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I have been asked to tell you something more about the papers to be -- delivered in -- on April 15. There's not very much to be said, except that the -- the problem before the house is that the term "improvement," "internal improvement" used by -- in the speech of Webster, already in the year 1830 includes the constant problem of the United States, that its non-incorporated, non-urbanized responsibility, or territory, or region is always as vast as the part that is already digested. And I gave you last time an item of this. When John Jay said to the Spanish minister in Madrid that the Americans thought that God Almighty Himself had given them the Mississippi River at a time when not one American was settled on the Mississippi River. Now that is an extraordinary statement from any other people. And you would call, of course, any other nation greedy, and imperialistic, and aggressive. And -- but this peace-loving country of course, is quite a different situation.

We have the same problem in -- at this -- we -- we are halting at this moment in the year 1850. I told you that by 1850, a decisive step was taken from the people to -- to the public. Well, you know that the Mexican War brought about the final identification of America as a political entity with the geographical entity, because California was reached, and so it made sense now to identify what was on the map as the continent of America, and what was the political unity of -- first only of the 13 colonies?

So it took from 1780 to 19- -- to -- from 1708 to 1850 before the two completely different notions--one geographical and prehistorical, America as a continent; and the political entity, the United States of America, you see--made -- joined hands, so to speak. Of course, the South Americans were still not in it. But it made sense now to -- I -- to feel that the geograph- -- the lesson of geography and the lesson of history had been -- hadn't -- had been melted. You must think all the time from 1780 to 1850, there was a cleavage in the consciousness of the Americans because they did not cover the continent that had received from the Europeans the name, the label of "America." From the inside, they were already identifying themself from the outside, as you all well know. Even as late as 1864, the -- British, and the Spaniards, even, and the English cer- -- and the French certainly entertained notions that the whole of the continent was still open, you see. That for example Mexico could become a -- a -- a French dependency. Maximilian was only shot in 1864, isn't that right?

So in -- in America, America was already much more filled with historical, political, you see, organized content in 1850 than it was to the outside world. The outside world still saw the discrepancy, the distinction between the two.

Well, you have in the Monroe Doctrine, of course, an attempt to wave the flag over all the continent ahead of time, so to speak. So I have -- my -- my assignment has been to discover at least two situations in American history where the fruits of a -- the war -- intervening war--be it the Mexican War, be it Jackson's war in 1815 against New Orleans, or be it any other of the enter- -- entertakings -- undertakings of this country--where they outran the mentality of the people, the citizens of the country, and the Constitution, and where we therefore have this triangular relation, as I tried to call it, in -- from which we suffer at this moment again, where it takes -- has taken 14 years before the responsibilities of the United States in Berlin are certainly announced to the astonished world.

So far, you have read in the papers in 1950 that we had to back up the Germans. But unfortunately now the organization of the world is such that the Germans cannot be backed up, but the Americans are engaged in -- in Berlin. Everybody is interested in what the Americans do in Berlin. And the mayor of Berlin and the mayor of Bonn, Mr. Adenauer, they are just mayors. And they are not representative of power. And -- and the whole fiction over -- under which the United States at this moment--I think you are still laboring--that -- that our Allies are supported by us. Mr. Eisenhower of course knows very well that at best our Allies support us. That is, we are the mainstay. And they are within our orbit, and they are already forming a part of our responsibility. And the whole thing is in reverse. And that's why -- he desperately says -- calls it "mutual aid," and the lobby at home calls it "foreign aid," in order to make people here still, you see, dream that they live in 1912, and that it's very nice if they had -- give handouts to the rest of the world, when it is a fact that if we have no solidarity with the poor nations of the world, in the true sense of "solidarity," then we are licked. And it doesn't -- will -- won't take a war to lick us, you see. If you think that you can afford to -- to give charities to the poor in the rest of the world, then just -- look at the statistics. We have 40 percent of all the telephones in the world. We have 50 percent of all the riches of the world. And you just think that the -- a -- a country of 200 million people can allow themselves to be in -- in this way, when 3 billion other people go hungry, or have -- have nothing of this? That's just { }.

