier in the war. And I was deeply moved, of course, by the conflict. And I tried to {fancy} -- at the front it was, in the second year of the war, possibility of unifying all the veterans of all the different countries, and make them turn around and face the home warriors, and these journalists, and these home patriots and fight them, instead. Because soldiers at the front are really of the same -- very much of the same breed as against the ladies at home. And -- well, I fumbled around with a project -- literary project. And I had the soldiers, and knights, and officers of all nations meet in my imagination. The manuscript is still there. And it's something -- it has still -- probably got to be done about it sometime. And the last speech I -- is a phil- -- is -- is -- has this as its content. I offer this to you to make you understand the practical importance of this definition of a philosopher as being a city in -- the nutshell.

They had met regularly and discussed -- I mean, the future of the human race. And on All Souls, at the end of the year of the Church, in November, you see, the ecclesiastical year goes to an end. Advent already belongs to the next year of the Church, you know. Decem- -- November 30 is the last day of the Church year. I had one man stand all alone. And he said, "All the others," there were 72, "have -- seems to have relinquished me, have deserted. I am here alone. What does this mean?"

And he said, "That's the real triumph, because in this year, we have been welded together to such an extent that everyone -- can now represent the 71 others, too. Everyone has taken over, so to speak, the other nation- -- nations' viewpoint, and the other nations' character -- so much that he is now empowered to speak for all. And so we have multiplied. Out of 72 individuals there have now -- have now come 72 people, you see, who can speak every one of them, for all 72."

Now that is, in a small way, Plato's experience in The Republic, you see. That at least he, Plato, must have filled himself with the positions, and the experiences of all men in a city, and in all potential cities, before he can, you see,

propose the best state. Ja?

(Then you're telling us, Sir, we can't treat men in any way that's natural or objectively { } human behavior?)

Well, if you take a tree, Sir. Obviously, if you have an apple tree, the apple that is able to produce a new apple tree must have a certain wealth of poten- -- potentiality. If you begin to treat the human mind as a real thing, and not as a flimsy abstraction, you will understand that you can -- man can only bear fruit in political thinking if he has really become the apple of the whole tree.

That's all I want to say at this moment. I don't want to stress your question so much. If you could only see, I'm moving in a -- quite a different direction from your question. Can you see this? The important thing is that Plato is not thinking in the abstract, but he has filled himself with the life of his city. If you could see this, you see. And so he has become now an acorn or an apple. And the apple tree, Athens, can now wither on the stem and perish, because through Plato, the Greeks' free city is safe for generations, you see. From generation to generation, you can read Plato and inherit the -- the glory that was Greece. And also the limitations that were Greece. You can't find in Plato anything beyond the Greek city.

The important thing that I wanted to make -- is you nowhere find in the American tradition the distinction again between nature, by -- according to which the human being would have to be a microcosmos, a small nature, a small world -- and the micropolis, the -- ethical problem that a man has -- must have inherited all the good ways of life, of his city, the lawful order, his -- the quality of law-abidence, of virtue, you see, before he can speak about government. And you see there is a very vast discrepancy between being micropolis and being microcosmos.

Modern man seems--in this era of chemistry it is understandable--seems to boast that he is a microcosmos. But then he would have no direction, and he would have -- not know what is right and wrong. Because nature has no direction, and nature has no right and wrong. And nature is merciless, as I told you. In nature, everything is just itself, you see. Nature is based on selfhood, on impenetrability, on resistance, on gravity, on -- you see, on no escape. Society is based on interpenetration, on mutual understanding, on reciprocity, and on inheritance. And I can inherit acquired faculties. And the micropolis therefore is Plato. And please say to yourself, all Greek philosophers try to form this micropolis in various degrees. Some thought you could dissolve the polis into physis, as Epicurus, you see, and Lucretius. And they tried to be microcosms. There's no

doubt that Lucretius, and all the Epicureans, and Democritus tried to give the weight to physis and said the -- the city of man is a burden on us. Let's go out into nature. But that's only one {strand}. Then you get Heraclitus, and you get -- and you get Socrates, and you get Plato. And they struggle violently, you see, to restore the balance, and to say, "The philosopher must inherit the ways of life of a city. Before, he cannot lay out the next city. Before, he cannot philosophize."

(Well, if the philosopher has all the parts of the city within him, what would be the objection to having the philosopher be king?)

Too muchness, too muchness. He would -- he would take away all the freedom from anyone. Nobody could be creative. Since he has -- knows it all, the others would become automat- -- automat- -- you see, automatons. Because he knows too much.

I mean, the -- the grain of seed must fall in the ground and die before it can bear fruit, you see. The philosopher is the grain of seed before it has died. You understand? If he rules himself. He can teach. And if then in 72 others his doctrine comes to life, they can found a city. You see, but it -- Alexander could conquer the world, you see, in the next generation. But Aristotle had no right to rule. That's the difference. The philosopher himself must not rule, because by his own self, he would extinguish the spontaneous life, the freedom of all the people he ruled. Can't you see this? Overweight.

That's the mystery between Church and state, gentlemen. The Church teaches, but it must not rule. As soon as a church rules, you see, it is horrid. It becomes a great inquisitor. Can you see this? It's the same problem, you see. The -- the wisdom of the Church has been that it -- that it is on a different planet. It does not rule itself. But it teaches. It instructs. It corrects. It criticizes. It prophesies. It leads, you see. It converts. But the people themselves must act in the state. And that's why the separation of state and Church is profoundly true. This Plato did not know. Plato is not a Christian, because he lives before this separation of the gods, you see, and the laws. That's why he's even called The Theologian, and he wanted to be king. And you can see that would be a pope who would be emperor, and an emperor would be pope.

It's all -- is -- if you don't understand -- that's why Plato at this moment is a great danger to be read. Lenin read him. And the Bolsheviks read him. And you read him. And you think it's harmless, gentlemen. If you unite Plato's -- Plato's claims in yourself, you become intolerable tyrants, because your insight is one thing, you see. You can use this for teaching. Or -- you see, your fumbling in the political game, you see, like Mr. Nixon, who's just an opportunist, you see, that's -- more harmless, because he's just, you see, always out for one thing. He

has not a straight thought in his mind. But he can't do much harm. He's not a tyrant. He's not like Lenin, or Marx, or Stalin. He has no philosophy, you see, except Nixon.

This is very strange. But you see, Nixon is only in Plato's thought one little side issue. Therefore it isn't -- he isn't so preponderant. Can you see this? He cannot be so destructive as -- as a man who says, "I know it all."

Gentlemen, Plato has in The Symposion in a certain manner outrun himself. His whole philosophy is between the single in- -- philosopher and the city. In The Symposion, however, there's a little more of unity between people because the truth comes out in such a way that every one has to contribute something. There is in this sense no philosopher in The Symposion who is alone. But there is an orchestra of philosophers, { } people. And that's why alt- -- it has always been felt that in The Symposion, Plato is greater than himself, that he transcends himself in { }, that his love for people, and his love of Athens, and his love of the arts, and his love of love make him, so to speak, explode his own system. And that's a very beautiful spectacle, gentlemen. A living soul must always be greater than his own mind. The love of -- you see, of reality must be greater than cleverness. You must be better than yourself; the Bible calls it, "Let us be more than conquerors." The living soul is always greater than he knew yesterday to be. I mean, you say, "I can't do this," and tomorrow you have done it, because we live. And life is -- the life of the next day must be more than my thoughts of yesterday.

And -- and Plato in a -- in a way I think has overdone -- outdone himself in The Symposion. And I cannot -- we cannot read it together, but let us look up just a few lines. It is the only place in The Rep- -- in the -- Plato in which a woman can say something. And who is she? Diotima, yes. "Honored by Zeus" is her name. It has been the downfall of Greek philosophy that women were shoved aside, that the experience of married life, for example, was not ever utilized, you see, for explaining any comradeship, or community, and that Plato, even in the -- in the gov- -- in laws, and the city, treats marriage as a -- as though he was an owner of the stockyards of Chicago. It's butchery. It is -- it is a stud farm. And he even demands that in denial of intercourse -- a wise women be present then to judge the eugenics of the case. He { } in this respect, because he tries to treat love as natural, and is unethical, anti-ethical.