And this is the situation, that the world is -- is -- is lopsidedly organized. And we are responsible at this moment, just against our will -- totally against our will, but that's the situation. There is a class war between the nations, you see. All what Marx said about labor and capital is ridiculous compared to the problem of India, and China, and the West, you see. There are proletarian nations, and there are capitalist nations, and that's the problem. And the workers, of course, in England, or in France, or in Germany, or in -- in -- in this country, are just as exploiting these -- these others, from the point of view of these masses there in Africa, you see, as the rich. I mean, there is no distinction between labor and capital. All Americans, I, too, and of course everybody here included, we all

exploit in the eyes of the underdog their poverty. That isn't true, by the way, but it looks like it.

And this is what we -- are, so to speak, that is the slander, that is the calumny -- calumny, that is the worry which you and I have now to entertain, that we are already in a wide world with a responsibility which we deny, but which has -- thrust upon us after we destroyed all the colonial powers in -- of Europe, and suddenly have all these Arabs, and African Negroes, and Hindus, and Malayans on our hands. I mean, it -- if you push the -- the Holland -- Dutch out of India, as Mr. Roosevelt did in 19- -- 18- -- in 1945, or if you push the turks out of -- of Palestine, somebody, you see, is responsible, and this can't be the Arabs, and this can't be the Malayans. It's very nice to say -- fir- -- "Live on -- on your own." They can't, obviously.

If you destroy big empires, like Austria, Hungary, and Turkey, and -- or China, somebody has to be the receiver. And unfortunately, the United States are forced in the unvoluntary role of receivership. It's not a very popular situation. But I'm serious about this, that the wars have made these new boundaries. They have created them. And you must understand that wars are irreversible. What has come about by the destruction of the order of society in the two world wars, you see, that all the older holdings of Great Britain, or France, or of Germany--because they've had colonies, too--all Austria-Hungary -- AustriaHungary, you see, was almighty on the Balkans. And in Turkey, the -- the Mari- -- the dollar, the Ma- -- of the empress Maria Theresa, was the currency in all those countries of the Fertile Crescent. You don't even know this.

So the destruction of the structures of this territory has been so total in these two wars. Do you think a country like Lebanon, or a country like Jordan is a country? It -- it -- these are villages. Or Mr. Saud -- Saudi -- this Ibn Saud of Arabia, this bloody tyrant? Where nobody can worship God in his country. No Jewish officer of the American navy is allowed to land in his -- in his -- in his robber-band country. And we take this for granted. That's -- terrible.

So you have everywhere receivership situations, bankrupt countries. They are all members of the United Nations, but they are no nations. -- Take the tyrants in South America. I mean, take the -- take Mr. Trujillo. These are all -- is still all open. It is as open as California was, or New Mexico in -- or Texas in -- in 1836.

So this is the problem that whether you take Guam in 1898 and its very peculiar situation--you know, they have their self-government, but they can't vote for the president of the United States. A very peculiar legislation. A very interesting one. I haven't found why they can't vote for the president of the

United States. Perhaps it's too -- too far away to send the ballot boxes in.

You have all kind, even today, in -- of distinctions in our -- in our possessions. And they just may show you that this has been the constant headache of the United States since 1780. The Manifest Destiny has consisted of this strange discrepancy. In 1898, it was officially called in the legislation of this country the distinction between incorporate territories and non-incorporate territories. You may have heard of the expression. That was officially stated even in -- 1898, that part of the gain of the war couldn't be digested right away. So it was called "nonincorporate territories," which means we haven't made up our mind what to do with it.

And that's exactly this problem. I think it's -- if you go back to my list--and I recommend this very much to you--here is the peace between France and England, you see, in 1776. The 13 colonies annex the whole country down -- up to the -- as far as the Mississippi, including my own state, Vermont. And then you get the situation of 1815, and you get Jackson democracy; the western frontier takes over the political order. Then you get the -- Mexican War, and you get Fort Sumter. You get the World War, and you get the economic crisis and the New Deal.

And so, don't be surprised that at this moment we are faced with the outcome of the Second World War, which you already have forgotten, and of which some of you have not the faintest idea. But it's just upon us. And there is -- all the problems of the so-called summit conference are nothing but the nonconcluded peace of 1945. And in the meantime, you had a -- four cars in every garage, that's all. Or make it '59. I don't care.

So the -- United States have always -- it has always taken 15 years or 14 years after a war to come to grips with the result of the war. Once you see this, your approach to social history may become a little different, because it is not true that simply by living, eating, breathing physically from one astronomical day after another that you can escape history and can skip the past. The skip is -- the past is all the more with you, the more you try to run away with it -- from it. Because nobody has wanted to give a thought, because Mr. Johnson of the American Legion disarmed this country totally in 1948. He was secretary, as you know, of defense. And then we -- we get Korea. That was just a little presentiment, what you do when you try to forget that after a war, you cannot let the boys go home. I told you that my best students stayed in the armed forces on my -- because I pressed them to do so. Then they became of course very, very bitter, because they saw that nobody else did this reasonable thing.

I also told you -- already the story of this -- of this physicist, who is in

Washington with the Carnegie Foundation, who stayed until he had designed the -- the submarine which -- which Mr. Rickover is now using, I mean, over the Pole. Because he said, "After a war, you have to arm for the next war."

I tried to tell you that the -- the ment- -- the -- the mind of the people in this country has never wanted to live through the two extremes of war and peace. But only in alternation, that there -- people were very brutal in wartime indeed, and that they were very sweet and pacifistic in peacetime. But this isn't the problem. You have to be a warrior in peacetime, and you have to be peaceful in wartime. That is the moral problem of mankind, if you want to comprehend the wits of our undertaking as human beings. You have to be chivalrous to your enemy. And you have to treat every enemy as though he was your friend tomorrow, in war. And you have to treat even your -- your own parents in peacetime as such whom you have to leave one day and to cleave to your wife of your choosing. And because no boy wants to do this in this country, there are all these unhappy divorces and unhappy marriages.

But that's war. There is war between the generations in peacetime. And it has to be, has to be declared. And it has to be suffered. And then you can restore peace. There is -- my -- my parents are of course, included in -- in my home when they become the grandparents of my children. That's the way in which you reannex parenthood. But in between, there is a vacancy.

So war in peacetime--between the sexes and between the generations--and chivalry in peace -- in wartime, between the territorial enemies, because you know -- and if you only had known that Ber- -- the mayor of Berlin now is your ally, it would have been much easier to make peace in 1945, wouldn't it -- would've been much simpler to lay out the real story, and to have 25 miles of -- of a strip of -- ribbon of road into this city, I mean. And not to leave it there in the woods, as we -- as Mr. Wynant has done, our negotiator, who has made all this mess. He committed suicide, so peace with him.

He made all the -- I mean, the American negotiators, you see, allowed everything, I mean. They didn't care, you see. This was the enemy: humiliate him, treat him badly. Well, it doesn't help. You -- the enemy of today is the -- is your ally tomorrow. That's the rule of history. And of course the ally of today is the enemy of tomorrow. That's the rule of history, too. But you can only this with a very wide heart. If you do, you must go to war without, you see, throwing overboard your humanity. And I told you of this -- poor boy who -- who left the Episcopal Church when he had to go to war, because he thought he was now a bad boy, anyway, so it didn't matter anymore.

And in this -- most of us, you see, you -- take the cases of violence. The

same boy, the sweetest boy, all of a sudden, he clubs his father on the head and kills him. This is a typical aberration, you see, of two extremes who are irreconcilable. But war and peace are not beyond human understanding. If you -- if you take a man like Robert Lee, or Washington, they are so outstanding because they had this in them, that they were at war and at peace at the same time. Of course, that was Lincoln, too. E- -- all the great Americans had this capacity, this width of feeling. Their -- their heart was always bigger than their mind. You declare war, all right. You have to shoot, all right. But you know that this decision of yours is reversible, that you have to conclude peace. You are superior to the mind which -- the will of victory. There is more in -- in your life than just your own will.