This is not true of The Symposion. In The Symposion, the spirit gets hold of a woman. And that's why I think The Symposion will always astonish within Greece. Of course, the Greeks had one very great poetess. Who was she? Sappho. But even this poor woman was condemned to lesbian love by the circumstances. Nevertheless, she was a very, very great woman. I can never read her

poetry without being deeply moved. And she heads her -- holds her own and -- with any great poet. Although we have so very little of her, every shred of paper we have of her, makes her into a first -- puts her into the first rank.

Will you kindly read 115? No, wait a minute; 114 -- I -- I'm mistaken. Can you? Who has a copy? 114 -- "Now with your leave."

("Now with your leave, we will take the battle --")

Alcibiades, the most beautiful, and the most successful statesman of Athens speaks of Socrates, and tries to say what Socrates meant for him. Ja?

("For it is fair to say { } and there was that --)

That's Socrates. Hi- -- "him" is Socrates.

("For there was that battle after which the generals actually gave me the prize of valor.")

So Alcibiades is talking. He was distinguished, got the -- by the order of merit. It's a little bit like the story now of the two swimmers. You have seen this, the story. One won in the heat, with 3 minutes 52, and the other won in the Olympics. Who was it? What?

(Jones.)

Jones was the other, was he? What's the name? Haven't you read the story?

(Green.)

No. No.

(Yeah.)

No.

(Yeah.)

The 400 meter? In swimming.

(The 800 meters. The 1500 meters.)

Well, didn't you see in Melbourne, he said, "I still consider the man who won the heat as the champion."

(That was the race. That was running.)

What was it? How do you spell it?

(Track. Track.)

Really? What's the name?

(Jones.)

Jones. I know this. And the other?

(Tom {Courtenay}.)

(No. Charlie Jenkins.)

Jenkins. That's it. Now we have it. All right. So -- so Jenkins, you see, gave me the prize of valor. This man. Please, go on. That's Socrates.

("I would not { } other person came to my rescue and saved my life. I was wounded, but he would not leave me. He saved my weapon, and me, too. Then I made { } myself, Socrates, to you the prize of valor.")

There you have the Jenkins-Jones situation. Ja?

("And here you will not find fault with me or say I am lying. But the fact is, when the generals looked at my rank and wanted to give me the prize, you were more eager than the generals that I should get it and not -- that I should get it and not yourself. Again, gentlemen, it was worthwhile to see Socrates when the army was routed and retreating from Delios. I happened to be there on hos- -- horseback and he on foot. This man and Laches were retreating together in the rout. I met them and told them to cheer up, and I said I would not desert them. There indeed, I had an even better view of Socrates than at Pot- -- Potidaea, for I had less to fear, being on horseback. First I had saw how he had kept his head much better than La- -- Laches. Then I really thought, Aristophanes, to quote your words, that he marched exactly as he does here, with swaggering gait and rolling eyes, quietly looking around his friends and enemies, and making it quite clear to everyone, given a long way off, that if anyone laid a finger on this man, he would defend himself stoutly.

"And therefore he came off safe, both this man and his companion. For in war, where -- where men are like that, people don't -- usually don't touch them with a finger, but pursue those who are running headlong. One could quote many other things in praise of Socrates, wonderful things.")

Would you kindly underline this, if you own the book, "wonderful things." We can -- have to -- to dwell on this word "wonder" right away. Ja? Go on.

("Of -- of his other habits, one -- one might perhaps say much the same about another man. And yet it is not his being like any other man in the world, ancient or modern, that is worthy of all wondering. When men like Achilles --")

"Men like Achilles might be found. One might take, for example, Brasidas and others. And again, men like Pericles, such as Nestor and Antenor. And there are more besides. And so we might go on with our comparisons. But as for this man, so awed, both the man and his talk, none could ever be found to come near him, neither modern nor ancient, unless he is to be compared to no man at all, but to the Silenuses, and satyrs, to which I have compared him, him and his talk. For indeed there is something which I left out when I began, that even his talk is very like the opening Silenuses."

That's the companion of Bacchus intoxicated with wine.