Well, this is all I have to say. I think wherever you find this strange march of American history, that you will feel some kind of reverence and fear--two things--for the future of this country. It has been led in marvelous ways, but at a tremendous cost, because it has had always to pass through this make-up examination. And the Civil War certainly is a proof of what I'm saying, you see. The -- certainly in 19- -- in 1845, the slavery had not become industrialized. There were no hired begetters of Negroes, as you had in the industrial- -- -lizing South, from 1840 to 19- -- 1860. And the rule in this country therefore is that we allow things to get much worse before we allow them to get better. But for our social history, I think, you may put down a law that there is no evolution in history, because things get worse before they get better. They have to get worse before they get better. That is, time is not a straight line. That's your worst superstition at this moment. I find it all over the world. People think, "That's the march of events." Gentlemen, that's only the march of the dispatches in The Mirror, or in The Examiner, or in the Hearst press. You see. They have every day a headline. But they do not con- -- form a continuum.

Real history, as I tried to show you, is quite different. Because of our own blindness, from 1945, we marched happily into the -- prosperity, you see. And now suddenly we are called back, and we have to take another tack. And that's the -- our budget, with $40 billion for armaments. It would be just possible to have $10 billion for armaments and $30 billions for the solidarity with the poor countries. It would be a better budget. And in 20 years from now, you will have to have this budget, because by that time, everybody will know that we can't go to war.

But we -- we'll be starved out, and will be despised if we do not give three-quarters of this military budget for the solidarity with the poor -- poverty in the world. Not because we like it, but be- -- just because that is the global -- the global truth that we must form one wide society. Under this conditions, we may remain the United States in separation, politically. But we have to do something economically.

This budget today is just fantastic. It's -- lopside. But we have to have it, because we are 14 years delayed. If we had kept our armament up in '45, it would -- the whole thing would be in a very different -- it would be in a different situation. We could even s- -- go straight. We can't go straight now. We have to go backward and start again. And actually, what we have with this army budget is nothing but the expense of 1945. And that has taken 14 years, the Eisenhower administration and the Truman administration, to bring this home to the people. In 1948, you see, we had a nice armament budget of $7 billion, I think, you see. That was foolish.

So now gradually we come back to the normal consequence of 1945. Can you see my reasoning, that history is not a straight line, because of human obtuseness? Because we don't obey orders, we have to -- we have to learn. We can only learn by s- -- giving up what we have done wrong, and starting there where we left off, from oblivion. And as long as you believe that every day is later than the previous day, you cannot make any -- wise decisions, and you cannot live in history, because in every moment, three-quarters of the people want to live their own life. And then they are called back into the common stream of life by such necessities.

So if you allow me to say this, gentlemen, the difference between peace and war is that war are -- wars are phylogenetic events. That is, the whole race is called to order at the sacrifice of life of the living generation. It's a phylogenetic event. And the other -- I mean, if I use these strange words from zoology--that's an ontogenetic -- event. That is, in your individual -- in peacetime, you live your individual life. Now if in the ontogenetic existence of your own life from -- from birth to death, you obey the orders of the race, and you consider that you are only one generation in many, the phylogenetic problem doesn't arise. You are at the same time, as I said, warrior and -- and pacifist, you see.

And therefore wars are only inevitable when we in peace, the civilian -- in civilian life defy this and say, "We are just ourselves. We are self-made men." When this was rampant in the United States, the Admiral Mahan, who wrote the famous book, Sea Power, you may -- must have heard his name. Who has not heard Mahan's name? I'm interested. Everybody. You have not? Well, he wrote the famous book Sea Power which made the United States navy-conscious.

But this was a -- a great man. He had of course, as many sold- -- as many educated soldiers, the insight into this interplay of peace and war. So he said, "There is no self-made man in the kingdom of Heaven." And I recommend this word to you, because it's a very important word. It connects 18th-century America once more with 19th-century America. In the 19th century, everybody was thought of as a self-made man. But Mahan, perhaps still of course in the tradition

of the 18- -- of the 18th century and 17th century in this country, and so he wisely said, "In the kingdom of Heaven, there is no self-made man. There we depend on guidance. There we cannot do our own will. There our own purposes fall short of what we have to do."