"When you agree to listen to the talk of Socrates, it might seem at first to be nothing but absurdity. Such words and phrases are wrapped outside it like the hide of a boisterous satyr. Packasses, and smiths, and shoemakers, and tanners are what he talks about. And he seems to be always saying the same things, in the same words, so that any ignorant and foolish man would laugh at them. But when they are opened out, and you get inside them, you will find his words first full of sense, as no others are. Next, most divine and containing the finest images of virtue, and reaching farthest -- in fact, reaching to everything which it profits a man to study who is to become noble and good."

Now, will you take over? Go.

("This, gentlemen, is my laudation of Socrates. And I have mixed in as well some blame by telling you of the way he insulted me. I am not the only one he has treated so. He has done the same to Charmides, Glaucon's son; and Euthydemus, Diocles' son. And very many other whom he has tricked as a lover and made them treat him as the beloved instead.")

"And made them treat him as beloved instead."

("-- beloved instead. This is a warning to you, Agasthon, not to be deceived by this man. Try to learn from our experience; and take care not to be the fool in the proverb, who could only learn by his own. When Alcibiades --?")

Al-ki-bia-des. That's the Greek pronunciation. Let's stick to that. Al-ki-bia-des.

("-- Alcibiades had ended his speech, there was much laughter at his frankness, because he seems to be still in love with Socrates. But Socrates said, `You're sober, I think, Alcibiades, or you would never have wrapped all that smart mantle around you, or tried to hide why you've said all this, and put your point in a postscript at the end. For your real aim in all you said was to make me and Agasthon quarrel. You think I ought to be your lover and love no one else, and Agasthon should be --")

Ag-a-thon, I think we have to say. I think that's the tradition. Agathon. You have a point. In Greek it would be A-GAH-thon. Who lear- -- who knows Greek? So. When the last syllable -- is long, then it -- the accent has to -- always in Greek has always to be on the second syllable. So it would be in Greek Agathon. "...should be your beloved and loved by no one else." Ja. Go on.

("But I see through you. Your satyric and Silenic drama has been shown up. Now, my dearest Agathon, don't let him get at anything by it. Only take care that no one shall make you and him quarrel.")

One moment. Gentlemen, Socrates here is shown as the miracle. He himself is the miracle, the wondrous person. And I have tried to show you that this is the problem -- in Greece that man, the philosopher, is the wonder. Because he contains the whole city, and therefore, the secret of life--he's the micropolis, you see--is -- appearing in him, and can bear fruit. And then you have the sense of wonder with regard to physis. But in -- in The Symposion, there is a third element which you don't have at any other of the dialogues: admiration. That's the sense -- third relation of miracu- -- the miraculous to humanity. "Admiration," of course, in your language, has very little to do with "miracle." But it is -- I'm afraid to say, you see, the same root, and it is the same feeling, that you are aroused to admiration, because something strikes you as miraculous, or somebody strikes you as miraculous. And so in The Symposion, gentlemen, it is the only place where Plato has given a picture of the Academy. Neither one philosopher, nor the whole -- the old city, the city of man going to war, and planting cabbage, and begetting children, but in the Academy, you have philosophers admiring each other, and loving each other, and living together in the realm of the spirit.

The ethos of Plato appears here, because here is Alcibiades, you see: great statesman. And here of course is Plato himself, and here is Agathon the tragedian. And here is Aristophanes, the com- -- the writer of poetry. All the people of the spirit and of the mind, connected with each other in a peace of love, in a banquet, you see, of a drinking bout and good talk. And that is more than the city, and more than the individual philosopher. And in this moment, the -- the Academy, which is the unity of spirit, you see, between good men, are united in a selfless company, in a higher service.

When Woodrow Wilson came to Dartmouth, gentlemen, unfortunately hi- -- this speech is forgotten. It's not even printed in his collected speeches. He made a very wonderful speech in 1909. Every one of you should look it up in the addresses of Dartmouth College. It was at the occasion of the inauguration of -- of President {Nichols}. And Woodrow Wilson gave a wonderful speech and said that a college must be a friendship of -- and an unselfish company. "An unselfish company." If it wasn't, it was no good. He also raised the question in this great address, when he said, "While I look around here in Dartmouth Hall"--it was -- ja, I think it was Dartmouth Hall, yes, Webster hadn't been built--"I came to think if it was possible that this group here could produce an Abraham Lincoln. And I had sadly to confess to myself that it couldn't."