And "there is no self-made man in the kingdom of Heaven" is a kind of -- of encouragement that the 18th-century American -- the members of the free churches of this country, and the soldiers, and Marines, and naval men of the 19th century see eye to eye in the pro- -- in the task to be at peace in wartime, and to be at war in peacetime. In order to flatten out the curve between phylogenetic events, these are--we call them wars, or you call them bloody revolutions, or you call them anarchy, you call them catastrophes--all the phylogenetic events, you see, call us to order after we have gone astray. And it isn't necessary to wait for a war to set your house in order.

But history doesn't march in a straight line. If you look at this, it's zigzagging, you see. This is how it goes. Now I don't care for the scheme, whatever geometrical figure you use. But I tell you one secret: God has not created geometry. No real life, no real time has anything to do with straight lines, or corners, or points. These are all just the imperfections of the human mind. Two hundred years ago, the geometers were so proud that they thought that God was a -- a -- so to speak, asked us to do everything geometrically. I warn you against this. God created round bosoms, and four limbs, and -- unevennesses. Not two eyes -- your -- the left eye are not even equal. They are not alike. They are different. They differ. God hates geometry for life. Geometry is murderous. And all the ideas of Mr. D‚scartes, that -- or -- or Spinoza, that you should have an ethics -- on the lines of geometry, I think, have destroyed all human society. Geometry is of our mind. It's an imperfection of our mind, because we have to simplify matters. But reality knows nothing of lines of -- an -- and -- and -- and -- and planes, and points. They all -- there is always extension.

And therefore, time is rhythmical. The problem of the fullness of time is today with us. I told the students in the seminar--may repeat it here, you see--what we are faced with today is the problem of the fact that you and I -- we can only live in rhythms. You can have day and night. But you can't have 24 hours. Your illusion is -- a worker who works in shifts, you see, is a miserable creature, if he has to work at night rega- -- anybody -- who has worked in the night shift? Then you know something about it, isn't that --?

The 24-hour day, you see, is the greatest intrusion of geometrical and physicists' time into our existence. And we haven't solved yet the consequences of this. And I'm going -- the second half of this course of course will have to do with this intrusion into humanity. In the -- from 1850 to this day, we have al-

lowed subhuman judgments of time and space to creep into our existence. I tried to tell you that down to 1850, we have dissolved "the people" into "the public." And now I'm going to show you after Easter that from 1850 on, the problems of the subdivision of the individual, the atomization, the breaking-apart, the nervous breakdown, all these problems are now besetting us. That is, the units below the individual. How happy we would be if we were still rugged individuals. But we are much less than individuals. We are just patches of nerves -- bundles of nerves. We are -- have breakdowns. We have al- -- aliases. We are smaller than the individual. And this is the labor problem. This is the Negro problem. This is the problem of the husband in the house with an overbearing wife. This is the problem everywhere today that -- we would be very happy indeed if we were proud individuals. But just -- we aren't. We are much less than individuals. You have psychoanalysis to prove it to you. We are scattered, shattered, destroyed. We are less than units. A man who today is a complete unity -- well, he is a rarity. Ninety-nine of the people I meet, you see, are -- have -- are -- have schizophrenia. That is, they are below the individual.

We have to go into this. That's the second -- will be the second half of the course. Today in -- in between I will have to show you the desperate rear-guard action of the churches in the first half of the 19th century by trying to remain the people. This -- Unitarians, I told you already, Mr. Channing leading, admitted that the audience in a church might just as well be treated as the lecture-hall audience. The body of Christ was no longer present in the Church. There were just thousand visitors. They count now today how many people come to church on a Sunday. It's statistics. Now that's a public. It has nothing to do with a church people.