You have again the problem: philosophers, you see, you can produce in a college, but -- you understand, but not Abraham Lincoln so easily. At best, Nelson Rockefeller.

Where's the -- my crayon, my chalk? Here. So I think to end today's, gentlemen, picture of Plato, I have tried to show you that Plato is the -- himself the micropolis. And perhaps I should write him with a capital M. { } a great thing. One man at least has achieved in antiquity that he is the whole city in his own { }. There is in him then the logos. That is, he can by his doctrine reconcile men's existence on this globe in a city and under the domination of the beautiful and the true on this globe. Then there is the city. Either Athens, that's the old city; and the future city, that's the republic. The best city. That's his republic. Now obviously, gentlemen, that's the -- ethos of Plato. And we haven't been able to deal much with the physis, but you can believe me that he also has a doctrine about physis.

Now in The Symposion, there is a subject, because the Academy, the -- the orchestra, the living-together of these philosophers is not of this world. It's Heaven. It's the -- the famous ivory tower of which you talk so much. But I would like you to understand that the ivory tower is not just negative. It's very easy to dismiss the ivory tower, you see. With The Symposion, if you read it, and I want -- want -- would like you -- like to think that some of you will take to it

and read it themselves. In the -- there is mutual admiration. You call a mutual admiration society, gentlemen, but without admiration, they -- life is intolerable. We have to admire each other. That's not negative. We just have to in order to stand each other. If you don't admire each other, you will kill each other.

And therefore, gentlemen, Plato, plus Plato, plus Plato--that is, a -- a multitude of Platos--is that heavenly society, which ever since has been called "the other world," the other world. This idea of another world, gentlemen, which you think is connected with Christianity, { } -- is not a Christian idea. It's a Greek idea. Plato takes refuge in this world of ideals, in this ideal world, that The Symposion describes how good people can rejoice in this so-called other world. Why is it "other"? They are not concerned with establishing the best city. They do not steep -- step down, so to speak, into reality, you see, but they are rede- -- released to their own best devices, their own cheerfulness, their own joy in each other. And this mutual love of The Symposion is what I call -- tried to tell you is the exuberance, the sufferance begotten by the philosophic- -- -izing spirit, where two, three people can meet in the mind, you see. That is neither logos, nor ethos, nor physis, you see. That's Heaven. There is peace. There is redemption. There is already at least mentally achieved the unity of this dilemma. In The Symposion, there is no conflict. Everything seems to go easy. It's the Beatitudes. It's the Island of the Blessed. What the French call "Les Champs Elys‚es." That means Elysian, what all -- ages have always tried to -- to construct, you see: a Heaven in which all these -- these -- not only dilemmas, but these paradoxes would be dissolved.

The Symposion is what the Seventh Letter of Plato says: "I have never written down what I really mean to be the kernel of my philosophy," he has said. I could answer, except in The Symposion, you see. The real kernel of his doctrine is that people can already in this world live as the wise can live together, you see, in harmony, despite their differences. There has no -- been no dispo- -- despotism of one ruling the city, so to speak.

And therefore -- always when you talk of Plato, put The Symposion on a -- quite a different plane from the dialogues, or from the -- from The Republic. The Republic has to deal with a physical city, and an ethical city to be brought down to earth. But -- The Symposion, you are living in Heaven. You are living in one good hour, you see, in a festive hour. It's the difference between work day and festive day in the philosopher's life. The -- the -- all the other works of Plato are hard work, and something to be learned from it. But The Symposion, gentlemen, is not the question of learning anything. Any fool who analyzes the doctrine of love in The Symposion deserves to be chased out of the town of the philosophers, you see. Because this is Heaven, and in Heaven, there is no argument. There is just enjoyment, and good talk, and in friendship, and in

mutual love.

Now I find many pedants--you probably have found in your textbooks men like Will Durant or some such gentleman. He will, of course, put all these writings on the same plane, you see, and go to work and make mincemeat out of The Symposion. But The Symposion, gentlemen, is a work of art. And it is a unity between thought and scenery, so to speak. And woe to you if you ever come to deplore, to rape The Symposion, gentlemen. That's not a question of argument, but that's a question of joining in. If you can in your own friendship establish such an evening with your good friends, then you have made the right use of The Symposion.