If you go to Dorchester, in Massachusetts, where the Adams family worshiped, there you have still in 1780 a church built with the most wonderful architecture. But because it is so wonderful, it is of course in no book on art. It's not considered great art. Yet I think it's the finest art. It's -- can compete in its perfection with any cathedral. And what do you see in this church in Dorchester? A wide room cut out opposite from this room. That is, wider, broader than deep. And for -- I -- should say for a congregation perhaps of 400. And in this wide hall here, there is high up a trem- -- a majestic Bible, opened, at the pul- -- pulpit. And this -- under this word of God, the congregation down there gathers every Sunday. And the meaning is that they will be, through the word of God, through the Bible, organized into the body of Christ, and will forget themselves, and will come to church not as private people who choose to go to church for hearing a good sermon, or for -- being seen for their spring dress, but because they have to tran- -- be transformed into something they cannot be on weekdays, because they are alone, into members of this body of Christ.

That is in -- the 18th century still possible in this country that an -- an architect or whoever it was--a builder, a contractor--got the spirit of the whole experience of the Pilgrim fathers through 150 years, and was so inspired that he built a building that may very well in my estimation compete with Chartres and all the Gothic cathedrals in the world, because it gives expression to belief. And wherever you have true belief, you find expression. And there is something. But of course, our modern idea is that individuals go to church. Well, of course that's not a church. As I said, that's a lecture hall.

So we -- the desperate step from 1780 to 1850 of the low-brows to keep their people's church will have to be told. I have -- will have -- we'll have to be brief. But it is of course culminating in the Mormon enterprise. The Mormons are the last enterprise to have a church people, you see, as a people. And as you know, they are still very strong, and are proselytizing. And it is very interesting that in Mr. Channing's bailiwick in Cambridge, right opposite the Episcopal Seminar there is now the huge, Mormon church, in the heart of -- right across from Longfellow House. Now if you had told anybody a hundred years ago in Massachusetts that this was going to happen, I think they might have emigrated.

So this defense action of the good people who didn't -- saw what had happened in this transformation between people to public, in these movements of Prohibition, Abolition, suffrage, vegetarianism, and what-not, this -- this disintegration, are still partly with us. And I tell you, frankly I have great respect for this effort. And I think 150 years ago, I would have been found on the side of these people who tried to remain people, and not to go public.

But it's all over now. We are now between the individual and the subindividual. And so I like to give you at this moment a -- a picture of what the United States have become in 1850 in the membership of the nations of the western -- civilized world. By 1850, the U- -- Amer- -- people of the American -- United States have become a function, or were beginning to play a role in the western world which I think is still played by this country, and which, of course, from the inside of the United States may not be very visible, but which is very important, and I think on the whole--as all division of labor between nations--very important to understand. You see, nations are not 66 or 81 in the United Nations. But the Italians, or the French, and the Germans have of course every one a function to fulfill. They -- they contribute something which no- -- -body else contributes. The English contribute their Queen Elizabeth. What would -- where would America be without Queen Elizabeth?

That is, we borrow from other countries certain mental functions. And the division of labor of the nations of the western world has reached -- has -- has, so to speak, included the people of the United States in the very moment when they

were transformed into the public on the marketplace, or in the lecture hall, or in the elections.

And so it wouldn't be right to say that in 18- -- 1750, the United -- the people of the United States played a great part in the affairs of the rest of the world. The men -- you know who was the only man read widely in -- in -- in Europe, in the middle of the 18th century? Does anybody know? There was one author who was highly appreciated in -- in Europe.




In the 18th century, in 1750. Yes, Jonathan Edwards. Jonathan Edwards. He was considered a very great mind in Europe, and in England, and in Scotland even, where they're all -- very deep. It was -- is very different since 1850.

In the life of the Greek mind, of the mind of the student--as you are students, you see--there are four phases through which -- every experience of the mind migrates. You have the inspiration. Let me call it better not { }. You organize it into a body of scientists or of thinkers. You educate people in this. And finally it becomes commonplace and is known to everybody. Everybody today knows that Coper- -- what Copernicus taught in 1542, you see, that the earth was -- circling around the sun. Today this is a commonplace. When it came to the man, it was inspiration. It took women's rights -- all the movements for which we are spoken -- it took a hundred years before Prohibition was proclaimed as the 18th Amendment. But I told you that in 1816, there were some good people who simply -- suddenly had the idea, the inspiration that they should go beyond temperance and prohibit the drinking -- the -- the production of liquor, which was quite unheard-of before that time, you see. It takes a hundred years at least--I think it takes usually 120 or 130 years--before an inspiration becomes commonplace.

Now the various nations of the western world have adopted a different attitude to these various ways of the spirit, or phases of the spirit. The French are sanctifying the idea, the inspiration. That is, to them, a man is an outstanding man and is mentioned as a writer, or as a thinker, and is worshiped if he has a new idea that is not understood by the rest of the world. That makes -- just breaks in like dawn in the morning for the first time, novelty in the sense also of not to be understood. Whether you take Picasso, or whether you take Pasteur, or whether you take any -- Voltaire, the suffering of the he- -- genius is to them the

natural situation of inspiration. He is in the minority not only; he is alone.

And this is then the phase which is represented in the whole system of Paris. Where you have hotbeds in the salons of Paris, genius is cultivated and is allowed to live as an oddity; and it doesn't matter whether he is a best-seller. Nobody in France would ever think that genius can be a best-seller. That's a contradiction in terms. And if you here pervert the process and judge everybody according to the question: "Is he a best-seller?" you can't get genius. You can get best-sellers. But I would doubt that any decent man can be a best-seller in his own lifetime. Then {he can't} be very good.

You know this piano player from this -- from Kentucky who went to Warsaw and got the -- the prize in music? You may have heard of him. He was then invited by the Polish ambassador in Washington, and the Polish ambassador obliged the senators of Kentucky to come there, too. And they were perfectly helpless and came, and said that to the ambassador, the Polish ambassador, "He's very good, is he?" "He's very good, is he?" of their own countryman in Kentucky, you see.

Well, that's the true situation of genius. And in France, that's accepted. Nobody thinks that the provinces of France are more -- less parochial and provincial than we are, in any country. But the lady in the salon in France comforts Victor Hugo, or Baudelaire, or Verlaine, or Sartre, and says, "Don't worry. They'll come around. A hundred years from now, you'll be famous. And in the meantime, I will be very good to you." And -- and so the -- the {hegerea}, as it is called in old Roman tradition, or these -- or the H‚loise will comfort her Ab‚lard, but the world will not. And they will not believe -- expect this, you see.

Now in England -- in -- in Germany, it's very difficult -- very different. There you -- as you know -- this is a very popish country, and a very professorial country, and there all thoughts must be systematized, as you have seen in time now with Mr. Paul Tillich. He's a typical German professor. And he is on organized thought. And that's a community of colleagues; it's a faculty. And that's not the solitude of the genius as in France that is cultivated and normal in Germany, but the organization of work. The -- the collaboration of several people who do not care that the -- again that the common man doesn't understand. They are high-brow. And instead of "genius," I would prefer -- propose that the word "high-brow" may be used, because that is very important in America, you see. The Lutherans were all high-brow. And the -- this country stands against the German Reformation, in -- in every feature of its existence, because the -- in the 17th century, the Lutherans represented King James I of England, you see, and the ways of the Episco- -- Anglican Church. And so this country threw out highbrowness, Oxford and Cambridge, et cetera. And -- and in the same sense, I -- on

the other hand the Germans have clung to this high-browishness.

And when -- I -- I was very proud as an American citizen now, when I returned and delivered a speech for a -- two months ago in -- in Germany for a large audience, I -- they came up to me, and said, "But you spoke as though you were really talking to us."

And I said, "What else can I do?"

And they felt that was quite extraordinary, because you have to read a book, instead of delivering a speech, you see, when you are a German professor.

So bookishness is -- high-browishness or organized collegial thinking, seminar thinking, group thinking--which is like a hedgehog, turned inside and esoteric--that is very much the ivory-tower idea of German science and scholarship. If you go to England, it is very different. Any decent Englishman has to conceal that he's working. He has an attach‚ case where I have a briefcase, you see. This looks like work, but an attach‚ case, you see, looks as though you had a weekend, a free weekend, and went hunting. And I have -- however have found out that in such attach‚ cases there was just nothing else but books. But it looked as though they were gentlemen. That is, education in England, in Oxford and Cambridge, is stronger than high-browishness, and -- priggishness, and learnedness, and bookishness. You must never show in England when you are an educated person that you work, but that you are in style, that you are an educated man. And of course you go to Boston, you have it even better, because Boston is of course super, super Oxford.

That is, the New England and the England have taken the stage in which thought reaches this third phase of a -- being a means to educate a man. And the fourth phase -- when it reaches the public, when it -- you can buy a little book, Greek within Half an Hour, Mathematics for the Millions, you see, then we are in the realm of the public, of the best-seller, and of the paperbound book, and of everybody, you see, everybody a millionaire, everybody a philosopher, everybody everything.

Now all these phases are inevitable. And they are all indispensable. And I'm not poking fun at any one of them, but I want you to know that as nations, the English, the French, the Germans, and the Americans occupy or allow their people to occupy a specific place in this representative march of thought through the body politic of the western world. And it is very important for you to understand that nations are not sovereign entities, but they are also functional members of a process. And without the French salon, with its new ideas, and without the English educated men, and without the German scholarship, whose diction-

aries all of you use, whether you use an English -- whether you use a Greek dictionary, the so-called Scott { }, you see, that's just a jaw- -- of German {vintage}. All the big -- all the boring, learned works usually come from Leipzig.

Dictionaries, for example. And the -- these four phases now occupy a different length of time in a ma- -- person's life. You can -- no commonplace truths, popular truths, by buying a book and reading it through, let's say within an hour, or within a day, or within a week. That is, these four phases can be distributed as meaning that they demand a different amount of time in the life of the individual. The inspired genius, as Jesus, or Socrates, or Newton--who saw the apple fall, as you know--is total. That is, all his life, from birth to death, is dedicated to this inspiration. All great innovations -- have been -- allow me one more moment, please, to finish this, the argument once, so that you can think about it. I don't want to forget you this. And don't think that this is an abstraction. You can see that an Englishman spends four years in Oxford, and lives there, and that makes him an educated man. It just -- it should be the same with you in a liberal arts college. That's giving -- getting an education. It takes four years of your life. To be a scholar, or an artist takes half of your life. You decide at 20 or 25 to become this, a doctor; then you are for the rest of your life, you see. This means that half of your life is spent in the form of organized thinking, be it science or art. This takes four years--or three years, or six years, I mean; it takes the time in -- during which you are educated, get an education. This takes, as I say, a day, or a week, or an hour. And this takes a whole life.

That is, if you look at the great men of -- from whom a new chapter in history begins of -- of the spirit, their upbringing, their dependency on -- on the environment is -- all is melted into the process of -- of every thing they make use. Childhood, parents, enemies, everything. If you -- I could give you -- I have given in a book on this great story of the human spirit, examples to show you that a new faith only can come about when there are people who -- who become the vintage, with every ounce of their existence, of this new plantation.

And so the whole life guarantees a -- a true inspiration. Or -- makes a man a genius. This makes a man a pro- -- a professional, that he gives half his life by the choice of his profession to become a good doctor, or a good -- good technician, or whatever it is. This makes a man an educated man, and this makes a man somebody who -- who is able to know everything that goes on, of everything a little and -- but therefore can keep company with all the professional men, you see, and can understand them. It's the public that supports him, you see, and can be -- can be taken into the confidence, so to speak, that can pass a -- a judgment on the achievements and contributions of these various mental contributions and gifts. We need them all.

Now it is strange that in 1850, the people of the United States were ready to step into this breach and to form this popular public, or this general public, which did not exist in the other countries to that extent, because not -- there was no egalitarian situation, you see, and not everybody was asked to share in the fruits of the spirit. And I think that has a greatness and -- you are never told this, because obviously -- I don't know why. The division of labor between the nations seems to be too serious or too difficult a business to be ever at -- even mentioned in political science, or the history of art, or in anything. But that's the foundation of our existence. That's the reason why the United States at this moment do need western Germany, and -- England, and France, and Italy, and Spain. -- Europe is still a part of your way of life.

And we have to speak about this then on Friday.